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Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

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Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

Old 5th Jan 2010, 09:05
  #5821 (permalink)  
 
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Walter, there is one bit I really don't get about your hypothesis. The vast majority of posters here believe the MOD's findings to be unjust; they seek to add doubt to the MOD's pilot error argument. Many of these posters also have significant SH (including SF) experience. Why is there not one who is willing to even acknowledge that your theory may have some substance? Could there really be such a watertight cover-up when many of the people 'in the know' would happily discredit the MOD?
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 12:17
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Thanks to a particularly knowledgeable insider who spotted the importance of these documents I have been able to publish the newly-disclosed evidence in full. They're the documents on which the BBC based its Chinook Mk2 coverage yesterday. Chinook Mk2: we publish new evidence of computer problems (Tony Collins's IT Projects Blog)

The documents don't show that software caused the crash - but they are unequivocal in showing that the Mk2 wasn't airworthy.

Whether or not technical problems set off a chain of events which led to the crash on the Mull of Kintyre, and whether or not the RAF was right to blame the pilots, there’s the separate question of whether the helicopter should have been in the air in the first place.

How the Mk2 came to be given a CAR and RTS without the software problems being remedied is baffling. That alone is a good reason for the MoD to persist in blaming the pilots.
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 12:46
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but they are unequivocal in showing that the Mk2 wasn't airworthy.
It should be reiterated that in 1999 the Chief of Defence Procurement confirmed to the Public Accounts Committee that perhaps the most fundamental component of airworthiness had not been implemented properly on Chinook (and other aircraft).

Not that he could deny it, given the numerous reports in the 90s which said precisely the same thing as Haddon-Cave; all arising from the problems caused by the swingeing cuts in the funding to maintain airworthiness.

But perhaps "confirmed" is the wrong word. "Boasted" may be better, given his consistent written rulings that functional safety could be ignored for the purposes of declaring airworthiness. And the inability to confirm functional safety is exactly what Boscombe are talking about in these memos.

Now, when you have that kind of lunacy at the top, little wonder the CAR and RTS were signed in the face of a "positively dangerous" statement.
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 14:17
  #5824 (permalink)  
 
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Times second leader, 5 Jan 2010

The Times today (Times of London for colonial readers) headlines its second leader 'Unfit for Purpose (Continued) and summarises the sorry history detailed in the thread above.

Being self-serving can also prove self-defeating. The Ministry of Defence, by refusing to reconsider its verdict that the 1994 helicopter crash which killed 29 people was caused by “gross negligence” by the pilots, is risking its credibility just to save face. More is at stake than the reputation of two dead servicemen — though that in itself should matter to the MoD more than anyone. There is also a deeper question: is the MoD putting pride before honour?

2009 was a year that the Ministry of Defence must be keen to forget. Bernard Gray, a former special adviser for defence, wrote a devastating official report complaining about a culture of waste and incompetence. A separate official report by Charles Haddon-Cave, a leading aviation lawyer, concluded that the 2006 plane crash in Afghanistan that killed 14 Service personnel was avoidable and caused by financial pressure and cuts.
The new year has not begun well, either. The MoD is now facing renewed questions about the causes of the Chinook helicopter disaster of 1994. The helicopter crashed in thick fog in the Mull of Kintyre, killing all 29 people on board — the RAF’s worst peacetime helicopter accident. The tragedy also had a delicate political backdrop: 25 of those who died were senior members of Northern Ireland’s intelligence community. The RAF’s original inquiry blamed the two pilots, finding them guilty of gross negligence. That version of events is now looking unsustainable and unacceptable.

The guilt of the two pilots, who had unblemished careers until that fatal flight, was established by default. The RAF argued that human failure was the only available explanation. But the families of the pilots, and many aviation experts, have long argued that the ruling represented an unjust blight on two fine careers.

The MoD’s position relied on the assumption that technical failures in the Chinook’s software system could not explain such a disastrous degree of error. But that possibility can no longer be ruled out. Before the crash, several internal MoD documents raised significant alarms about the Chinook’s engine control computer software, describing it as positively dangerous. One memo, written nine months before the crash by a senior engineering officer, argued that “deficiencies” in the software meant that the pilot’s control of the engines could not be assured. Another, written the day before the crash, stated it was imperative that the RAF should cease operations.

None of this, it must be said, conclusively proves that the crash must have been caused by computer error. Human negligence remains a possibility. In fact, given the catastrophic nature of the crash, it is impossible that anyone will ever know for sure what caused the disaster. But growing evidence that the MoD was concerned about the Chinook’s safety software does clearly demonstrate an inescapable degree of uncertainty — more than enough uncertainty to justify reversing the guilty verdict imposed on the two pilots.
So why is the MoD so reluctant to change its position? In the phrase of Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who was Defence Secretary in 1994, it seems to be a case of bureaucratic stubbornness. Continuing to blame the pilots, in fact, is starting to look like something more serious than just a mistake. It suggests a worrying culture of denial.
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 16:20
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The Thunderer 'has it in one'!
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 16:35
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It's a good leader. The crash could have been caused by human error or technical malfunction of a kind which didn't leave a physical trace or wasn't properly investigated (the AAIB investigated only what it was asked to investigate) or a combination of the two. For the finding against the pilots to be sustained certainty is needed.

And the one thing that characterizes the investigations after the crash is uncertainty.

The MoD denies there are uncertainties: it points to what it calls "hard evidence". This is evidence from the manufacturers whom we trust for such basic information as the waypoint change.

Since when would you trust a manufacturer's evidence - on its own and without independent verification - after a major fatal crash?
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 19:43
  #5827 (permalink)  
 
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From The Scotsman

174 glitches in doomed Chinook software
174 glitches in doomed Chinook software - The Scotsman
Published Date: 05 January 2010
By David Maddox
PRESSURE is mounting on defence chiefs to exonerate the two pilots officially blamed for the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994 after new evidence emerged that computer software could be to blame.

An internal document, written nine months before the accident, suggested that a new system known as full authority digital engine control (Fadec) was "positively dangerous".

It appears to challenge the RAF's conclusion that "gross negligence" by the pilots – Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper, 28, and Rick Cook, 30 – was the cause of the accident.

Yesterday Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who was defence secretary at the time, claimed that he was kept in the dark about the possible faults.

And he said the verdicts against the two men are now "unsustainable" and only maintained by "bureaucratic stubbornness".

Written by experts working for the Ministry of Defence's aircraft testing centre at Boscombe Down, the document shows there were serious concerns in the engine control computer software, according to the BBC.

It said the hazard analysis of the Chinook mark 2 identified the software in the engine Fadec as "safety critical", adding that any "malfunctions or design errors could have catastrophic effects".

It went on to claim that there were 21 category 1 and 153 category 2 anomalies which had been revealed. One of these was considered to be "positively dangerous".

It concluded: "Pilots' control of the engines through Fadec cannot be assured."

Further documentation, reportedly from the day of the accident, said it was "imperative" that the "RAF should cease operations".

The accident in thick fog at around 6pm on 2 June 1994 claimed 29 lives, including 25 leading anti-terrorism experts from the army, Royal Ulster Constabulary, RAF and MI5.

It was a major setback in the government's efforts to tackle the IRA and the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland.

An RAF inquiry eventually blamed the two pilots who both lost their lives in the accident.

Two air vice marshals, who reviewed the initial inconclusive inquiry, ruled they had been flying too fast and low for the conditions and were guilty of "gross negligence" and that the Chinook had been airworthy. But the documents obtained by the BBC appear to back up concerns raised in a more recent inquiry in the House of Lords which highlighted doubts over Fadec.

And it has brought about renewed calls for the inquiry to be reviewed and the two pilots to have their names cleared.

Sir Malcolm Rifkind yesterday claimed he had not been informed of the warnings about Fadec.

He said: "When the RAF have been asked that question in recent years, they have said that they had already concluded that the software problem, although it existed, couldn't have been a possible explanation for the Chinook disaster and that is why they didn't draw it to the attention of ministers or the wider public.

"I think that was an error of judgment. I think that was a serious mistake."

He added that the latest revelations meant that the finding that the pilots were guilty of gross negligence was "unsustainable" but said he did not think there had been a cover up.

"I think it is bureaucratic stubbornness," he said. "But it is combined with a lack of will by ministers to provide the leadership needed to insist on the matter being re-opened."

The SNP's defence spokesman Angus Robertson has been campaigning since 2002 to have the two pilots' names cleared.

Yesterday he pointed out that the initial RAF internal finding, the Fatal Accident Inquiry, and a House of Lords report all concluded that there was no evidence that the pilots were to blame.

"This latest evidence undermines the MoD's false conclusion even further," he said.

"The position of the MoD is untenable, and their hurtful and flawed verdict cannot be allowed to stand. The pilots – both of whom had unblemished flying records – must be exonerated."

However, a spokesman for the MoD yesterday insisted that the evidence was not new and could not change the verdict.

In a statement, he said: "Ministers have repeatedly stated that they would reopen the Board of Inquiry if new evidence is raised.

"Despite numerous representations over the years, nothing has been presented to successive secretaries of state that would justify reopening the Inquiry.

"This latest information is from an RAF document; it was available to the Inquiry team and cannot be classed as new evidence."
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 20:32
  #5828 (permalink)  
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Hi everyone.

Firstly, a very happy 2010 to you all.

I'll bet the MoD had thought we had gone away :
Unfortunatley for them, we were just working behind the scenes - and we continue to do so!

The MoD response was completely predictable and the fact that they, once again, returned to this tired old mantra of "It's not new evidence" was something that was expected. What would be useful is if the MoD could produce a copy of any document that lists what information was available to the Board of Inquiry for them to request if they though it relevent. My guess is no such document exists

Did the BoI actually know of the existence of these current documents? Did the BoI know that at the time they were sitting, the MoD was suing the engine manufacturers? I very much doubt it.

As usual, the MoD are blaming junior officers - not only the two pilots for the crash, but now the President of the BoI for not requesting documents that he was unaware existed!

I should thank you all for your continued support and also thank those who have been working very hard, behind the scenes for us. You have all been fantastic.

I can only hope that the well-publicised untenable position of the MoD will finally be revealed and they will finally do the honourable thing and return the reputations of Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook to their respective families. Only then will the Campaign cease.

My best, as always,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 21:13
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A Sad reflection on two Air Marshals and many MOD officials

I have just finished the account of events published in Computerweekly.com. on ZD 576. I feel tremendous sympathy for the Trapper and Cook families. I can understand what they are up against. Thankfully the public is now getting an insight into just how incompetent the MOD is, sadly due to two wars.
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 21:22
  #5830 (permalink)  

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Happy New Year, Brian, a very well done to all involved in this latest chapter.

It's good to see what we have been saying for so long has now achieved the wider public airing that it needed.

I'm not certain, but in my time in the service, which as you are aware, corresponds to this same time frame and predates it, I don't ever recall any RAF BOI that mentioned airworthiness issues in any detail, but only the serviceability of the individual airframe at the time of the accident.
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 23:15
  #5831 (permalink)  
 
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I can only hope that the well-publicised untenable position of the MoD will finally be revealed and they will finally do the honourable thing and return the reputations of Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook to their respective families. Only then will the Campaign cease.
Brian, I can understand why the families and colleagues of the crew would want closure, and for the campaign to wind down.

As a retired RAF pilot and officer, I personally would not be satisfied with the RAF just doing the "honourable thing" and clearing Jon and Rick. Some heads need to roll, and that includes the 2 senior officers who were so insistent, despite a complete lack of the necessary evidence, to blame the pilots. Those responsible for 'hiding' these recently uncovered documents also need to face censure, and harsh censure at that. These people are a disgrace.

I am not suggesting that the campaign should in any way be involved in the process to see that the miscreants face the music. But given the disgraceful behaviour of some of the people involved in the blatantly poor decisions to use the HC2, as well as the recent embarrassing revelations of the Haddon-Cave report, I find myself aghast and utterly ashamed of the upper echelons of the RAF and the MOD. Their behaviour is inexcusable, and backsides need kicking, even if it means dishonourable discharge from the Service.
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 23:15
  #5832 (permalink)  
 
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New Look?

I have spent the day going through the forum and found some useful information.........mainly from the analysis of the Racal nav box ....but to put my observations in chronological order...........

# According to the track of the a/c , it would never have passed within 1.5 kilometers of the yachtsman , if the position he gave was accurate.....and so he would have quite a false impression of its speed . In his defence he did say that he was not familiar with the a/c type and asked to observe one at various distances in order to make his estimates more accurate..it seems this was never actioned .
# The approach to the coastline was at a very oblique angle and not head on as many contributors seem to suggest .
#The waypoint change was made 1.5 kilometers from waypoint 'A' and some 25 seconds before impact....
#The rising ground would be on the starboard side of the a/c and I imagine it is quite possible that the sea surface was still visible out to port (west) , does this mean it was still legal VFR..???..
#Both latitude and longitude entries for the waypoint 'A' in the superTANS had been rounded down , which unfortunately places the waypoint inland about 0.05 NM...
#The superTANS is stated to have been in GPS mode , I am guessing here that this means that it is only accepting/displaying data from the GPS source ....
#Analysis of the GPS position logged after impact shows that there was an offset to the SW of the actual position ......I take this to infer that the information presented to the flight crew would direct them to places North and East of the real location....
#The accumulated error of these two offsets places the waypoint 'A' inland even further , actually close to 500 meters from the shore , and coinciding very closely to the point of impact . Not a coincidence I think .
***********************
If the offset's had been in the opposite sense the virtual waypoint 'A' would have been safely offshore....and overflying the point would have been quite safe......and the a/c could fly along the coast with scarcely any change in course.
On a good CAVOK day they would not need this waypoint as the coastline and lighthouse would be visible , it must have been entered with some intention to use it as and when.........
One final point , the magnetic variation applied for the course to waypoint 'B' seems to have a value of 9.4 degrees applied , whereas the entries made manually state 7.5 degrees ..??????..irrelevant..???
Most of this is derived from a scale drawing on a map......

waiting now for the flak........

Last edited by Robin Clark; 8th Jan 2010 at 14:22. Reason: changing words checkpoint to waypoint
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Old 5th Jan 2010, 23:36
  #5833 (permalink)  
 
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ShyT
Perhaps I am a bit one-eyed on this – I actually could interpret the following as the same as what I was saying:
<<...in the case of a serious emergency, RAF training recommends that 7700 is selected, if no other code was given after making contact with an ATC agency. >>
This could be a litmus test for whether we are able to communicate at all rationally – does what you wrote contradict what I have been saying about not changing SSR code immediately a serious problem accurs? Are you not saying that, whilst still having your transponder set as before, you first try to alert some ATC authority?
Subsequent to trying to raise an alert, if no other code was given or indeed if there had not been a timely response, then 7700 would be the usual option.
BUT it is not the practice to scabble at the switches immediately (ask ATC people),


Perhaps while we're on the subject of the transponder setting you could give some helpful advice as you have flown these beasts quite a lot:
the relevance is the expected radar coverage of them during their sea crossing;
if you had been flying the leg over the sea from Carnlough to the vicinity of the Mull low level, VFR would you have cruised above 750ft or below 250ft? Or was someone pulling my leg over generally avoiding 500ft to leave it for the FJs?


Cows
<<Why is there not one who is willing to even acknowledge that your theory may have some substance?>>
Good question! I realise it is difficult for servicemen to express contravertial views openly, quite apart from the “groupthink” mentality – I'll bet there wasn't many expressing support for the views of Dr David Kelly before you set off for Iraq, either. This is not meant as an insult – you have to think and move as a confident team – it is a statement of understanding why, indeed, no one wants to contemplate the overall scenario I have put forward.
That said, I am at a loss to understand why some of the more innocuous aspects of navigation equipment, procedures, performance, etc cannot be honestly and fully addressed – you don't have to swallow the big plot to take part in a discussion which could at least advance understanding of this crash – following this line so far has, I believe I can claim, at least shown the “official” account of their flight to be hogwash and that the verdict is baseless – the airworthiness issue could never hope to exonerate the crew more cleanly than it being established that a hitherto undisclosed activity was part of the flight plan. Worth a little thought, surely?
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 00:05
  #5834 (permalink)  
 
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Walter,

"Good question! I realise it is difficult for servicemen to express contravertial views openly, quite apart from the “groupthink” mentality"

There are plenty of current and ex servicemen expressing their controversial views right through this thread.

"no one wants to contemplate the overall scenario I have put forward."

I would humbly suggest that all of those current and ex servicemen posting on here and many many more who are keeping their powder dry have contemplated your theory and their silence on the matter should speak volumes.

"That said, I am at a loss to understand why some of the more innocuous aspects of navigation equipment, procedures, performance, etc cannot be honestly and fully addressed"

They have been but sadly you have chosen to completely ignore it.

I have in previous answers to you explained why I believe it impossible for the "fitting" of the equipment needed to support your theory to have been kept a complete secret all this time but you also choose to ignore that.

Shy also asks you to explain why the crew specifically asked for a Mk1 if their intention was to do as you would have us believe but again you refuse to address that very simple question.

You ask lots but answer almost nothing.
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 00:06
  #5835 (permalink)  

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BUT it is not the practice to scabble at the switches immediately (ask ATC people),
Walter, Incorrect; it's irrelevant to ask "ATC people". It's not actually their responsibility what a pilot does in the cockpit in an emergency.

Again, please do bear in mind that I did operate in the SH role for about fifteen years. As an operational conversion unit instructor, I did know what was taught.

If there is likely to be no possibility of r/t contact with ATC, due to low altitude terrain masking, or distance (quite normal for SH), setting 7700 may be the one thing that alerts someone, somewhere, watching a secondary radar display, that an aircraft is in distress, without a word being said. This would hopefully result in SAR being alerted if necessary. That is what the 7700 code was designed for! The co-pilot, or the crewman may well have attempted to do this.

if you had been flying the leg over the sea from Carnlough to the vicinity of the Mull low level, VFR would you have cruised above 750ft or below 250ft? Or was someone pulling my leg over generally avoiding 500ft to leave it for the FJs?
If I was flying below low cloud and I thought that military jets were likely to be in the area, I would have made a risk assessment and considered flying at the lower altitude at the expense of radar cover if seen as less risky.

SH is, by necessity, primarily a low level, VFR operation. It was by no means unusual to transit at a level below which the military fast jets were allowed to fly. In fact, we were directed to make best training use of "routine" transits by operating at the minimums. For example, during Cold War exercises, we were usually ordered to fly not above 150 feet above ground level, with the jets not below 250 feet agl.
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 00:19
  #5836 (permalink)  
 
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Shy,

"That is what the 7700 code was designed for! The co-pilot, or the crewman may well have attempted to do this."

Not sure about the Chinook and doubt they were much different but in my 3 Puma tours that is certainly something the Crewman was taught. In the single pilot op days he would be the only guy with the free hands and even when we nav/co pilot'd up he was still part of that loop for sure.
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 00:19
  #5837 (permalink)  

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To expand on my comment about use of the transponder:

If already in receipt of an ATC service, pilots are taught to retain the transponder code already given by ATC, where one has been given (a code isn't always given; not all ATC units have secondary radar) rather than to change to 7700 unprompted, if an emergency subsequently occurs (while still in receipt of that service). As part of the termination of that service, the pilot will reselect his VFR code, i.e. 7000.

If an emergency occurs prior to r/t contact being made with ATC, pilots are taught to squawk 7700 unless subsequently told to set something else by ATC. They may be directed to retain 7700 in this situation.
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 10:04
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From the UK Gardian newspaper (& similar in the Daily Telegraph)

Your report (MoD knew of Chinook flaws before fatal crash, says father, 5 January) fails to report the Ministry of Defence's reasons for upholding the board of inquiry's findings into the Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash. We have always made clear that we would revisit the findings if new evidence was presented. Despite the efforts over many years of those campaigning to clear the pilots, including an exhaustive report submitted in 2008, no such evidence has ever been found. The computer software issues raised in the documents obtained by the BBC were well known at the time and had been factored into the operating instructions. These issues were discounted in the context of this accident following a thorough independent assessment by the Air Accident Investigation Branch. This led the board of inquiry to conclude – along with those who have reconsidered this over the years – that there was no evidence of technical failure which would have been a factor in the crash.
What was exposed, in a diligent and logical analysis, was that the pilots consciously breached their operating rules, thereby knowingly placing their aircraft, passengers, crew and themselves at risk. This was the basis for the gross negligence finding. Des Browne's review was in response to the 2008 report, and concluded there was no new evidence and the original findings should stand. The Chinook helicopter has a remarkable safety record and has proved a mainstay of recent operations. Aircraft losses are not always due to equipment failings and it is a disservice to our people, particularly those working heroically in Afghanistan, to see a conspiracy behind every tragic loss.
Air Chief Marshal Stephen Dalton
Chief of the air staff
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 10:25
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factored into the operating instructions

That would be the Flight Reference Cards and Aircrew Manual that clear evidence showed were incomplete/immature (because the CAR and RTS which informs them were also immature); thus exacerbating Human Factors hazards.

He lies.
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 10:40
  #5840 (permalink)  
 
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Yet another CAS with no bolleaux; what else could we expect? And just to correct him, it was not the BOI that ruled out a possible technical cause it was the two reviewing officers: Wratten and Day. They are the only two living people who know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what happened in the final moments of the flight in question.

Brian, keep at it - justice will eventually prevail.
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