KC-X RFP Mk II (merged)
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: by the Great Salt Lake, USA
Posts: 1,542
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Nice biased distortion of the reason.
1. Boeing was going to offer India a variant of the USAF-spec KC-767, not the Italian/Japanese-spec version.
2. Boeing simply knows that, if the USAF again chooses the Airbus KC-45, that India won't pay for the development of the variant, and will kick it out of the contest on cost grounds.
3. Thus, Boeing would lose all money it put into the Indian tanker bid effort.
4. In order to remain in the contest, Boeing would have to offer to pay for much of the development costs themselves, thus losing massive money on the deal.
It is simply a business act... without a guarantee of the USAF paying for the development of the new version of the KC-767, Boeing will lose money on the Indian deal no matter what they do, therefore there is no reason to bid.
1. Boeing was going to offer India a variant of the USAF-spec KC-767, not the Italian/Japanese-spec version.
2. Boeing simply knows that, if the USAF again chooses the Airbus KC-45, that India won't pay for the development of the variant, and will kick it out of the contest on cost grounds.
3. Thus, Boeing would lose all money it put into the Indian tanker bid effort.
4. In order to remain in the contest, Boeing would have to offer to pay for much of the development costs themselves, thus losing massive money on the deal.
It is simply a business act... without a guarantee of the USAF paying for the development of the new version of the KC-767, Boeing will lose money on the Indian deal no matter what they do, therefore there is no reason to bid.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 932
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
GK121,
Fair enough. But your post also highlights that as the Airbus KC-X bid is closely based on the RAAF's KC-30 design, which is actually flying and transferring fuel - albeit with a problem last week - Boeing's KC-X bid is much less mature and therefore has considerably more technical risk.
It will be interesting to see which way the USAF jumps on this one - personally, (and I claim no expertise in this) all the indicators are that the Airbus should win on merit. Again.
S41
1. Boeing was going to offer India a variant of the USAF-spec KC-767, not the Italian/Japanese-spec version.
2. Boeing simply knows that, if the USAF again chooses the Airbus KC-45, that India won't pay for the development of the variant, and will kick it out of the contest on cost grounds.
3. Thus, Boeing would lose all money it put into the Indian tanker bid effort.
4. In order to remain in the contest, Boeing would have to offer to pay for much of the development costs themselves, thus losing massive money on the deal.
2. Boeing simply knows that, if the USAF again chooses the Airbus KC-45, that India won't pay for the development of the variant, and will kick it out of the contest on cost grounds.
3. Thus, Boeing would lose all money it put into the Indian tanker bid effort.
4. In order to remain in the contest, Boeing would have to offer to pay for much of the development costs themselves, thus losing massive money on the deal.
It will be interesting to see which way the USAF jumps on this one - personally, (and I claim no expertise in this) all the indicators are that the Airbus should win on merit. Again.
S41
Join Date: Jul 2006
Location: by the Great Salt Lake, USA
Posts: 1,542
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All valid points, and I agree with your conclusion.
The KC-767 is "good enough to enter in India's competition"... but it is also risky & expensive, so the chances of winning India without first winning USAF are non-existent, and the chances of winning USAF are not good.
The KC-767 is "good enough to enter in India's competition"... but it is also risky & expensive, so the chances of winning India without first winning USAF are non-existent, and the chances of winning USAF are not good.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Thread Starter
Ares: A Tanker Clue
Want to know the outcome of the USAF's tanker decision? There's a big clue over at the Forbes website.
Uberconsultant to defense companies Dr Loren Thompson issues what is little less than a Jeremiad against Airbus, and the European governments who have been its primary bankers throughout much of its development. It is government subsidy on a massive scale, Thompson charges, which will allow Airbus to undercut Boeing's price on the tanker deal with a larger aircraft, and win the contract. And, Thompson predicts, the result will be another furious political battle:
It would be worth seeing the mechanism by which remaining government support in the form of launch aid would allow Airbus to sign a money-losing tanker contract, or an explanation for why Airbus would want to spend that money locking up the military tanker market, which compared with the core commercial business is like a Cessna 150 alongside an A380.
But that's a little beside the point.
What Thompson, and some on Capitol Hill, are advocating is a retroactive change in the tanker competition rules, to throw out any decision in favor of Airbus. Such a decision would subordinate the Pentagon's judgment to that of Congress, delay the program and increase its costs, and force the USAF to buy its second-choice aircraft. It's hard to consider an action that would be more damaging to European-US defense trade interests.
One final observation: Thompson's clients usually keep him well informed, and he's saying bluntly that "the Air Force is planning to award the $35 billion tanker contract to its European rival". The piece in Forbes reads a lot like what doctrine writers call "shaping the battlespace".
In the fall of 2001, with the Joint Strike Fighter source selection in its final weeks, it was Boeing's advocates who started to call for a teaming arrangement, rather than winner-take-all. It seems like the same message is coming across now.
Want to know the outcome of the USAF's tanker decision? There's a big clue over at the Forbes website.
Uberconsultant to defense companies Dr Loren Thompson issues what is little less than a Jeremiad against Airbus, and the European governments who have been its primary bankers throughout much of its development. It is government subsidy on a massive scale, Thompson charges, which will allow Airbus to undercut Boeing's price on the tanker deal with a larger aircraft, and win the contract. And, Thompson predicts, the result will be another furious political battle:
Having declared in his State of the Union speech that waning competitiveness has brought America to a new “Sputnik moment,” the President will be asked to award the biggest military hardware contract ever to a foreign country — mainly because it was able to leverage illegal trade subsidies to underbid its U.S. rival. That should provoke quite a political storm on Capitol Hill, where members have already alleged that predatory business practices by Airbus have cost the U.S. aerospace industry many tens of thousands of jobs.
I don't buy outright Thompson's argument that the claimed $20 billion in subsidies - which is a lot of money, but is spread over 40 years for a company that had $85 billion in sales in 2010 and scored a single order for $15.6 billion a couple of weeks ago - is what allows Airbus to undercut Boeing today. It would be worth seeing the mechanism by which remaining government support in the form of launch aid would allow Airbus to sign a money-losing tanker contract, or an explanation for why Airbus would want to spend that money locking up the military tanker market, which compared with the core commercial business is like a Cessna 150 alongside an A380.
But that's a little beside the point.
What Thompson, and some on Capitol Hill, are advocating is a retroactive change in the tanker competition rules, to throw out any decision in favor of Airbus. Such a decision would subordinate the Pentagon's judgment to that of Congress, delay the program and increase its costs, and force the USAF to buy its second-choice aircraft. It's hard to consider an action that would be more damaging to European-US defense trade interests.
One final observation: Thompson's clients usually keep him well informed, and he's saying bluntly that "the Air Force is planning to award the $35 billion tanker contract to its European rival". The piece in Forbes reads a lot like what doctrine writers call "shaping the battlespace".
In the fall of 2001, with the Joint Strike Fighter source selection in its final weeks, it was Boeing's advocates who started to call for a teaming arrangement, rather than winner-take-all. It seems like the same message is coming across now.
My impression right now is that there is not a lot of difference in the two proposals in terms of US jobs. Engines and a lot of systems and avionics are already US-sourced. EADS will do more tin-bending outside the US, but has the upside potential of commercial freighters and export tankers, which Boeing doesn't offer.
So what we're really seeing is an internal fight between EADS states and Boeing states, wrapped up in the flag.
So what we're really seeing is an internal fight between EADS states and Boeing states, wrapped up in the flag.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 932
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
LO,
Yes, almost certainly. Which given the GOP majority in the House makes the choice of assembly plant in Alabama look astute - GE engines are also assembled all over the place.
Years ago I recall being told that the Space Station was uncancellable on this basis - NASA had Space Station contracts in 433 of 435 Congressional Districts and all 50 States. Value for money was the key driver for each contract, no doubt...
S41
Yes, almost certainly. Which given the GOP majority in the House makes the choice of assembly plant in Alabama look astute - GE engines are also assembled all over the place.
Years ago I recall being told that the Space Station was uncancellable on this basis - NASA had Space Station contracts in 433 of 435 Congressional Districts and all 50 States. Value for money was the key driver for each contract, no doubt...
S41
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Thread Starter
Remarks from the head of US Transportation command which are relevant for the KC-X programme - and equally for the RAF/Airtaker fleet and it's lack of of own AAR capability....
Danger For Strategic Airlift in Central Asia
.........McNabb also noted big savings from adjusting C-17 use in moving supplies to Afghanistan and predicted huge savings would be generated if a replacement tanker were available.
Because of the need to refuel C-17s during longer trips to Afghanistan, Transcom logisticians discovered it is 45% more efficient to use the new airlifters for only the last leg of the trip. Savings are pegged at $110 million to $116 million per month through a reduction in aerial refuelings, he says.
The savings from modifying in-flight refueling to make them more efficient could be further increased by introduction of a new tanker.
“We pass more fuel than we carry cargo,” McNabb says. Tankers constitute the majority of Transcom’s 900 daily sorties. But because most KC-135s cannot receive fuel in flight, they have to carry that fuel and weight back to their base. The average amount of fuel returned to base is 35,000-40,000 lb. per aircraft.
“They are carrying that all the time,” McNabb says. “We’re talking about 5 million lbs. a day. If you can leave that fuel in the fight, you only carry it one time. [Saving] 20 to 25 percent of the fuel bill is a lot.”
However, the new tanker designs would allow the remaining fuel to be transferred to other tankers remaining in refueling orbits. The savings in fuel are calculated in the millions of gallons.
Danger For Strategic Airlift in Central Asia
.........McNabb also noted big savings from adjusting C-17 use in moving supplies to Afghanistan and predicted huge savings would be generated if a replacement tanker were available.
Because of the need to refuel C-17s during longer trips to Afghanistan, Transcom logisticians discovered it is 45% more efficient to use the new airlifters for only the last leg of the trip. Savings are pegged at $110 million to $116 million per month through a reduction in aerial refuelings, he says.
The savings from modifying in-flight refueling to make them more efficient could be further increased by introduction of a new tanker.
“We pass more fuel than we carry cargo,” McNabb says. Tankers constitute the majority of Transcom’s 900 daily sorties. But because most KC-135s cannot receive fuel in flight, they have to carry that fuel and weight back to their base. The average amount of fuel returned to base is 35,000-40,000 lb. per aircraft.
“They are carrying that all the time,” McNabb says. “We’re talking about 5 million lbs. a day. If you can leave that fuel in the fight, you only carry it one time. [Saving] 20 to 25 percent of the fuel bill is a lot.”
However, the new tanker designs would allow the remaining fuel to be transferred to other tankers remaining in refueling orbits. The savings in fuel are calculated in the millions of gallons.
But because most KC-135s cannot receive fuel in flight, they have to carry that fuel and weight back to their base. The average amount of fuel returned to base is 35,000-40,000 lb. per aircraft.
The tanker will always need enough fuel to return and land safely - I don't know what the Spams do, but the UK always had a 'minimum off-task fuel' (MOTF) which was the fuel state needed to RTB with sufficient fuel to be able to go-around, transit and land at the alternate, plus appropriate contingency fuel.
Whether or not the tanker can refuel itself in flight merely influences the on-task time, not the MOTF. Reach MOTF and Bingo, home you have to go!
Surely the Spams aren't considering letting a tanker become tanker-dependent on an AAR anchor? Or flying without enough fuel for an alternate?
Efficient tanker planning has always been rather more of a European thing than a US thing, simply because the US usually had the luxury of just opening another tin of 135s and filling the sky with jets rather than having to work out a 'cunning plan' with just a handful as the UK is obliged to.
In GW1, we often used a pair of VC10s outbound with the attack formation, then one would transfer any surplus to the other before going home, leaving only one contingency tanker available for unplanned AAR if the attack formation needed it. Perhaps that's the sort of thing McNabb actually meant - transfer spare gas to another tanker and RTB at MOTF?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Thread Starter
IIRC correctly, during GW1, the USAF was very rigid concerning planned take-off, task and landing times. To the extent that even if planned missions cancelled the tankers till flew so they could land back at the right time to meet their next parking slot and time and fuel upload.
So they'd either have to burn it, dump it or give it away to make the expected fuel on the ground.
So they'd either have to burn it, dump it or give it away to make the expected fuel on the ground.
Join Date: Jun 2004
Location: Oxon
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
During the Kosovo conflict the USAF policy (at least initially) was to offload 'spare' fuel from the off task tankers to a 'reliability' tanker (usually a KC10) orbiting over the Adriatic, enabling fuel to remain airborne and 'on task' and the returning tankers to leave the area on a suitable minimum.
This reliability tanker would then be available to off load at short notice to any 'extra' task or replace a no show tanker! Damn good idea, except for the poor reliability tanker crews who stayed on task for sometimes up to 10 hours just burning a hole in the Ozone over the Adriatic!! Every now and then the boredom being shattered with a refuel up to maximum AUW and coffin corner! Difficult to say the least and on one occasion resulted in an over run and boom going through the skin!! Refuels to max AUW stopped very soon after.
Of course it did mean that the reliability tankers had to have the ability to receive fuel. A lesson the USAF seem to have learnt, with I understand, a requirement for the replacement tanker aircraft (whatever it/they may be) to have a receptacle.
This reliability tanker would then be available to off load at short notice to any 'extra' task or replace a no show tanker! Damn good idea, except for the poor reliability tanker crews who stayed on task for sometimes up to 10 hours just burning a hole in the Ozone over the Adriatic!! Every now and then the boredom being shattered with a refuel up to maximum AUW and coffin corner! Difficult to say the least and on one occasion resulted in an over run and boom going through the skin!! Refuels to max AUW stopped very soon after.
Of course it did mean that the reliability tankers had to have the ability to receive fuel. A lesson the USAF seem to have learnt, with I understand, a requirement for the replacement tanker aircraft (whatever it/they may be) to have a receptacle.
Last edited by Udonkey; 10th Feb 2011 at 06:13.
Of course it did mean that the reliability tankers had to have the ability to receive fuel. A lesson the USAF seem to have learnt, with I understand, a requirement for the replacement tanker aircraft (whatever it/they may be) to have a receptacle.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Witney UK
Posts: 616
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The reason the FSTA does not have a receiver capability is because it was not a requirement of the initial request back in 2000. As one of the government of the times wonderful PFI schemes no bidder was going to offer anything that was not asked for so it is not provided.
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 932
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As usual, Mr AF is correct.
Worse, when asked "WTF, over" when it was so much more expensive than the much more capable KC-45 variant (would've had all kinds of things the UK couldn't have used - boom, freight door, freight floor, receiver capability), it was "all very complicated" and in any event "we didn't need these capabilities anyway" because "OA has demonstrated it was irrelevant".
B0llocks...
S41
Worse, when asked "WTF, over" when it was so much more expensive than the much more capable KC-45 variant (would've had all kinds of things the UK couldn't have used - boom, freight door, freight floor, receiver capability), it was "all very complicated" and in any event "we didn't need these capabilities anyway" because "OA has demonstrated it was irrelevant".
B0llocks...
S41
Also in this day of coalition activity why no boom on the FSTA???
From an RAF point of view, I explained that the primary advantage of having a boom was that the wretched bean counters would have to forget their stupid idea of a 2-person AAR flight deck for FSTA, as a boom would dictate the need for a boom operator. Otherwise, it was an option which would include a training burden, both initial and recurrent and was really only a 'might be nice to have' for interoperability benefits, but was very far from being essential.
As for equipping the FSTA for operation in the receiver role, the bidding consortia (one of whom was spectacularly naive) announced that their proposals met the spec - or rather, the Indicative Statement of User Need..
- so a probe/receptacle would be outside the stated need. But if the RAF wanted it, they would have to pay the extra...."We always did it that way on Victors" mentality initially condemned the TriStar to have an AAR probe. I recall doing trials (in the VC10K tanker) and the success rate / time required for the golden-gloved test pilot to make contact and stay in at the specified IAS wasn't that good. The probe was very noisy and fatigued the TriStar airframe - and there were few operational requirements which would have justified it....
Whilst prodding is indeed the sport of kings, the cost/benefit of equipping the UK FSTA fleet for operation in the receiver role just wasn't worth it. Pity!
Dragging a boom around the sky for the odd occasion when an American (non-USN) aircraft might need fuel from an FSTA seems to me to be an expensive waste of fuel/time/training in the current era.
If you want interoperability for NATO fighters, ensure they have probes!
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: UK
Posts: 932
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
At 600 USG/min that's got to be the best part of an hour in contact to get 100 tonnes. You'd want a UARSSI surely?
So, yes, UARSSI pls (oh look, like E-3Ds). And a KC-45A would be great with all the bells and whistles (and RR Trents.)
S41