F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
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please stop dancing, you made a big claim repeatedly through this
now either show this USN statement or retract your claim
""The USN state that within 5 years the stealth capability of the F-35 will be insufficient to penetrate modern AD systems without EW support"
"sensors will start to circumvent stealth" in the future.
"The rapid expansion of computing power also ushers in new sensors and methods that will make stealth and its advantages increasingly difficult to maintain," Adm. Greenert wrote in July. "It is time to consider shifting our focus from platforms that rely solely on stealth."
"The rapid expansion of computing power also ushers in new sensors and methods that will make stealth and its advantages increasingly difficult to maintain," Adm. Greenert wrote in July. "It is time to consider shifting our focus from platforms that rely solely on stealth."
PS, this ,already widely known principle,could mean very bad news for all things stealth and also bad news for jammer technology
Quantum Imaging Technique Heralds Unjammable Aircraft Detection | MIT Technology Review
Quantum Imaging Technique Heralds Unjammable Aircraft Detection
Physicists have exploited the quantum properties of photons to create the first imaging system that is unjammable
Physicists have exploited the quantum properties of photons to create the first imaging system that is unjammable
Last edited by kbrockman; 13th Feb 2013 at 08:41.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
I know a lot of people out there don't like or trust Carlo Kopp's analyses and think he has an agenda, but he knows his subject and does his research. I haven't seen many challenge his facts, only his conclusions. In which case this paper reveals a lot about the capability of the F-35 stealth against double digit SAW systems. 3 years old but the design hasn't changed.
Assessing Joint Strike Fighter Defence Penetration Capabilities
Assessing Joint Strike Fighter Defence Penetration Capabilities
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ORAC, getting desperate now when you have to drag out clown club as a source..
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_...sions/sub8.pdf
APA (represented by Messrs Goon and Mr Kopp) and RepSim (represented by Mr Mike
Price) are mainly critical of F-35 cost estimates and capabilities, and in their testimony, made several errors of fact and misrepresentations about F-35 capability.
As neither APA nor RepSim have access to the detailed classified F-35 data, their analysis is basically flawed through incorrect assumptions and lack of knowledge of classified F-35 performance information. Without this knowledge, APA and RepSim can only speculate on the F-35's capabilities and its ability to counter extant and evolving threats.... is inconsistent with years of detailed analysis undertaken by Defence, the JSF Program Office, Lockheed Martin and the eight other F-35 partner nations.
does this mean you don't have a link and just made up "The USN state that within 5 years the stealth capability of the F-35 will be insufficient to penetrate modern AD systems without EW support"
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_...sions/sub8.pdf
APA (represented by Messrs Goon and Mr Kopp) and RepSim (represented by Mr Mike
Price) are mainly critical of F-35 cost estimates and capabilities, and in their testimony, made several errors of fact and misrepresentations about F-35 capability.
As neither APA nor RepSim have access to the detailed classified F-35 data, their analysis is basically flawed through incorrect assumptions and lack of knowledge of classified F-35 performance information. Without this knowledge, APA and RepSim can only speculate on the F-35's capabilities and its ability to counter extant and evolving threats.... is inconsistent with years of detailed analysis undertaken by Defence, the JSF Program Office, Lockheed Martin and the eight other F-35 partner nations.
does this mean you don't have a link and just made up "The USN state that within 5 years the stealth capability of the F-35 will be insufficient to penetrate modern AD systems without EW support"
Last edited by JSFfan; 13th Feb 2013 at 11:45.
If you have any concerns that the mere existence of LO aircraft around the globe may drive threat system designers to use different bits of the RF spectrum sometime in the next few decades, then you need to have the next bit of the countermeasures cycle ready - and in your weight growth and signature budget.
"Stealth" was a means of dealing with the problem in the 1970's and 1980's era tech of radar coverage of target areas, its intent being that "the bomber always get through." The tech had been in development for some time, yet by the time B-2 was fielded, the setting for which the requirement was established had morphed considerably. Fortunately, B-2 retained for a while some distinct advantages as a delivery platform versus a certain class of air defense architectures.
If military hardware history tells us anything, it tells us about technological advance/edge, counter, counter counter, and so on. (Granted, submarines are still about the best "stealth" platform yet to be put into the field, but they are not aircraft.)
It should not surprise us at all that between R & D, advances in math, and advances in computing power that a "counter" to stealth is at least in the works if not in a prototype stage.
This brings me back to JSF and B-2. B-2 was stealthy and in the field twenty years before JSF can hope to be IOC. The old saw about "building kit to fight the last few wars" screams at me.
As I don't know enough else about F-35 I won't comment, but that is the basket into which we (in the US) chose to put our eggs in the late 1990's. It's been the Fargin elephant in the defense acquisition room for nearly twenty years.
It has foreclosed, due to its budgetary impact, programs like Comanche and a field artillery system that other services ran up the flag pole. Bang for buck, we aren't sure what we'll really get.
It is the V-22 Osprey, second edition, with afterburner. (As a program).
Until it goes out into the field and operates, I'd not blame anyone, particularly a nation with a modest defense budget, for being massively skeptical about its bang for buck payoff as a core weapons system in the combined arms kit a given MoD has and maintains.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 13th Feb 2013 at 12:22.
A few basics on Kopp's comments:
It is widely agreed (including by LockMart) that outer mold line is the principal driver of aircraft signature in the frequencies of greatest concern.
The most basic calculations of RCS are a product of Maxwell's equations and Ufimtsev's Theory of Physical Diffraction. Neither of these things are classified.
The limfac into the 1970s was the ability to model complex shapes and curves with reasonable confidence - that is, one would know that the model stuck on the pole would not have unexpected signature. The F-117 was made possible by working both ends of the problem: increasing computing capacity with hardware and software, and simplifying the calculation by using an all-planar shape.
Clearly, the computer hardware problem is no longer a limfac, nor does one need to see anything secret to write an RCS-estimation program or develop an accurate wireframe.
Materials are important but still have less impact on overall RCS than shaping, particularly at stealth-fighter levels. Mostly, what they do is take care of edges, apertures, holes and doors and other discontinuities. (If we could achieve all-round broadband - 30dbsm with RAM, we'd do it.)
LockMart and others have been careful to criticize Kopp for not having access to the classified details (no
, Sherlock) but have not said (a) that he's wrong or (b) that F-35 RCS is equivalent to F-22.
Subject to the Rice-Davies Stipulation, it should be noted that competitors have come to the same conclusions as Kopp, broadly speaking.
It is widely agreed (including by LockMart) that outer mold line is the principal driver of aircraft signature in the frequencies of greatest concern.
The most basic calculations of RCS are a product of Maxwell's equations and Ufimtsev's Theory of Physical Diffraction. Neither of these things are classified.
The limfac into the 1970s was the ability to model complex shapes and curves with reasonable confidence - that is, one would know that the model stuck on the pole would not have unexpected signature. The F-117 was made possible by working both ends of the problem: increasing computing capacity with hardware and software, and simplifying the calculation by using an all-planar shape.
Clearly, the computer hardware problem is no longer a limfac, nor does one need to see anything secret to write an RCS-estimation program or develop an accurate wireframe.
Materials are important but still have less impact on overall RCS than shaping, particularly at stealth-fighter levels. Mostly, what they do is take care of edges, apertures, holes and doors and other discontinuities. (If we could achieve all-round broadband - 30dbsm with RAM, we'd do it.)
LockMart and others have been careful to criticize Kopp for not having access to the classified details (no
, Sherlock) but have not said (a) that he's wrong or (b) that F-35 RCS is equivalent to F-22.Subject to the Rice-Davies Stipulation, it should be noted that competitors have come to the same conclusions as Kopp, broadly speaking.
Last edited by LowObservable; 13th Feb 2013 at 15:31.
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what part of "clown club are clueless morons" didn't you understand?
As a constrained by politeness ADF statement, this is damming
APA's criticisms of the F-35's aerodynamic performance and stealth capabilities, and
their claim that the F-35 will not be competitive in 2020, is inconsistent with years of
detailed analysis undertaken by Defence, the JSF Program Office, Lockheed Martin and
the eight other F-35 partner nations.
7. To comprehensively rebut many of APA's assertions in regard to F-35 performance would
require release of highly sensitive U.S. data. As neither APA nor RepSim have access to
the detailed classified F-35 data, their analysis is basically flawed through incorrect
assumptions and lack of knowledge of classified F-35 performance information. Without
this knowledge, APA and RepSim can only speculate on the F-35's capabilities and its
ability to counter extant and evolving threats.
@Lonewolf_50, any chance you can flick an email to russia, china and a dozen countries in the EU and abroad that are developing VLO 5th and 6th gen to not waste their time
As a constrained by politeness ADF statement, this is damming
APA's criticisms of the F-35's aerodynamic performance and stealth capabilities, and
their claim that the F-35 will not be competitive in 2020, is inconsistent with years of
detailed analysis undertaken by Defence, the JSF Program Office, Lockheed Martin and
the eight other F-35 partner nations.
7. To comprehensively rebut many of APA's assertions in regard to F-35 performance would
require release of highly sensitive U.S. data. As neither APA nor RepSim have access to
the detailed classified F-35 data, their analysis is basically flawed through incorrect
assumptions and lack of knowledge of classified F-35 performance information. Without
this knowledge, APA and RepSim can only speculate on the F-35's capabilities and its
ability to counter extant and evolving threats.
@Lonewolf_50, any chance you can flick an email to russia, china and a dozen countries in the EU and abroad that are developing VLO 5th and 6th gen to not waste their time
Last edited by JSFfan; 13th Feb 2013 at 14:08.
JSFfan,
You're behaving like a petulent child now. No here is having a go at you, just expressing opinions about a possible future platform. Or is JSF really a matter of life and death to you for some reason?
You're behaving like a petulent child now. No here is having a go at you, just expressing opinions about a possible future platform. Or is JSF really a matter of life and death to you for some reason?
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I am some what reluctant to jump into this discussion, but since the merits of signature reduction have been raised I thought I would add this.
RF “stealth” does not make an aircraft “invisible” and it never has. What signature reduction does is to make an aircraft more difficult to detect in a given frequency range. In the air-to-air arena the radars are generally in the X to Ka-bands because of the need for a smaller antenna to fit on a fighter aircraft (leaving out AWACS for the time being). These bands require a set of materials and shaping which is characterized by the F-22.
In the air-to-ground arena these higher frequency bands are associated with mobile SAM radars for same size reason in that they are easy to move around and have very good range resolution. This is where the F-117 was optimized and where the F-22 is also fairly good.
Now you also have the lower frequency bands associated with the long range, high power, search radars which feed cueing information to the shooters and allow them to be more effective by only have to look at a particular sector of their firing area. These lower frequency bands require a set of materials and shaping which is characterized by the B-2. The F-22/F-35 are not that good in this arena. And most operational tests against SAM systems assume a cued system giving the shooters the best chance for an engagement.
Then there is the issue of IR detection which can be reduced in the mid-wave with materials as the detected energy is primarily reflected energy. However signature reduction is very difficult to do in the long wave where skin heating is the primary source of the energy detected. As a target, the only good news is the IRST systems do not track in range but only in azimuth. While there are ways of passive ranging a target they mostly rely on a non-maneuvering target.
The conclusion is that for every aircraft a decision must be made as to whether the cost of signature reduction and the advantage it creates in the combat arena are worth the cost in design and maintenance. RF signature reduction in air-to-air still reduces the range at which most fighters can detect and range on a target. For some manufactures, however, the advantage of stealth has been over stated.
RF “stealth” does not make an aircraft “invisible” and it never has. What signature reduction does is to make an aircraft more difficult to detect in a given frequency range. In the air-to-air arena the radars are generally in the X to Ka-bands because of the need for a smaller antenna to fit on a fighter aircraft (leaving out AWACS for the time being). These bands require a set of materials and shaping which is characterized by the F-22.
In the air-to-ground arena these higher frequency bands are associated with mobile SAM radars for same size reason in that they are easy to move around and have very good range resolution. This is where the F-117 was optimized and where the F-22 is also fairly good.
Now you also have the lower frequency bands associated with the long range, high power, search radars which feed cueing information to the shooters and allow them to be more effective by only have to look at a particular sector of their firing area. These lower frequency bands require a set of materials and shaping which is characterized by the B-2. The F-22/F-35 are not that good in this arena. And most operational tests against SAM systems assume a cued system giving the shooters the best chance for an engagement.
Then there is the issue of IR detection which can be reduced in the mid-wave with materials as the detected energy is primarily reflected energy. However signature reduction is very difficult to do in the long wave where skin heating is the primary source of the energy detected. As a target, the only good news is the IRST systems do not track in range but only in azimuth. While there are ways of passive ranging a target they mostly rely on a non-maneuvering target.
The conclusion is that for every aircraft a decision must be made as to whether the cost of signature reduction and the advantage it creates in the combat arena are worth the cost in design and maintenance. RF signature reduction in air-to-air still reduces the range at which most fighters can detect and range on a target. For some manufactures, however, the advantage of stealth has been over stated.
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decision must be made as to whether the cost of signature reduction and the advantage it creates in the combat arena are worth the cost in design and maintenance.
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I think that a number of countries must be considering not just the undefined cost of acquisition of the F35 but also the unquantified cost of operation for the F35 when it arrives, in the mean time they have to cover the not inconsequential cost of keeping their "legacy" fleets airworthy.
I am surprised that more countries have not gone the way of the RAAF.
I am surprised that more countries have not gone the way of the RAAF.
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Bevo
Thank you. At last an educational unbiased post by somebody who knows what they are talking about.
Thank you. At last an educational unbiased post by somebody who knows what they are talking about.
Last edited by John Farley; 13th Feb 2013 at 16:33.
@Lonewolf_50, any chance you can flick an email to russia, china and a dozen countries in the EU and abroad that are developing VLO 5th and 6th gen to not waste their time
Their production costs are a fraction of ours. That is an economic edge they'll have for another generation at least. Whether or not their designs, manufacturing, and maintenance standards are up to 5 and 6 gen fielding and operations is an unknown. But the effort is being put forth, and there are decent brains in those design houses as well.
On to more substantial matters.
Then there is the issue of IR detection which can be reduced in the mid-wave with materials as the detected energy is primarily reflected energy. However signature reduction is very difficult to do in the long wave where skin heating is the primary source of the energy detected.
As a target, the only good news is the IRST systems do not track in range but only in azimuth. While there are ways of passive ranging a target they mostly rely on a non-maneuvering target.
The conclusion is that for every aircraft a decision must be made as to whether the cost of signature reduction and the advantage it creates in the combat arena are worth the cost in design and maintenance. RF signature reduction in air-to-air still reduces the range at which most fighters can detect and range on a target. For some manufactures, however, the advantage of stealth has been over stated.
The war better be "short" and each loss hurts the operational commander a lot. As a defense planner, is that giving you the bang for your defense buck that you think you are paying for?
I think many [most?] are just balking at cost plain and simple.
I don't think you'll be able to do simple sheet metal bending to repair or return to service the fancier and fancier geometries of composites used in these elegant aircraft designs.
Has that recurring cost been fairly assessed?
I suspect those costs, which we'd typically cover with "Operations and Maintenance" funds in annual appropriations, are going to surprise some folks. The smaller your military establishment, the bigger the sticker shock when those numbers skew out of conservative forecasts.
When will we know if JSF works? When will we know if we get a good bank for that buck? And if we don't, what is Plan B?
There isn't one, on this side of the pond, and there isn't the money to have one. The money has already been consumed by the 800 pound acquisition gorilla. Brer Rabbit has at least one foot in the tab baby, and my be about to kick it again.
The "High Low mix" myth isn't even a viable position to advocate. "Either or" has disappeared. By IOC, all eggs are in one basket, no turning back.
OBTW: that "rosy picture" is for the best funded military establishment on the planet.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 13th Feb 2013 at 17:07.
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Bevo, it's like a game of snakes and ladders, ever evolving.
just to add to what you said
the JORN would be a good example of what a long range radar can do, it's said to be a world leader, but LO materials move on too
Patent US20100271253 - CNT-BASED SIGNATURE CONTROL MATERIAL - Google Patents
it seems LM has access to computer controlled, radar multi-band frequency nanocomposites, the evolving game goes on
just to add to what you said
the JORN would be a good example of what a long range radar can do, it's said to be a world leader, but LO materials move on too
Patent US20100271253 - CNT-BASED SIGNATURE CONTROL MATERIAL - Google Patents
it seems LM has access to computer controlled, radar multi-band frequency nanocomposites, the evolving game goes on
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Head of DSTO in Australia made a very public comment in 1999 that stealth was a decaying asset in capability terms, and especially in the air-to-surface role. I thought that was a very perceptive and, especially in Canberra at that time, highly contentious comment. I sided with him then, and down the track nothing persuades me otherwise.
Last edited by cuefaye; 13th Feb 2013 at 22:25.
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One cannot outfox physics. 
Last edited by JSFfan; 13th Feb 2013 at 23:37.
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An update from Holland,
JSF Nieuws.nl » Dutch F-35 IOT&E and the reliability of the US Government
Also, the institute Clingendael, the most influential study bureau in Holland has just come out with a very critical rapport on the JSF and the effects it will have on the Dutch DoD.
Clingendael: krijgsmacht mét JSF minst aantrekkelijke toekomstscenario :: nrc.nl
Situation 2008: promises
In the MOU, signed by Dutch secretary of state Jack de Vries on the 30th of May 2008, we can find in paragraph 5.2.4:
“ The NL MOD share of the Financial Cost Ceiling is 30M TY U.S, dollars. The NL MOD Non-financial Cost contribution includes, but is not limited to, munitions, use of two (2) JSF Air Systems, and the services of trained personnel for IOT&E efforts.”
The planning was that the IOT&E would take place from mid-2012 until mid-2014, 2 years, separated in a Block 2 and a Block 3 part.
Situation 2013: deception
This week the Dutch parliament received a surprising letter, telling the members of parliament:
- The cost ceiling will be broken, cost of IOT&E participation will be about € 54 million (US$ 73 million)
- The IOT&E will take 4 years, not 2 years
- The IOT&E planning is now from 2015 until 2018, however it may be a little later
- The two Dutch F-35s can not be used until that moment (2015)
- We have to pay “parking costs” several millions a year
We could have bought the Dutch F-35As some years later, now we bought potential “hangar queens” from the much more expensive, early LRIP3 and LRIP4 series (having saved about US$ 100 million). We invested over US$ 250 million in these two planes, that will be parked for several years, useless investment by a country with a defence budget under high pressure.
In the MOU, signed by Dutch secretary of state Jack de Vries on the 30th of May 2008, we can find in paragraph 5.2.4:
“ The NL MOD share of the Financial Cost Ceiling is 30M TY U.S, dollars. The NL MOD Non-financial Cost contribution includes, but is not limited to, munitions, use of two (2) JSF Air Systems, and the services of trained personnel for IOT&E efforts.”
The planning was that the IOT&E would take place from mid-2012 until mid-2014, 2 years, separated in a Block 2 and a Block 3 part.
Situation 2013: deception
This week the Dutch parliament received a surprising letter, telling the members of parliament:
- The cost ceiling will be broken, cost of IOT&E participation will be about € 54 million (US$ 73 million)
- The IOT&E will take 4 years, not 2 years
- The IOT&E planning is now from 2015 until 2018, however it may be a little later
- The two Dutch F-35s can not be used until that moment (2015)
- We have to pay “parking costs” several millions a year
We could have bought the Dutch F-35As some years later, now we bought potential “hangar queens” from the much more expensive, early LRIP3 and LRIP4 series (having saved about US$ 100 million). We invested over US$ 250 million in these two planes, that will be parked for several years, useless investment by a country with a defence budget under high pressure.
Also, the institute Clingendael, the most influential study bureau in Holland has just come out with a very critical rapport on the JSF and the effects it will have on the Dutch DoD.
Clingendael: krijgsmacht mét JSF minst aantrekkelijke toekomstscenario :: nrc.nl
ken, does this remind anyone of the NH-90 program? 
That sobering letter ought ot raise as many flags in Washington as it does in Amsterdam.
That sobering letter ought ot raise as many flags in Washington as it does in Amsterdam.