Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Do you have a shred of evidence to show the crew were not VMC and flying at a sensible speed for the conditions?
Let me emphasis once again. Wratten's published judgement was based on the conditions at waypoint change.
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All this talk about the definition of what Fog is and what Hill fog is and whether they were VFR or IFR is irrelevant. The weather could have been Blue-Blue and they could have still been IFR.
The question is, were they VMC? Were they clear of cloud and in sight of the surface and the answer is clearly No. They were IMC and below their Safety Altitude. They should have turned around.
They were unprofessional and displayed poor airmanship - but they were not grossly negligent.
The question is, were they VMC? Were they clear of cloud and in sight of the surface and the answer is clearly No. They were IMC and below their Safety Altitude. They should have turned around.
They were unprofessional and displayed poor airmanship - but they were not grossly negligent.
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The Cause of the accident was because the crew flew the aircraft into the ground. The Safety Altitude was 5,900 feet. The aircraft impacted at 810 feet Therefore it was below the Safety Altitude. Why didn't they take avoiding action? Did they see the Mull of Kintyre? If they did see it why didn't they avoid it? If they didn't see it , why didn't they see it? Were they looking out? Were they clear of cloud? - Quite probably although that has not been determined. Were they in sight of the surface? Well if they could see the surface they why did they fly into it? If they couldn't see the surface then what were they doing about not being able to see the surface when they knew exactly where they were and they knew that they were below the SALT?
But they were not grossly negligent.
But they were not grossly negligent.
As a non-pilot, may I ask why there is such a huge discrepancy between the various Safety Altitude theories we read here. Vec says 5900; another poster PM'd me today adamant it was 2400 feet. Both clearly believe they are correct. Are the rules for such things not well articulated?
I'm a mere engineer. The rules in my world are hammered into you from Day 1. For example, when Boscombe Down say "positively dangerous", "not airworthy", "not cleared to any level" and " should not be released for Service Use" we're taught to pin back lugholes and pay attention - it means you don't have a draft Release to Service and a pen in the same vicinity. (ACAS was obviously AWOL on his Day 1).
So;
(a) Why did he sign, and,
(b) In doing so, why did he withhold Boscombe's statements from Users?
That he did both is irrefutable. Is that negligence? Maladministration? Failure of Duty of Care? Or just rank Incompetence? Or, perhaps he was ordered to. Would that order be illegal?
I think we should be told.
I'm a mere engineer. The rules in my world are hammered into you from Day 1. For example, when Boscombe Down say "positively dangerous", "not airworthy", "not cleared to any level" and " should not be released for Service Use" we're taught to pin back lugholes and pay attention - it means you don't have a draft Release to Service and a pen in the same vicinity. (ACAS was obviously AWOL on his Day 1).
So;
(a) Why did he sign, and,
(b) In doing so, why did he withhold Boscombe's statements from Users?
That he did both is irrefutable. Is that negligence? Maladministration? Failure of Duty of Care? Or just rank Incompetence? Or, perhaps he was ordered to. Would that order be illegal?
I think we should be told.
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Thats because the different services have different methods for calculating the safety altitude. However, in essence it is irrelevant as 810 feet would have been beneath any services Safety Altitude.
Flt Lt Tapper had calculated that his safety altitude for the leg between the Mull and Corran as being 5,900 feet.
Flt Lt Tapper had calculated that his safety altitude for the leg between the Mull and Corran as being 5,900 feet.
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The Cause of the accident was because the crew flew the aircraft into the ground. You know for certain that the aircraft was serviceable at the time of the crash The Safety Altitude was 5,900 feet. The aircraft impacted at 810 feet Therefore it was below the Safety Altitude. Would that be a factor if they were clear of cloud and in sight of the ground Why didn't they take avoiding action? Did they see the Mull of Kintyre? If they did see it why didn't they avoid it? If they didn't see it , why didn't they see it? Were they looking out? Were they clear of cloud? - Quite probably although that has not been determined. Were they in sight of the surface? Well if they could see the surface they why did they fly into it? If they couldn't see the surface then what were they doing about not being able to see the surface when they knew exactly where they were and they knew that they were below the SALT?
But they were not grossly negligent.
The Safety Altitude was 5,900 feet. The aircraft impacted at 810 feet Therefore it was below the Safety Altitude. Would that be a factor if they were clear of cloud and in sight of the ground Why didn't they take avoiding action? Did they see the Mull of Kintyre? If they did see it why didn't they avoid it? If they didn't see it , why didn't they see it? Were they looking out? Were they clear of cloud? - Quite probably although that has not been determined. Were they in sight of the surface? Well if they could see the surface they why did they fly into it? If they couldn't see the surface then what were they doing about not being able to see the surface when they knew exactly where they were and they knew that they were below the SALT?But they were not grossly negligent.
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Safety Altitude
Safety Altitude is that which will keep you not less than 1000 feet above terrain five miles either side of track or ahead of you.
The SA for the leg Mull-Corran was 5900' because of higher ground near Corran.
The SA at the Mull was 2400 feet because that would have kept the aircraft 1000 feet above the highest point on the Mull and there was no higher ground less than five miles ahead.
You would need to consult the map to see when 2400 feet would no longer have been applicable, ie, because of higher terrain.
First sentence should read, "Safety Altitude 'in IMC',"
The SA for the leg Mull-Corran was 5900' because of higher ground near Corran.
The SA at the Mull was 2400 feet because that would have kept the aircraft 1000 feet above the highest point on the Mull and there was no higher ground less than five miles ahead.
You would need to consult the map to see when 2400 feet would no longer have been applicable, ie, because of higher terrain.
First sentence should read, "Safety Altitude 'in IMC',"
Last edited by Boslandew; 14th Nov 2010 at 19:21. Reason: Omission
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you have no idea as to what actually caused the crash
Safety Altitude is that which will keep you not less than 1000 feet above terrain five miles either side of track or ahead of you.
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Originally Posted by vecvechookattack
The crash was caused by the pilots flying the aircraft into the ground. There is no dispute about that fact.
Despite all that has been written here, I'm still none the wiser.
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If you do then your statement would be correct however if you don't your statement is in fact nothing more than a personal opinion, or did I miss something.
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Vec and SFFP
I think you are both in violent agreement with eachother!
Of course, any sane person can see that, without CVR/ADR, there will always remain an element of doubt as to what actually happened.
Regards (IMC) safety altitude, it would have been be good airmanship to be at the SAlt for the next leg BEFORE the next turning point (remember 'pre HAT' checks anyone?). This is what I was taught when a student and later on the OCU and what I, in turn, said as an instructor. If the SAlt for the next leg was 5900ft, it meant that, if trying to climb and 'fly the plan' at IMC altitudes, ZD576 would have to have climbed to 5900ft amsl on QNH before they got to the Mull! 5900ft would then have sensibly become FL65 (extra 450 ft due low local QNH of 998mb) and thence FL75 for the correct quadrantal for the leg to Mull/FL65 again for the leg to Corran. If the crew were using the Belfast RPS (highly likely) and it was 996mb or below, then it would have been good airmanship for the 5900ft to have become FL75 to Mull and FL85 to Corran .....all of which are easily above icing layer of approx 2500ft (don't forget the OAT guage was only accurate to +/- 1 deg C) - which is why the IMC option never existed. I suspect that the crew were well aware of this and why they were mightily cheesed off that the Mk1 was u/s - not only for the icing limitation but also as the Mk2 nav kit was not cleared for use in IMC in the fabrication of an RTS!
This then begs the question - why try a cruise clmib at all? (as the explanation that the BoI came up with). I don't believe the crew would ever have considered this option, as I understand the SH procedure was to slow down/turn back, do a turn emergency 180 deg or, in extremis, do an rapid max climb to the emergency safe altitude - in Scotland, generally held to be 6500ft amsl (Ben Nevis). Obviously, ZD576 was doing none of things - so either they were happy with the viz and their visual position relative to the Mull, there was a visual illusion, distraction or disorientation....or they couldn't manoeuvre for some reason (UFCM or Engine/FADEC problem).
Doubt? Oh yes, mountains of it!
I think you are both in violent agreement with eachother!
Of course, any sane person can see that, without CVR/ADR, there will always remain an element of doubt as to what actually happened.
Regards (IMC) safety altitude, it would have been be good airmanship to be at the SAlt for the next leg BEFORE the next turning point (remember 'pre HAT' checks anyone?). This is what I was taught when a student and later on the OCU and what I, in turn, said as an instructor. If the SAlt for the next leg was 5900ft, it meant that, if trying to climb and 'fly the plan' at IMC altitudes, ZD576 would have to have climbed to 5900ft amsl on QNH before they got to the Mull! 5900ft would then have sensibly become FL65 (extra 450 ft due low local QNH of 998mb) and thence FL75 for the correct quadrantal for the leg to Mull/FL65 again for the leg to Corran. If the crew were using the Belfast RPS (highly likely) and it was 996mb or below, then it would have been good airmanship for the 5900ft to have become FL75 to Mull and FL85 to Corran .....all of which are easily above icing layer of approx 2500ft (don't forget the OAT guage was only accurate to +/- 1 deg C) - which is why the IMC option never existed. I suspect that the crew were well aware of this and why they were mightily cheesed off that the Mk1 was u/s - not only for the icing limitation but also as the Mk2 nav kit was not cleared for use in IMC in the fabrication of an RTS!
This then begs the question - why try a cruise clmib at all? (as the explanation that the BoI came up with). I don't believe the crew would ever have considered this option, as I understand the SH procedure was to slow down/turn back, do a turn emergency 180 deg or, in extremis, do an rapid max climb to the emergency safe altitude - in Scotland, generally held to be 6500ft amsl (Ben Nevis). Obviously, ZD576 was doing none of things - so either they were happy with the viz and their visual position relative to the Mull, there was a visual illusion, distraction or disorientation....or they couldn't manoeuvre for some reason (UFCM or Engine/FADEC problem).
Doubt? Oh yes, mountains of it!
Just to be clear, VVHA (can't you get a shorter handle)
The form of your first sentence above implies that the pilots were in control of the CH2 at the time of impact. There is no conclusive evidence that that was the case, and a great deal to imply that it might not have been the case. Therefore, your second sentence above is false.
If your first sentence was corrected to 'The crash occured when the aircraft flew into the ground' then agreed, there is no dispute.
The crash was caused by the pilots flying the aircraft into the ground. There is no dispute about that fact.
If your first sentence was corrected to 'The crash occured when the aircraft flew into the ground' then agreed, there is no dispute.
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SAlt
VVHA
In my last, I was attempting to answer Tucumsah's query. 5900 feet is the SAlt for the complete leg, Mull - Corrin, 2400 feet is the SALt in the area within 5nm of the highest point on the Mull.
Leaving aside radar-flown/SF aircraft whose limits are presumably restricted, I cannot believe that anyone flies overland IMC less than 1000 feet above the highest ground.
SAlt above the sea is not really relevant here.
In my last, I was attempting to answer Tucumsah's query. 5900 feet is the SAlt for the complete leg, Mull - Corrin, 2400 feet is the SALt in the area within 5nm of the highest point on the Mull.
Leaving aside radar-flown/SF aircraft whose limits are presumably restricted, I cannot believe that anyone flies overland IMC less than 1000 feet above the highest ground.
SAlt above the sea is not really relevant here.
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Out of interest, let's try removing the weather from the equation and imagine that it was a gin-clear day, and let's suppose that an eye witness saw the whole thing.
He/she described the aircraft rolling very slowly to starboard at about 400 ft until, having passed 90 degs of bank, the nose was dropping below the horizon, rate of roll increased somewhat and the aircraft rolled almost all the way round, nose dropping all the time. Eventually, the nose started to rise, but it hit the rising ground, still sinking, with the nose above the horizon and a few degs of left bank.
What would your hypothesis be regarding the cause of the crash? Unauthorised aerobatics? (In a Chinook?!)
Would you reach for the 'Grossly Negligent' rubber stamp?
Or might you wonder if some unknown unserviceability had led to a loss of control leading to a loss of several hundred feet of altitude and catastrophic impact with the ground?
Remember, you have no ADR and no CVR. Oh, and the Chinook is known to suffer from electrical and mechanical disconnects within the Flt Ctrl system, spurious engine faults caused by immature FADEC software and prone to UFCMs.
Any doubt whatsoever?
He/she described the aircraft rolling very slowly to starboard at about 400 ft until, having passed 90 degs of bank, the nose was dropping below the horizon, rate of roll increased somewhat and the aircraft rolled almost all the way round, nose dropping all the time. Eventually, the nose started to rise, but it hit the rising ground, still sinking, with the nose above the horizon and a few degs of left bank.
What would your hypothesis be regarding the cause of the crash? Unauthorised aerobatics? (In a Chinook?!)
Would you reach for the 'Grossly Negligent' rubber stamp?
Or might you wonder if some unknown unserviceability had led to a loss of control leading to a loss of several hundred feet of altitude and catastrophic impact with the ground?
Remember, you have no ADR and no CVR. Oh, and the Chinook is known to suffer from electrical and mechanical disconnects within the Flt Ctrl system, spurious engine faults caused by immature FADEC software and prone to UFCMs.
Any doubt whatsoever?
Many thanks for the replies -re SALT.
To summarise, the ROs got it wrong by at least 3000' and in doing so rather missed the point that to fly, never mind fly under IFR, one really should have an aircraft cleared to do so, with the necessary instruments with the necessary clearances.
I see flaws and doubt where MoD sees absolute certainty.
To summarise, the ROs got it wrong by at least 3000' and in doing so rather missed the point that to fly, never mind fly under IFR, one really should have an aircraft cleared to do so, with the necessary instruments with the necessary clearances.
I see flaws and doubt where MoD sees absolute certainty.
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meadowbank
QUOTE
The one thing that you cannot do is exclude the weather from this tragedy.
I totally agree.
The Investigating BOI stated that the forecast weather " was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
As BEagle has pointed out before now, that was a slightly odd way of putting things. To express it slightly differently I would suggest that it should have read that the forecast weather " was suitable for the flight, but would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
Therefore the Chinook should have been at or above Safety Altitude as it approached the Mull and should only have descended to low level again once it was demonstrably certain that the weather conditions permitted flight in accordance with VFR.
The crew did not so do - with tragic results.
QUOTE
The one thing that you cannot do is exclude the weather from this tragedy.
I totally agree.
The Investigating BOI stated that the forecast weather " was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
As BEagle has pointed out before now, that was a slightly odd way of putting things. To express it slightly differently I would suggest that it should have read that the forecast weather " was suitable for the flight, but would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
Therefore the Chinook should have been at or above Safety Altitude as it approached the Mull and should only have descended to low level again once it was demonstrably certain that the weather conditions permitted flight in accordance with VFR.
The crew did not so do - with tragic results.
The Investigating BOI stated that the forecast weather
