Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Head of RAF Talking Rubbish
In the Telegraph today :Head of Royal Air Force talking 'rubbish' over 1994 Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash - Telegraph
Plus a couple of letters which, once again, I cannot find the link.
Plus a couple of letters which, once again, I cannot find the link.
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They were hiding pulse;
Why the Defence Secretary should overturn the Chinook negligence verdict
SIR – Your leading article (January 5) suggests that the RAF may be “trying to hide something”. This is challenged by Air Chief Marshals Graydon and Alcock (Letters, January 7), who ask how something could be hidden for so long.
Well, something still is hidden. Since the Chinook disaster in 1994, the RAF and MoD have covered up an MoD Boscombe flight-test report on the helicopter’s (1993) engine computer system Fadec. This is new evidence because it is “airworthiness critical” and unexamined by any inquiry.
The RAF board of inquiry did not examine the Boscombe report, and it could not find the cause. Two air marshals subsequently blamed the dead pilots for gross negligence.
The Boscombe report has never been published. No subsequent inquiry – judicial, parliamentary or professional – has evaluated it. Not even the defence minister at the time, Malcolm Rifkind, knew the contents of the report.
Leaks suggested that, before the crash, Chinook ZD576’s engine computer system was unacceptable to Boscombe’s engineers and test pilots. It was prone to uncommanded power fluctuations, including sudden revving up.
Was the crew of ZD576, when about to make a scheduled left turn away from high ground, suddenly distracted by an engine run-up? We shall never know. It is possible. But the RAF did not give the pilots the benefit of any doubt. They found gross pilot negligence. Under RAF rules, only “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” allowed a finding of negligence.
If they were worried, and still are, about what the Boscombe Fadec report would reveal about their decision to allow this aircraft to carry VVIPs, no matter. The Secretary of State can set aside the negligence verdict with a stroke of his pen without further cost or inquiries, redeeming the honour of the RAF and, above all, of the pilots concerned.
Michael Ramsden
Welwyn, Hertfordshire
SIR – What is the attraction of conspiracy theories? President Kennedy was killed by Lee Harvey Oswald. The Chinook pilots flew into high ground in bad weather.
Flt Lt R.H. Statham RAF (retd)
Langport, Somerset
Why the Defence Secretary should overturn the Chinook negligence verdict
SIR – Your leading article (January 5) suggests that the RAF may be “trying to hide something”. This is challenged by Air Chief Marshals Graydon and Alcock (Letters, January 7), who ask how something could be hidden for so long.
Well, something still is hidden. Since the Chinook disaster in 1994, the RAF and MoD have covered up an MoD Boscombe flight-test report on the helicopter’s (1993) engine computer system Fadec. This is new evidence because it is “airworthiness critical” and unexamined by any inquiry.
The RAF board of inquiry did not examine the Boscombe report, and it could not find the cause. Two air marshals subsequently blamed the dead pilots for gross negligence.
The Boscombe report has never been published. No subsequent inquiry – judicial, parliamentary or professional – has evaluated it. Not even the defence minister at the time, Malcolm Rifkind, knew the contents of the report.
Leaks suggested that, before the crash, Chinook ZD576’s engine computer system was unacceptable to Boscombe’s engineers and test pilots. It was prone to uncommanded power fluctuations, including sudden revving up.
Was the crew of ZD576, when about to make a scheduled left turn away from high ground, suddenly distracted by an engine run-up? We shall never know. It is possible. But the RAF did not give the pilots the benefit of any doubt. They found gross pilot negligence. Under RAF rules, only “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” allowed a finding of negligence.
If they were worried, and still are, about what the Boscombe Fadec report would reveal about their decision to allow this aircraft to carry VVIPs, no matter. The Secretary of State can set aside the negligence verdict with a stroke of his pen without further cost or inquiries, redeeming the honour of the RAF and, above all, of the pilots concerned.
Michael Ramsden
Welwyn, Hertfordshire
SIR – What is the attraction of conspiracy theories? President Kennedy was killed by Lee Harvey Oswald. The Chinook pilots flew into high ground in bad weather.
Flt Lt R.H. Statham RAF (retd)
Langport, Somerset
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If I was personally affected by this tragedy I would now test this new evidence through the civil court system by way of a modest compensation claim for gross negligence against an individual OR the MoD.
Dalton appears to be acting as a mouthpiece of the Government.
Unbelievably, he has admitted that the MoD were aware of the "positively dangerous" software, and in doing so, has admitted that the RAF and MoD were grossly negligent in providing clearances to fly. There isn't a court in the land that would now uphold the verdict imposed by individuals in the RAF, that the pilots were grossly negligent.
The Government and Dalton appear to be trying to suppress new evidence; just side step them and test out the new evidence in the civil courts.
Dalton appears to be acting as a mouthpiece of the Government.
Unbelievably, he has admitted that the MoD were aware of the "positively dangerous" software, and in doing so, has admitted that the RAF and MoD were grossly negligent in providing clearances to fly. There isn't a court in the land that would now uphold the verdict imposed by individuals in the RAF, that the pilots were grossly negligent.
The Government and Dalton appear to be trying to suppress new evidence; just side step them and test out the new evidence in the civil courts.
Last edited by nigegilb; 9th Jan 2010 at 16:23.
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Chinook
Ralph Kohn. Your expert opinions are of course not to be taken lightly, and it would therefore be very interesting to know what you think of ACM Dalton's statement that : "In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
Regards JP
Regards JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 9th Jan 2010 at 15:10. Reason: finger trouble!
Ralph Kohn. Your expert opinions are of course not to be taken lightly, and it would therefore be very interesting to know what you think of ACM Dalton's statement that : "In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
Regards JP
Regards JP
"In a nutshell, had those responsible for the CAR and RTS not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern their issue, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did, because the aircraft would be still undergoing test and evaluation".
JP, the pilots may or may not have been negligent, I do not know and nor can you; but the Staffs responsible for ignoring Boscombe demonstrably were.
(a) Where is the evidence they sought alternate independent advice and this persuaded them Boscombe were wrong, and,
(b) Where is the evidence of the mandated conflict resolution process whereby CA and ACAS agree the above, before CA signs the CAR and offers it to ACAS?
Given the above would have had to take place between 12th October 1993 (Boscombe's unequivocal advice NOT to grant CA Release) and 9th November 1993 (CA signing said CA Release), I can assure you the timescales are impossible. Any trials officer who has ever worked at Boscombe will tell you this, as will anyone who has ever managed an aircraft project. Especially as the baseline from which they had to conduct this 4 weeks work was only a fraction of safety critical code checked in FADEC, with hundreds of problems. Never mind the subsequent clearance work on new, affected or disturbed systems which, in October/November, would be at the mercy of winter weather and probable flight cancellations. Then the minor matter of re-booking the REG, which usually had to be done 2 years in advance, such was the call on it. And so on...........
Bottom line. JSP318 and CA Instructions were flouted and a grossly immature aircraft released to service; compounded by the order to use it for a VVIP flight. That is gross negligence.
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Given the serious charge that you have laid out above, it is now imperative that we discover the source of the claim made by Dalton, that this does not constitute new evidence.
Did he take the advice of the Attorney General? Or is he providing a personal opinion, in which case, what legal qualification does he have to make such a statement?
What is Dalton prepared to do to verify the statement he has made?
If he has nothing other than opinion he should step aside, his input is worthless and could be construed as deliberately misleading.
Did he take the advice of the Attorney General? Or is he providing a personal opinion, in which case, what legal qualification does he have to make such a statement?
What is Dalton prepared to do to verify the statement he has made?
If he has nothing other than opinion he should step aside, his input is worthless and could be construed as deliberately misleading.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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JP - now, I am not holding my breath for an answer, simply expecting obfuscation or diversion, but do you think the ACM could conceivably have said:
"In a nutshell, had the pilot(s) not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, (he) could not possibly have crashed (on the Mull of Kintyre) as he did."
of the Tornado crash (ZG708) - or the Shackleton crash, or ---? After all they hit the ground, did they not - so they were obviously below the authorised height for VFR flying at that moment, as was the Chinook? Would you have considered that a reasonable comment, if made, on those accidents? As the CO of the Tornado squadron at the time, I'm sure he would have commented in that B of I, but I am not privy to his actual comments which I suspect (rightly) did not include those or similar words.
I imagine Ralph Kohn, like most of us, will consider those comments by Dalton to be totally illogical, since neither the ACM nor Ralph Kohn actually KNOW how or why 'they crashed' any more than me, you, or a big black dog - but I have a feeling Ralph Kohn will probably not be bothering to reply to your post either, especially since as you are presumably aware he made no comment on any aspects of the flying of the aircraft, but simply on the '3 main claims' by Dalton which related to fitness of the aircraft to be both released to service and to be used on that mission.
"In a nutshell, had the pilot(s) not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, (he) could not possibly have crashed (on the Mull of Kintyre) as he did."
of the Tornado crash (ZG708) - or the Shackleton crash, or ---? After all they hit the ground, did they not - so they were obviously below the authorised height for VFR flying at that moment, as was the Chinook? Would you have considered that a reasonable comment, if made, on those accidents? As the CO of the Tornado squadron at the time, I'm sure he would have commented in that B of I, but I am not privy to his actual comments which I suspect (rightly) did not include those or similar words.
I imagine Ralph Kohn, like most of us, will consider those comments by Dalton to be totally illogical, since neither the ACM nor Ralph Kohn actually KNOW how or why 'they crashed' any more than me, you, or a big black dog - but I have a feeling Ralph Kohn will probably not be bothering to reply to your post either, especially since as you are presumably aware he made no comment on any aspects of the flying of the aircraft, but simply on the '3 main claims' by Dalton which related to fitness of the aircraft to be both released to service and to be used on that mission.
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From the Shackelton BOI
The BOI even commented on shoddy sqn procedures/management but I don't recollect any Gross Negligence accusation being levelled by the RAF after this accident. 
The Board of Inquiry concluded that the accident was caused because the aircraft was flown below a safe altitude in unsuitable weather conditions. The board were unable to determine the reason for this
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John Purdey
Thank you so much for your post.
As you may have read in our (the 3 Fellows) letter to the Guardian, we are primarily interested in events leading to the premature Release to Service in November 1993.
As such, we have nothing more to add to the excellent posts by "tucumseh" and "BOAC", which we support in full.
Thank you so much for your post.
As you may have read in our (the 3 Fellows) letter to the Guardian, we are primarily interested in events leading to the premature Release to Service in November 1993.
As such, we have nothing more to add to the excellent posts by "tucumseh" and "BOAC", which we support in full.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Folks,
could someone please confirm, or not, that Sir Stephen Dalton was the CO of the Tornado squadron which suffered the tragic loss of crew and aircraft at Glen Ogle in September 1994.
If he was, I have his remarks from the BoI and they make interesting reading. If confirmed, I will be happy to post the remarks in full [names redacted]. One interesting line is: I believe it would be unwise to draw any conclusions as to human failings because there is too much scope for conjecture
And this from a tragic accident where the aircraft had ADR and CVR and the exact actions of the crew and subsequent aircraft responses are known whith absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
I'll refrain from further comment until ACM Dalton's association is confirmed or not.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
could someone please confirm, or not, that Sir Stephen Dalton was the CO of the Tornado squadron which suffered the tragic loss of crew and aircraft at Glen Ogle in September 1994.
If he was, I have his remarks from the BoI and they make interesting reading. If confirmed, I will be happy to post the remarks in full [names redacted]. One interesting line is: I believe it would be unwise to draw any conclusions as to human failings because there is too much scope for conjecture
And this from a tragic accident where the aircraft had ADR and CVR and the exact actions of the crew and subsequent aircraft responses are known whith absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
I'll refrain from further comment until ACM Dalton's association is confirmed or not.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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I find it fascinating (and somewhat unnerving) that both Dalton and Graydon appear from their letters to the Times and Telegraph respectively to have been stirred to write by the charge of 'bureaucratic stubbornness' (Times) / 'institutional resistance' (Telegraph); essentially the same charge.
As eloquently pointed out by Ralph Kohn: Dalton proceeds to draw his argumental revolver but then points it directly at his own left foot before pulling the trigger by writing: "The computer software issues raised in the documents obtained by the BBC [identified as "positively dangerous" in said documents] were well known at the time and had been factored into the operating instructions [already known to be woefully inadequate and even "incomprehensible to operating aircrew" by previous enquiries]."
Graydon draws his argumental revolver and points it directly as his right foot before pulling the trigger by writing: "As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons Defence Committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF - through the MOD - has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable." Utterly missing the point that neither the HoL Inquiry, HoC DC, MoK Gp (nor, indeed, the FAI, HoC PAC or the serving SofS at the time, Malcolm Rifkind) have accepted those submissions, however 'comprehensive' or precise'.
Neither letter adds anything new or advances the MoD case one iota. From the MoD's point of view, both letters grievously undermine the MoD case. Both appear moved to write by the charge of bureaucratic stubbornness (however phrased). Both bureaucratically bleat that no 'new' evidence has been presented in a case where there was never enough evidence to support a finding of Gross Negligence in the first place.
One wonders why Day and Wratten haven't entered the fray this time. Day's reliance on stating opinion and flawed Boeing computer models as 'fact' was holed below the waterline by the HoL Cttee, so he is a busted flush. Perhaps Wratten is waiting for the Sunday papers (as is his wont).
The 'new boys' enter the public fray to refute the charge of bureaucratic stubbornness only to display their bureaucratic stubbornness to all and sundry. I used to bore myself by quoting Hamlet 3:2 on PPRuNe in relation to another long fight for right that was eventually won. So will this one because these ladies doth protest too much, methinks. I scent blood.
As eloquently pointed out by Ralph Kohn: Dalton proceeds to draw his argumental revolver but then points it directly at his own left foot before pulling the trigger by writing: "The computer software issues raised in the documents obtained by the BBC [identified as "positively dangerous" in said documents] were well known at the time and had been factored into the operating instructions [already known to be woefully inadequate and even "incomprehensible to operating aircrew" by previous enquiries]."
Graydon draws his argumental revolver and points it directly as his right foot before pulling the trigger by writing: "As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons Defence Committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF - through the MOD - has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable." Utterly missing the point that neither the HoL Inquiry, HoC DC, MoK Gp (nor, indeed, the FAI, HoC PAC or the serving SofS at the time, Malcolm Rifkind) have accepted those submissions, however 'comprehensive' or precise'.
Neither letter adds anything new or advances the MoD case one iota. From the MoD's point of view, both letters grievously undermine the MoD case. Both appear moved to write by the charge of bureaucratic stubbornness (however phrased). Both bureaucratically bleat that no 'new' evidence has been presented in a case where there was never enough evidence to support a finding of Gross Negligence in the first place.
One wonders why Day and Wratten haven't entered the fray this time. Day's reliance on stating opinion and flawed Boeing computer models as 'fact' was holed below the waterline by the HoL Cttee, so he is a busted flush. Perhaps Wratten is waiting for the Sunday papers (as is his wont).
The 'new boys' enter the public fray to refute the charge of bureaucratic stubbornness only to display their bureaucratic stubbornness to all and sundry. I used to bore myself by quoting Hamlet 3:2 on PPRuNe in relation to another long fight for right that was eventually won. So will this one because these ladies doth protest too much, methinks. I scent blood.
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Have the Conservatives made any comment on these latest "developments". If not ,why not, given Cameron's apparent stance.
I do hope so AT.
So will this one because these ladies doth protest too much, methinks. I scent blood.
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Ralph K
It would be nice if you did have an opinion on this point.
Hanging their Lordships out to dry is commendable if they deserve it, but perhaps we have a case of two negligences to persue...............?
In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.
Hanging their Lordships out to dry is commendable if they deserve it, but perhaps we have a case of two negligences to persue...............?
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Chinook
Ralf Kohn. Many thanks for the response. The Release to Service aspects of this sad business are beyond my expertise, (and after my time), but I find it odd that as a fellow pilot of such wide experience you do not wish to comment on the serious accusation of poor airmanship made by CAS. With all good wishes, JP
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John, the way I read this is that the weather argument (ergo aircrew negligence) revolves around a degree of evidence and some subjective (albeit based upon experience) joining of the dots regarding airmanship. Conversely, the whole airworthiness issue is a very objective and necessary discussion, regardless of whether it actively contributed towards the crash.
As someone previously stated, two wrongs don't make a right, but to ignore some very convincing issues highlighted by the crash whilst pursuing a hypothesis which inevitably has some doubt due to the lack of CVR/ADR is, at very least, disingenuous.
Yours
CGB
As someone previously stated, two wrongs don't make a right, but to ignore some very convincing issues highlighted by the crash whilst pursuing a hypothesis which inevitably has some doubt due to the lack of CVR/ADR is, at very least, disingenuous.
Yours
CGB
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Mr Purdey
To save me typing it all out again - an extract from my post 5915
If I may add that what the MoD have stated about 'not knowing about the extent of the cloud out over the sea' I have in writing. This effectively undermines all the bluff and bluster by Day and his infamously poor illustration to the HoL, which of course, he presented as 'fact' and on which stands the AM's assumptions and claims that the pilots were breaking the LL viz regs.
The emperors are down to their boxers!
To save me typing it all out again - an extract from my post 5915
2.
Quote:
breached their operating rules
This is also misleading and "too low, too fast and in illegal viz" is a line used by Day and Wratten.
Firstly, the ac was not 'too low' - it was at a normal MSD for a transit by a military helicopter.
Secondly, neither was it 'too fast' - but at normal transit speed - approx 130kts IAS but with some following wind.
Lastly, many people have claimed that the ac was in fog at the time of the crash thereby breaking the Low Level mil viz regs. Well, it may have been in cloud at the time of the impact but the position of Mull was clearly discernable from out at sea (from whence the ac arrived). Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman (when asked more diligently by the Sheriff's FAI) described the ac 'in sunlight' and effectively 'clear of cloud, insight of surface'. Furthermore, the MoD have also stated they do not know the extent of the cloud over the sea, if it was at all.
The activation of the next waypoint to Corran is also a clear indication (ask Chinny operators) that the crew were visual with the Mull and were therefore intending to steer left up the coast. Why they did not, we will never know but in the light of a lack of definitive and conclusive evidence, one cannot assume negligence.
Quote:
breached their operating rules
This is also misleading and "too low, too fast and in illegal viz" is a line used by Day and Wratten.
Firstly, the ac was not 'too low' - it was at a normal MSD for a transit by a military helicopter.
Secondly, neither was it 'too fast' - but at normal transit speed - approx 130kts IAS but with some following wind.
Lastly, many people have claimed that the ac was in fog at the time of the crash thereby breaking the Low Level mil viz regs. Well, it may have been in cloud at the time of the impact but the position of Mull was clearly discernable from out at sea (from whence the ac arrived). Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman (when asked more diligently by the Sheriff's FAI) described the ac 'in sunlight' and effectively 'clear of cloud, insight of surface'. Furthermore, the MoD have also stated they do not know the extent of the cloud over the sea, if it was at all.
The activation of the next waypoint to Corran is also a clear indication (ask Chinny operators) that the crew were visual with the Mull and were therefore intending to steer left up the coast. Why they did not, we will never know but in the light of a lack of definitive and conclusive evidence, one cannot assume negligence.
If I may add that what the MoD have stated about 'not knowing about the extent of the cloud out over the sea' I have in writing. This effectively undermines all the bluff and bluster by Day and his infamously poor illustration to the HoL, which of course, he presented as 'fact' and on which stands the AM's assumptions and claims that the pilots were breaking the LL viz regs.
The emperors are down to their boxers!