Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
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Hi Trojan 1981; re your post #95.
Sorry; but I have to disagree with you re supposed helicopter vulnerability/survivability in combat. This bit from a comprehensive US Army study of Vietnam operations:
‘Statistics on relative vulnerability (of helicopters) reveal that out of 1,147 sorties, one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly, the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted.’
9SQN RAAF flew 237,806 sorties for 58,768 hours during 5.5 years (2,000 days) of Vietnam War operations. Only 1 aircraft was directly lost to ground-fire and 3 aircraft were forced to land. 23 overall received mostly minor battle damage. These were lower probabilities than for the US Army with operating practices significant. There have of course been a few losses to MANPADS in Afghanistan but risk from 7.62mm and 12.7mm weaponry would be no greater and arguably less intense than during Vietnam operations. The apparent apprehension among some operators regarding risk of ground-fire in Afghanistan is a bit puzzling although there are doubtless political overtones due to the worldwide unpopularity of involvement.
The Huey II is not dated; it is a virtually as new factory upgraded light weight battlefield support platform with lots of certified enhancement options, long supportability envisaged due to commonality of components with civil versions and orders approaching 200. If Chinook, Blackhawk, Kiowa all have parallel upgrade programs, how can a Huey be considered obsolescent? It betters the Blackhawk in some respects like cabin layout, weight, technical simplicity, operating costs and probably hot and high performance, although latter data for UH-60L or M not known.
A 'new' Huey II costs $2million and a Blackhawk UH-60M upgrade about $14million (2008 dollars). Assuming the dismal decision to waste 20 plus Hotel model Iroquois for historical purposes will not be rescinded, it would seem more cost-effective to buy maybe 50 or more Huey II from Bell Helicopter than put ADF Blackhawks, which are about 4 times as expensive to operate, through an upgrade program. If no action in this direction, then crucial battlefield utility helo capability will be forfeited as the MRH90 will clearly be quite unsuited for that function.
Why not an AC-130 capability? An invaluable asset in all theatres from Vietnam onwards and likely to remain in the USAF inventory for some time - the US Marine Corps is also adapting some of their C-130. Converting some RAAF C-130H for special operations roles and acquiring more C-130J would really enhance flexibility and versatility for regional operations. Apart from money of course, the problem is AC-130 may be a bit too warlike for our politicians, many of whom now seem to see the ADF becoming a virtual 'peace corps'.
Sorry; but I have to disagree with you re supposed helicopter vulnerability/survivability in combat. This bit from a comprehensive US Army study of Vietnam operations:
‘Statistics on relative vulnerability (of helicopters) reveal that out of 1,147 sorties, one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly, the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted.’
9SQN RAAF flew 237,806 sorties for 58,768 hours during 5.5 years (2,000 days) of Vietnam War operations. Only 1 aircraft was directly lost to ground-fire and 3 aircraft were forced to land. 23 overall received mostly minor battle damage. These were lower probabilities than for the US Army with operating practices significant. There have of course been a few losses to MANPADS in Afghanistan but risk from 7.62mm and 12.7mm weaponry would be no greater and arguably less intense than during Vietnam operations. The apparent apprehension among some operators regarding risk of ground-fire in Afghanistan is a bit puzzling although there are doubtless political overtones due to the worldwide unpopularity of involvement.
The Huey II is not dated; it is a virtually as new factory upgraded light weight battlefield support platform with lots of certified enhancement options, long supportability envisaged due to commonality of components with civil versions and orders approaching 200. If Chinook, Blackhawk, Kiowa all have parallel upgrade programs, how can a Huey be considered obsolescent? It betters the Blackhawk in some respects like cabin layout, weight, technical simplicity, operating costs and probably hot and high performance, although latter data for UH-60L or M not known.
A 'new' Huey II costs $2million and a Blackhawk UH-60M upgrade about $14million (2008 dollars). Assuming the dismal decision to waste 20 plus Hotel model Iroquois for historical purposes will not be rescinded, it would seem more cost-effective to buy maybe 50 or more Huey II from Bell Helicopter than put ADF Blackhawks, which are about 4 times as expensive to operate, through an upgrade program. If no action in this direction, then crucial battlefield utility helo capability will be forfeited as the MRH90 will clearly be quite unsuited for that function.
A good CAS platform for the ADF would be one with long loiter time, precision guided weapons and real-time datalink capability. An aircraft that can remain clear of most gound fire and also provide battlefield surveillance and comms relay, in addition to targeting; essential for effective networked operations.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 22nd Oct 2010 at 17:16.
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A good CAS platform for the ADF would be one with long loiter time, presicion guided weapons and real-time datalink capability. An aircraft that can remain clear of most gound fire and also provide battlefield surveillance and comms relay, in addition to targeting
(1) lead time. We simply can't afford the lead time. The ADF needs something that can be fielded - and that will work - in absolute minimum time, and
(2) cost. Australia simply can't afford yet another hugely expensive super high tech military buy that might not deliver everything it promises. All too many of the recent very expensive buys have two things in common - (a) they are one off systems, unlike anything operated by any other military force in the world, and (b) have not resulted in the ADF gaining a platform or a system that has delivered anywhere near the promised results, if they have delivered anything at all.
Look how successful - and cost-effective - the one exception has been, where we bought off the shelf - the C17.
Besides, as Bushranger 71 says, the ADF already operates the perfect airframe for the job you dream of, and have been since 1957 or so - the Hercules. Three or four of our H models just need to be fitted with the standard (note that incredibly important word) US kit to turn them into AC130s.
If our political and military leadership in Canberra had the will, I daresay we could have them in the field and operational in Afghanistan, crewed by our own people, within six months of the decision being made.
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Do we really expect to hear the outcome of this....
....let alone the true facts?
but we're open to Suggestions:
a. Crews weren't up-to-date on their cat checks
b. Weapons tight clearances hadn't been lifted by the Dutch ambassador to Afghanistan
c. Dutch Commander was on leave in Lahore and couldn't be contacted on his cell-phone.
d. Crews had forgotten to remove the armament safety pins.
e. Crews were FIGMO and had promised each other not to allow each other to get the other into trouble (sorta like "Dutch Treat")
f. Squadron SOP's dictated that crews remain at medium altitudes for best fuel consumption, best line of sight comms, optimalized battlefield overview and least shrapnel damage.
g. ISAF ROE's were still being translated from Dutch to English.
h. There was some doubt that the insurgents firing upon the Aussies were Taliban and not just local angry peasant farmers.
i. Aircraft were just out of manufacturer's warranty and overdue their 20,000 mile servicings.
j. Weapons were highly classified and Dutch officers were anxious not to allow them to fall into the hands of a sophisticated enemy.
k. Embedded Dutch journos had warned the pilots of adverse publicity about atrocities, should they be involved in any senseless killing of nationals.
l. Crews included Afghans under instruction and they refused to fire upon their fellow countrymen.
m. There were rumours of IED's, MANPADS, RPG's and other nasties possibly being in the area.
.
UNC
Down in the delta and Chook'd out (it's always so lonely seeing your helo disappear , dangling in the distance - and you're still there on the ground, wondering about the next likely development - as the sun disappears below the horizon).
but we're open to Suggestions:
a. Crews weren't up-to-date on their cat checks
b. Weapons tight clearances hadn't been lifted by the Dutch ambassador to Afghanistan
c. Dutch Commander was on leave in Lahore and couldn't be contacted on his cell-phone.
d. Crews had forgotten to remove the armament safety pins.
e. Crews were FIGMO and had promised each other not to allow each other to get the other into trouble (sorta like "Dutch Treat")
f. Squadron SOP's dictated that crews remain at medium altitudes for best fuel consumption, best line of sight comms, optimalized battlefield overview and least shrapnel damage.
g. ISAF ROE's were still being translated from Dutch to English.
h. There was some doubt that the insurgents firing upon the Aussies were Taliban and not just local angry peasant farmers.
i. Aircraft were just out of manufacturer's warranty and overdue their 20,000 mile servicings.
j. Weapons were highly classified and Dutch officers were anxious not to allow them to fall into the hands of a sophisticated enemy.
k. Embedded Dutch journos had warned the pilots of adverse publicity about atrocities, should they be involved in any senseless killing of nationals.
l. Crews included Afghans under instruction and they refused to fire upon their fellow countrymen.
m. There were rumours of IED's, MANPADS, RPG's and other nasties possibly being in the area.
Dutch to review SAS claims
October 22, 2010 - 8:19PM
Breaking Internet News
AAP
The Dutch defence force will review claims that its personnel refused to help Australian special forces soldiers ambushed by the Taliban in Afghanistan, Defence Minister Stephen Smith says.
The claims were made in a new book by ex-SAS soldier Rob Maylor, extracts of which were published by News Ltd on Friday.
The book refers to an incident on September 2, 2008, in which an Australian special forces unit came under heavy fire from Taliban insurgents.
Mr Maylor claims two Dutch Apache helicopters refused to descend and help by returning fire.
Mr Smith on Friday said the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had contacted its Dutch equivalent, which indicated its intention to review the claims.
He confirmed two Dutch attack helicopters were present during the incident but said Australian troops had fire support from US and UK helicopters as well as US F-18 jets.
"The ADF has contacted their Dutch counterparts who have indicated their intention to review the claims," Mr Smith said in a statement on Friday.
"The incident, as it has been reported, goes to the detail of operational procedures and rules of engagement.
"As is the case in such matters, I take the professional operational advice of the CDF (Chief of the Defence Force).
"It remains my view that the Dutch have made a very important contribution in Oruzgan," Mr Smith said.
"Australia greatly appreciates the efforts of the Dutch forces in Oruzgan and the close relationship that we developed with them."
Mr Smith said ensuring sufficient helicopter support for troops was crucial and that Prime Minister Julia Gillard had raised the issue with senior military commanders during her recent visit to Afghanistan.
October 22, 2010 - 8:19PM
Breaking Internet News
AAP
The Dutch defence force will review claims that its personnel refused to help Australian special forces soldiers ambushed by the Taliban in Afghanistan, Defence Minister Stephen Smith says.
The claims were made in a new book by ex-SAS soldier Rob Maylor, extracts of which were published by News Ltd on Friday.
The book refers to an incident on September 2, 2008, in which an Australian special forces unit came under heavy fire from Taliban insurgents.
Mr Maylor claims two Dutch Apache helicopters refused to descend and help by returning fire.
Mr Smith on Friday said the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had contacted its Dutch equivalent, which indicated its intention to review the claims.
He confirmed two Dutch attack helicopters were present during the incident but said Australian troops had fire support from US and UK helicopters as well as US F-18 jets.
"The ADF has contacted their Dutch counterparts who have indicated their intention to review the claims," Mr Smith said in a statement on Friday.
"The incident, as it has been reported, goes to the detail of operational procedures and rules of engagement.
"As is the case in such matters, I take the professional operational advice of the CDF (Chief of the Defence Force).
"It remains my view that the Dutch have made a very important contribution in Oruzgan," Mr Smith said.
"Australia greatly appreciates the efforts of the Dutch forces in Oruzgan and the close relationship that we developed with them."
Mr Smith said ensuring sufficient helicopter support for troops was crucial and that Prime Minister Julia Gillard had raised the issue with senior military commanders during her recent visit to Afghanistan.
UNC
Down in the delta and Chook'd out (it's always so lonely seeing your helo disappear , dangling in the distance - and you're still there on the ground, wondering about the next likely development - as the sun disappears below the horizon).
Last edited by UNCTUOUS; 23rd Oct 2010 at 01:29.
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I have to agree with others who've commented that Australian Defence spending will come under enormous pressure as the Gillard government attempts to fulfill its promise to come up with a balanced budget by 2013. (Another promise I don't think they'll achieve, but that's another matter and the pprune moderators won't allow discussion on that.)
Defence has always been more or less 'the caged canary in the mine' in economic hard times - i.e., the first area any government looks to to save some money, (and at the same time, [always a high priority for any government], offend a minimum number of voters), when times are tough.
Looking at what's currently happening in the UK should cause anyone in the ADF to pause and consider what effect cuts not even half as deep as the ones the Brits have just announced would have on all the grandiose plans Kevin Rudd announced just a few short years ago.
Simply put: they ain't gunna happen, or quite a few of them aren't, and if they do, they'll be greatly reduced in scope, and hourly operating costs of the surviving ones will play a huge part in how much use the ADF can make of them. (Tell me, what do the ~50 Tiger pilots the Army currently has actually do?)
Drifting off thread for one moment, but can anyone tell me why the Brits, after cutting into almost every Government Department to a truly punishing degree, exclude from their cuts what always seems to be 'the' most sacred of sacred cows - foreign aid? What is it about foreign aid that keeps it excluded from any cuts?
Oh, and UNCTIOUS:- superb post. Why don't you send that in to 'The Australian', if only to their online edition. They might actually print it.
Defence has always been more or less 'the caged canary in the mine' in economic hard times - i.e., the first area any government looks to to save some money, (and at the same time, [always a high priority for any government], offend a minimum number of voters), when times are tough.
Looking at what's currently happening in the UK should cause anyone in the ADF to pause and consider what effect cuts not even half as deep as the ones the Brits have just announced would have on all the grandiose plans Kevin Rudd announced just a few short years ago.
Simply put: they ain't gunna happen, or quite a few of them aren't, and if they do, they'll be greatly reduced in scope, and hourly operating costs of the surviving ones will play a huge part in how much use the ADF can make of them. (Tell me, what do the ~50 Tiger pilots the Army currently has actually do?)
Drifting off thread for one moment, but can anyone tell me why the Brits, after cutting into almost every Government Department to a truly punishing degree, exclude from their cuts what always seems to be 'the' most sacred of sacred cows - foreign aid? What is it about foreign aid that keeps it excluded from any cuts?
Oh, and UNCTIOUS:- superb post. Why don't you send that in to 'The Australian', if only to their online edition. They might actually print it.
Frazzled - you are spot on regarding our Blackhawks.
MTOW, Bushranger, I agree with most of what you are saying. Bushranger, with regard to Helos, they are more vulnerable than a higher flying UAV or manned aircraft and, as I believe you are suggesting, the loss of one or several would have political consequences. In high intensity conflict, where there is effective red-air, helicopters would also face substantial air-air threat (I have been told by fighter pilots that rotor discs stand out like the dogs proverbial on radar and, I assume, also the heat sig on IRST).
IMHO a good off the shelf solution would be the AC-130U. The problem is we currently don't even have enough C-130s (or Crew) to meet our current airlift requirements. Also, a new AC-130U is approx $190 mil. An AC-130 can spend long periods on station and provide substantial direct fire support. Another cheaper and safer, but less effective, option would be the MQ-9 or equivilent.
MTOW, Bushranger, I agree with most of what you are saying. Bushranger, with regard to Helos, they are more vulnerable than a higher flying UAV or manned aircraft and, as I believe you are suggesting, the loss of one or several would have political consequences. In high intensity conflict, where there is effective red-air, helicopters would also face substantial air-air threat (I have been told by fighter pilots that rotor discs stand out like the dogs proverbial on radar and, I assume, also the heat sig on IRST).
IMHO a good off the shelf solution would be the AC-130U. The problem is we currently don't even have enough C-130s (or Crew) to meet our current airlift requirements. Also, a new AC-130U is approx $190 mil. An AC-130 can spend long periods on station and provide substantial direct fire support. Another cheaper and safer, but less effective, option would be the MQ-9 or equivilent.
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How about one from left field - add this to the wish list..
Us are rumoured to be developing a gunship lite based on the C27J platform to increase their numbers of gunships....Hmmmmm
Despite what navs might tell you our C130H's have just about had it - too much time spent low level and airframes are just about cactus.
We don't have enough J's at the moment let alone crew. Training seems to be the problem - can not train enough crews fast enough both fron and back end.
One day when I am king we will buy off teh shelf US products as we seem to follow them into everythig these days and they at least keep spares on teh shelf.
F
Us are rumoured to be developing a gunship lite based on the C27J platform to increase their numbers of gunships....Hmmmmm
Despite what navs might tell you our C130H's have just about had it - too much time spent low level and airframes are just about cactus.
We don't have enough J's at the moment let alone crew. Training seems to be the problem - can not train enough crews fast enough both fron and back end.
One day when I am king we will buy off teh shelf US products as we seem to follow them into everythig these days and they at least keep spares on teh shelf.
F
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If there is a comparison to made with the war in Vietnam, the most effective support for ground troops was provided by artillery shooting from fire support bases, frequently flown in by helicopter. The much-reported 30 minute response time for fixed wing air support in Afghanistan is a nonsense against lightly armed, mobile, irregular opposition with extensive local knowledge. 5 minutes max should be the objective.
But is there a comparison to be made with Vietnam?
But is there a comparison to be made with Vietnam?
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Mobile Fire Support
Hi MikeSevens,
Yes; arty support in Vietnam was very good and particularly where Fire Support Patrol Bases had overlapping gun ranges. But that concept of operations is pretty predictable and patrolling from garrisons somewhat advantages the enemy who can generally move freely beyond artillery range. Same lessons learned by the French in Vietnam apply in Afghanistan today.
Some contend 1 Australian Task Force dominated their TAOR by frequently establishing FSPBs to support patrolling, but debatable. The local Viet Cong infrastructure was severely dented but the North Vietnamese Army still roamed into the area when it suited their strategies.
Many ex-military worldwide question why there has not been broader use of air mobility in Afghanistan to minimize the IED threat, but that appears to be a resources issue with some political constraints. What seems lacking for the Australian ISAF component (apart from own utility helicopters) is more suitable integral armoured cavalry support to enable mobile immediate fire support response.
The M113 light armoured cavalry vehicle, as operated in Vietnam by Australian forces, allowed greater operational flexibility. Fitted with a 76mm gun turret and mortar, it could provide immediate fire support response out to about 10k. But, the heavy weapon capability has been excluded in an ongoing (botched) enhancement program for 431 M113 vehicles, although some will be adapted for mortar carriage (120mm?). Too many negatives in employing cumbersome behemoth tanks.
Yes; arty support in Vietnam was very good and particularly where Fire Support Patrol Bases had overlapping gun ranges. But that concept of operations is pretty predictable and patrolling from garrisons somewhat advantages the enemy who can generally move freely beyond artillery range. Same lessons learned by the French in Vietnam apply in Afghanistan today.
Some contend 1 Australian Task Force dominated their TAOR by frequently establishing FSPBs to support patrolling, but debatable. The local Viet Cong infrastructure was severely dented but the North Vietnamese Army still roamed into the area when it suited their strategies.
Many ex-military worldwide question why there has not been broader use of air mobility in Afghanistan to minimize the IED threat, but that appears to be a resources issue with some political constraints. What seems lacking for the Australian ISAF component (apart from own utility helicopters) is more suitable integral armoured cavalry support to enable mobile immediate fire support response.
The M113 light armoured cavalry vehicle, as operated in Vietnam by Australian forces, allowed greater operational flexibility. Fitted with a 76mm gun turret and mortar, it could provide immediate fire support response out to about 10k. But, the heavy weapon capability has been excluded in an ongoing (botched) enhancement program for 431 M113 vehicles, although some will be adapted for mortar carriage (120mm?). Too many negatives in employing cumbersome behemoth tanks.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 23rd Oct 2010 at 23:22.
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Spot the Hueys
Hi again Trojan 1981; re your post #105.
Post-Vietnam War, the RAAF Iroquois and fighter squadrons were tasked to develop helicopter versus fighter tactics which is why the Air Force Huey camouflage scheme emerged (designed by my creative daughters). Both 5 and 9 Squadrons were ultimately involved in trials and it was great fun. A few of us having flown fighters was beneficial because we understood how to make target acquisition and tracking more difficult for the higher speed birds (then Macchis and Mirages).
The outcomes were more favourable for helos than most would imagine provided appropriate tactics are employed relative to the operating environment (terrain, vegetation, visibility, etcetera). Having said that, a few Hueys got 'splashed' although we did not then have our doorguns loaded with 100 percent tracer to discourage our opponent friends a little! As you suggest, more modern technology should advantage the fighters but the question really begged is whether ADF air components would be deployed in less permissive air environments?
What might be done to provide funding and manpower for say AC-130 and utility helo capabilities, if Defence can be convinced of these deficiencies? Some possibilities: retrench 10,000 of the public service component of Defence (they would not be missed!); mothball 2 fighter squadrons to extend the life of the F/A-18 and opt out of the JSF project; curtail the MRH90 project by at least half the number of aircraft; recover the Iroquois being discarded and feed them through the Bell Helicopter Huey II factory upgrade program (below $100million for upgrade plus ongoing support costs).
Something has to happen to regain adequate combat readiness and military credibility therefore some rationalising of force structures seems necessary. It would of course all depend on Service Chiefs admitting their respective force shortcomings and MPs having the political will for corrective action.
Post-Vietnam War, the RAAF Iroquois and fighter squadrons were tasked to develop helicopter versus fighter tactics which is why the Air Force Huey camouflage scheme emerged (designed by my creative daughters). Both 5 and 9 Squadrons were ultimately involved in trials and it was great fun. A few of us having flown fighters was beneficial because we understood how to make target acquisition and tracking more difficult for the higher speed birds (then Macchis and Mirages).
The outcomes were more favourable for helos than most would imagine provided appropriate tactics are employed relative to the operating environment (terrain, vegetation, visibility, etcetera). Having said that, a few Hueys got 'splashed' although we did not then have our doorguns loaded with 100 percent tracer to discourage our opponent friends a little! As you suggest, more modern technology should advantage the fighters but the question really begged is whether ADF air components would be deployed in less permissive air environments?
What might be done to provide funding and manpower for say AC-130 and utility helo capabilities, if Defence can be convinced of these deficiencies? Some possibilities: retrench 10,000 of the public service component of Defence (they would not be missed!); mothball 2 fighter squadrons to extend the life of the F/A-18 and opt out of the JSF project; curtail the MRH90 project by at least half the number of aircraft; recover the Iroquois being discarded and feed them through the Bell Helicopter Huey II factory upgrade program (below $100million for upgrade plus ongoing support costs).
Something has to happen to regain adequate combat readiness and military credibility therefore some rationalising of force structures seems necessary. It would of course all depend on Service Chiefs admitting their respective force shortcomings and MPs having the political will for corrective action.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 24th Oct 2010 at 02:58.
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The M113 light armoured cavalry vehicle, as operated in Vietnam by Australian forces, allowed greater operational flexibility. Fitted with a 76mm gun turret and mortar, it could provide immediate fire support response out to about 10k. But, the heavy weapon capability has been excluded in an ongoing (botched) enhancement program for 431 M113 vehicles, although some will be adapted for mortar carriage (120mm?). Too many negatives in employing cumbersome behemoth tanks.
The MRV 'beasts' had all been retired before the ASLAV was trialled. The 25mm on the ASLAV gives direct fire out to the same range as the 76mm, far more accurately.
Your description of Land 106 as being 'botched' ... well, I can't disagree. Half a billion beer tickets blown on vehicles that just won't be deployed. It would have cost more to buy a contemporary IFV to equip 1 BDE, but that will have to happen under Land 400 anyway, and the result would have been a useful asset.
Given the grief it has caused 2 Div RAAC Regiments, (who have had half a decade in the wilderness after 'donating' their buckets to be fed into the M113 upgrade program), and the resultant lack of a battlefield-employable car - - -
'Cumbersome behemoth tanks'? You mean the mobile, protected, network-enabled, sensor-equipped intimate direct fire support system? The 'negatives' to which you refer must be the political fall out. For this we can thank the Army for not explaining why we need tanks; and the ignorance of pollies and the self-appointed authorities on all things strategic. For some reason tanks push cranky buttons in the likes of Mike Carlton (SMH) like nothing else
When push comes to shove Australian tanks save Australian soldiers' lives. Australian soldiers will die on some operation in the future because the ignorance of the tank haters will have removed the capability from the inventory. You get fired up about RW battlefield lift (and related); I get fired up about the undeserved and unjustified position that armour in general, and tanks in particular, have in the ADF's and the Gummint's view of the world.
Sorry for the thread hijack folks.
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Hello LT-DT; re your post #111.
We are off the thread theme although complaints from Afghanistan were re lack of integral utility helos and mortars which led to calls for deployment of Abrams tanks. Also; some poor grammar on my part best clarified.
I was thinking max range of 120mm mortar at about 10k (see: Modern Mobile Mortars) and cannot locate some Vietnam imagery to verify introduction of the Saladin 76mm turret (it may have been later). But I do recall argument in favour being the ability to fire canister rounds, like the Centurions. Cannon is great, as fitted to ASLAV, but why not also to mortar carrier M113s?
The Centurion 'tankies' were the most disciplined of the fighting arms in Vietnam and great to work with, but the APC equipped cavalry units were more flexible. 70 tonne Abram tanks have significant deployability constraints (transportation, wharves, cranes, roads, bridges, etcetera) and field support penalties including large tank recovery and transporter vehicles. Australia needs to be able to quickly deploy light armour into rudimentary airfields around the region by C-130 and maybe C-17, hence the appeal of a versatile M113 FSV.
Methinks enough said re armour and I am too old to get 'fired up' concerning issues which I see as just interesting forum debate.
We are off the thread theme although complaints from Afghanistan were re lack of integral utility helos and mortars which led to calls for deployment of Abrams tanks. Also; some poor grammar on my part best clarified.
I was thinking max range of 120mm mortar at about 10k (see: Modern Mobile Mortars) and cannot locate some Vietnam imagery to verify introduction of the Saladin 76mm turret (it may have been later). But I do recall argument in favour being the ability to fire canister rounds, like the Centurions. Cannon is great, as fitted to ASLAV, but why not also to mortar carrier M113s?
The Centurion 'tankies' were the most disciplined of the fighting arms in Vietnam and great to work with, but the APC equipped cavalry units were more flexible. 70 tonne Abram tanks have significant deployability constraints (transportation, wharves, cranes, roads, bridges, etcetera) and field support penalties including large tank recovery and transporter vehicles. Australia needs to be able to quickly deploy light armour into rudimentary airfields around the region by C-130 and maybe C-17, hence the appeal of a versatile M113 FSV.
Methinks enough said re armour and I am too old to get 'fired up' concerning issues which I see as just interesting forum debate.
Bushranger, I know little about Armour, but I have worked with Cav units deploying APCs and later combinations of ASLAVs and Bushmasters. My understanding is that they are very happy with the current equipment and believe that many lives have been saved using bushmasters for battlefield mobility and patrolling with escort LAVs to provide direct fire support as required. Indeed the LAVs have been very effective in this role. The Cav blokes told me they feel the current equipment is more than adequate. Frankly, my experience in Bushmasters (cramped, hot, dangerous) scared the crap out of me and I will be happy if I never see another one again!
Regarding your post 109; I was referring to BVR engagements of Helos using either Radar or passive IR (still BVR) detection, as I am informed is possible with current and upcoming equipment. But I am no expert on this, I am only going on what I have been told by fighter pilots.
Obviously a UAV would face the same air-air threat, but the consequences would be much lessened. Also the loiter time would be such that even a small fleet could provide constant availlability to the task group - no wait time.
I don't know, but the attitude of the Army hierarchy may bear some respnsibility for the lack of direct fire support in place. For large pre-planned operations like the one at Derapat why was there not an ATO for CAS before the operation began?
Regarding your post 109; I was referring to BVR engagements of Helos using either Radar or passive IR (still BVR) detection, as I am informed is possible with current and upcoming equipment. But I am no expert on this, I am only going on what I have been told by fighter pilots.
Obviously a UAV would face the same air-air threat, but the consequences would be much lessened. Also the loiter time would be such that even a small fleet could provide constant availlability to the task group - no wait time.
I don't know, but the attitude of the Army hierarchy may bear some respnsibility for the lack of direct fire support in place. For large pre-planned operations like the one at Derapat why was there not an ATO for CAS before the operation began?
B71, I don't think the issue for any M-1 Abrams deployment to A/stan is logistics. As you can see they can be flown in to an airhead. Ports/wharves etc are restrictions from another age - prior to the C-17!
QUOTE:
The C-17's ability to fly long distances and land in remote airfields in rough, land-locked regions make it a premier transporter for military, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. It can:
Take off from a 7,600-ft. airfield, carry a payload of 160,000 pounds, fly 2,400 nautical miles, refuel while in flight and land in 3,000 ft. or less on a small unpaved or paved airfield in day or night.
Carry a cargo of wheeled U.S. Army vehicles in two side-by-side rows, including the U.S. Army's main battle tank, the M-1. Three Bradley infantry-fighting vehicles comprise one load.
Drop a single 60,000-lb. payload, with sequential load drops of 110,000 lb.
Back up a two-percent slope.
Seat 54 on the sidewall and 48 in the centerline.
QUOTE:
The C-17's ability to fly long distances and land in remote airfields in rough, land-locked regions make it a premier transporter for military, humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. It can:
Take off from a 7,600-ft. airfield, carry a payload of 160,000 pounds, fly 2,400 nautical miles, refuel while in flight and land in 3,000 ft. or less on a small unpaved or paved airfield in day or night.
Carry a cargo of wheeled U.S. Army vehicles in two side-by-side rows, including the U.S. Army's main battle tank, the M-1. Three Bradley infantry-fighting vehicles comprise one load.
Drop a single 60,000-lb. payload, with sequential load drops of 110,000 lb.
Back up a two-percent slope.
Seat 54 on the sidewall and 48 in the centerline.
The ADF does not even have the airlift capability to sustain the current deployment, let alone adding tanks. Thats why contractors are often used. One subject I do know is ADF logistics. The sheer amount of man-hours and parts required to support armoured vehicles (particularly tanks) in the field is astounding. I am not saying we can't do it, but it would take a lot more logistical support to sustain them. It is not just a matter of moving the vehicles.
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wouldn't have thought tanks were the answer - but as an aviator i know nothing about armour, glad to leave that to the army. Though I hear IED and flat bottom hulls don't mix well.
However, having carried the odd injured army dude out of theatre after being in a bushmaster I can only imagine that other defence forces are envious of the ADF.
They need quick response support WHEN they need it. Would be nice if we had our own dedicated air support but are they ready and the chinooks got sucked up into the US system whats stopping the ARH being sucked up into the same system.
Also, if we were deployed ARH would we have enough crews/spares for year round deployment or only "seasonal" like the chooks, and if seasonal then what will they use in the off season?
Handing over.....
However, having carried the odd injured army dude out of theatre after being in a bushmaster I can only imagine that other defence forces are envious of the ADF.
They need quick response support WHEN they need it. Would be nice if we had our own dedicated air support but are they ready and the chinooks got sucked up into the US system whats stopping the ARH being sucked up into the same system.
Also, if we were deployed ARH would we have enough crews/spares for year round deployment or only "seasonal" like the chooks, and if seasonal then what will they use in the off season?
Handing over.....
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Frazzled, until the ADF 'progressed' to its current sorry RW situation - at the insistence of a few people now long retired, but still very keen to protect their 'legacy' - the ADF had a unit that could have provided everything you ask for. It was called 9 Squadron.
Here we go again!
Sorry, not exactly aviation but....
QUOTE: The Australian , 25th Oct 2010
AUSTRALIA'S largest defence project, the $8 billion plan to build the navy's new air warfare destroyers, has had its first serious setback.
A Melbourne shipyard has botched the construction of the central keel block of the first warship.
The multi-million-dollar bungle could delay the project by up to six months and is believed to have triggered a rift between the Williamstown shipyards, where the hull block was built, and the warship's Spanish designer.
The setback has alarmed the Defence Materiel Organisation, which sees the AWDs as its flagship project and a key test of whether Australia can sustain a viable naval shipbuilding industry.
The three new 6500-tonne destroyers, based on the Spanish F100 boats, will be the most capable warships in the nation's history when they enter service from 2014.
The Australian understands that the central keel block of the first AWD warship, HMAS Hobart, was built to inaccurate dimensions as a result of faulty welding and inadequate quality control at the Williamstown shipyards, operated by an AWD subcontractor, BAE Systems Australia.
QUOTE: The Australian , 25th Oct 2010
AUSTRALIA'S largest defence project, the $8 billion plan to build the navy's new air warfare destroyers, has had its first serious setback.
A Melbourne shipyard has botched the construction of the central keel block of the first warship.
The multi-million-dollar bungle could delay the project by up to six months and is believed to have triggered a rift between the Williamstown shipyards, where the hull block was built, and the warship's Spanish designer.
The setback has alarmed the Defence Materiel Organisation, which sees the AWDs as its flagship project and a key test of whether Australia can sustain a viable naval shipbuilding industry.
The three new 6500-tonne destroyers, based on the Spanish F100 boats, will be the most capable warships in the nation's history when they enter service from 2014.
The Australian understands that the central keel block of the first AWD warship, HMAS Hobart, was built to inaccurate dimensions as a result of faulty welding and inadequate quality control at the Williamstown shipyards, operated by an AWD subcontractor, BAE Systems Australia.
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Hi TBM-L; re your post #114.
Methinks we can have a worthwhile debate re ADF armour deployability capabilities so I am working on a starter for a new thread, something like: 'ADF deployability of armoured elements'.
Cheers Mate.
Methinks we can have a worthwhile debate re ADF armour deployability capabilities so I am working on a starter for a new thread, something like: 'ADF deployability of armoured elements'.
Cheers Mate.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 25th Oct 2010 at 22:32.