F-35 Cancelled, then what ?

[PhilipG]

With the USN deferring its purchase of F35Cs does this mean that the US Marines will have the first deployable squadron of them for a CVN?

[ORAC]

The worry, GK, is if this is the start of the "Cost Death Spiral". The vain hope is that, "The JSF Program Office..... expects the Navy’s cutbacks to be offset by international JSF procurements.” In fact, the international customers are also deferring their orders awaiting the mirage of price reductions as production ramps up - and always the cost creeps up..

LM can always hope more money will be provided, but the USN is cutting orders to meet their budget and topping up with weapons, and the USAF have stated clearly that they are going to follow the same policy.

The question now isn't cancellation per se, but what reduced number will be built.....

[LowObservable]

GK - There is as yet no mention of whether the Navy wants to buy 20 F-35Cs (FRP) in 2021. That was supposed (as of last year) to happen in 2020. By the way, the 12 F-35Cs in 2020 will cost $144m each versus $81m for each of the last batch of 26 F/A-18s. That's rather more than inflation.

In the 2020s at full rate the U.S. F-35 program will cost (if the budget trends for FY19-20 are correct) >$14 billion per year, including c. $700m just for upgrade R&D.

The full-rate unit procurement cost for the F-35B is $147m, incidentally, and don't forget that the partners will also be billed for upgrade R&D at upwards of $2m per aircraft per year. (That number may come down as more jets join the fleet.)

Also - since partner contributions boost that Block upgrade R&D above the $700m U.S. figure - it's interesting to note that two years' work on a five-year Block 4A/B program (to add some new weapons to the F-35 and fix a few issues here and there) is roughly equivalent to the entire JAS 39E R&D bill.

[Just This Once...]

Originally Posted by ORAC

"The JSF Program Office..... expects the Navy’s cutbacks to be offset by international JSF procurements.” In fact, the international customers are also deferring their orders awaiting the mirage of price reductions as production ramps up - and always the cost creeps up..

One of things that makes me uncomfortable about this program is the JSF Program Office. The JSF PO is full of JSF customers who rather than holding LM to account actually participate in the corporate message.

How we ended up in the position of the customer providing the excuses for the manufacturer whilst paying the increasing bills is beyond me. The UK has a number of serving officers and crown servants at the JSF PO and it is unclear to me how the lawful customer and supplier relationship is maintained. At best it is far from normal business practice, at worst it starts to look a little like corruption.

Of course, it could be the case that all the international military officers working at the JSF PO genuinely believe that they will buy all their notional numbers, that all their fellow nations will do likewise and that the likely additional international sales are so assured that they are not risking any taxpayer's money.

[LowObservable]

Word, JTO.

The program has a way of capturing the people whose job it is to represent the customer. Some have gone on to work for the contractor, but the single biggest factor is a culture oriented towards success - or rather, success in the eyes of those who will be appointing you to your next job. And since you're going to move on long before it's finished, the temptation is to declare that everything is fine and bank on things not totally going to poo until you're safely out of range.

Now add to that the frog-in-boiling-water factor: it was easy to love JSF in 2002 when it was cheaper and better than anything else and all the alternatives looked wobbly. (And it was so cheap that it was't going to threaten any other acquisition program.) By the time most of the bad news surfaced in 2011 it was too late for many customers to look at alternatives.

The funniest bit in the JPO's response to the AvWeek story:

The JSF Program Office states that “the Navy’s commitment to the program remains strong”

I keep looking for the org chart where the CNO reports to the JPO public affairs guy, but try as I might I cannot find it.

[Hempy]

The reason the 'customer' (read government) is singing LM's mantra is that to not do so would in effect be admitting to HIS 'shareholders' (read taxpayers) that some of his decision making has also been somewhat, shall we say, imprudent.

[Heathrow Harry]

ORAC is correct - this is classic death by a thousand cuts

We (or the Americans or anyone else) start a programme saying we'll buy X units - the cost goes up and the timeline runs on and it becomes "up to X units"

Then we slow down orders, and ever so gradually the commitment fades away and the unit cost goes up

all you then need is for the opposition or the media to focus on the unit cost and the pressure to cut hard becomes impossible to avoid

[Lowe Flieger]

GK121:

....this is enough to trigger the "OH MY G@D THE SKY IS FALLING AND THE F-35C IS DOOMED FOREVER" brigade to hare off in full cry.

'F35C is doomed' certainly wasn't what I intended to say, and having checked my post I don't think that is what I said. The USN and USMC are going to get and operate F35Cs. But I still don't read the USN as being cheerleaders for the aircraft. They appear to be taking it more because they have to and not because they want to. If it were not to prove its worth and something more to the Navy's liking is on the horizon come the mid 2020's it might yet not take the full compliment. Of course I am drawing conclusions from afar and may be mistaken, and they want it badly. Certainly not how it looks from here though.

I most certainly don't want any part of the F35 programme to fail as it is going to be a significant component of our and many of our allies' fast jet fleets for years to come. Failure is not an option as far as I can see and given how far it has already battled against a strong tide, the programme's leaders think that too. It's very much in the interests of all operators that it evolves into an excellent system in each of its forms.

LF

[Turbine D]

Original Quote by: GK121 Either people can't read or they are just living in their own world.

I think people need to read with a wider vision. As you probably know, the US Navy has a new CNO, Jonathan Greenert. He is a bright personable guy, rising up through the ranks with a submarine background. Shortly after assuming his new position, he receives this letter from the Chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee.
Document: July Letter from Rep. Randy Forbes to CNO Adm. Jonathan Greenert On 'Deficit of Strategic Thinking' - USNI News
This letter is followed up by another public statement by Representative Ford reenforcing his letter. Now put yourself in Jonathan Greenert's shoes. Are you going to develop a Pacific seapower strategy, staffing your new G.R.Ford class aircraft carrier that cost $12-16 Billion along with 10 others, that are currently operational, with an aircraft that may not be capable either offensively or defensively in its intended mission? How will that meet the needed strategy to meet the Chinese threat in the Far East?

A 30% reduction in the quantity of any purchase is significant, just as a 30% reduction in pay or pension would be.

[glad rag]

It's very much in the interests of all operators that it evolves

well you have to ask why we have to pay for an aircraft that has to "evolve" into a useful [sic] platform....

[SARF]

It seems to me that a dedicated naval jet plane... And a dedicated air defence plane. And a dedicated ground attack plane would have been an easier solution.. With pilots specialised in each.

[Willard Whyte]

Too late for Dave, but that seems to be the way 6G is heading, or at least as a recommendation.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand...AND_RB9759.pdf

Key findings:
• Joint aircraft programs have not historically saved overall life-cycle cost.
• The difficulty of reconciling diverse service requirements in a common design or design family is a major factor in historical joint aircraft cost outcomes.
• The JSF is exhibiting trends similar to prior joint aircraft programs.
• Historical analysis suggests that joint aircraft programs have coincided with contraction in the industrial base and thus a decline in potential future industry competition and increased strategic and operational risk.
• Unless the participating services have identical, stable requirements, DoD should avoid future joint fighter and other complex joint aircraft programs.

I would suggest a future where all three manufacturers, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, all design, develop, build and sell different aircraft to be one where capability is maximised as well as reducing costs. There may well be some commonality in certain systems and structure technology (software/systems integration/engines/self-healing/stealth - for example), but each airframe optimised for role and basing requirements. I.E.: Naval F/A (twin engine - carrier optimised), and both heavy (twin engine) and light (single engine, extreme agility) land-based F/A aircraft. So yes, essentially G6 eqivalents of the -18, -15/-22, and -16/-35A.

[orca]

Turbine D,

Thank you for posting that, it's a very interesting read. However, whilst I agree entirely with the author's thrust it is a very verbose way of saying:

'We need a strategy that tells us what we actually want a Navy for (ends), how we are going to do it (ways) and what that's going to cost (means)."

It may or may not be that a 5th gen fighter can play a part, but the chap's got a point - have carriers and aircraft for a reason, but don't let that reason be that we have carriers and aircraft.

[Turbine D]

Orca,

Politicians have a way of being verbose. Your simple explanation hits the nail on the head!

[Lonewolf_50]

Originally Posted by SARF

It seems to me that a dedicated naval jet plane... And a dedicated air defence plane. And a dedicated ground attack plane would have been an easier solution.. With pilots specialised in each.

Since the US Congress disagrees with you (and it is from them that the initial requirement for a Joint Procurement came) that line of argument you espouse is only about fifteen years in the coffin, and still moldering.

One of things that makes me uncomfortable about this program is the JSF Program Office.

I had similar complaints about the T-6 program office over a decade ago, while still in the Navy. Further comments and to be fair, the folks in the Office tried to do their job as they saw it. Where you sit can determine what you see.

[Biggus]

I see there's an ex-RAF 2* with exposure to JSF who left and immediately joined Lockheed Martin.

Wasn't there some rule about not leaving the RAF and going straight into an area you had previous exposure to? I believe this came up on Pprune when a previous CAS left and joined BAE straight away, but I'm working from memory.

[jindabyne]

Biggus,

It happened quite often. So what? (not being derogatory)

[rh200]

And a dedicated ground attack plane would have been an easier solution.. With pilots specialised in each.

Most likely correct, but are the easiest options always the best option? Too may variables in changing world over a long period of time.

[Biggus]

I was just seeking clarification of the situation, and whether any such rule (which presumably isn't legally enforceable?) exists.

[Ivan Rogov]

J913. Acceptance of Business Appointments after leaving the Services. Sponsor: ACOS Pers Pol (RAF)
(1) The principles governing the acceptance of business appointments by officers of the Crown Services after leaving the Services are laid down in Command Paper 5517, an extract from which is reproduced in Appendix 17.
(2) Before accepting, within two years of leaving the Service, an offer of employment of a consultancy with a defence contractor or foreign government all officers must obtain the approval of the Ministry of Defence. An officer at or above the rank of Rear Admiral, Major General or Air Vice-Marshal must obtain approval to take up any paid employment, whether or not with a defence contractor or foreign government.
(3) This procedure is necessary to ensure that when an officer accepts outside employment there should be no cause for suspicion of impropriety. In particular the procedure is designed to allay public concern that the advice and decisions of an officer in Crown Service might have been influenced by the hope or expectation of future employment with a particular firm or organisation and to avoid the risk that such employers might be gaining an unfair advantage over competitors by employing an officer who has had access to commercial, technical or other information which those competitors could legitimately regard as their trade secrets. Most applications will be approved without condition, but waiting periods or other conditions may be imposed on those applications where there has been a close link between the applicant (when serving in the Armed Forces) and the proposed employer, or that company's competitors.
(4) Applications should be made on MoD Form BA42 which can be found in the Defence Intranet Library under Government Jobs as Business Appointment Form. Full details of contacts are shown on the form and queries should be addressed to, DGCP-HR Ops Industrial Relations, Main Building, Level 6 Zone N, Whitehall London, SW1A 2HB. It is essential that no appointments are accepted until formal approval has been obtained.

QR(RAF) 13-42 AL30/Jun 12
UNCONTROLLED WHEN PRINTED

Edit - Didn't someone call foul on the original SARH contract due to a recent RAF recruit on one of the teams (rightly or wrongly)?

Had a couple of JSF briefs by RAF personnel (admittedly not in the last few years) and they all came across as LM sales pitches with no impartiality, objectivity or honesty, it's a shame this program concentrated on politics rather than performance/capability/cost to secure it's future.

The US strategy of technological advantage (therefore it's Allies) is coming to an end in the near future, i.e: Pay more and get better tech V's Pay less and get more is becoming, Pay more and get the same or worse tech.

The battlespace is changing, look how quick Iraq was able to source aircraft and conduct Operations last year. Most nations won't need to own a 5th Gen aircraft as they could rent from RS or CH in the next 10 years within a week or two, especially for hard currency!