Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[meadowbank]

John Purdey,

In response to my recent lengthy submission, you simply asked:

Meadowbank. I think you might do well to take the hint from so many other contributers, including me, that this whole story should now be allowed to rest until we see the findings of the new Inquiry; do you not agree?

I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and assume that you weren't being patronising, but I'm afraid I don't agree and it is disappointing that one as eloquent as yourself has once again not offered us all the benefit of a constructive response.

If the MoD had overturned the finding of Gross Negligence when no grounds were found for it by the House of Lords Select Committee , we (the campaigners) would have all given ourselves a big pat on the back and gone away. However, because the MoD has continued to defend what amounts to a manslaughter conviction on Messrs Tapper and Cook, further digging has uncovered a horrible mess that threatens to implicate many senior officers who were complicit in hurrying the immature Chinook Mk2 into service.

With best wishes,

Meadowbank

PS. The asssumption that the pilots were negligent because they flew into a hill covered in cloud is akin to assuming a body floating face-down in a swimming pool has drowned. But then, you wouldn't make that mistake, would you?

[tucumseh]

However, because the MoD has continued to defend what amounts to a manslaughter conviction on Messrs Tapper and Cook, further digging has uncovered a horrible mess that threatens to implicate many senior officers who were complicit in hurrying the immature Chinook Mk2 into service.

Well said Meadowbank. The tragedy is that, despite Haddon-Cave reiterating these systemic failings there are still those who deny them. Despite CDP giving evidence to the Public Accounts Committee of one of the most serious failings occurring on Chinook, there are those who insist Haddon-Cave simply doesn't apply to Chinook. We have the ludicrous situation now whereby one MoD department provides the November 1993 Release to Service under FoI, while at the same time another insists there was no such thing as an RTS until 1996! I do hope MoD get their story straight for Lord Philip, but in case they don't he's been told the truth and provided with the necessary papers.

What strikes me about all this is that, while MoD is very agitated at being "found out", they have made no effort whatsoever to identify the individuals whose actions led directly to their current problems. They'd rather shoot the messenger. Despite numerous warnings remaining on record since the late 80s, who is responsible for refusing to take action? Demonstrably, a series of fatal accidents would have been avoided. May as well include such questions in Lord Philip's brief as the same names will crop up.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Meadowbank. No, not patronising. As to continuing the discussion, please yourself; I have had my say. With renewed good wishes. John Purdey

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

tuc,

Back at post 6723 you gave a very detailed explanation with regards to previous AMSO's and their complicity in the complete destruction of the airworthiness system.

I sincerely hope their names are on the list for Lord Philip's consideration and I hope they are subsequently exposed for their part in this shameful matter.

[dalek]

I am off for two weeks fishing in British Columbia, so I may be out of the loop for a while. Mr RACAL expert (if you are out there), one final question.

To know where and when the crew made a manual selection to the new waypoint, your analysis would have to tell you the exact time and sequence of switch selection and button pushing?

If it could do this, how come there is no mention of Display Power Switch ON to OFF?

Bye for now.

[meadowbank]

John Purdey

Once again, you duck the issue by claiming to have had your say when you're against the ropes.

Meadowbank. No, not patronising. As to continuing the discussion, please yourself; I have had my say. With renewed good wishes. John Purdey

This is tantamount to sticking your head in the sand or sticking your fingers in your ears and repeating "Not Listening" over and over again. Shame really as you have such an eloquent pen when it suits you!

I predict you'll be back, blindly supporting their airships!

Thank you, though, for the good wishes, which I'm happy to reciprocate,

MB

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Meadowbank. Many thanks, but I am not going to be provoked. See my earlier posts; I have nothing to add. Regards Jp

[Robin Clark]

JP ...I find that I must take issue with your 6770......although I agree with you that they were off course and heading for high ground...............I think that the Foghorn confusion is unlikely to say the least..........

..you appear to have accepted , what might at first seem , to be a plausible suggestion without doing any research to check further.....

..at waypoint change they had 30 second to run to the waypoint itself , which was on a heading from them of 018 degrees true........their track 021 true.....
...then some mere 8 to ten seconds later they pass the foghorn , which is on their starboard side......
...so...
1...it is too early...
2...it is on the wrong side of the aircraft track......
3...it is on a short section of East-West aligned coast , instead of North-South coastline......
4...it is tiny in comparison sizewise.....to the lighthouse complex.......
5...if they could see it at all , they could see all of it ........and it doesnt have a 1.5 million candlepower light flashing on top of it .........


...a student PPL on his/her first solo X-country might panic and make such a mistake....... but surely not these guys.....

rgds Robin....


......link.......

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Robin. Please do not think me discourteous nor dismissive of your opinions, but i really have nothing to add to my many earlier posts. With all good wishes, JP

[Ralph Kohn]

Gentlemen

This letter appeared in the September 2010 issue of RAeS Aerospace Professional Monthly.

This site, detailing the work so far of we 3 Fellows may also be of interest.

http://sites.google.com/site/heathwaypilot/home

Ralph Kohn (FRAeS)

[MrBernoulli]

See my earlier posts; I have nothing to add.

Please do not think me discourteous nor dismissive of your opinions, but i really have nothing to add to my many earlier posts.

We can but hope that there is nothing more for JP to add.

[meadowbank]

Calling all RAF Chinook Aircrew

From the Kohn report:

8.4
To illustrate the number of engine problems, these accounted for a fourth of all Chinook mishaps in the (United States Services) Financial Year 1998. The areas that most needed attention are the torque-metering system and power controls. The Chinook community is anxiously waiting the fielding of the upgrade T-55GA-714A engine which will bring improvements to all areas of the
power plant, including the full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) system. The T-55GA-714A engine has proved itself on special-operations aircraft where it drastically reduced the number of engine related accidents.
(Source : Flightfax December 1998 issue)

Q1. Have the the torque-metering system and power controls been modified since the Mull of Kintyre crash in June 1994?

Q2. Do RAF Chinooks have the T-55GA-714A engine (or an equivalent model) and, if so, was this retro-fitted at some stage since June 1994?

[BOAC]

Any news of how the MOD 'review' of evidence is going and when Lord Philip will start?

[tucumseh]

Any news of how the MOD 'review' of evidence is going and when Lord Philip will start?

The initial, and only, announcement was that Lord Philip would sit in private and only consider existing evidence.

As MoD have consistently said all "new" evidence already exists, that means he should consider all evidence, but we know (don't we?) that this is not what MoD intend.

It would seem The Philip Review is not to be conducted in the same way as Mr Haddon-Cave's, in that a public call for evidence has not been made and no address supplied to submit evidence to. However, Lord Philip's address is easily found and, in my opinion, justice would be best served if submissions were made by "interested parties" only. That is, family.

What isn't known is whether Lord Philip is to be "assisted" by an MoD-supplied Filtering Team, whereby irrelevant (i.e. embarrassing) evidence doesn't reach him. It would help to know if his review is being conducted from an MoD office, as was Haddon-Cave's, in which case one should expect MoD to intercept his e-mails as well.

Bottom line - write to him direct, recorded delivery; but don't expect a reply if you are not family. If you are not family, write via your MP.


BTW, I did say previously that all I wished to say had been submitted, but I'll be amending mine because the systemic airworthiness failings baseline has now been pushed back to mid-1987 (11 years before Haddon-Cave's) - the implementation by AMSO of a policy that wasted hundreds of millions and effectively froze all airworthiness work for 5 years. Or, at least, the letter calling for a re-evaluation of the policy is dated July 1992, but it took another 2 years to re-establish the funding that had been cut, with no retrospective action to fill the gaps (risks) created by AMSO from 87-94. No wonder people in that area at the time don't want this "new" evidence heard!


Sorry, edited to clarify that MoD(PE), Service Users and Sponsors had been calling for re-evaluation since 14th January 1988 (the day after the policy was mentioned in THESBAC, as it was not advertised in-house while being developed the previous year); the letter I refer to is the first internal AMSO admission that the 1989 audit was correct (£Many00Ms knowingly wasted and, consequently, airworthiness compromised).

[Chugalug2]

So the net spreads wider and wider. The initial attack on UK Military Airworthiness now posted as 1987, the originator the then AMSO. One man and one initiative, and with seemingly inevitable consequence UK Military Airworthiness provision, with all its checks and counterbalances, is unpeeled until a Grossly Unairworthy aircraft type is issued with an RTS by ACAS, followed equally inevitably by the subsequent crash, the worst in RAF history. Some initiative! Some effect!

[cazatou]

meadowbank

Re your 6798.

The Investigating BOI stated in their Report that the Forecast Weather "was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."

To put that another way - the Forecast Weather "was suitable for the flight but would have precluded flight in accordance with VFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."

The weather encompassing the Mull of Kintyre - as testified to by numerous persons (including two trained Met Observers) on the Mull at the time of the crash - was drastically below acceptable limits for an aircraft to be flying at low level at a groundspeed in the order of 150 kts. As the BOI put it - "Any visual contact with the Mull or Lighthouse in the prevailing weather conditions should have prompted a reduction in height and speed well below those at impact."

There was no Distress Call or Emergency Squawk - nor was there any evidence that the Passengers and Crew were prepared in any way for a crash landing. Indeed, there was no evidence that the Pilots were in any way concerned in respect of the perilous position they were in until the desperate apparent attempt at an escape manouvre just prior to impact.

Of course if the Crew Roster had been scheduled to use BOTH crews (in view of the heavy tasking load that day) then the second Crew would have had plenty of time to have adjusted the Flight Plan for the evening sortie to & avoid the poor weather and without any risk of exceeding Crew Duty Time. If that had been done then the days Tasking could have proceeded with one experienced Chinook Pilot as Captain for each sortie.

Just so I make myself absolutely clear on that point - the Chinook Detatchment were In-Theatre to assist the Civil and Military Authorities of the UK in the face of Armed Insurrection - they were not there to have every other day off!! Moreover, to have the 2 experienced Pilots in one Crew and the relatively inexperienced (on type) RN Pilot coupled with a Navigator in the other Crew was a most bizarre Crew Roster.

[tucumseh]

was drastically below acceptable limits for an aircraft

What was drastically below acceptable (indeed, mandated) limits for an aircraft was the Release to Service which was, frankly, a fabrication.

the desperate apparent attempt at an escape manoeuvre just prior to impact

Perfect description of events immediately following UFCM, reported by both senior Test Pilot (Sqn Ldr Burke) and RAF Handling Sqn at Boscombe; and as stated in RTS (depending what version you have and whether or not you believe MoD’s new claim there was no such thing as an RTS in 1994). All withheld from the BoI, or not reported by them.

Just so I make myself absolutely clear on that point - the Chinook Detachment were In-Theatre to assist the Civil and Military Authorities of the UK in the face of Armed Insurrection - they were not there to have every other day off!! Moreover, to have the 2 experienced Pilots in one Crew and the relatively inexperienced (on type) RN Pilot coupled with a Navigator in the other Crew was a most bizarre Crew Roster.

Even as non-aircrew I see your point, but is this not another example of “Organisational Fault” which, again, the BoI did not address, even though required to?

[Chugalug2]

caz, well done for at least posting when so many of the MOD apologists are conspicuous by their absence. However I find it strange that following a post by Ralph Kohn, reproducing his letter written on behalf of the three Fellows and published in the RAes Aerospace publication, you make no reference to it. Here we have a call to expose the scandal of 2 decades of deliberate suborning of the Airworthiness Regulations by the MOD and you want to crack on about a detachment roster of 16 years ago!

Tuc's post (echoed by mine) pinning the start of that MOD attack on the UK Military Airworthiness System to an AMSO initiative taken in 1987 is similarly unworthy of comment it seems compared to your old standby of the forecast weather in the "vicinity" of the Mull! The "vicinity" as we have heard could be as little as a few feet, due to the peculiar orographic effects common to the Mull.

So how about we all take a deep wiff of the coffee as presented rather than stuffing our fingers in our ears and chanting "I can't hear you, I can't hear you!"

This aircraft was Grossly Unairworthy as a result of deliberate measures taken by RAF Senior Officers both at the time and for up to 7 years previously. That is the scandal and that is what should now be the subject of review.

[Cows getting bigger]

There are two separate questions here:

a. Is there any doubt as to the crew's negligence in hitting the Mull?
b. Is there any doubt as to the MOD's negligence in bringing the Mk2 into service prior to the Mull crash?

[sycamore]

Cazatou,as you seem to have been `nearer` the action than most of us,could you possibly supply any answer to my question posed at #6734/ p 337,or any clarification ??