Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Avoid imitations
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Cazatou, as I am obviously not on your ignore list after all, perhaps you would now make a reply to my repeated direct question to yourself regarding your SH experience so that other contributors can attach due consideration to your replies regarding the conduct of such operational flights.
Thank you.
Thank you.
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Steady, baston or you'll rival the Rolling Sones for 'farewell tours'
But I do promise that I will not comment further on the deliberations on this thread as I feel that none of you are getting anywhere, slowly, gosh how slowly!
Best drop it I would say. OOOH that was a comment - Blast!
Happy Barbeque Summer to you all.............
PS BOAC, who are the Rolling SONES?
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SFFP
I have retired from comment, but I am sitting on highish watching the Circulatory Birds circulating - and it is fun waiting for the inevitable...
This made me smile as I do recall one or two declaring their "retirement" recently
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sffp
That is really good because we are both amused and not circulating in EDCs
May more join in and see the light.................
Giggling away to myself again as you appear to be unable to help yourself
May more join in and see the light.................
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Cazatou
Your #5639
This isn't quite correct. There were important changes to the FADEC code after the Mull crash, and a different CPU used. From NAO report Feb 2000:
"As a result of the concerns raised about the software, the FADEC manufacturer has addressed some of the anomalies within the software, and produced an improved version which was then subjected to a Sneak and Traceability analysis to gain further confidence in its integrity. In September 1998 the Department, with the Royal Air Force’s consent, issued full Controller Aircraft Release for the Chinook Mk2, removed the internal carriage all-up mass restriction for internal loads and allowed the Mk2 fleet to operate to the maximum payloads specified by Boeing which are 21 per cent higher than those specified in the Staff Requirement."
Your #5639
Please try to get it right. Boscombe Down did not "Ground" the Mk2 Chinook; it ceased Trials Flying until such time as clarification was provided in respect of engine control malfunctions that had occurred on the ground during start up checks. Such clarification was completed and accepted by Boscombe Down on 24 October 1994 and Test flying recommenced without any changes to the FADEC system..."
This isn't quite correct. There were important changes to the FADEC code after the Mull crash, and a different CPU used. From NAO report Feb 2000:
"As a result of the concerns raised about the software, the FADEC manufacturer has addressed some of the anomalies within the software, and produced an improved version which was then subjected to a Sneak and Traceability analysis to gain further confidence in its integrity. In September 1998 the Department, with the Royal Air Force’s consent, issued full Controller Aircraft Release for the Chinook Mk2, removed the internal carriage all-up mass restriction for internal loads and allowed the Mk2 fleet to operate to the maximum payloads specified by Boeing which are 21 per cent higher than those specified in the Staff Requirement."
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Tony Collins
<<There were important changes to the FADEC code after the Mull crash, and a different CPU used. From NAO report Feb 2000:
"… In September 1998 the Department, with the Royal Air Force’s consent, issued full Controller Aircraft Release for the Chinook Mk2 ...>>
Could you please give us an estimate of how many hours were flown in HC2 Chinooks between the accident date and the first implementation of any of these changes? In other words, how much flying was done subsequent to the crash without any changes to the FADEC system? And, if the amount is sufficient to pass judgement on, how does this compare with expected/satisfactory reliability for a military aircraft?
<<There were important changes to the FADEC code after the Mull crash, and a different CPU used. From NAO report Feb 2000:
"… In September 1998 the Department, with the Royal Air Force’s consent, issued full Controller Aircraft Release for the Chinook Mk2 ...>>
Could you please give us an estimate of how many hours were flown in HC2 Chinooks between the accident date and the first implementation of any of these changes? In other words, how much flying was done subsequent to the crash without any changes to the FADEC system? And, if the amount is sufficient to pass judgement on, how does this compare with expected/satisfactory reliability for a military aircraft?
Hey, Wally, there might after all be more to your little green men scuttling around the Mull with wacky wirelesses theory than was known hitherto!
See Britain's Roswell: a flying saucer in Suffolk - Telegraph
See Britain's Roswell: a flying saucer in Suffolk - Telegraph
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Walter Kennedy
I don't know though I could try and find out. It's worth bearing in mind the restrictions we now know existed at the time of the crash, which were supposed to reduce the risk of system problems, such as not switching the FADEC into reversionary (backup) mode because of unpredictable behaviour.
I couldn't imagine any supplier being able to sell a commercial system in which users were not able to have a backup facility. The lack of a reliable backup was potentially more serious in the case of the Mk2 because the FADEC was categorised by Boeing as safety-critical.
I can see why you'd want to compare the number of hours flown uneventfully after the Mull accident, before changes to the FADEC. That said, I've taken an interest in the probable causes of crashes of some commercial aircraft and it's not unusual for investigators, from the CVR and CDR, to discover a chain of events which hadn't been predicted by anyone, not even the manufacturer. So trying to apply any scientific analysis to what little we know from the Mull crash would seem to me to be of no value, or at best speculation.
Indeed to me the most striking technical thing about the Mull crash is how little independently-verified information there is. On what is known, and has been verified by the AAIB - and the TANS information was given no AAIB endorsement - I do not see that any cause, probable cause, or even likely cause, can be established.
Much has been said about the waypoint change, as reported by Racal [now Thales]. The AAIB did not endorse Racal's report.
Could you please give us an estimate of how many hours were flown in HC2 Chinooks between the accident date and the first implementation of any of these changes? In other words, how much flying was done subsequent to the crash without any changes to the FADEC system? And, if the amount is sufficient to pass judgement on, how does this compare with expected/satisfactory reliability for a military aircraft?
I couldn't imagine any supplier being able to sell a commercial system in which users were not able to have a backup facility. The lack of a reliable backup was potentially more serious in the case of the Mk2 because the FADEC was categorised by Boeing as safety-critical.
I can see why you'd want to compare the number of hours flown uneventfully after the Mull accident, before changes to the FADEC. That said, I've taken an interest in the probable causes of crashes of some commercial aircraft and it's not unusual for investigators, from the CVR and CDR, to discover a chain of events which hadn't been predicted by anyone, not even the manufacturer. So trying to apply any scientific analysis to what little we know from the Mull crash would seem to me to be of no value, or at best speculation.
Indeed to me the most striking technical thing about the Mull crash is how little independently-verified information there is. On what is known, and has been verified by the AAIB - and the TANS information was given no AAIB endorsement - I do not see that any cause, probable cause, or even likely cause, can be established.
Much has been said about the waypoint change, as reported by Racal [now Thales]. The AAIB did not endorse Racal's report.
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Beagle
Ask the lads getting resupplied by Chinooks in difficult conditions in Afghanistan what kind of “wacky wirelesses” they hold and how they are used to guide the Chins in - that is, if they'll talk to an idiot like you.
Tony Collins
<<I don't know though I could try and find out. >> I rather think you should as your post on the changes seemed intended to rebut Cazatou's point on putting the suspension of further flying into perspective.
Assuming that you have some knowledge of how the FADEC system worked in HC2 Chinooks at the time, could I ask you please to check this thread (recent posts) for posts I have made dismissing the FADEC – briefly, the engines were found in a matched state which does not fit with engine control problems (either the FADEC or the pilot nees to trim them to get them as close as found after they had settled at a level following change) and the most speculated problem of an undemanded runaway would have helped them as the action required would have been to increase collective (eg climb) to restrain rotor rpm. What possible FADEC problem is it that you envisage could have contributed? - just a big distraction to the pilots and loadmaster? - a bit like the FADEC red herring on this thread?
<<Indeed to me the most striking technical thing about the Mull crash is how little independently-verified information there is. On what is known, and has been verified by the AAIB - and the TANS information was given no AAIB endorsement - I do not see that any cause, probable cause, or even likely cause, can be established. Much has been said about the waypoint change, as reported by Racal [now Thales]. The AAIB did not endorse Racal's report. >>
I take it that the “cause” you are referring to in this context is a technical problem with the aircraft – couldn't agree with you more – there is no evidence whatsover for a technical fault with the a/c causing this crash.
However, if you look at the flight planning, instrument settings, and their lining up with a known LZ (much used by mil helos up until that time) and consider that no one wants to contemplate that scenario nor pass comment on the candidate equipment I have suggested may have been used there, perhaps you may understand that the reason we may never know what happened that day is because the powers that be wish it so.
Ask the lads getting resupplied by Chinooks in difficult conditions in Afghanistan what kind of “wacky wirelesses” they hold and how they are used to guide the Chins in - that is, if they'll talk to an idiot like you.
Tony Collins
<<I don't know though I could try and find out. >> I rather think you should as your post on the changes seemed intended to rebut Cazatou's point on putting the suspension of further flying into perspective.
Assuming that you have some knowledge of how the FADEC system worked in HC2 Chinooks at the time, could I ask you please to check this thread (recent posts) for posts I have made dismissing the FADEC – briefly, the engines were found in a matched state which does not fit with engine control problems (either the FADEC or the pilot nees to trim them to get them as close as found after they had settled at a level following change) and the most speculated problem of an undemanded runaway would have helped them as the action required would have been to increase collective (eg climb) to restrain rotor rpm. What possible FADEC problem is it that you envisage could have contributed? - just a big distraction to the pilots and loadmaster? - a bit like the FADEC red herring on this thread?
<<Indeed to me the most striking technical thing about the Mull crash is how little independently-verified information there is. On what is known, and has been verified by the AAIB - and the TANS information was given no AAIB endorsement - I do not see that any cause, probable cause, or even likely cause, can be established. Much has been said about the waypoint change, as reported by Racal [now Thales]. The AAIB did not endorse Racal's report. >>
I take it that the “cause” you are referring to in this context is a technical problem with the aircraft – couldn't agree with you more – there is no evidence whatsover for a technical fault with the a/c causing this crash.
However, if you look at the flight planning, instrument settings, and their lining up with a known LZ (much used by mil helos up until that time) and consider that no one wants to contemplate that scenario nor pass comment on the candidate equipment I have suggested may have been used there, perhaps you may understand that the reason we may never know what happened that day is because the powers that be wish it so.
Wally, Afghanistan in 2009 is somewhat different to Scotland in 1994, I would venture to suggest.
Those in the know have told you repeatedly that your theory is wholly incorrect.
Period.
Whilst I would not stoop to terming you an idiot, I do think that it's high time you stopped this endless nonsense about making a planned approach to an LZ on the Mull. With or without the assistance of weird and wonderful wacky wireless systems.....or little green men, SEALs or anyone else.
Those in the know have told you repeatedly that your theory is wholly incorrect.
Period.
Whilst I would not stoop to terming you an idiot, I do think that it's high time you stopped this endless nonsense about making a planned approach to an LZ on the Mull. With or without the assistance of weird and wonderful wacky wireless systems.....or little green men, SEALs or anyone else.
Another useful response from my oily stalker, it seems....
Do you really consider Wally's off the wall theory should be afforded any further credibility?
V-force days were great, by the way. Insult me all you like, but that's a fact!
Do you really consider Wally's off the wall theory should be afforded any further credibility?
V-force days were great, by the way. Insult me all you like, but that's a fact!
Last edited by BEagle; 19th Aug 2009 at 20:05.
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Sorry, but I have to go with Beagle here. Walter's theory, however plausible, will never be resolved (just as the FADEC discussion is at stalemate). The problem is that even if everyone categorically states the PRC112 scenario didn't not occur, there will be conspiracy theorists who offer that dark forces are at play hiding the 'facts'. No different to the JFK Grassy Knoll or whether Neil Armstrong actually set foot on the Moon.
FWIW, I believe that the LZ scenario did not happen; in fact I'm pretty sure of it. But how does one prove something that never occurred?
FWIW, I believe that the LZ scenario did not happen; in fact I'm pretty sure of it. But how does one prove something that never occurred?
To quote Vinny Jones, Olly, "You can call me Susan if it makes you happy".
Anyway, I suggest ceasing this line of 'discussion' as it detracts from the serious issue of the wholly unreasonable verdict passed upon the Chinook pilots by Wratten and Day.
Justice will eventually be done. Not too long now.
Anyway, I suggest ceasing this line of 'discussion' as it detracts from the serious issue of the wholly unreasonable verdict passed upon the Chinook pilots by Wratten and Day.
Justice will eventually be done. Not too long now.
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Cows
<<But how does one prove something that never occurred? >>
Like the control jam or the rampant FADEC? - hasn't stopped volumes of waffle on them , has it?
But basic analysis of so many parameters points to an intended approach to the Mull that was uneccessary for the basic ferry flight and a deviation from a planned route (for which I have pointed to the evidence of their returning to it).
Why, 15 years on, can we not discuss, for academic interest if you like, the entry into service of that piece of kit? Despite Beagle's “… Afghanistan in 2009 is somewhat different to Scotland in 1994, ... “, RAF Chinooks were definitely using it by early 1995 which puts the first HC2 Chinook in mid '94 ripe for a try out.
Why has no-one described landing at that LZ?
Why were the radar recordings denied that would have cleared up that odd squawk code?
And so on.
Take your heads out of the sand and get some nuts – if there was any chance of there having been foul play that day, however improbable or unpalatable to contemplate, the implications for how our country really works are so great that every stone should be upturned to try and be sure one way or the other. Think about it.
You (collectively speaking) may think that just an embarrassing cock up happened and just want the pilots' names cleared without too much dirt being thrown at your service – but this attitude is blocking any outsiders from checking out the possibility of a wilful act.
<<But how does one prove something that never occurred? >>
Like the control jam or the rampant FADEC? - hasn't stopped volumes of waffle on them , has it?
But basic analysis of so many parameters points to an intended approach to the Mull that was uneccessary for the basic ferry flight and a deviation from a planned route (for which I have pointed to the evidence of their returning to it).
Why, 15 years on, can we not discuss, for academic interest if you like, the entry into service of that piece of kit? Despite Beagle's “… Afghanistan in 2009 is somewhat different to Scotland in 1994, ... “, RAF Chinooks were definitely using it by early 1995 which puts the first HC2 Chinook in mid '94 ripe for a try out.
Why has no-one described landing at that LZ?
Why were the radar recordings denied that would have cleared up that odd squawk code?
And so on.
Take your heads out of the sand and get some nuts – if there was any chance of there having been foul play that day, however improbable or unpalatable to contemplate, the implications for how our country really works are so great that every stone should be upturned to try and be sure one way or the other. Think about it.
You (collectively speaking) may think that just an embarrassing cock up happened and just want the pilots' names cleared without too much dirt being thrown at your service – but this attitude is blocking any outsiders from checking out the possibility of a wilful act.
Wally, is this list of UK 7000-ser SSR allocations of any interest to you:
That was the list as of a couple of years ago - the current list is in the UK AIP ENR 1-6-2-10.
7760 is/was not a 'special purpose' code and has no significance.
7000................Conspicuity code
7001................Military Fixed-wing Low Level Conspicuity/Climbout
7002................Danger Areas General
7003................Red Arrows Transit/Display
7004................Conspicuity Aerobatics and Display
7005................Autonomous military operations within active TRAs
7006................Autonomous Operations within TRAs
7007................Open Skies Observation Aircraft
7010................Operating in Aerodrome Traffic Pattern
7011-7013.......Not allocated
7014-7027.......UK Domestic
7030-7045.......RNAS Culdrose
7030-7047.......Aldergrove Approach
7030-7057.......TC Thames/TC Heathrow
7030-7066.......Durham Tees Valley Airport
7030-7077.......Aberdeen (Northern North Sea Off-shore)
7046-7047.......RNAS Culdrose Conspicuity
7050-7077.......RNAS Culdrose
7067................Durham Tees Valley Airport Conspicuity
7070-7076.......TC Thames/TC Heathrow
7100................LTCC and LACC Saturation Code
7101-7177.......Transit (ORCAM) Brussels
7200................RN Ships
7201-7247.......Transit (ORCAM) Vienna
7250-7257.......UK Superdomestic for destinations in France and Barcelona FIR
7260-7267.......Superdomestic - Shannon/Dublin to France and Spain
7270-7277.......Plymouth Radar Superdomestic for destinations in UK and France
7300................Not allocated
7301-7307.......Superdomestic - Shannon Eastbound landing UK
7310-7327.......Superdomestic - UK to Netherlands
7330-7347.......Superdomestic - Netherlands to UK
7350...............Norwich Approach Conspicuity
7350-7361.......MoD Ops in EG D701 (Hebrides)
7350-7367.......RNAS Culdrose
7350-7373.......Manchester Approach
7350-7377.......Bournemouth Approach/LARS
7351-7377.......Norwich Approach
7362................MoD Ops in EG D702 (Fort George)
7363................MoD Ops in EG D703 (Tain)
7374................Dundee Airport Conspicuity
7375................Manchester TMA and Woodvale Local Area (Woodvale UAS Conspicuity)
7400................MPA/DEFRA/Fishery Protection Conspicuity
7401-7437.......UK Domestic
7440-7477.......Superdomestic Spain and France to UK, Ireland, Iceland and North America
7500................Special Purpose Code - Hi-Jacking
7501-7537.......Transit (ORCAM) Geneva
7540-7547.......Transit (ORCAM) Bremen
7550-7577.......Transit (ORCAM) Paris
7600................Special Purpose Code - Radio Failure
7601-7607........Superdomestic - Shannon/Dublin to Nordic States
7610-7617........Superdomestic - Ireland to UK
7620-7657........Superdomestic - UK to USA, Canada and Caribbean
7660-7677........Superdomestic - UK to USA, Canada, Canaries and Caribbean.
7700................Special Purpose Code - Emergency
7701-7717.......Superdomestic - UK to France and Spain
7720-7727.......Transit (ORCAM) Munich
7730-7757.......Superdomestic - Shannon Eastbound landing UK
7760-7775.......Superdomestic - UK to Channel Islands
7776-7777.......SSR Monitors
7001................Military Fixed-wing Low Level Conspicuity/Climbout
7002................Danger Areas General
7003................Red Arrows Transit/Display
7004................Conspicuity Aerobatics and Display
7005................Autonomous military operations within active TRAs
7006................Autonomous Operations within TRAs
7007................Open Skies Observation Aircraft
7010................Operating in Aerodrome Traffic Pattern
7011-7013.......Not allocated
7014-7027.......UK Domestic
7030-7045.......RNAS Culdrose
7030-7047.......Aldergrove Approach
7030-7057.......TC Thames/TC Heathrow
7030-7066.......Durham Tees Valley Airport
7030-7077.......Aberdeen (Northern North Sea Off-shore)
7046-7047.......RNAS Culdrose Conspicuity
7050-7077.......RNAS Culdrose
7067................Durham Tees Valley Airport Conspicuity
7070-7076.......TC Thames/TC Heathrow
7100................LTCC and LACC Saturation Code
7101-7177.......Transit (ORCAM) Brussels
7200................RN Ships
7201-7247.......Transit (ORCAM) Vienna
7250-7257.......UK Superdomestic for destinations in France and Barcelona FIR
7260-7267.......Superdomestic - Shannon/Dublin to France and Spain
7270-7277.......Plymouth Radar Superdomestic for destinations in UK and France
7300................Not allocated
7301-7307.......Superdomestic - Shannon Eastbound landing UK
7310-7327.......Superdomestic - UK to Netherlands
7330-7347.......Superdomestic - Netherlands to UK
7350...............Norwich Approach Conspicuity
7350-7361.......MoD Ops in EG D701 (Hebrides)
7350-7367.......RNAS Culdrose
7350-7373.......Manchester Approach
7350-7377.......Bournemouth Approach/LARS
7351-7377.......Norwich Approach
7362................MoD Ops in EG D702 (Fort George)
7363................MoD Ops in EG D703 (Tain)
7374................Dundee Airport Conspicuity
7375................Manchester TMA and Woodvale Local Area (Woodvale UAS Conspicuity)
7400................MPA/DEFRA/Fishery Protection Conspicuity
7401-7437.......UK Domestic
7440-7477.......Superdomestic Spain and France to UK, Ireland, Iceland and North America
7500................Special Purpose Code - Hi-Jacking
7501-7537.......Transit (ORCAM) Geneva
7540-7547.......Transit (ORCAM) Bremen
7550-7577.......Transit (ORCAM) Paris
7600................Special Purpose Code - Radio Failure
7601-7607........Superdomestic - Shannon/Dublin to Nordic States
7610-7617........Superdomestic - Ireland to UK
7620-7657........Superdomestic - UK to USA, Canada and Caribbean
7660-7677........Superdomestic - UK to USA, Canada, Canaries and Caribbean.
7700................Special Purpose Code - Emergency
7701-7717.......Superdomestic - UK to France and Spain
7720-7727.......Transit (ORCAM) Munich
7730-7757.......Superdomestic - Shannon Eastbound landing UK
7760-7775.......Superdomestic - UK to Channel Islands
7776-7777.......SSR Monitors
7760 is/was not a 'special purpose' code and has no significance.
Last edited by BEagle; 20th Aug 2009 at 04:41.