Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
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Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
In the big scheme of things, losing 20 diggers in Afghanistan isn't earth shattering across the termly spectrum of a limited regional war. However speaking as an ex-Vietnam conflict helo pilot, I cannot help but wonder why we are playing into Taliban hands by committing our ground-pounders to foot-patrol forays from their bases along well-known and oft-plied routes. The Taliban doesn't need intell to interdict those routes. They simply set up the IED's and rely upon their teenagers to give them 20 minutes notice of a patrol tracking towards.
I'm not sure whether all of these IED's are being command detonated by cell phone or walkie-talkie, but I'd suggest that a vast majority are. If so, are the patrols carrying jammers?
Enough said on that subject, however there's another aspect that requires explanation. Instead of foot-tracking towards regional population centers or suspected arms caches, why not utilize the tried and tested methodology of choppering in to somewhere else and foot-tracking in on an unexpected axis? Obviously I'd not be well versed in modern tactics as my experience dates back 40 years, however I do hope that we are NOT putting our forces in harm's way through being afraid of the MANPADS versus helo threat.
Helo's at low-level are sufficiently safe if escorted by gunships. Whenever we did people-sniffers in Vietnam at ultra low-level we had gunships in 2 click trail and all it took was a smoke-pop and an R/T call to deter the gooks from taking potshots or engaging you with LAW's or RPG's. They eventually found it wiser to keep their heads down. Escorted helos at low-level using terrain-hugging and nap-of-the-earth masking techniques have the distinct advantage of their tracking and destination being indeterminate and time precious - as far as the opposition is concerned. Courtesy of modern NVG'ss you can do it night and day. Contrast that tactic to a foot-slogger patrol heading fortress outbound in daylight on a known tracking with an obvious objective. Chalk and cheese.
Even if MANPADS come into the equation, very few of these are effective against low-level helos and they'd be easily engaged by follow-up supportive gunships. Contrast this effective quid pro quo against the current nil cost to the insurgents of simply detonating an IED from a safe hidey-hole..
So I guess my question is quite simply: "Would a company/squadron of slicks with a heavy hog team of three gunships help drop this IED toll?" If the answer is yes or even just maybe, I'd be prepared as a taxpayer to stump up $500 to help fund this change of strategy. If the shared bill was $1500 I could also manage that. There's no great difference between rugged terrain and jungle as far as a helo squadron is concerned. If you put this solution to the people I'd suggest that about 30% would be prepared to send the Def Dept $500, even if they had to add it to their credit card bills.
Gaining the upper hand and minimizing casualties might be as simple as using proven tactics to defeat a very unsophisticated enemy.
If this is a viable proposition and it isn't being addressed by my old Sqn mate CDF Angoose Houston, then colour me confused. It takes more than crocodile tears and heartfelt pronouncements to turn a situation around each time a digger is killed in action. I'd like to see some Israeli style strategic change of direction, even if it costs a few quid. Sometimes the solutions are obvious and sometimes they are obscurely elusive. This one is fairly plain to me.
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I'm not sure whether all of these IED's are being command detonated by cell phone or walkie-talkie, but I'd suggest that a vast majority are. If so, are the patrols carrying jammers?
Enough said on that subject, however there's another aspect that requires explanation. Instead of foot-tracking towards regional population centers or suspected arms caches, why not utilize the tried and tested methodology of choppering in to somewhere else and foot-tracking in on an unexpected axis? Obviously I'd not be well versed in modern tactics as my experience dates back 40 years, however I do hope that we are NOT putting our forces in harm's way through being afraid of the MANPADS versus helo threat.
Helo's at low-level are sufficiently safe if escorted by gunships. Whenever we did people-sniffers in Vietnam at ultra low-level we had gunships in 2 click trail and all it took was a smoke-pop and an R/T call to deter the gooks from taking potshots or engaging you with LAW's or RPG's. They eventually found it wiser to keep their heads down. Escorted helos at low-level using terrain-hugging and nap-of-the-earth masking techniques have the distinct advantage of their tracking and destination being indeterminate and time precious - as far as the opposition is concerned. Courtesy of modern NVG'ss you can do it night and day. Contrast that tactic to a foot-slogger patrol heading fortress outbound in daylight on a known tracking with an obvious objective. Chalk and cheese.
Even if MANPADS come into the equation, very few of these are effective against low-level helos and they'd be easily engaged by follow-up supportive gunships. Contrast this effective quid pro quo against the current nil cost to the insurgents of simply detonating an IED from a safe hidey-hole..
So I guess my question is quite simply: "Would a company/squadron of slicks with a heavy hog team of three gunships help drop this IED toll?" If the answer is yes or even just maybe, I'd be prepared as a taxpayer to stump up $500 to help fund this change of strategy. If the shared bill was $1500 I could also manage that. There's no great difference between rugged terrain and jungle as far as a helo squadron is concerned. If you put this solution to the people I'd suggest that about 30% would be prepared to send the Def Dept $500, even if they had to add it to their credit card bills.
Gaining the upper hand and minimizing casualties might be as simple as using proven tactics to defeat a very unsophisticated enemy.
If this is a viable proposition and it isn't being addressed by my old Sqn mate CDF Angoose Houston, then colour me confused. It takes more than crocodile tears and heartfelt pronouncements to turn a situation around each time a digger is killed in action. I'd like to see some Israeli style strategic change of direction, even if it costs a few quid. Sometimes the solutions are obvious and sometimes they are obscurely elusive. This one is fairly plain to me.
.
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Helo's at low-level are sufficiently safe if escorted by gunships. Whenever we did people-sniffers in Vietnam at ultra low-level we had gunships in 2 click trail and all it took was a smoke-pop and an R/T call to deter the gooks from taking potshots or engaging you with LAW's or RPG's. They eventually found it wiser to keep their heads down. Escorted helos at low-level using terrain-hugging and nap-of-the-earth masking techniques have the distinct advantage of their tracking and destination being indeterminate and time precious - as far as the opposition is concerned. Courtesy of modern NVG'ss you can do it night and day. Contrast that tactic to a foot-slogger patrol heading fortress outbound in daylight on a known tracking with an obvious objective. Chalk and cheese.
.
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Even if MANPADS come into the equation, very few of these are effective against low-level helos and they'd be easily engaged by follow-up supportive gunships. Contrast this effective quid pro quo against the current nil cost to the insurgents of simply detonating an IED from a safe hidey-hole.
Things have moved in........
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You're missing the point
The big boogey-man on the block in Afghanistan may be the legendary Stinger but if they are indeed present (and not just a spectral and imagined threat), in that largish country they'd be very few and far between. How to defeat their highly localized limitation?
Just truck the patrols to an LZ pickup nearby and have the choppers fly in to emplane them. We're not talking Vietnam style combat assaults here, just a two-ship slick flight with one or two gunships in support. With some coordination, their destinations could even be distant and in support of an adjacent province.You'd need to be Nostradamus to position the limited supply of MANPADS to be conveniently located for a chopper kill. And the Shadow is not talking about combat assaulting a target, just giving the patrols a non-evident axis of advance towards an objective and thus avoiding a well-trammeled path towards their local and traditional areas and objectives of interest. Their exit route could similarly be a non-evident exfiltration towards an obscure pickup LZ.
Like the Shadow, I see little evidence of any lateral thinking and plenty of evidence for us continuing to play foolishly by the taliban's own ground rules.
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Just truck the patrols to an LZ pickup nearby and have the choppers fly in to emplane them. We're not talking Vietnam style combat assaults here, just a two-ship slick flight with one or two gunships in support. With some coordination, their destinations could even be distant and in support of an adjacent province.You'd need to be Nostradamus to position the limited supply of MANPADS to be conveniently located for a chopper kill. And the Shadow is not talking about combat assaulting a target, just giving the patrols a non-evident axis of advance towards an objective and thus avoiding a well-trammeled path towards their local and traditional areas and objectives of interest. Their exit route could similarly be a non-evident exfiltration towards an obscure pickup LZ.
Like the Shadow, I see little evidence of any lateral thinking and plenty of evidence for us continuing to play foolishly by the taliban's own ground rules.
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What makes you think that in the last forty years no-one else has thought about this?
What makes you think that what you suggest is not being done?
What makes you think that there are no helo's on task?
What makes you think that you can demonstrate security when it isn't secure enough to go in and out your own front door?
How do you interact with the population if you helo everywhere?
There are many more tasks that have to be carried out by these helos in addition to what you suggest. Convoys will still be required to deliver stores in sufficient quantities as are required.
This is not a north/south gooks all out war, this is an insurgency amongst local populations that may or may not be sympathetic in either direction!
There are very many tried and tested tactics and techniques being employed but it doesnt change the fact that the lads on the ground have to demonstrate a presence in order to establish a secure environment.
Your offer of cash for helos is comendable but if I had $500 spare then I might think that as good a use might be in making some of our brave lads whom have been injured a little bit more comfortable.
IMHO HEDP
What makes you think that what you suggest is not being done?
What makes you think that there are no helo's on task?
What makes you think that you can demonstrate security when it isn't secure enough to go in and out your own front door?
How do you interact with the population if you helo everywhere?
There are many more tasks that have to be carried out by these helos in addition to what you suggest. Convoys will still be required to deliver stores in sufficient quantities as are required.
This is not a north/south gooks all out war, this is an insurgency amongst local populations that may or may not be sympathetic in either direction!
There are very many tried and tested tactics and techniques being employed but it doesnt change the fact that the lads on the ground have to demonstrate a presence in order to establish a secure environment.
Your offer of cash for helos is comendable but if I had $500 spare then I might think that as good a use might be in making some of our brave lads whom have been injured a little bit more comfortable.
IMHO HEDP
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Shadow/Unctuous-have you been to Afghanistan?
I have, I know the country, the threat, the reality......it isn't Vietnam, Northern Ireland etc....
Yes, SAMs are rare, but when they are unleashed they are effective. The biggest threat to helos is still old codgers that think that low-level tactics are safe.....
HPT
I have, I know the country, the threat, the reality......it isn't Vietnam, Northern Ireland etc....
Yes, SAMs are rare, but when they are unleashed they are effective. The biggest threat to helos is still old codgers that think that low-level tactics are safe.....
HPT
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Gaining the upper hand and minimizing casualties might be as simple as using proven tactics to defeat a very unsophisticated enemy.
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It's slightly naive of the original poster to image that today's military are so wet behind the ears that they are not aware of the basics. Helicopters are essential but a continuous ground presence in every town and village and the ability to support them, particularly the smaller, remote bases is the capability that is most required. That means as many well trained troops (preferably Afghans), on foot, as is possible - the raw material for a successful counterinsurgency.
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Vietnam was a) 40 years ago and b) not a great success for the US, so what worked there may be pretty irrelevant.
At some point you have to put, and keep, boots on the ground. Those boots will always be vulnerable to all sorts of irregular threats, whether that's suicide bombers, IEDs or as we've seen several times, rogue Afghan soldiers/police turning their weapons on their mentors.
At some point you have to put, and keep, boots on the ground. Those boots will always be vulnerable to all sorts of irregular threats, whether that's suicide bombers, IEDs or as we've seen several times, rogue Afghan soldiers/police turning their weapons on their mentors.
as my experience dates back 40 years
If this is a viable proposition and it isn't being addressed by my old Sqn mate CDF Angoose Houston
You're not Bushranger 71 using another handle are you....?
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I possibly understand where Shadow is coming from, and broadly agree with some of his sentiment too.
The bit where he lets himself down is suggesting the enemy here are unsophisticated. IMHO they are doing pretty well, bearing in mind they have no CAS, no AT, no helos, no artillery, no secure (modern) radio net, no full coverage AD systems, plus they often have very old equipment too.
Even given all of the above, they regularly take us on and do fairly well from it!
Yes we do need to keep boots on the ground, that is true, but I think Shadow was suggesting we fly troops from one village to another (the downside being that troops will already have to be in each village to assure its LZ), so that boots can be on the ground, but only where the populous are.
That is how I read it.
I also know a convoy is easier in some ways to attack than a foot patrol, but then it is easier for them to have grenade launchers, or HMG's to retaliate with, as well as their own organic IED sensors.
I do actually think they are many very sound lessons to be learned from Vietnam, and many of the tactics used there are still effective today (surprisingly effective too). Some are obvious to an armchair general like me, but I do wonder just how many active generals are picking up on mistakes made, and the use they can be to the enemy.
Oh, I am talking of lessons learned (and used) by the VC, not the Americans BTW.
The bit where he lets himself down is suggesting the enemy here are unsophisticated. IMHO they are doing pretty well, bearing in mind they have no CAS, no AT, no helos, no artillery, no secure (modern) radio net, no full coverage AD systems, plus they often have very old equipment too.
Even given all of the above, they regularly take us on and do fairly well from it!
Yes we do need to keep boots on the ground, that is true, but I think Shadow was suggesting we fly troops from one village to another (the downside being that troops will already have to be in each village to assure its LZ), so that boots can be on the ground, but only where the populous are.
That is how I read it.
I also know a convoy is easier in some ways to attack than a foot patrol, but then it is easier for them to have grenade launchers, or HMG's to retaliate with, as well as their own organic IED sensors.
I do actually think they are many very sound lessons to be learned from Vietnam, and many of the tactics used there are still effective today (surprisingly effective too). Some are obvious to an armchair general like me, but I do wonder just how many active generals are picking up on mistakes made, and the use they can be to the enemy.
Oh, I am talking of lessons learned (and used) by the VC, not the Americans BTW.
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Hydraulic Palm Tree and others... when you cut Shadow's message down to its core, he's proposing more helicopter support be available for the guys (you!) in Afghanistan.
Are you saying you don't need or want it?
I think we all need to be a lot more aware than some seem to be that it's a natural human trait, if you're part of The System, to defend the status quo.
No one's accusing the current military of being wet behind the years. (I have to say that I was very, very favourably impressed by the baggy-arsed grunts [affectionate description] who I saw in the recent 4 Corners program on the ABC.) I think he was saying, (and as another armchair general whose only wartime experience dates from 40 years ago, I must say I agree with him), that a viable ADF helicopter support element would give those men wearing the boots that must be on the ground an opportunity to get those boots where they're needed without necessarily having to walk through otherwise unavoidable and easily-identified killing zones.
Surely any asset that gives the grunts-on-the-ground more flexibility in the way they project their force is a good thing?
(And I don't think Shadow is Bushranger 71. If he knows Angus as Angoose, I'd be guessing he's a few years younger than BD.)
Are you saying you don't need or want it?
I think we all need to be a lot more aware than some seem to be that it's a natural human trait, if you're part of The System, to defend the status quo.
No one's accusing the current military of being wet behind the years. (I have to say that I was very, very favourably impressed by the baggy-arsed grunts [affectionate description] who I saw in the recent 4 Corners program on the ABC.) I think he was saying, (and as another armchair general whose only wartime experience dates from 40 years ago, I must say I agree with him), that a viable ADF helicopter support element would give those men wearing the boots that must be on the ground an opportunity to get those boots where they're needed without necessarily having to walk through otherwise unavoidable and easily-identified killing zones.
Surely any asset that gives the grunts-on-the-ground more flexibility in the way they project their force is a good thing?
(And I don't think Shadow is Bushranger 71. If he knows Angus as Angoose, I'd be guessing he's a few years younger than BD.)
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Only about 5 or 6 years younger than Brian
...and yes, both Unctuous and I were there in theatre in Brian's time (pre and post gunship). Only difference is that I've got two vastly different campaign medals and a different Cross to the one Brian wears - and only gave up on flying around 10 months ago. I think that any 9 Sqn type who saw the transition from the American gunship support to our own Bushranger inhouse on-scene fire support would have to say, once again, chalk and cheese. It's best stylized as teamwork. We didn't really have that with the US Army gunships and often they got diverted on more important tasking - or just failed to turn up (and misunderstandings were rife).
MTOW has encapsulated my argument for organic airlift (and fire-) support well. You don't need to secure the LZ's for insertion, because they're easily reconnoiterable and (being sans jungle) multiple choice. Unlike Vietnam you also don't need B52, F/GA, arty or gunship LZ prep -or even door-gun suppression - you just pitch-up unexpected like. If conversely however, you do an A to B via C ground-pound in to any taliban hive of activity, the bad guys can easily cover the likely access routes and ex-base exit routes to those tracks/trails with mines or IED's..... and they have 20 to 30 minutes to get organized. The noise of helos outbound or enroute doesn't give you any useful intell (until it's too late) on where they are going to deposit their troops - or even if there are any diggers onboard (i.e. maybe it's just logistic support).
If you change the game so that insertion to the proximity of the Tactical area of interest is via chopper, then the axis of likely advance to the objective becomes 360 degrees and impossible to cover. Not trying to tell people how to suck eggs but that's as plain as the nose on your face.
I don't see the Bushmaster vehicle as making anybody as impervious to the IED threat as the ubiquitous helo with its pop-up capability and organic light fire-team's firepower. I may be an old codger but I've still got all my marbles. IMHO so does everybody participating in this regional stoush. I just wish they'd start playing sensibly with theirs. It could be a game-changer.
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MTOW has encapsulated my argument for organic airlift (and fire-) support well. You don't need to secure the LZ's for insertion, because they're easily reconnoiterable and (being sans jungle) multiple choice. Unlike Vietnam you also don't need B52, F/GA, arty or gunship LZ prep -or even door-gun suppression - you just pitch-up unexpected like. If conversely however, you do an A to B via C ground-pound in to any taliban hive of activity, the bad guys can easily cover the likely access routes and ex-base exit routes to those tracks/trails with mines or IED's..... and they have 20 to 30 minutes to get organized. The noise of helos outbound or enroute doesn't give you any useful intell (until it's too late) on where they are going to deposit their troops - or even if there are any diggers onboard (i.e. maybe it's just logistic support).
If you change the game so that insertion to the proximity of the Tactical area of interest is via chopper, then the axis of likely advance to the objective becomes 360 degrees and impossible to cover. Not trying to tell people how to suck eggs but that's as plain as the nose on your face.
I don't see the Bushmaster vehicle as making anybody as impervious to the IED threat as the ubiquitous helo with its pop-up capability and organic light fire-team's firepower. I may be an old codger but I've still got all my marbles. IMHO so does everybody participating in this regional stoush. I just wish they'd start playing sensibly with theirs. It could be a game-changer.
.
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Very different situation on the ground with very different tactics, requirements and intended outcomes. Just by saying 'it is enough like Vietnam for this to work, but no trees so a bit easier on that front' doesn't even come close. Suffice to say there are some very clever people working out there (and back here). Whilst more cabs are always a good thing, the tactics on the ground require a very different use than suggested, at this time.
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Shadow/MTOW
Of course we need more choppers. A Huey with an M60 is not going to achieve anything. A number of the choppers in theatre have M134 and even the prospect of a one KM chainsaw doesn't put the TB off. Many of the missions are supported by AH/CAS and the sight of an Apache or Tiger cuts nothing with the enemy.
You say the unpredictability of 360 degree approach is impossible to cover. Well if you are approaching Sangin just how different can the last 60 seconds of flight be when you are flying an aircraft at 50,000Ibs at the edge of power limitations - a gentle straight in approach is required, particularly with a slung load. RPGs and HMG can very easily be brought to bear.......as has bee proven.
The TB have spotters everywhere and pass direction, heights etc by radio...so they know where and when an aircraft is going to arrive overhead. These guys dig IN under tarps and are not visible.
It really isn't as easy as you might think!
HPT
Of course we need more choppers. A Huey with an M60 is not going to achieve anything. A number of the choppers in theatre have M134 and even the prospect of a one KM chainsaw doesn't put the TB off. Many of the missions are supported by AH/CAS and the sight of an Apache or Tiger cuts nothing with the enemy.
You say the unpredictability of 360 degree approach is impossible to cover. Well if you are approaching Sangin just how different can the last 60 seconds of flight be when you are flying an aircraft at 50,000Ibs at the edge of power limitations - a gentle straight in approach is required, particularly with a slung load. RPGs and HMG can very easily be brought to bear.......as has bee proven.
The TB have spotters everywhere and pass direction, heights etc by radio...so they know where and when an aircraft is going to arrive overhead. These guys dig IN under tarps and are not visible.
It really isn't as easy as you might think!
HPT
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Missing the point yet again
There is no suggestion of flying INTO a provincial centre or area of interest. A flight of helos would simply deposit the patrol at a distance from the objective, allowing the foot-sloggers to foot-slog in on an unpredictable axis - anything up to 10 or 12 clicks.
A variation on the well-proven aural deception theme of having the heavy hog team overfly the LZ in trail as two hovering slicks deposited their SAS boys in a jungle LZ might be as follows. 180 flare/hover in a number of locations raising dust - and in one of those locations deplanement occurs. Unless you're under close visual observation, the patrol's infiltration is likely to be unconfirmed/undetected. In the big scheme of things, intentionally generated uncertainty is worth ten times the best camouflage. Drop a few coloured smokes here and there along the way to generate Taliban confusion and R/T indiscipline.
The present practice of foot-sloggers departing the friendlies base towards an evident objective is to give the Taliban adequate time for preparing and manning their IED traps.... and over a very limited number of access routes. We're making it so easy for them to ambush our patrols.
Can't see where slung loads come into this argument. But operating fully loaded helos into minimal pads that have been prepped, are on fire and full of rising ash, while your door gunners are suppressing on twin M60's is just a typical slick pilot's distraction. The really complicating factor in SVN was that frequently these pads would have been blasted out by B52 strikes and be unlandable - as well as being surrounded by 100 ft tall trees of a triple canopied jungle. When you sank beneath the canopy you lost your vital headwind and got the RPM warning beeping - just to add to your angst. The Sqn boggy was always no 13 into a 12 acft pad. Overpitching and hitting like a bag of ****e was always on the cards. Avoiding collision, obstacles beneath and retaining the ability to fly out again was the important part. The difficulties in Afghanistan are only a variation on a well-worn theme.
Surprise and deception remain fundamental principles of war. We should consider using them.
A variation on the well-proven aural deception theme of having the heavy hog team overfly the LZ in trail as two hovering slicks deposited their SAS boys in a jungle LZ might be as follows. 180 flare/hover in a number of locations raising dust - and in one of those locations deplanement occurs. Unless you're under close visual observation, the patrol's infiltration is likely to be unconfirmed/undetected. In the big scheme of things, intentionally generated uncertainty is worth ten times the best camouflage. Drop a few coloured smokes here and there along the way to generate Taliban confusion and R/T indiscipline.
The present practice of foot-sloggers departing the friendlies base towards an evident objective is to give the Taliban adequate time for preparing and manning their IED traps.... and over a very limited number of access routes. We're making it so easy for them to ambush our patrols.
Can't see where slung loads come into this argument. But operating fully loaded helos into minimal pads that have been prepped, are on fire and full of rising ash, while your door gunners are suppressing on twin M60's is just a typical slick pilot's distraction. The really complicating factor in SVN was that frequently these pads would have been blasted out by B52 strikes and be unlandable - as well as being surrounded by 100 ft tall trees of a triple canopied jungle. When you sank beneath the canopy you lost your vital headwind and got the RPM warning beeping - just to add to your angst. The Sqn boggy was always no 13 into a 12 acft pad. Overpitching and hitting like a bag of ****e was always on the cards. Avoiding collision, obstacles beneath and retaining the ability to fly out again was the important part. The difficulties in Afghanistan are only a variation on a well-worn theme.
Surprise and deception remain fundamental principles of war. We should consider using them.
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TheShadow, the overriding sentiment from today's rotary wing flyers seems to be "What would you know, you silly old fart. This isn't 40 years ago."
Perhaps I should amend that to read: "What would you know, you silly old RAAF fart."
I can't help but feel that there are more than a few among the current generation of Army flyers who have swallowed the extremely skewed views of a few now senior Army people who oversold their case to get their hands on the helicopters with the line that the RAAF worked only from 1100 to 1430 hours Monday to Friday and only ever slept in five star hotels - and that however the RAAF did it, the Army would do it differently.
Tin hat (I'm too old to own a kevlar) on and chinstrap secure as I await the inevitable incoming. But after you've calmed down a bit, guys, I think most of you will admit that there's more than a little of that sentiment out there. Take a look at some of the utter rubbish posted on the AAAA's site (and their refusal to allow any contrary views to be posted) before you say there isn't.
Perhaps I should amend that to read: "What would you know, you silly old RAAF fart."
I can't help but feel that there are more than a few among the current generation of Army flyers who have swallowed the extremely skewed views of a few now senior Army people who oversold their case to get their hands on the helicopters with the line that the RAAF worked only from 1100 to 1430 hours Monday to Friday and only ever slept in five star hotels - and that however the RAAF did it, the Army would do it differently.
Tin hat (I'm too old to own a kevlar) on and chinstrap secure as I await the inevitable incoming. But after you've calmed down a bit, guys, I think most of you will admit that there's more than a little of that sentiment out there. Take a look at some of the utter rubbish posted on the AAAA's site (and their refusal to allow any contrary views to be posted) before you say there isn't.
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I don't see how a lack of helos suddenly makes it easy for diggers to study the subject of the relationship between victims, offenders, and the criminal justice system - and you're making that sound like a bad thing. 
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There is no suggestion of flying INTO a provincial centre or area of interest. A flight of helos would simply deposit the patrol at a distance from the objective, allowing the foot-sloggers to foot-slog in on an unpredictable axis - anything up to 10 or 12 clicks.
Have you seen the terrain in AFG.....it somewhat limits approach directions and exposes the pongos to 10 or 12 clicks worth of ambush...snipers and IEDS.
A variation on the well-proven aural deception theme of having the heavy hog team overfly the LZ in trail as two hovering slicks deposited their SAS boys in a jungle LZ might be as follows. 180 flare/hover in a number of locations raising dust - and in one of those locations deplanement occurs. Unless you're under close visual observation, the patrol's infiltration is likely to be unconfirmed/undetected. In the big scheme of things, intentionally generated uncertainty is worth ten times the best camouflage. Drop a few coloured smokes here and there along the way to generate Taliban confusion and R/T indiscipline.
Yes we are familiar that tactic, and it would be nice to have the additional assets to play at that game....the TB watch everything and report very coherently as to what has been dropped and don't for one second think that they don't have NVDs.
as well as being surrounded by 100 ft tall trees of a triple canopied jungle. When you sank beneath the canopy you lost your vital headwind and got the RPM warning beeping - just to add to your angst. The Sqn boggy was always no 13 into a 12 acft pad. Overpitching and hitting like a bag of ****e was always on the cards.
The difficulties in Afghanistan are only a variation on a well-worn theme.
And 7x7, I have 20 years of RAF behind me, so don't tar me with the AAAvn brush....
HPT
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Perf Planning
as well as being surrounded by 100 ft tall trees of a triple canopied jungle. When you sank beneath the canopy you lost your vital headwind and got the RPM warning beeping - just to add to your angst. The Sqn boggy was always no 13 into a 12 acft pad. Overpitching and hitting like a bag of ****e was always on the cards.
Unfortunately the L13 engine in the Huey was prone to a very variable performance. No two aircraft would have a definable or consistent performance for a reason I'll explain below - so unlike ops in PNG or OZ, a TOLD card was pretty much a useless predictor of nothing useful - performance-wise.
The problem in SVN was always that ops into burnt pads gave aircraft a sticky ash compressor coating that degraded performance non-linearly. At the end of the average day, for the high mission numbers, you'd be finding it very difficult not to overpitch and bleed RPM, having lost up to 15Tq. After each day's flying, most aircraft were automatically scheduled for a large drink of walnut shells down the inlet that evening. Next day it was the same power-erosive process of performance degradation. That doesn't happen so much in sandy desert environments. Sand tends to burnish compressor blades.
We never had the option of saying "sorry" - that we'd "only be able to take 7 troops because of full fuel" on the first lift. Nothing gung-ho about it, just that the battalion commanders were calling the shots to the CP and they were issuing the tasking. But admittedly, we were a "can-do" outfit.
Notwithstanding all that, in over 1000hrs in country I never broke any airplanes. In fact few were broken in the time I was there (if you discount a few engine failures - Kiwi Ken Wells, Tony Casadio, Ken Vidal, Rowley Waddlewood etc)
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I have to agree with nearly everything you say, Hydraulic Palm-tree.
The Shadow, I respect your experience and have nothing to say about Vietnam or its relevence. HPT has some good points however, I wont repeat them, but everything he has said so far about operating helos in the 'ghan is true. The Bushmaster is an excellent peice of equipment. It pains me to say that because I hate riding in armour, it feels like a coffin and the idea of being in one when an IED goes off nearby scares the crap out of me. That said, they work well. Most of the Aussie casualties were outside the vehicle when the device activated, while those inside have survived.
Remember, it is a basic premise of warfare that a force most occupy and hold ground. This has never been more important than in Afghanistan. The TB are not an enemy who are intimidated easily and airbourne direct fire support can only achieve so much. One stray bullet can make enemies of an entire village.
Food for thought, the Russians killed more than 2 million Afghans and still lost.
The Shadow, I respect your experience and have nothing to say about Vietnam or its relevence. HPT has some good points however, I wont repeat them, but everything he has said so far about operating helos in the 'ghan is true. The Bushmaster is an excellent peice of equipment. It pains me to say that because I hate riding in armour, it feels like a coffin and the idea of being in one when an IED goes off nearby scares the crap out of me. That said, they work well. Most of the Aussie casualties were outside the vehicle when the device activated, while those inside have survived.
Remember, it is a basic premise of warfare that a force most occupy and hold ground. This has never been more important than in Afghanistan. The TB are not an enemy who are intimidated easily and airbourne direct fire support can only achieve so much. One stray bullet can make enemies of an entire village.
Food for thought, the Russians killed more than 2 million Afghans and still lost.