'No blame' Over RAF Tornado Crash
No sadder than I, or we could just call it 'getting our facts straight'. Some data on there is wrong (e.g. ZH557) as the guy running the site admits - he's grateful for updates.
Time to get back to the point; The mechanical / design / engineering accident total doesn't seem to show that the F3 was spectacularly dangerous from that point of view, but what is the overall rate of unknown/aircrew error accidents these days? or if that's class. , is it getting worse? I would have expected a general chopping of hours / currency to show up across the Air Force, rather than on one particular type.
It's very difficult to comment from such a distance in time, but deep valley-bashing with the big jugs on, especially half-full and down that valley, is not something I would even have considered. It's not something I would have expected Nige to do; but something led to him, and the other 3, thinking it would be OK. I suspect it's down to familiarity with low level. I remember around 1990 getting about 40+ hours a year of LLOL affil / sweep / whatever. There'll be less now then. Perhaps more importantly, how much do baby pilots get now through flying training, and who with (i.e. recent operational types, which I had even back on the UAS)?
Time to get back to the point; The mechanical / design / engineering accident total doesn't seem to show that the F3 was spectacularly dangerous from that point of view, but what is the overall rate of unknown/aircrew error accidents these days? or if that's class. , is it getting worse? I would have expected a general chopping of hours / currency to show up across the Air Force, rather than on one particular type.
It's very difficult to comment from such a distance in time, but deep valley-bashing with the big jugs on, especially half-full and down that valley, is not something I would even have considered. It's not something I would have expected Nige to do; but something led to him, and the other 3, thinking it would be OK. I suspect it's down to familiarity with low level. I remember around 1990 getting about 40+ hours a year of LLOL affil / sweep / whatever. There'll be less now then. Perhaps more importantly, how much do baby pilots get now through flying training, and who with (i.e. recent operational types, which I had even back on the UAS)?
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Does anyone know how I can get in touch with any family member of either Flt Kenneth Thompson or Flt Nigel Martin?. I have information that could be of interest to them.
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DV
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DV
I doubt if any TAWS could be engineered to a sufficiently high standard to provide the necessary protection to allow the aircrew to stop worrying about CFIT, as it were (I know you didn't claim that).
As terrain following radar autopilot systems exist now....could not that be incorporated into latter Marks or Types at not a lot of additional expense?
The comments about lack of training and reduced flight hours due to budget cuts is very accurate as is the concern of general lack of experience in the new pilots arriving for operational duty with limited exposure to this type of flying.
Yet we all started out as newbies and managed not to weed ourselves out along the way.
Was it our skill and training or just plain old fashioned luck that prevented us from joining the ranks of the departed?
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Call for an FAI
This was an accident in which the State was implicated, and according to the Crown Office’ s own manual, plus guidance from Lord Cullen, mandated an Inquiry which engaged Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such an inquiry calls for an independent and effective investigation which is open to a sufficient element of public scrutiny and appropriately involves the nearest relatives. In other words an FAI, but one was not called.
DV
DV
Ahh. 558. AKA "tango in the night'
IIRC, It was ON the runway at AKR not "near" ?
IIRC, It was ON the runway at AKR not "near" ?
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Fox3 has a valid point. The F3 with fuel in the 2250ltr tanks had a severely limited flight envelope. Whoever thought of low flying in this configuration was, how shall I put it, mistaken.
DV's recent post caused me to revisit the incident report, and I was struck by the fact that the report was silent on the point made by 57mm above.
Even in a best case scenario, the route chosen was highly marginal for aircraft in Lima fit. That Blacksmith 2 came within 1 second of a similar fate surely proves the point, and we can all be thankful that we were saved from the horror of two fully serviceable RAF aircraft being lost one after the other due to CFIT on a routine training mission.
Surely the biggest contributor to this accident was the choice of route? Surely there was some form of review / sense check? Given all of the other checks and sign offs preflight, surely someone other than the crews had to approve this? Glen KInglass is hardly on the dark side of the moon, and must surely have been flown over/ through on many occasions by many fast jets. Its challenges must have been well understood corporately, such that there should have been an appreciation by all concerned that this flight would be pushing the boundaries to a considerable degree.
Despite the multiple acknowledgements of this after the event, I would have expected the report to make much more of the fact this wasnt identified beforehand.
Even in a best case scenario, the route chosen was highly marginal for aircraft in Lima fit. That Blacksmith 2 came within 1 second of a similar fate surely proves the point, and we can all be thankful that we were saved from the horror of two fully serviceable RAF aircraft being lost one after the other due to CFIT on a routine training mission.
Surely the biggest contributor to this accident was the choice of route? Surely there was some form of review / sense check? Given all of the other checks and sign offs preflight, surely someone other than the crews had to approve this? Glen KInglass is hardly on the dark side of the moon, and must surely have been flown over/ through on many occasions by many fast jets. Its challenges must have been well understood corporately, such that there should have been an appreciation by all concerned that this flight would be pushing the boundaries to a considerable degree.
Despite the multiple acknowledgements of this after the event, I would have expected the report to make much more of the fact this wasnt identified beforehand.
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The BoI report fails to mention the 1998 TART report and its recommendation to reinstall the auto wing sweep and manoeuvre system. A system that would have reduced the pilot's workload and ensured the correct wing/slat setting. It was being used very successfully in Saudi Arabia at the time of the accident.
The reinstallation (A/C were delivered with it fitted but had it removed/disengaged) was rejected on cost grounds.
DV
The reinstallation (A/C were delivered with it fitted but had it removed/disengaged) was rejected on cost grounds.
DV
I have no specific knowledge of the F3 RTS but I think you might be missing the thrust of the point. The RTS will detail g, AOA and speed limitations that, taken together, may make it impossible to fly safely around *some* valleys at low level. Aircrew need to ensure that their proposed route can be flown within the applicable airframe limits; the RTS can’t possibly cater for the infinite variety of possibilities. Low flying in Lima fit would be perfectly safe over some terrain, but sadly not the sort involved here.
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The BoI report fails to mention the 1998 TART report and its recommendation to reinstall the auto wing sweep and manoeuvre system. A system that would have reduced the pilot's workload and ensured the correct wing/slat setting. It was being used very successfully in Saudi Arabia at the time of the accident.
DV
DV
A colleague at the time had the opportunity to try the accident flight profile in a simulator and found it almost impossible to avoid CFIT with the same flight parameters. The same profile was quite safe if the speed was increased by 100kts.
EAP
