Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Tandemrotor:
No, because the cause of the accident remains unknown! Why does it remain unknown? Because it has never been thoroughly investigated! It is a matter of record that the Chinook had serious airworthiness shortcomings, the HC1 as evidenced by the CHART report which was not buried sufficiently enough (one copy remaining in the HoC library). The HC2 then added to the Chinook's shortcomings, principally with bad code written for the FADECs. None of this was reviewed by the BoI. Why? The airworthiness of the HC2 was so problematic that BD suspended flying it and pleaded that the RAF (which strangely was already operating it following CAR and RTS) do likewise. The next day was June 2nd, 1994....!
Have you ever asked the AAIB what they thought of this Accident Investigation, Tandemrotor? Extremely rigorous did they say? No? Thought not! This accident cries out for professional investigation. Instead we, the RAF, NoK, everyone, has to rely as usual on Judicial Reviews and Coroners' Reports. Thorough? Yer 'avin a larf, aintcher?
Is there any proof directly linking any 'airworthiness' issues with the cause of the accident on 2nd Jun 1994...
Have you ever asked the AAIB what they thought of this Accident Investigation, Tandemrotor? Extremely rigorous did they say? No? Thought not! This accident cries out for professional investigation. Instead we, the RAF, NoK, everyone, has to rely as usual on Judicial Reviews and Coroners' Reports. Thorough? Yer 'avin a larf, aintcher?
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Have you ever asked the AAIB what they thought of this Accident Investigation, Tandemrotor?
Do you...
I note that you admit you are unable to substantiate your exaggerated claim that:
given that a likely major factor, if not the direct cause, of this accident was the utterly dysfunctional state of the UK Military Airworthiness Provision then and now.
More mature language might also assist.
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 29th May 2011 at 15:07.
Yes we all know who Mr Cable is, Tandemrotor. Is it your claim then that he pronounced the RAF Inquiry into the loss of ZD576 as:
I notice that you do not suggest that the Chinook HC2 was not then Grossly Unairworthy, merely that I have not "substantiated" my "exaggerated" claim that it was. Read the thread, Tandemrotor, read the thread!
Oh, and as for the:
Leave the pomposity to JP, he's much better at it than you are!
an extremely rigorous and thorough investigation?
Oh, and as for the:
More mature language might also assist.
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I have never quibbled with the appalling state of the Mk2 in Jun of 1994. I knew of many problems (and those of the Mk1) long before the vast majority here.
But your claim was:
Read the words. That is a ridiculous exaggeration, which cannot be supported by any available facts.
Never mind the circumstantial. Please explain to me what evidence demonstrates that airworthiness was a 'major factor' in THIS accident... That evidence simply does not exist.
I will return this thread to you chaps now, but I will continue to monitor, to ensure BOTH SIDES stick to what is supported by facts. Since to do otherwise is simply sloppy, and those directly involved have always deserved far better!
But your claim was:
given that a likely major factor, if not the direct cause, of this accident was the utterly dysfunctional state of the UK Military Airworthiness Provision then and now.
Never mind the circumstantial. Please explain to me what evidence demonstrates that airworthiness was a 'major factor' in THIS accident... That evidence simply does not exist.
I will return this thread to you chaps now, but I will continue to monitor, to ensure BOTH SIDES stick to what is supported by facts. Since to do otherwise is simply sloppy, and those directly involved have always deserved far better!
TR, like tuc, I do not claim that airworthiness (or rather the gross lack of it) caused this accident, simply because we don't know what caused this accident, and that primarily because it has never been properly investigated. The main reason I say that is because the BoI never considered the elephant in the room:
You tell us you knew of the many problems of the HC1 and the HC2, and so did others, such as the RAF Odiham Station TP, yet no-one gave evidence to that effect or was even called to give such evidence.
Perhaps the most damning issue though is not of investigation, but of avoidance in the first place. If, as tuc says, the Airworthiness Regulations had been properly adhered to, as is required by Military Law, then the HC2 would not have been granted an RTS, would not have entered service when it did, and ZD576 would not have ended up splattered across a Scottish hillside. In that way at least, TR, we can be certain that airworthiness was a major factor in this accident. I admit that I suspect it to be more than that but I cannot prove it. Many accident causes cannot be completely proved, but are the most likely cause as determined by the investigators. Ironically Gross Negligence is possibly a just finding in this case, it was merely laid against the wrong people!
the appalling state of the Mk2 in Jun of 1994
Perhaps the most damning issue though is not of investigation, but of avoidance in the first place. If, as tuc says, the Airworthiness Regulations had been properly adhered to, as is required by Military Law, then the HC2 would not have been granted an RTS, would not have entered service when it did, and ZD576 would not have ended up splattered across a Scottish hillside. In that way at least, TR, we can be certain that airworthiness was a major factor in this accident. I admit that I suspect it to be more than that but I cannot prove it. Many accident causes cannot be completely proved, but are the most likely cause as determined by the investigators. Ironically Gross Negligence is possibly a just finding in this case, it was merely laid against the wrong people!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 29th May 2011 at 17:07.
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Did Mr Cable say that the RAF Inquiry was "extremely rigorous and thorough?"
I thought that John Blakeley said that the BOI's coverage of the engineering aspects of the accident were anything but.
I thought that John Blakeley said that the BOI's coverage of the engineering aspects of the accident were anything but.
Last edited by dalek; 30th May 2011 at 13:52.
dalek, I suspect that what you are quoting will turn out to be:
The words glasshouses and stones come to mind!
a ridiculous exaggeration, which cannot be supported by any available facts.
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Now that the temperature between TR and Chug has cooled a little, some ponts to ponder.
1. We will never know what actually caused the crash. It could have been a number of causes; crew error, technical failures/distractions, illusions or a combination thereof (even WK's theory is not totally impossible- improbable but not impossible). So it is pointless arguing about a definitive final act chaps - pse don't keep going around that buoy.
2. The AAIB did their best with very little surviving evidence (I have also spoken to Tony Cable at length) and my abiding thought from those conversations is that 'no evidence of failure is not evidence of no failure' - a concept seemingly lost on the RAF - and hence back to point 1!
3. Also, dont forget the AAIB only 'assisted' the BoI with the technical report and that the following investigation by the BoI was indeed less than thorough, as suggested by Tuc (for example the BoI chose to place different emphases on certain aspects of AAIB report and ignore others!). The reasons of such an approach by the Board could be traced to the lack of investigative experience of serving officers, the time constraints placed upon them and the process, as well as (possible) undue 'senior' influence (Bill Tench, Chief Inspector AAIB in 1987!!). However, the fact remains that the BoI studiously did not look deeply enough at 'organisational fault' as a contributory factor - even though AP3207 allowed this. And even if the BoI did not know about CHART, there were enough clues - but I suspect they would never have been permitted to go there.
3. However, having read all the lack of airworthiness issues and regulatiolns not complied with, then to my mind, it IS substantiated (with absolutely no doubt whatsoever) that the senior people involved in the abysmally implemented and under-funded airworthiness process were grossly negligent. Ultimately, they severely failed the crew and pax on ZD576 - as well as, inter alia, XV179 & XV230. While no-one can say this negligence was a direct cause, however, I challenge anyone with an open mind to deny the relevence to the crash. If nothing else, it certainly adds to the mountain of doubt surrounding the final flight of ZD576. It will, I hope, help to persuade Lord Philip to rule against the appalling verdict by D&W of crew negligence.
4. But while I am sure that clearing the names of Jon & Rick is the first priority of everyone who has posted here recently, may I also suggest that preventing such an unairworthy and 'positively dangerous' aircraft ever again taking to the skies whilst wearing RAF roundels would be something of which the 29 souls aboard ZD576 would approve? I do - and, therefore, I fully support Chug's and Tuc's suggestion of better implementation of the safety and airworthiness regulations, led by a totally independent and properly-funded oversight authority. That is the bigger picture, I feel.
5. As for any sanction against those incompetent, high-level 'blimps' (airships lacking any means of power or directional control) who oversaw the airworthiness process in the 1980-90s and who have obfuscated ever since - that we should leave to Lord Philip and the SofS. Certainly the blimps
deserve our scorn and to have many sleepless nights. Fit to lead? I'm not so sure.
1. We will never know what actually caused the crash. It could have been a number of causes; crew error, technical failures/distractions, illusions or a combination thereof (even WK's theory is not totally impossible- improbable but not impossible). So it is pointless arguing about a definitive final act chaps - pse don't keep going around that buoy.
2. The AAIB did their best with very little surviving evidence (I have also spoken to Tony Cable at length) and my abiding thought from those conversations is that 'no evidence of failure is not evidence of no failure' - a concept seemingly lost on the RAF - and hence back to point 1!
3. Also, dont forget the AAIB only 'assisted' the BoI with the technical report and that the following investigation by the BoI was indeed less than thorough, as suggested by Tuc (for example the BoI chose to place different emphases on certain aspects of AAIB report and ignore others!). The reasons of such an approach by the Board could be traced to the lack of investigative experience of serving officers, the time constraints placed upon them and the process, as well as (possible) undue 'senior' influence (Bill Tench, Chief Inspector AAIB in 1987!!). However, the fact remains that the BoI studiously did not look deeply enough at 'organisational fault' as a contributory factor - even though AP3207 allowed this. And even if the BoI did not know about CHART, there were enough clues - but I suspect they would never have been permitted to go there.
3. However, having read all the lack of airworthiness issues and regulatiolns not complied with, then to my mind, it IS substantiated (with absolutely no doubt whatsoever) that the senior people involved in the abysmally implemented and under-funded airworthiness process were grossly negligent. Ultimately, they severely failed the crew and pax on ZD576 - as well as, inter alia, XV179 & XV230. While no-one can say this negligence was a direct cause, however, I challenge anyone with an open mind to deny the relevence to the crash. If nothing else, it certainly adds to the mountain of doubt surrounding the final flight of ZD576. It will, I hope, help to persuade Lord Philip to rule against the appalling verdict by D&W of crew negligence.
4. But while I am sure that clearing the names of Jon & Rick is the first priority of everyone who has posted here recently, may I also suggest that preventing such an unairworthy and 'positively dangerous' aircraft ever again taking to the skies whilst wearing RAF roundels would be something of which the 29 souls aboard ZD576 would approve? I do - and, therefore, I fully support Chug's and Tuc's suggestion of better implementation of the safety and airworthiness regulations, led by a totally independent and properly-funded oversight authority. That is the bigger picture, I feel.
5. As for any sanction against those incompetent, high-level 'blimps' (airships lacking any means of power or directional control) who oversaw the airworthiness process in the 1980-90s and who have obfuscated ever since - that we should leave to Lord Philip and the SofS. Certainly the blimps
deserve our scorn and to have many sleepless nights. Fit to lead? I'm not so sure.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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17 years ago today.
Remembering all those who were lost.
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Remembering all those who were lost.
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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H Harry
Convenient crashes do seem to occur a lot - the most disgusting one involving the RAF happened in Gib in WW2 when a certain Polish leader died - an air crash can always be called an accident - however much it stinks - and if a very disciplined force (with groupthink, too) is the tool it would not be that hard to pull off at all.
Regime change in the old country would be a bit harder to achieve piecemeal and, back to my post that started off this latest string, Ahern made it clear that the RUC being opened up was the major obstacle to the peace process.
The rest of you in overdrive, are you?
Recently, I only answer half the time to prevent newcomers reading the thread seeing only the obfuscation and pulp waffle - I am not trying to win a pizzing contest with you - I have merely been trying to sound out and get support for one aspect and I am eternally grateful for the help I have been given - there are surely enough of you pursuing other aspects that my posts are not flooding the thread - some direct lies and the absence of open discussion of helicopter equipment and procedures that would have been innocuous pointed to ... well you tell me, I have said enough.
BOAC
Interesting that you used the word "consideration" -all material submitted to the inquiry is said to be "reviewed" but that doesn't mean it will be "considered". Please be assured that I got my stuff in last January while I was over there.
Here's that link again: these are the guys you have let down:
pprune posts :: May2011Vid4PPRUNE.mp4 video by grauniad - Photobucket
Convenient crashes do seem to occur a lot - the most disgusting one involving the RAF happened in Gib in WW2 when a certain Polish leader died - an air crash can always be called an accident - however much it stinks - and if a very disciplined force (with groupthink, too) is the tool it would not be that hard to pull off at all.
Regime change in the old country would be a bit harder to achieve piecemeal and, back to my post that started off this latest string, Ahern made it clear that the RUC being opened up was the major obstacle to the peace process.
The rest of you in overdrive, are you?
Recently, I only answer half the time to prevent newcomers reading the thread seeing only the obfuscation and pulp waffle - I am not trying to win a pizzing contest with you - I have merely been trying to sound out and get support for one aspect and I am eternally grateful for the help I have been given - there are surely enough of you pursuing other aspects that my posts are not flooding the thread - some direct lies and the absence of open discussion of helicopter equipment and procedures that would have been innocuous pointed to ... well you tell me, I have said enough.
BOAC
Interesting that you used the word "consideration" -all material submitted to the inquiry is said to be "reviewed" but that doesn't mean it will be "considered". Please be assured that I got my stuff in last January while I was over there.
Here's that link again: these are the guys you have let down:
pprune posts :: May2011Vid4PPRUNE.mp4 video by grauniad - Photobucket
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Walter
Have you ever flown an aircraft into Gibraltar in windy conditions?
I have diverted on more than one occasion because of unacceptable crosswind conditions. There is little (if any) leeway on that runway in adverse wind conditions.
Have you ever flown an aircraft into Gibraltar in windy conditions?
I have diverted on more than one occasion because of unacceptable crosswind conditions. There is little (if any) leeway on that runway in adverse wind conditions.
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Caz,
I am familiar with Gib - I recommend you look into the circumstances of that crash, there has been a lot written about it (for a start, they were taking off, not landing). Anyway, it's off topic and I don't want to waste time with the sheep just now.
I am familiar with Gib - I recommend you look into the circumstances of that crash, there has been a lot written about it (for a start, they were taking off, not landing). Anyway, it's off topic and I don't want to waste time with the sheep just now.
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General Sikorski murdered by Kim Philby. Dr Kelly by MI5 or Special Branch.
Great topics. Wrong thread.
Walters persistance has shown that CPLS was fitted. It took fifteen years.
Even if he can show beacon transmission on the Mull, I can think of three possible explanations:
1. Deliberate attempt to mislead the crew.
2. Simple misunderstanding. Man on ground not in the place crew thought he would be.
3. Technical malfunction. Right place, right time, but equipment generated incorrect range.
Walter says CPLS is "inherently reliable." So is DME.
In my time as a Navigator I remember submitting at least three serious incident reports relating to DME. As an SFSO, I probably dealt with around twenty.
Your theory may have some validity Walter, but you don't have evidence to back it up. If you accepted there were alternative possibilities you would be taken more seriously
Great topics. Wrong thread.
Walters persistance has shown that CPLS was fitted. It took fifteen years.
Even if he can show beacon transmission on the Mull, I can think of three possible explanations:
1. Deliberate attempt to mislead the crew.
2. Simple misunderstanding. Man on ground not in the place crew thought he would be.
3. Technical malfunction. Right place, right time, but equipment generated incorrect range.
Walter says CPLS is "inherently reliable." So is DME.
In my time as a Navigator I remember submitting at least three serious incident reports relating to DME. As an SFSO, I probably dealt with around twenty.
Your theory may have some validity Walter, but you don't have evidence to back it up. If you accepted there were alternative possibilities you would be taken more seriously
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dalek
The reference to the Sikorsky crash was in answer to Heathrow Harry's recent comment – read up on it and your perspective may broaden.
<<... CPLS was fitted. It took fifteen years.>> Well the complete picture regarding the fit took nearly 17 years from the crash to get – as recently as the last couple of weeks, someone let it slip in a PM that a piece of classified equipment had been removed from the wreckage. From the BOI transcript, there was only one piece of classified equipment on ZD576 and this appeared to have been CPLS.
So CPLS, a local nav kit that my analysis had predicted to have been used, was not mentioned in the AAIB report nor did not merit a mention in all those inquiries – it should have been considered by the airworthiness crowd just because it was a piece of electronics, shouldn't it? At the very least, why the hell was it not mentioned that such-and-such equipment was recovered? Mobile 'phones, pagers, etc but not a piece of nav kit!
<<3. Technical malfunction. Right place, right time, but equipment generated incorrect range.>>
CPLS also gave approximate bearing (+/- 4 degrees) – their turn at waypoint change was consistent with the ground set being out of position up the slope – a correctly functioning PRC112 being ½ a mile or so up the slope from waypoint A/LZ is the only logical explanation that explains their course change with a range error sufficient to throw them out but not so excessively beyond TANS range to waypoint A at the position of waypoint change nor their visual perception of range to the shoreline as to raise alarm – they would have biased in favour of the (local reference, precise) CPLS for small differences to what the TANS (that Tapper thought unreliable) gave and, as they were experienced in the area, what their eyes were telling them when approaching land bereft of familiar features (naff all trees, for example) and the ground texture blurred by surface mist.
<<Your theory may have some validity Walter, but you don't have evidence to back it up.>>
The evidence was the set of data and circumstances that had the crew approaching a point in a way that a reasonable crew would not have done without some type of DME reference – in the absence of any fixed navaid within reception, I was adamant that some local/portable DME set had been used far ahead of even knowing of the existence of CPLS on RAF a/c – that it later emerged that such had been fitted is surely a clear case of QED.
<<If you accepted there were alternative possibilities you would be taken more seriously.>> Oh but I did – for a couple of years: I initially flagged the possibility to the RAF and govt ministers within weeks of the crash as, had a fixed installation been referred to (I did not know at the time that there wasn't one in range), evidence of access to ground equipment may have been lost after a maintenance visit; but this was just in case, I was not blind to other possibilities, just that this angle needed to be covered; I waited patiently for the results of investigations and then sat in on the FAI in Paisley – I found that AAIB's elimination of damage by an explosion (rocket, etc) was justified by detailed examination and explanation but much of the other witnesses (MOD etc) left me with the feeling that basic analysis had not been done, much was omitted and pertinent questions were not clearly answered or indeed met with obfuscation. Years down the track, I was referred to this thread for information and the exchange of views – while I recognise that so many do not want to explore this line for whatever reason, I have found that I have needed to persevere as from time to time I do get a snippet of useful information and, as this would surely be the obvious thread for anyone interested in this crash to read, I have had to re-post certain points as they would otherwise be smothered in the general waffle. I believe the scenario that I have presented does fit with everything that is known about this crash and that, even if it is not wholly correct, it has served as a framework to construct their most likely actions from the available data.
May I suggest that so many of you know in your hearts that something fishy happened here and so you rightly feel a great injustice has been done to the pilots but the implications of a possible contrived crash are just too much for you to contemplate? - so you (collectively speaking) rant against the legal niceties or the airworthiness, like a bull at the red cloak. I have said for years that you do not have to buy the whole conspiracy thing but in following this unpalatable line we have progressed understanding of the circumstances – it may well be just a case of an exercise gone wrong that would have embarrassed your service but we really need to know all there is to know.
<<2. Simple misunderstanding. Man on ground not in the place crew thought he would be.>> so whoever this was and whoever was responsible for the planning of the exercise should be the ones guilty – gets the pilots' names cleared automatically, doesn't it?
The reference to the Sikorsky crash was in answer to Heathrow Harry's recent comment – read up on it and your perspective may broaden.
<<... CPLS was fitted. It took fifteen years.>> Well the complete picture regarding the fit took nearly 17 years from the crash to get – as recently as the last couple of weeks, someone let it slip in a PM that a piece of classified equipment had been removed from the wreckage. From the BOI transcript, there was only one piece of classified equipment on ZD576 and this appeared to have been CPLS.
So CPLS, a local nav kit that my analysis had predicted to have been used, was not mentioned in the AAIB report nor did not merit a mention in all those inquiries – it should have been considered by the airworthiness crowd just because it was a piece of electronics, shouldn't it? At the very least, why the hell was it not mentioned that such-and-such equipment was recovered? Mobile 'phones, pagers, etc but not a piece of nav kit!
<<3. Technical malfunction. Right place, right time, but equipment generated incorrect range.>>
CPLS also gave approximate bearing (+/- 4 degrees) – their turn at waypoint change was consistent with the ground set being out of position up the slope – a correctly functioning PRC112 being ½ a mile or so up the slope from waypoint A/LZ is the only logical explanation that explains their course change with a range error sufficient to throw them out but not so excessively beyond TANS range to waypoint A at the position of waypoint change nor their visual perception of range to the shoreline as to raise alarm – they would have biased in favour of the (local reference, precise) CPLS for small differences to what the TANS (that Tapper thought unreliable) gave and, as they were experienced in the area, what their eyes were telling them when approaching land bereft of familiar features (naff all trees, for example) and the ground texture blurred by surface mist.
<<Your theory may have some validity Walter, but you don't have evidence to back it up.>>
The evidence was the set of data and circumstances that had the crew approaching a point in a way that a reasonable crew would not have done without some type of DME reference – in the absence of any fixed navaid within reception, I was adamant that some local/portable DME set had been used far ahead of even knowing of the existence of CPLS on RAF a/c – that it later emerged that such had been fitted is surely a clear case of QED.
<<If you accepted there were alternative possibilities you would be taken more seriously.>> Oh but I did – for a couple of years: I initially flagged the possibility to the RAF and govt ministers within weeks of the crash as, had a fixed installation been referred to (I did not know at the time that there wasn't one in range), evidence of access to ground equipment may have been lost after a maintenance visit; but this was just in case, I was not blind to other possibilities, just that this angle needed to be covered; I waited patiently for the results of investigations and then sat in on the FAI in Paisley – I found that AAIB's elimination of damage by an explosion (rocket, etc) was justified by detailed examination and explanation but much of the other witnesses (MOD etc) left me with the feeling that basic analysis had not been done, much was omitted and pertinent questions were not clearly answered or indeed met with obfuscation. Years down the track, I was referred to this thread for information and the exchange of views – while I recognise that so many do not want to explore this line for whatever reason, I have found that I have needed to persevere as from time to time I do get a snippet of useful information and, as this would surely be the obvious thread for anyone interested in this crash to read, I have had to re-post certain points as they would otherwise be smothered in the general waffle. I believe the scenario that I have presented does fit with everything that is known about this crash and that, even if it is not wholly correct, it has served as a framework to construct their most likely actions from the available data.
May I suggest that so many of you know in your hearts that something fishy happened here and so you rightly feel a great injustice has been done to the pilots but the implications of a possible contrived crash are just too much for you to contemplate? - so you (collectively speaking) rant against the legal niceties or the airworthiness, like a bull at the red cloak. I have said for years that you do not have to buy the whole conspiracy thing but in following this unpalatable line we have progressed understanding of the circumstances – it may well be just a case of an exercise gone wrong that would have embarrassed your service but we really need to know all there is to know.
<<2. Simple misunderstanding. Man on ground not in the place crew thought he would be.>> so whoever this was and whoever was responsible for the planning of the exercise should be the ones guilty – gets the pilots' names cleared automatically, doesn't it?
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All the recovered data pointed to the intentional approach that I described.
Such data is surely "evidence" of their intentions.
Let's make it really simple:
if you wanted to swing around the light house you need to cross the shoreline at a particular spot before it because you have a significant turning radius at speed;
at their speed, when crossing at waypointA (the LZ they had used before) on a track of 035 (that they were on on that last leg and which was on the HP's HoSI course selector) a banked turn of anything between 30 and 60 gives you plenty of room and (at their height) well clear of the mist running up the slope - BUT you would not want to get that crossing point wrong or come over it unexpectedly soon.
The use of something like CPLS would be the only thing that could explain why they would try it unless they were reckless.
These pilots were very good, unlikely in the extreme to be reckless, and were familiar with that area and low flying in the region and would not have trusted either TANS nor their eyes in those conditions to judge a turn that close in at any kind of speed.
The engine and control dispositions established at impact only fit with sudden awareness and reaction - neither a/c fault nor planned climbs, etc fit - they were surprised at where they were exactly.
Such data is surely "evidence" of their intentions.
Let's make it really simple:
if you wanted to swing around the light house you need to cross the shoreline at a particular spot before it because you have a significant turning radius at speed;
at their speed, when crossing at waypointA (the LZ they had used before) on a track of 035 (that they were on on that last leg and which was on the HP's HoSI course selector) a banked turn of anything between 30 and 60 gives you plenty of room and (at their height) well clear of the mist running up the slope - BUT you would not want to get that crossing point wrong or come over it unexpectedly soon.
The use of something like CPLS would be the only thing that could explain why they would try it unless they were reckless.
These pilots were very good, unlikely in the extreme to be reckless, and were familiar with that area and low flying in the region and would not have trusted either TANS nor their eyes in those conditions to judge a turn that close in at any kind of speed.
The engine and control dispositions established at impact only fit with sudden awareness and reaction - neither a/c fault nor planned climbs, etc fit - they were surprised at where they were exactly.
it should have been considered by the airworthiness crowd just because it was a piece of electronics, shouldn't it?
I have posted the following more than once....
It was noted by a BoI witness that (redacted) classified kit was on board. MoD have declined to say what this was.
The regulations of the day mandated that any classified kit be recorded in a separate section of the RTS. On security grounds, that section could be withheld from those RTS recipients who didn't need to know about the kit; but the existence of the classified section MUST be recorded so that all recipients know what they have in front of them may not be complete. Clearly, Odiham and Aldergrove would have the full RTS (or, in this case, a document "in the form of" an RTS; but omitting the mandated content of an RTS).
However, there is no classified section in the RTS. That means, with 100% certainty, that the regulations governing clearance of said kit were not implemented. It is doubtful if even the most basic work was undertaken by Boscombe or Boeing - both should have had a key role (e.g. Installation Design, Safety Case and EMC). This is supported by the fact that not one single item of Nav or Comms kit onboard had Full or even Limited clearance for use; either in November 1993 when ACAS issued the RTS or on 2nd June 1994.
You continue to denigrate the "airworthiness crowd", whom I assume you take to include the AAIB and RAF Inspectorate of Flight Safety. The former made nine recommendations, all relating to airworthiness - some specific to Chinook, others generic (a reflection of the systemic failings ordered by senior RAF staffs). The latter, 48. Anything that is said on this thread about airworthiness is simply a refection and an extension of their work (as they didn't address the finer details). 14 and 16 years later, respectively, Mr Haddon-Cave made the same recommendations; although again he did not address the detail. That is, the same systemic failings remain (which means there are many who continue to obey orders instead of speaking up).
These are hard, undeniable facts. You may not like them, but please don't denigrate those who deal in these facts when, as others have said, you have not produced a shred of evidence to support your theory. As ever, I agree your theory is technically possible. I don't have a theory. I simply reiterate the facts that the Chinook HC Mk2 RTS was 99% non-compliant with the regulations and there was no proper clearance to fly it.
That is an Organisational Fault of the highest magnitude and, in my opinion, raises doubt about the safety of the verdict against the pilots. I would go further - as the senior staffs involved had, for some years, been warned of the likely outcome of their anti-airworthiness policies, yet made quite deliberate decisions to not only ignore the warnings but issue orders to compromise airworthiness even further, then their actions amount to criminal negligence. Again, that is not just my opinion, it is a simple statement of fact supported by internal MoD audit reports from January 1988 and June 1996; illustrating again a timeframe that spans Mull of Kintyre.
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Tuc
So the large number of people (eg Ralph's team) looking at airworthiness have identified what that kit was and evaluated its possible relevance to the crash?
Why not - It was a long time ago - so does it still need to be classified?
Why is it so taboo?
SFFP
Just what form would the evidence (acceptable to you) have to take? A written plan signed by the pilots as opposed to the intentions deduced from ample data? The latter would surely be more relevant as it was what they did.
The logical conclusions as to their intentions (from the analysis of all the available data) get as far at least as to rubbish the original official statements pointing to negligence (eg the "inappropriate rate of climb") and the airworthiness arguments (as meaningful control was demonstrated).
I agree that any proof to date that CPLS was actually used is circumstantial - eg in what circumstances would such a crew make such an approach (as evidenced from the available data) in such conditions? and why would the forward loadmaster be where he was instead of being at the side window? etc, etc. Of course someone would know and a sworn statement would be nice and it is those who may know that my post of the team members on board was meant to shame into action.
So the large number of people (eg Ralph's team) looking at airworthiness have identified what that kit was and evaluated its possible relevance to the crash?
Why not - It was a long time ago - so does it still need to be classified?
Why is it so taboo?
SFFP
Just what form would the evidence (acceptable to you) have to take? A written plan signed by the pilots as opposed to the intentions deduced from ample data? The latter would surely be more relevant as it was what they did.
The logical conclusions as to their intentions (from the analysis of all the available data) get as far at least as to rubbish the original official statements pointing to negligence (eg the "inappropriate rate of climb") and the airworthiness arguments (as meaningful control was demonstrated).
I agree that any proof to date that CPLS was actually used is circumstantial - eg in what circumstances would such a crew make such an approach (as evidenced from the available data) in such conditions? and why would the forward loadmaster be where he was instead of being at the side window? etc, etc. Of course someone would know and a sworn statement would be nice and it is those who may know that my post of the team members on board was meant to shame into action.
Walter
I cannot speak for anyone else but I very much doubt if private individuals have the resources at hand, for example a REG equivalent, to carry out the mandated testing and trialling necessary to clear such equipment for any level of use.
Any such individuals would say that they have no need to, because their primary aim is to demonstrate the regulations were dangerously breached by MoD, knowingly placing aircrew at unnecessary risk. Having gathered that evidence and presented it to the Review, it is for Lord Philip to assess if could have been a contributory factor. If it was, then I suggest that is sufficient to clear the pilots.
On the other hand, you seek to explain the precise cause of the crash. May I suggest that any reply from Lord Philip to your theory will be along the lines of "Interesting, but not in my remit". He may also say "Thank you for drawing attention to systemic airworthiness failures (because CPLS was not mentioned in the RTS or Aircraft Data Set). You may be interested to know Boscombe Down, the RAF Inspectorate of Flight Safety and AAIB are like-minded".
As I've said before, you denigrate the airworthiness issue, but your theory actually relies upon the airworthiness regulations being serially breached. It would be a pre-requisite to even attempting to hide the paperwork trail, as many here have told you.
I cannot speak for anyone else but I very much doubt if private individuals have the resources at hand, for example a REG equivalent, to carry out the mandated testing and trialling necessary to clear such equipment for any level of use.
Any such individuals would say that they have no need to, because their primary aim is to demonstrate the regulations were dangerously breached by MoD, knowingly placing aircrew at unnecessary risk. Having gathered that evidence and presented it to the Review, it is for Lord Philip to assess if could have been a contributory factor. If it was, then I suggest that is sufficient to clear the pilots.
On the other hand, you seek to explain the precise cause of the crash. May I suggest that any reply from Lord Philip to your theory will be along the lines of "Interesting, but not in my remit". He may also say "Thank you for drawing attention to systemic airworthiness failures (because CPLS was not mentioned in the RTS or Aircraft Data Set). You may be interested to know Boscombe Down, the RAF Inspectorate of Flight Safety and AAIB are like-minded".
As I've said before, you denigrate the airworthiness issue, but your theory actually relies upon the airworthiness regulations being serially breached. It would be a pre-requisite to even attempting to hide the paperwork trail, as many here have told you.