F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
kbrockman,
The acceptable live:synthetic training ratio for F35 is likely to be different to that for non-stealth platforms, even assuming equal levels of sophistication in the simulations. The reason I say that is that the flight profiles of a stealth platform are more benign (and hence more amenable to practice in the simulator), whereas non-stealth platforms are more reliant on things like low flying and evasive manoeuvres, which are harder to replicate in simulation and need to be trained 'live' to help build the required physical responses.
An extreme example would be the B-2, in which I daresay a typical "night one" mission could be practiced in the sim with high levels of realism and little or no need for live training. Clearly, F-35 pilots will need live flying to practice things like air combat manoeuvring, with its associated 'g' forces, but the importance of such training in the CONOPS will be lower for the F-35 than for platforms such as F/A-18 or F-15. Hence my postulation that less 'live' flying will be needed for the F-35.
Furthermore, it is always possible that stringent peacetime limitations might be imposed on the use of various F-35 capabilities, which will render 'live' flying less valuable than simulation in some key areas.
The acceptable live:synthetic training ratio for F35 is likely to be different to that for non-stealth platforms, even assuming equal levels of sophistication in the simulations. The reason I say that is that the flight profiles of a stealth platform are more benign (and hence more amenable to practice in the simulator), whereas non-stealth platforms are more reliant on things like low flying and evasive manoeuvres, which are harder to replicate in simulation and need to be trained 'live' to help build the required physical responses.
An extreme example would be the B-2, in which I daresay a typical "night one" mission could be practiced in the sim with high levels of realism and little or no need for live training. Clearly, F-35 pilots will need live flying to practice things like air combat manoeuvring, with its associated 'g' forces, but the importance of such training in the CONOPS will be lower for the F-35 than for platforms such as F/A-18 or F-15. Hence my postulation that less 'live' flying will be needed for the F-35.
Furthermore, it is always possible that stringent peacetime limitations might be imposed on the use of various F-35 capabilities, which will render 'live' flying less valuable than simulation in some key areas.
Last edited by Easy Street; 24th Apr 2013 at 23:27.
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Lt General Christopher C. Bogdan Statement SASC 24 Apr 2013
WRITTEN TESTIMONY FOR THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES UNITED STATES SENATE
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov...n_04-24-13.pdf (180Kb)
WITNESS STATEMENT OF: Lt General Christopher C. Bogdan Program Executive Officer F-35
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES UNITED STATES SENATE
http://www.armed-services.senate.gov...n_04-24-13.pdf (180Kb)
WITNESS STATEMENT OF: Lt General Christopher C. Bogdan Program Executive Officer F-35
ES - That's an interesting notion, but you may also find as you try to follow that route that there is a floor level in flying hours below which you may not go. True, the F-35 (like other modern fighters) is relatively simple to operate thanks to "carefree handling" or envelope protection, and subsystem automation.
However, it also has a complex sensor suite and has to flight-plan according to stealth considerations, and it is intended to cover a broad swath of missions from CAS to air defense. You can practice those in a simulator - but, ultimately, don't you risk a disconnect between the actual flying experience and the sim?
I heard a long presentation late last year about experience with the F-22 (after about six years of operations) and there was no mention of being able to reduce hours.
However, it also has a complex sensor suite and has to flight-plan according to stealth considerations, and it is intended to cover a broad swath of missions from CAS to air defense. You can practice those in a simulator - but, ultimately, don't you risk a disconnect between the actual flying experience and the sim?
I heard a long presentation late last year about experience with the F-22 (after about six years of operations) and there was no mention of being able to reduce hours.
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I was under the impression that the new hook was already tested in ground trials?
According to your link, this is not the case yet (not that I think this will be a very big problem).
Also this got me worried a little ,thinking about the chevy vs ferrari comment made before !
The HMDS was also supposed to work by now, but apparently still needs a fair amount of attention.
The rest of the comments made by Gen Bogdan where already known, I remain sceptical how the 0/100 overrun cost is going to turn out once they start producing this thing in high volumes.
I somehow doubt that LM will agree, on a continuing base, to produce F35's at a loss making or close to 0 percent profit margin for the next 3 decades.
The comment made by the General concerning cost of sustainment sounds earily much like an early waiver for future surprises on this front.
Also
First, the F35 is by no means an all aspect VLO bomber like the B2.
Second, the bulk of its missions will be almost identical to the ones the F15/16/18,A10 and HARRIER force are doing today, I seriously doubt that training syllabus will be that much different on that front.
I'll go even further and make a fair guess that the added feature of stealth will further complicate training as it will require an all new training philosophy further increasing needed training time and costs.
I seem to remember the Clingendael institute and some NAVY Admirals making comments on this issue, they pretty much all said that most of the smaller nations would find it hard (financially) to achieve operational use of the Stealth feature, further negating the need for the F35.
We would all be better served by investing more in standoff weapons technology, advanced robotized stealthy cruise type missiles and armed drones.
If the 2 F117 incidents above former Yugoslavia proved 1 thing it is that complacency while doing a stealth mission ultimately leads to catatstrophy, stealth can be an added level of protection but only if you put in the extra training hours for it and subsequently use it in the field on a consistent base.
The F22 and B2 on the other hand are living prove that stealth certainly adds to the cost of maintenance in a big manner, there is absolutley no base to believe that F35 will be any different.
According to your link, this is not the case yet (not that I think this will be a very big problem).
A Critical Design Review was completed in February 2013 on a redesigned arresting hook system and modeling and simulation involving the redesigned hook showed a marked improvement in performance. Ground test of this newly redesigned hook is scheduled at Lakehurst, NJ in
8
the 4th Quarter of 2013, followed by aircraft carrier qualifications in 3rd Quarter of 2014.
8
the 4th Quarter of 2013, followed by aircraft carrier qualifications in 3rd Quarter of 2014.
My biggest concern in development is software. I am moderately confident that the program will successfully release the Block 2B and 3I capability by 2015and 2016, respectively. However, I see more risk to the delivery of Block 3F, our full warfighting, capability by
6
2017.
6
2017.
Additional work still needs to be done to ensure that the program has a night vision camera that is effective for operations as our testing indicated that the current night vision camera is unsuitable for operational use. As risk reduction, the program continues to fund development of a night vision goggle-based alternative helmet solution. The goggle-based helmet development will continue until we see demonstrated improvement in all of the risk areas of the original helmet and until the government has secured a price agreement with the prime contractor showing significant cost reduction in the original helmet.
I somehow doubt that LM will agree, on a continuing base, to produce F35's at a loss making or close to 0 percent profit margin for the next 3 decades.
The comment made by the General concerning cost of sustainment sounds earily much like an early waiver for future surprises on this front.
F-35 Sustainment costs remain a concern across the Department and to me personally. While the F-35 Joint Program Office and the Services continued to make progress in 2012 toward reducing sustainment estimates, there is much more work to be done in this area, and it is one of my highest priorities.
Originally Posted by Easy Street,
kbrockman,
The acceptable live:synthetic training ratio for F35 is likely to be different to that for non-stealth platforms, even assuming equal levels of sophistication in the simulations. The reason I say that is that the flight profiles of a stealth platform are more benign (and hence more amenable to practice in the simulator), whereas non-stealth platforms are more reliant on things like low flying and evasive manoeuvres, which are harder to replicate in simulation and need to be trained 'live' to help build the required physical responses.
An extreme example would be the B-2, in which I daresay a typical "night one" mission could be practiced in the sim with high levels of realism and little or no need for live training. Clearly, F-35 pilots will need live flying to practice things like air combat manoeuvring, with its associated 'g' forces, but the importance of such training in the CONOPS will be lower for the F-35 than for platforms such as F/A-18 or F-15. Hence my postulation that less 'live' flying will be needed for the F-35.
The acceptable live:synthetic training ratio for F35 is likely to be different to that for non-stealth platforms, even assuming equal levels of sophistication in the simulations. The reason I say that is that the flight profiles of a stealth platform are more benign (and hence more amenable to practice in the simulator), whereas non-stealth platforms are more reliant on things like low flying and evasive manoeuvres, which are harder to replicate in simulation and need to be trained 'live' to help build the required physical responses.
An extreme example would be the B-2, in which I daresay a typical "night one" mission could be practiced in the sim with high levels of realism and little or no need for live training. Clearly, F-35 pilots will need live flying to practice things like air combat manoeuvring, with its associated 'g' forces, but the importance of such training in the CONOPS will be lower for the F-35 than for platforms such as F/A-18 or F-15. Hence my postulation that less 'live' flying will be needed for the F-35.
Second, the bulk of its missions will be almost identical to the ones the F15/16/18,A10 and HARRIER force are doing today, I seriously doubt that training syllabus will be that much different on that front.
I'll go even further and make a fair guess that the added feature of stealth will further complicate training as it will require an all new training philosophy further increasing needed training time and costs.
I seem to remember the Clingendael institute and some NAVY Admirals making comments on this issue, they pretty much all said that most of the smaller nations would find it hard (financially) to achieve operational use of the Stealth feature, further negating the need for the F35.
We would all be better served by investing more in standoff weapons technology, advanced robotized stealthy cruise type missiles and armed drones.
If the 2 F117 incidents above former Yugoslavia proved 1 thing it is that complacency while doing a stealth mission ultimately leads to catatstrophy, stealth can be an added level of protection but only if you put in the extra training hours for it and subsequently use it in the field on a consistent base.
The F22 and B2 on the other hand are living prove that stealth certainly adds to the cost of maintenance in a big manner, there is absolutley no base to believe that F35 will be any different.
Same experience here, LO. In the early days of JSF there was a lot of talk about transfer of flying hours to the sim. The studies at the time suggested a minimum 'live-fly' which didn't give the numbers that the bean counters were hoping for - that 'floor' was nowhere near as low as they expected even with a massively hi-fi simulator (and extensive use of linked sims for package training). The other big hurdle was the cost of the sims and the fact that they could only demonstrate the capability to offer around 4 slots a day (with servicing and turnround).
I think we should head over to the Army board and tell them that we're going to do all our CAS training in the sim from now on. I am sure that the reaction will be overwhelmingly positive.
Written evidence to the Commons Select Committee - Prepared 23rd April 2013.
In the fixed wing air power section by DefenceSynergia...
...and in the summary...
The submission is quite well written, but doesn't contain that much evidence. I would imagine we'll see ore papers submitted in due course.
In the fixed wing air power section by DefenceSynergia...
With the introduction of the QE class of aircraft carrier the subject of UK fixed wing air power is no longer a matter just for the RAF. Indeed, the MoD decision to buy 48 of the F35B Lightning II short take-off and rolling landing (STORAL) version must be factored into the overall picture and UK air power doctrine (the two Fast Jet policy) revisited. The RAF operational requirement (OR) is for a medium range (1500 – 1800 nm) Tornado GR4 replacement which frankly none of the F35 variants (not least the F35B) can meet. Further, the NSS calls for 12 F35B to be routinely embarked upon a carrier with the ability to surge to 36 in an emergency. With a fleet of only 48 F35B and the necessary establishment of an operational conversion and trials unit (OCTU) it is unlikely that more than 40 aircraft will ever be available for operations, of which, some 25% will be unavailable for maintenance reasons, making the DPA requirement to surge to 36 a 'pipe dream'. Whether the RAF has a role in flying the F35B alongside the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) is academic. To meet the NSS ommitment and to achieve combat ready (CR) status whilst maintaining flying currency the majority of F35B, crews and maintainers will have to be dedicated to FAA carrier operations. This leaves the RAF with a single FJ (Typhoon) and no medium range Tornado GR4 replacement.
However, in the current financial climate realism must also play its part. Therefore, the defence budget as set must be used in the most cost effective way to achieve best 'bang for buck' which will require far more attention to professional programme and project management. For example: why pay in excess of £6bn for the failing F35B when perfectly suitable operational alternatives – French Rafael or US F/A-18E/F Super Hornet – are available now at a third of the cost? Why must MoD persist with its OR restrictive two Fast Jet fleet policy? Why do MoD continue to believe that the Army Reserves, despite all the commercial difficulties for employers, should be used outside their traditional general mobilisation role?
Last edited by Courtney Mil; 25th Apr 2013 at 15:23.
Unfortunately the contributors are somewhat lacking in credibility, to put it mildly. They appear to be under the impression that each QEC is more expensive in total than a Nimitz among other glaring howlers when you read into them. Even correctly identifying the name of a French carrier aircraft appears to be beyond them...
However compared to the other written contributors to the inquiry (four - all of which can be summarised as stop spending on defence, give the bunce to DfID) they are an oasis of reason....
However compared to the other written contributors to the inquiry (four - all of which can be summarised as stop spending on defence, give the bunce to DfID) they are an oasis of reason....
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 25th Apr 2013 at 15:22.
Indeed, yes. I like the idea of their suggestion that we buy Rafale instead and then, presumably, we'd eventually work out that we'd need to borrow France's carrier to operate them from.
Oh dear me no, it's worse than that.
Apparently, there is an "Internal Combustion Catapult System" or some such, that is a vastly cheaper alternative to EMALS. Which would allow QEC to be converted to CTOL configuration for the price of a bag of chips. Only the incompetent MOD are ignoring it on the basis that the USN (and by implication everyone else) is ignoring it too.....
They've written a letter to the Chancellor you know.....
Apparently, there is an "Internal Combustion Catapult System" or some such, that is a vastly cheaper alternative to EMALS. Which would allow QEC to be converted to CTOL configuration for the price of a bag of chips. Only the incompetent MOD are ignoring it on the basis that the USN (and by implication everyone else) is ignoring it too.....
They've written a letter to the Chancellor you know.....
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 25th Apr 2013 at 15:29.
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Fun Fact...I can see you are having trouble with the idea of simming the f-35..it gets worse...even whilst the f-35 is on training flights, it will still be simmed networked
Wind your neck in JSFfan. I am not having trouble with anything to do with simulation and it doesn't look like LO is either. We were discussing the supportable transfer of live flying hours and the minimum live flying for pilot training. Surely pilot training isn't another of your sudden areas of expertise?! 
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This link was on my opening internet screen this morning as fed by the AP. Whether accurate or not, it gives a flavor as to the F-35 program which the general public being exposed to in the US presently.
The U.S.'s Stealth Fighter Is Too Heavy and Slow, So the Pentagon Made Its Performance Tests Easier | Motherboard
The U.S.'s Stealth Fighter Is Too Heavy and Slow, So the Pentagon Made Its Performance Tests Easier | Motherboard
Originally Posted by JSFfan
you should use your computer more, that story is 2 mths old
You clearly failed to read my previous to you. No surprises there. Your fanbase here just keeps on growing.
I think we should head over to the Army board and tell them that we're going to do all our CAS training in the sim from now on. I am sure that the reaction will be overwhelmingly positive.
- Training a FAC for one operational tour and then using him for something completely different thereafter - unsupportable, end of. New FAC career structure urgently needed. RAF Regiment missed a trick, I fear, by focussing on force protection instead of carving a niche for themselves as the air-land interface a la USAF JTACs and TACPs.
- Insisting that FACs make a certain number of 'hot' controls to qualify or stay current - unsupportable in a world where practice bombs are history and live bombing can only be carried out on certain enormous rocks from very restrictive parameters. And there's not enough strafe training in this world to keep all the FACs current (besides, talk-ons to range strafe targets are hardly realistic training for anyone).
- Insisting that FACs make controls with real aircraft when the vast majority of FJ CAS is conducted from medium level, and hence the aircraft is never even seen - waste of time. The majority of such training could be conducted using a pilot talking into a ground radio whilst looking at an aerial photograph of the area being described by the JTAC.
- The only aspect of medium-level CAS that really needs a proper aircraft to support FAC training is targeting pod downlink work, and you could do this from a civilian contract aircraft for a pittance, instead of using flying hours on a 5th-gen fighter.
Last edited by Easy Street; 25th Apr 2013 at 20:19.
Easy Street,
Your input there is very timely. The balance between synthetic and live training is exactly the point I was making (and LO). There remains a massive difference between simulation and live - nothing (necessarily) to do with the quality of the simulation. At the end of the day, synthetic training gives an excellent foundation for students (and current crews/air trafficers/fighter controllers/FACs/etc) but there comes a point when live is required. I know it works well for the airlines, but I would hope the first time a pilot flies a live mission isn't in combat. Same for the FAC. And that was the point we were making. If you try to do too much in the sim, you also deny others the live training.
Your input there is very timely. The balance between synthetic and live training is exactly the point I was making (and LO). There remains a massive difference between simulation and live - nothing (necessarily) to do with the quality of the simulation. At the end of the day, synthetic training gives an excellent foundation for students (and current crews/air trafficers/fighter controllers/FACs/etc) but there comes a point when live is required. I know it works well for the airlines, but I would hope the first time a pilot flies a live mission isn't in combat. Same for the FAC. And that was the point we were making. If you try to do too much in the sim, you also deny others the live training.
