Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: Oz
Posts: 67
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Then and Now
In July 1964, three of the newly aquired RAAF Caribous were diverted on their delivery ferry from Canada to Australia, to Malaysia. They then continued to Vung Tau and formed the RAAF Transport Flight Vietnam. They were later joined by an additional four aircraft and redesignated 35SQN; operating in support of the AATTV and the US forces, and later 1ATF.
RAAF aquired the UH1B in late 1962. In 1964, 5SQN deployed four of the aircraft to Malaysia to support the Indonesian Confrontation. From 1966, 9SQN RAAF was deployed to Vietnam. Originally operating the UH1B, they re-equipped with the UH1H in 1968, those sixteen airframes being delivered directly to Vung Tau by the US Army.
How do the two scenarios (Vietnam and Afghanistan) compare?
RAAF aquired the UH1B in late 1962. In 1964, 5SQN deployed four of the aircraft to Malaysia to support the Indonesian Confrontation. From 1966, 9SQN RAAF was deployed to Vietnam. Originally operating the UH1B, they re-equipped with the UH1H in 1968, those sixteen airframes being delivered directly to Vung Tau by the US Army.
How do the two scenarios (Vietnam and Afghanistan) compare?
Last edited by Barry Bernoulli; 8th Oct 2010 at 03:05.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: OZ
Posts: 56
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
We have 2 chooks ove there because it the best we can do at the moment. Our blackhawks are old and tired, don't have the EWSP and would really need a serious upgrade in the engine department to handle hot and high environment. MRH90 doesn't sound any where near ready for anything and the tiger project is late and I doubt ready - and even if they were ready to deploy then you need the government with the will to get them over there.
Unfortunately, recently the ADF seem to be purchasing the newest most shiniest toys they can get their hands on. Tiger versus apache, mrh90 versus mike model blackhawks, wedgetail, A330 tankers (or VIP watch this space), JSF. Going for the porche when a commodore would do??
In the end we deal with what our masters buy us and try to make do but at the end of the day 2 chinooks is about the best it is going to get in the future.
Unfortunately, recently the ADF seem to be purchasing the newest most shiniest toys they can get their hands on. Tiger versus apache, mrh90 versus mike model blackhawks, wedgetail, A330 tankers (or VIP watch this space), JSF. Going for the porche when a commodore would do??
In the end we deal with what our masters buy us and try to make do but at the end of the day 2 chinooks is about the best it is going to get in the future.
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: Oz
Posts: 67
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It begs the question as to where the ADF has come with RW support to the troops in the 40 years since Vietnam. Much water, bitter water, has passed under the bridge, in an effort to provide empathetic support to the chaps on the line.
In 1989, 9SQN became A SQN of the 5th Aviation Regt and 35SQN became B SQN of the 5th. Moving RW from RAAF to Army was supposed to markedly improve the level of support.
Army now operates 35 Blackhawks, 6 Chinooks, plus MRH90 plus Tiger, plus ancilliaries. From that fleet, they field two CH47 in Afghanistan.
My observation is that 40 years of lessons learned, including the 20 years of integrated Army RW doesn't seem to have done much for the level of fielded air mobility support for the troops.
In 1989, 9SQN became A SQN of the 5th Aviation Regt and 35SQN became B SQN of the 5th. Moving RW from RAAF to Army was supposed to markedly improve the level of support.
Army now operates 35 Blackhawks, 6 Chinooks, plus MRH90 plus Tiger, plus ancilliaries. From that fleet, they field two CH47 in Afghanistan.
My observation is that 40 years of lessons learned, including the 20 years of integrated Army RW doesn't seem to have done much for the level of fielded air mobility support for the troops.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: OZ
Posts: 56
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Barry you're probably right. I've seen both systems from the inside and still as army rw you still found yourself explaining crew duty and other aviation restrictions to the grunts - so they probably haven't seen a great change in the level of service they have received. Grunts just don't understand aviation no matter who is providing teh service.
Though the raaf proably faring no better - a new boggie in the squadron is waiting for conversion in jun 2012. A two year wait due to delay in airframes. You could argue that the fighters are not getting any tanking since the 707's retired and corporate knowledge is being lost.
The problems i think is bigger than army versus raaf but more in the delays to projects having a flow on effect to the operational world. Don't see any solutions downtrack.
Though the raaf proably faring no better - a new boggie in the squadron is waiting for conversion in jun 2012. A two year wait due to delay in airframes. You could argue that the fighters are not getting any tanking since the 707's retired and corporate knowledge is being lost.
The problems i think is bigger than army versus raaf but more in the delays to projects having a flow on effect to the operational world. Don't see any solutions downtrack.
Join Date: Dec 1998
Location: England
Posts: 242
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Not sure why everybody is talking about tanks -Standard Political Distraction ploy?
08 Oct 2010
An Australian soldier is recovering in Afghanistan after he was wounded by an exploding roadside bomb, the Australian Defence Force (ADF)says.
The soldier from the Special Operations Task Group was wounded when the vehicle he was traveling in struck an improvised explosive device (IED) in northern Kandahar six days ago, a statement from the ADF said on Saturday.
The wounded soldier was flown to a medical facility at Kandahar Airfield, but later released after an assessment confirmed he had not been seriously injured.
Commodore Roger Boyce said the wounded soldier would spend some time recovering before returning to combat operations.
The incident occurred during a joint operation between Australian and Afghan troops to improve security in and around Kandahar city.
An Australian soldier is recovering in Afghanistan after he was wounded by an exploding roadside bomb, the Australian Defence Force (ADF)says.
The soldier from the Special Operations Task Group was wounded when the vehicle he was traveling in struck an improvised explosive device (IED) in northern Kandahar six days ago, a statement from the ADF said on Saturday.
The wounded soldier was flown to a medical facility at Kandahar Airfield, but later released after an assessment confirmed he had not been seriously injured.
Commodore Roger Boyce said the wounded soldier would spend some time recovering before returning to combat operations.
The incident occurred during a joint operation between Australian and Afghan troops to improve security in and around Kandahar city.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Evening Standard: David Cameron ‘rules out slash and burn defence cuts’
..........However, the helicopter budget is expected to be reduced by as much as Ł1 billion. Ministers are expected to insist that this will not affect operations in Afghanistan......
..........However, the helicopter budget is expected to be reduced by as much as Ł1 billion. Ministers are expected to insist that this will not affect operations in Afghanistan......
Join Date: Apr 2000
Posts: 291
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I see the GAF helicopter thread has "taken wing"... too much input from der Auslanders?
Frazzled, I think the senior Army officers who orchestrated the campaign to have the helicopters transferred to the Army honestly believed that by doing so, they could sweep aside all those annoying problems they had with junior RAAF pilots refusing to do their every bidding and citing all those bothersome things like performance limitations, crew duty time etc.
Frazzled, I think the senior Army officers who orchestrated the campaign to have the helicopters transferred to the Army honestly believed that by doing so, they could sweep aside all those annoying problems they had with junior RAAF pilots refusing to do their every bidding and citing all those bothersome things like performance limitations, crew duty time etc.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Australia - South of where I'd like to be !
Age: 59
Posts: 4,261
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Since the other thread was deleted.
Article in The Age newspaper today.
Tiger helicopters ready to fly: maker
Dan Oakes, Marseille
October 16, 2010
AUSTRALIAN attack helicopters are unable to operate in Afghanistan because Defence has insisted on ultra-strict night flying specifications, according to an aircraft manufacturer.
Head of Eurocopter's government programs Dominique Maudet told The Age yesterday that Defence wanted a standard of external lighting above and beyond that used on similar Tiger helicopters the French military had flown successfully in Afghanistan in the past year.
The disclosure came a day after the Australian Defence Force urged the Dutch government to keep its Apache attack helicopters in Oruzgan province, while simultaneously claiming the Tigers were not needed in the restive southern province.
Advertisement: Story continues below
''The French have flown more than 1300 hours in Afghanistan with the current lighting system,'' Mr Maudet said. ''The specificity of the Australian request will be met by this modification, but [the existing system] does not prevent at all the Tiger to fly at night.''
Mr Maudet believes the request stems from incidents in the past involving other makes of helicopter.
In 1996, 18 soldiers were killed when two Blackhawk helicopters crashed during a training exercise near Townsville. There were claims, later disproved, that the crash was due to defective night-vision goggles.
''Australia has very, very high sensitivity about this issue in the past, which led the Commonwealth of Australia to very specific demands compared to the French,'' Mr Maudet said.
The Coalition recently called for six Tiger attack helicopters, additional troops and other military hardware to be sent to Afghanistan.
Australian troops make up 1500 of the 1800-strong coalition contingent in Oruzgan, but they rely on logistical support from other nations in the combined force.
Defence has said it could be two years before Australia's Tiger helicopters are ready for deployment in Afghanistan Mr Maudet said 13 of 22 Tigers ordered had been delivered.
Dan Oakes travelled to Marseille on a tour sponsored by Eurocopter.
Article in The Age newspaper today.
Tiger helicopters ready to fly: maker
Dan Oakes, Marseille
October 16, 2010
AUSTRALIAN attack helicopters are unable to operate in Afghanistan because Defence has insisted on ultra-strict night flying specifications, according to an aircraft manufacturer.
Head of Eurocopter's government programs Dominique Maudet told The Age yesterday that Defence wanted a standard of external lighting above and beyond that used on similar Tiger helicopters the French military had flown successfully in Afghanistan in the past year.
The disclosure came a day after the Australian Defence Force urged the Dutch government to keep its Apache attack helicopters in Oruzgan province, while simultaneously claiming the Tigers were not needed in the restive southern province.
Advertisement: Story continues below
''The French have flown more than 1300 hours in Afghanistan with the current lighting system,'' Mr Maudet said. ''The specificity of the Australian request will be met by this modification, but [the existing system] does not prevent at all the Tiger to fly at night.''
Mr Maudet believes the request stems from incidents in the past involving other makes of helicopter.
In 1996, 18 soldiers were killed when two Blackhawk helicopters crashed during a training exercise near Townsville. There were claims, later disproved, that the crash was due to defective night-vision goggles.
''Australia has very, very high sensitivity about this issue in the past, which led the Commonwealth of Australia to very specific demands compared to the French,'' Mr Maudet said.
The Coalition recently called for six Tiger attack helicopters, additional troops and other military hardware to be sent to Afghanistan.
Australian troops make up 1500 of the 1800-strong coalition contingent in Oruzgan, but they rely on logistical support from other nations in the combined force.
Defence has said it could be two years before Australia's Tiger helicopters are ready for deployment in Afghanistan Mr Maudet said 13 of 22 Tigers ordered had been delivered.
Dan Oakes travelled to Marseille on a tour sponsored by Eurocopter.
Here we go again, Australia believing that we lead the world. We buy a miserable 22 aircraft and demand a standard above the main users. I was at Oakey Army Airfield the other day and the precious heaps called the MRH-90 don't even have a door gun system!
I was told it was not part of our doctrine??? If we need one, the Italian mini gun system would be it. Imagine buying a "combat" helicopter without a gun! If we do buy the system it will take 5 years to qualify it for flight in the Southern Hemisphere.....
I was told it was not part of our doctrine??? If we need one, the Italian mini gun system would be it. Imagine buying a "combat" helicopter without a gun! If we do buy the system it will take 5 years to qualify it for flight in the Southern Hemisphere.....
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: OZ
Posts: 56
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
7 X 7 you are probably right but aviation is aviation and you can't get away from crew duty and other issues.
MRH90 can fit a door gun - or people can enter and exit the door but can they do both at the same time. And exactly where does the loadmaster sit?? Does he has his own seat and have a hareness like a blackhawk or does he sit on the floor??
MRH90 can fit a door gun - or people can enter and exit the door but can they do both at the same time. And exactly where does the loadmaster sit?? Does he has his own seat and have a hareness like a blackhawk or does he sit on the floor??
Frazzled you are right. I was told that we don't need door gunners. The crewman/loadie has his own 'station'. I guess we shall rename them Army Flight Attendants!
I went in and out of the ramp and at my miniature 5'10" height without any gear and guns had to crouch down. The answer was "well that's how we do it in a Chinook"....
I went in and out of the ramp and at my miniature 5'10" height without any gear and guns had to crouch down. The answer was "well that's how we do it in a Chinook"....
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ADF Utility Helo Capability Must Be Restored
Am re-engaging here hoping that there will be less inter-service sledging and no more '...inappropriate libelous, defamatory or otherwise tortious language...', as encountered on some threads (see Site Terms & Conditions).
The present parlous situation for the ADF has arisen because Australia has a defence industry policy in lieu of a military preparedness policy with the major arms peddlers now parenting most of defence-related industry in country. Progressive optimization of proven hardware in service (where cost-effective) to maintain continuous and credible military capabilities has been virtually spurned since the Vietnam War. DMO/DSTO now conspire with the big arms corporations to generate expensive projects for industry regardless of whether these are prudent hardware options and they have mostly resulted in big delays, cost overruns and very serious capability gaps. Had Seahawk been fitted with a modular dipping sonar (as available in USN), Blackhawk upgraded including EWSP, Iroquois enhanced to Huey II, the ADF would now have a more credible helo force.
Decommissioning the Iroquois gunship role mid-2003 has left an inexcusable fire support capability gap until maybe mid-2012. Upgradable to Huey II for peanuts (about $2million), an enhanced Bushranger gunship could carry 500 rounds of 20mm HE for podded low recoil cannon (in lieu of 70mm rocket launchers), 12,000 rounds of 7.62mm for miniguns and doorguns, hover in ground effect at around 12,000 feet at max operating weight (10,500 pounds) in ISA+20 conditions and also have some nice systems incorporated. Alas, nobody is held accountable for this 9 year gap in fire support capability or waste of invaluable assets in Iroquois disposal.
Undermanning of some supposed ADF operational units is equally serious. If units cannot be manned with medically fit bods (not obese) to within say 5 percent of their operational personnel establishment; then how can they be considered combat ready in the Order of Battle? But I was always told by highers over the years that the number of units in the Order of Battle was sacrosanct and one must never admit to being inadequately manned! The expansionary visions for the ADF envisaged in Defence White Paper 2009 toward a somewhat mythical Force 2030 structure are thus quite unrealistic in my view.
What might be done regarding helo force capacity? Consider these operating costs per flying hour for 2006/07 provided by Defence (in 2008 dollars): Seahawk - $45,317; Sea King - $23,616; Squirrel - $5,208; Blackhawk - $20,659; Kiowa - $2,865. The operating cost of a Huey II according to Bell Helicopter is below $5,000 per hour. Just guessing, but figures for Tiger and MRH90 will likely exceed Sea King and Blackhawk.
This wisdom is from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:
‘The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a ‘platoon carrier’, different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the ‘sizing’ of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.’ – Lieutenant General John J. Tolson
Discarding the Iroquois leaves the ADF without the most valuable of battlefield support helos, a light inexpensive utility aircraft capable of widely varied roles that can be operated very cost-effectively with some affordable losses in combat.
The MRH90 is clearly too big, heavy, complex, expensive, costly to operate and unsuited in multiple respects for general battlefield utility roles. The most cost-effective solution would be to acquire 50 or more Huey II which have great multi-role flexibility/versatility, including for naval support functions, and it might be more economical to just leave Tiger and MRH90 in hangars! But what types to shed and who might operate whichever is not being argued now.
There would of course need to be offsets to persuade the politicians to go down that track. At risk of being ostracized by my fighter associates, methinks shedding a couple of fighter squadrons and extending the F/A-18 a bit longer would be advantageous. Why? Because the Wedgetail/MRTT/JSF saga has disaster writ all over and the JSF might yet founder as a US project. Making some RAAF manpower available could help substantially in rebuilding a utility helicopter component. There also remains a small window of opportunity when many willing retirees (others) could be co-opted to assist in re-establishing Huey capabilities. CDF Angus may of course shudder at these thoughts, but it is arguably an achievable and affordable proposition if people are prepared to think outside the square in terms of improving ADF military capabilities.
Advisory info re Rex Budd. Now hospitalised in Cairns. Still mentally with it but declining physically.
The present parlous situation for the ADF has arisen because Australia has a defence industry policy in lieu of a military preparedness policy with the major arms peddlers now parenting most of defence-related industry in country. Progressive optimization of proven hardware in service (where cost-effective) to maintain continuous and credible military capabilities has been virtually spurned since the Vietnam War. DMO/DSTO now conspire with the big arms corporations to generate expensive projects for industry regardless of whether these are prudent hardware options and they have mostly resulted in big delays, cost overruns and very serious capability gaps. Had Seahawk been fitted with a modular dipping sonar (as available in USN), Blackhawk upgraded including EWSP, Iroquois enhanced to Huey II, the ADF would now have a more credible helo force.
Decommissioning the Iroquois gunship role mid-2003 has left an inexcusable fire support capability gap until maybe mid-2012. Upgradable to Huey II for peanuts (about $2million), an enhanced Bushranger gunship could carry 500 rounds of 20mm HE for podded low recoil cannon (in lieu of 70mm rocket launchers), 12,000 rounds of 7.62mm for miniguns and doorguns, hover in ground effect at around 12,000 feet at max operating weight (10,500 pounds) in ISA+20 conditions and also have some nice systems incorporated. Alas, nobody is held accountable for this 9 year gap in fire support capability or waste of invaluable assets in Iroquois disposal.
Undermanning of some supposed ADF operational units is equally serious. If units cannot be manned with medically fit bods (not obese) to within say 5 percent of their operational personnel establishment; then how can they be considered combat ready in the Order of Battle? But I was always told by highers over the years that the number of units in the Order of Battle was sacrosanct and one must never admit to being inadequately manned! The expansionary visions for the ADF envisaged in Defence White Paper 2009 toward a somewhat mythical Force 2030 structure are thus quite unrealistic in my view.
What might be done regarding helo force capacity? Consider these operating costs per flying hour for 2006/07 provided by Defence (in 2008 dollars): Seahawk - $45,317; Sea King - $23,616; Squirrel - $5,208; Blackhawk - $20,659; Kiowa - $2,865. The operating cost of a Huey II according to Bell Helicopter is below $5,000 per hour. Just guessing, but figures for Tiger and MRH90 will likely exceed Sea King and Blackhawk.
This wisdom is from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:
‘The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a ‘platoon carrier’, different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the ‘sizing’ of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.’ – Lieutenant General John J. Tolson
Discarding the Iroquois leaves the ADF without the most valuable of battlefield support helos, a light inexpensive utility aircraft capable of widely varied roles that can be operated very cost-effectively with some affordable losses in combat.
The MRH90 is clearly too big, heavy, complex, expensive, costly to operate and unsuited in multiple respects for general battlefield utility roles. The most cost-effective solution would be to acquire 50 or more Huey II which have great multi-role flexibility/versatility, including for naval support functions, and it might be more economical to just leave Tiger and MRH90 in hangars! But what types to shed and who might operate whichever is not being argued now.
There would of course need to be offsets to persuade the politicians to go down that track. At risk of being ostracized by my fighter associates, methinks shedding a couple of fighter squadrons and extending the F/A-18 a bit longer would be advantageous. Why? Because the Wedgetail/MRTT/JSF saga has disaster writ all over and the JSF might yet founder as a US project. Making some RAAF manpower available could help substantially in rebuilding a utility helicopter component. There also remains a small window of opportunity when many willing retirees (others) could be co-opted to assist in re-establishing Huey capabilities. CDF Angus may of course shudder at these thoughts, but it is arguably an achievable and affordable proposition if people are prepared to think outside the square in terms of improving ADF military capabilities.
Advisory info re Rex Budd. Now hospitalised in Cairns. Still mentally with it but declining physically.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 17th Oct 2010 at 05:02.
Join Date: Apr 2000
Posts: 291
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If the story I heard some years ago about the ADF's acquisition of the Steyr rifle is to be believed, Bushranger71 has a point in his second paragraph.
My source (who was in a position to know) said that manufacturing the rifle in Australia was four times as expensive as buying the rifles directly from Steyr, and the jobs (in Australia) it created were almost all short-lived, (but, of course, most importantly, it allowed a senior politician to have his moment in front of a bank of cameras telling the electorate about all the jobs he'd created).
He said if they'd bought the rifles from Steyr and bargained (as part of the offsets in making the purchase) for a maintenance facility to be established in Australia, (to do maintenance on Steyr equipment from other areas as well as Australia), it would have meant fewer jobs, but they'd have all been long term ones, and saved the Australian taxpayer millions.
My source (who was in a position to know) said that manufacturing the rifle in Australia was four times as expensive as buying the rifles directly from Steyr, and the jobs (in Australia) it created were almost all short-lived, (but, of course, most importantly, it allowed a senior politician to have his moment in front of a bank of cameras telling the electorate about all the jobs he'd created).
He said if they'd bought the rifles from Steyr and bargained (as part of the offsets in making the purchase) for a maintenance facility to be established in Australia, (to do maintenance on Steyr equipment from other areas as well as Australia), it would have meant fewer jobs, but they'd have all been long term ones, and saved the Australian taxpayer millions.
according to a good friend the same is happening with the new air warfare destroyers.
US Arleigh Burke DDG modded for fewer crews + Aegis = no risk. [standard US ship with some more automation]
Spanish F100 heavily modded with US/Swedish etc equipment + Aegis + big risk and huge cost overruns. [special design for Oz only]
US Arleigh Burke DDG modded for fewer crews + Aegis = no risk. [standard US ship with some more automation]
Spanish F100 heavily modded with US/Swedish etc equipment + Aegis + big risk and huge cost overruns. [special design for Oz only]
Join Date: Aug 2000
Posts: 665
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TBM-Legend, if what a Navy friend has told me is true, there's much more to be uncovered about the Spanish Air Warfare Destroyer than just what you have mentioned. Much, much more. And it's going to cost many, many millions to fix (if indeed it's fixable).
The way he tells it, it's a classic example of the people doing the purchasing never having once stepped aboard a warship in their lives and if the Navy could get away with doing day cruises, and put the crew to beddybyes ashore every night - or crew it with pygmies who are happy to bunk up in racks four bunks high, they might be able to get it up and running - one day. However, most agree that that isn't a very practical option for a country with a 12,000 NM coastline.
The way he tells it, it's a classic example of the people doing the purchasing never having once stepped aboard a warship in their lives and if the Navy could get away with doing day cruises, and put the crew to beddybyes ashore every night - or crew it with pygmies who are happy to bunk up in racks four bunks high, they might be able to get it up and running - one day. However, most agree that that isn't a very practical option for a country with a 12,000 NM coastline.
Join Date: Jan 2009
Location: North Arm Cove, NSW, Australia
Age: 86
Posts: 229
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sadly; the AWD is another example of how Australia has been contemptuous of our highly valued US alliance by acquiring European hardware including MRTT, Tiger, MRH90, LPDs. Shameful hypocrisy!
Although beaut German submarines would be a good choice as America no longer manufactures diesel boats.
Although beaut German submarines would be a good choice as America no longer manufactures diesel boats.