Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
JP you are really very tiresome and not more so than when you persist with your interminable questions. This is my post of 16April2009:
I am not going to repeat my account of why I wrote the section that you quoted, please reread my answers above. In reply to your last post, yes I wrote what I quote in this post. I don't expect such a clear answer or my two previous replies to satisfy you. That's not your way is it? For others of a less obtuse attitude I would summarise my thoughts as any and every theory of why this aircraft crashed become a candidate when it is perceived that the Aircraft Operator and the Air Worthiness Authority are in a conspiracy to cover the real reason up. When that conspiracy is seen to involve besmirching the good names of two deceased junior officers with no real proof then those two organisations may expect no respite from those outraged at their behaviour. And yes JP, I've just written that!
Good post, Walter. You are quite right of course. All of us have something to contribute to this debate, with the possible exception of those who broadcast to "You idiots". As long as we don't expect others to take all our pet theories on board, we deserve to be listened to. There is in this sorry saga a big secret yet to come out. It could be airworthiness, it could be state sponsored murder, it could be neither, but it will be something big. Nothing less would account for the bizarre position that both the RAF High Command and the MOD have adopted, both untenable and unshared by the other national institutions. The truth will eventually come out, it always does. We would do better to work towards that united rather than divided. Thank you, a lesson learned!
I was well aware of the BD position then and I can only repeat what I said in #4294
How does it look from my seat? I'm still as happy to fly the Chinook today as I was in 1994. Like many others.
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Tandemrotor
You will be aware that even the House of Lords Committee acknowledged that Boscombe Down's decision not to authorise further Chinook Mk2 flight trials in June 1994 was made against a background of several engine control system malfunctions that had occurred on the ground during start up checks, which at that time had not been explained to their satisfaction. Clarification was accepted by Boscombe Down in October 1994 and test flying resumed without any changes to the FADEC system.
You will also be aware that the Operating Restriction as regards Aircraft Weight was adopted as a precautionary measure to ensure that the Chinook remained within the safe, single engine flight regime.
You will be aware that even the House of Lords Committee acknowledged that Boscombe Down's decision not to authorise further Chinook Mk2 flight trials in June 1994 was made against a background of several engine control system malfunctions that had occurred on the ground during start up checks, which at that time had not been explained to their satisfaction. Clarification was accepted by Boscombe Down in October 1994 and test flying resumed without any changes to the FADEC system.
You will also be aware that the Operating Restriction as regards Aircraft Weight was adopted as a precautionary measure to ensure that the Chinook remained within the safe, single engine flight regime.
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BOAC
Your posts #5052 and # 5073
Are you bilious?
My point is really quite simple - the position entered into the SuperTans corresponded not with the Lighthouse but with the HLS a few hundred metres away. The handwriting on the photocopied chart left behind at Aldergrove was not that of either of the deceased Pilots. We are told that Lt K RN did the initial planning for the sortie.
Given that the Senior Lighthouse Keeper standing outside the Lighthouse at the time of the crash estimated the visibility at that moment to be " 15 - 20 metres at most" and his companion Lighthouse Keeper stated that "The visibility as I drove over the hill from Campbelltown, was down to only about 10 metres or less...... I suddenly heard the sound of a Helicopter directly behind me, so close. I thought it was going to hit me, although I never saw it". It is entirely possible that the HLS was the planned turning point -not the Lighthouse.
If that is the case then it would appear that the actual positions of the waypoints were not checked by either of the 2 operating Pilots despite the fact that neither of them had planned the sortie.
That old adage again:
Don't assume - check
Your posts #5052 and # 5073
Are you bilious?
My point is really quite simple - the position entered into the SuperTans corresponded not with the Lighthouse but with the HLS a few hundred metres away. The handwriting on the photocopied chart left behind at Aldergrove was not that of either of the deceased Pilots. We are told that Lt K RN did the initial planning for the sortie.
Given that the Senior Lighthouse Keeper standing outside the Lighthouse at the time of the crash estimated the visibility at that moment to be " 15 - 20 metres at most" and his companion Lighthouse Keeper stated that "The visibility as I drove over the hill from Campbelltown, was down to only about 10 metres or less...... I suddenly heard the sound of a Helicopter directly behind me, so close. I thought it was going to hit me, although I never saw it". It is entirely possible that the HLS was the planned turning point -not the Lighthouse.
If that is the case then it would appear that the actual positions of the waypoints were not checked by either of the 2 operating Pilots despite the fact that neither of them had planned the sortie.
That old adage again:
Don't assume - check
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Cazatou stated clearly a very important factor in this flight when he wrote <<You will also be aware that the Operating Restriction as regards Aircraft Weight was adopted as a precautionary measure to ensure that the Chinook remained within the safe, single engine flight regime.>> - something I had tried to explain before was that there was ample power to spare in the event of an emergency manoeuvre being required, had the engines not had to spool up from the minimum matched level they were at to keep in the air while coasting in letting the speed wash off - had they been maintaining their high cruise speed, a cyclic climb could have instantly twitched them up a couple of hundred feet in the 4 seconds after it appeared that they started to take evasive action.
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Caz- this has now become farcical. You obviously have NO idea about the conduct of a low level nav by an operational crew and firmly believe that the crew were intent on pressing on in IMC below SA to reach a 'waypoint'. There is no hope for you.
I'm not saying they did not DELIBERATELY continue in a straight line to the point of impact - no-one knows, do they? Hence the 'doubt'. However, all who understand the competence of the crew, the nature of the task and ANY idea of how these things are flown would consider that to be implausible. At least we have a concensus that they were in all probability VMC at waypoint change (and therefore not 'grossly negligent' at that point) which should, I feel, be enough to require a fresh look at the finding.
PLEASE accept also that no-one here either thinks or claims that the weather conditions at the crash site were 'VMC' - that point is totally irrelevant so you can stop quoting SLK (and JLK). I DO hope you understand that - unless of course you have a source for the claim of 'VMC' at the site? The BoI maybe? The HoL enquiry? The Fatal Accident Enquiry? I've missed it.
Your point about mis-understood Waypoints is also irrelevant for a VMC navex.
My advice is to stick with the 'duty times and missed breakfast'? You'll probably do better with those.
I'm not saying they did not DELIBERATELY continue in a straight line to the point of impact - no-one knows, do they? Hence the 'doubt'. However, all who understand the competence of the crew, the nature of the task and ANY idea of how these things are flown would consider that to be implausible. At least we have a concensus that they were in all probability VMC at waypoint change (and therefore not 'grossly negligent' at that point) which should, I feel, be enough to require a fresh look at the finding.
PLEASE accept also that no-one here either thinks or claims that the weather conditions at the crash site were 'VMC' - that point is totally irrelevant so you can stop quoting SLK (and JLK). I DO hope you understand that - unless of course you have a source for the claim of 'VMC' at the site? The BoI maybe? The HoL enquiry? The Fatal Accident Enquiry? I've missed it.
Your point about mis-understood Waypoints is also irrelevant for a VMC navex.
My advice is to stick with the 'duty times and missed breakfast'? You'll probably do better with those.
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Chinook
Chugalug2.
Your "I would summarise my thoughts as any and every theory of why this aircraft crashed become a candidate when it is perceived that the Aircraft Operator and the Air Worthiness Authority are in a conspiracy to cover the real reason up."
A conspiracy! Odd that no whistleblower has surfaced to sell his story to an investigative journalist. Just think how much of a money-making venture that would be.
Regards. JP
Your "I would summarise my thoughts as any and every theory of why this aircraft crashed become a candidate when it is perceived that the Aircraft Operator and the Air Worthiness Authority are in a conspiracy to cover the real reason up."
A conspiracy! Odd that no whistleblower has surfaced to sell his story to an investigative journalist. Just think how much of a money-making venture that would be.
Regards. JP
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BOAC
Please try to drop the condecending tone of your posts and remain polite. It would be so refreshing.
- so what?
But not at the point of impact. So how did they achieve that? If it looks like a duck, sounds like a duck............................
Please try to drop the condecending tone of your posts and remain polite. It would be so refreshing.
At least we have a concensus that they were in all probability VMC at waypoint change
But not at the point of impact. So how did they achieve that? If it looks like a duck, sounds like a duck............................
JP:
Sorry JP, not much money to be made here as the "conspiracy" is a matter of public record, ie the UK Military Operating Authority and Airworthiness Authority are essentially one and the same, ie the MOD. It is that very dichotomy that lies at the root of there being "something wrong with our bloody aircraft". I would say that there is enough evidence in the public domain to show that this aircraft was unairworthy on the day that it crashed (and every other day, but that is by the bye for the moment). I would also say that there is enough evidence to show that this was known by the Operating Authority/Airworthiness Authority. Perhaps a pedant (not suggesting for a moment that you be one JP) might cavil at a "conspiracy" of one. So be it, I merely suggest that the Operating/Airworthiness Authority Accident Investigation, ie the BoI, failed to investigate that most glaring deficiency in the aircraft, thus made the resultant finding a farce, and leaves the likes of me with a high suspicion of a cover up. As to "whistleblowers" and "money making" these are simply MOD default abuse for those who dare to shine a light into their dank corridors. I notice you mention both in one line!
A conspiracy! Odd that no whistleblower has surfaced to sell his story to an investigative journalist. Just think how much of a money-making venture that would be.
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BOAC
Those years on Tactical Transports and Instructing on Low Level at SORF totally wasted. I should be ashamed n'est pas?
I must admit to being slightly confused by your statement that "At least we have a consensus that they were in all probability VMC at waypoint change". I do not recall being asked to vote. The only things about "waypoint change" that can be stated with any certainty are that the pilots were undoubtedly in control of the aircraft at that time - the change would not have been made if the pilots were experiencing any handling difficulties - and that they were only approx 5776 ft from impact and travelling at approx 250 ft per second.
You will note that the investigating RAF Board thought that they were in cloud and not flying VFR when they made the waypoint change.
Perhaps you can enlighten us as to what new information you have that makes you so certain that the Investigating Board and/or all the Reviewing Officers were wrong?
You will also be aware that both the Reviewing Officers stated to the HOL Committee that negligence had occurred by the time the pilots initiated waypoint change in that if they were in cloud the pilots should have flying in accordance with IFR; or they were flouting the basic rules of airmanship if VFR by endangering the aircraft by flying too fast and too low towards the cloud covered high ground.
Those years on Tactical Transports and Instructing on Low Level at SORF totally wasted. I should be ashamed n'est pas?
I must admit to being slightly confused by your statement that "At least we have a consensus that they were in all probability VMC at waypoint change". I do not recall being asked to vote. The only things about "waypoint change" that can be stated with any certainty are that the pilots were undoubtedly in control of the aircraft at that time - the change would not have been made if the pilots were experiencing any handling difficulties - and that they were only approx 5776 ft from impact and travelling at approx 250 ft per second.
You will note that the investigating RAF Board thought that they were in cloud and not flying VFR when they made the waypoint change.
Perhaps you can enlighten us as to what new information you have that makes you so certain that the Investigating Board and/or all the Reviewing Officers were wrong?
You will also be aware that both the Reviewing Officers stated to the HOL Committee that negligence had occurred by the time the pilots initiated waypoint change in that if they were in cloud the pilots should have flying in accordance with IFR; or they were flouting the basic rules of airmanship if VFR by endangering the aircraft by flying too fast and too low towards the cloud covered high ground.
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Pulse1 in post #4969 wrote <<Your attempts to convince us that Tapper played no part in flight planning has now been shown up to be totally false by tucumseh who was able to quote other parts of the same records, and you have not challenged his quotes from the Bo>>
I believe that Cazatou has quite rightly drawn our attention to just how the planning came together – it is crucially important to address this aspect.
It seems clear that the basic bus trip was planned by Lts Trapp and Kingston and that this “rough” planning was handed (the word used by Lt Trapp) to Flt Lt Tapper: it is important to note that this degree of planning covered fuel requirements which resulted in a noteable limitation to the options available to Flt Lt Tapper – regardless of any icing considerations, there would not be sufficient fuel for anything other than a VFR flight as there were not enough alternates (diversion options) available for a mid level instrument flight.
One would have to wonder how much more planning was required for just a bus trip but Flt Lt Tapper was observed to be doing more on more detailed charts later; MALM Forbes did his preparation on his maps too. If we add to this planning effort the crew planning for the sortie that had been done – Flt Lt Tapper had told Sqn Ldr Stangroom that his crew had “completed extensive pre-planning” - one would be forgiven for thinking that perhaps there was more to this flight than a simple ferry flight/bus trip.
We can expand on the planning aspect in the light of their having to stick to VFR: what if the conditions on the Mull had deteriorated just a little more and the shoreline could not be made out as they approached it? - it would have to have been considered in planning. Now Daleks point (post#4994, p250) is relevent <<It is just that I have never seen any evidence to support a planned approach to the Mull. As I have said "in my opinion", and that of my Puma and Tornado friends, the failure to insert a Waypoint between Belfast and the Mull suggests no planned accurate or precise approach. >> - there are two parts to this:
Firstly, if it was intended to accurately arrive at the area of the LZ from Aldergrove, one simply had to follow the 027 radial from Aldergrove all the way to waypoint A – it lies right on it, no need for an intermediate waypoint, STANS would have fed the HoSI and the course could have been followed accurately (and this track had been followed accurately);
Secondly, if this was a VFR ferry flight just passing by the Mull, given the conditions and the possibility that the shoreline may not be clearly seen, prudent planning would surely have had that there be a waypoint(s) to keep them clear of the Mull with sufficient margin in view of the perceived (in)accuracy of the STANS on a water crossing. This is not “instrument” flying – it is using a navaid to keep clear of an area of bad local conditions fixed on a landmass from which it would be difficult to judge one's distance off, while actually remaining in clear conditions over the sea.
Waypoint A clearly does not do this being right on the land;
Waypoint B is not a natural next waypoint after A to fit the scenario of a ferry route in these conditions – with reference to the annotated charts (I posted some time ago), you would have had to select waypoint B and turned towards it several miles before the position where they actually did in order to clear the high ground (higher than where they crashed) – if indeed just flying by the Mull was their intention, they should have had a waypoint just off the next headland to aim for, otherwise, in the event of their not having clear sight of the shoreline, they would have had to do some hurried chartwork (in a Chin at 150 kts!) or do a dog leg back to some arbitrary safe distance – after all that planning effort mentioned above, why would they not have had the very basics done (ie the extra waypoint(s)) for the simple ferry flight?
I conclude that there was an intention to closely approach the area of the LZ.
Some bright spark will probably say that, even if passing by/landing at that LZ was the objective, what would they have done thereafter? Well, as the LZ was low compared with the hill and the orographic cloud was only about 800 ft, they would have had to turn back out to sea and so the logical thing for them to do (whether leaving the site after a touch and go or waving off) would have been for them to have had set waypoint B (which they did) and just head out generally NW until the bearing to B was at a predetermined figure.
Pulse1 – perhaps you should appologise to Cazatou? - the gist of his views on planning was correct as there was a handover of the basic planning – and, in addressing this, hopefully we can see that there was a lot more to the planning aspect – so Cazatou was being constructive. In contrast, BOAC is, well, words fail me …
I believe that Cazatou has quite rightly drawn our attention to just how the planning came together – it is crucially important to address this aspect.
It seems clear that the basic bus trip was planned by Lts Trapp and Kingston and that this “rough” planning was handed (the word used by Lt Trapp) to Flt Lt Tapper: it is important to note that this degree of planning covered fuel requirements which resulted in a noteable limitation to the options available to Flt Lt Tapper – regardless of any icing considerations, there would not be sufficient fuel for anything other than a VFR flight as there were not enough alternates (diversion options) available for a mid level instrument flight.
One would have to wonder how much more planning was required for just a bus trip but Flt Lt Tapper was observed to be doing more on more detailed charts later; MALM Forbes did his preparation on his maps too. If we add to this planning effort the crew planning for the sortie that had been done – Flt Lt Tapper had told Sqn Ldr Stangroom that his crew had “completed extensive pre-planning” - one would be forgiven for thinking that perhaps there was more to this flight than a simple ferry flight/bus trip.
We can expand on the planning aspect in the light of their having to stick to VFR: what if the conditions on the Mull had deteriorated just a little more and the shoreline could not be made out as they approached it? - it would have to have been considered in planning. Now Daleks point (post#4994, p250) is relevent <<It is just that I have never seen any evidence to support a planned approach to the Mull. As I have said "in my opinion", and that of my Puma and Tornado friends, the failure to insert a Waypoint between Belfast and the Mull suggests no planned accurate or precise approach. >> - there are two parts to this:
Firstly, if it was intended to accurately arrive at the area of the LZ from Aldergrove, one simply had to follow the 027 radial from Aldergrove all the way to waypoint A – it lies right on it, no need for an intermediate waypoint, STANS would have fed the HoSI and the course could have been followed accurately (and this track had been followed accurately);
Secondly, if this was a VFR ferry flight just passing by the Mull, given the conditions and the possibility that the shoreline may not be clearly seen, prudent planning would surely have had that there be a waypoint(s) to keep them clear of the Mull with sufficient margin in view of the perceived (in)accuracy of the STANS on a water crossing. This is not “instrument” flying – it is using a navaid to keep clear of an area of bad local conditions fixed on a landmass from which it would be difficult to judge one's distance off, while actually remaining in clear conditions over the sea.
Waypoint A clearly does not do this being right on the land;
Waypoint B is not a natural next waypoint after A to fit the scenario of a ferry route in these conditions – with reference to the annotated charts (I posted some time ago), you would have had to select waypoint B and turned towards it several miles before the position where they actually did in order to clear the high ground (higher than where they crashed) – if indeed just flying by the Mull was their intention, they should have had a waypoint just off the next headland to aim for, otherwise, in the event of their not having clear sight of the shoreline, they would have had to do some hurried chartwork (in a Chin at 150 kts!) or do a dog leg back to some arbitrary safe distance – after all that planning effort mentioned above, why would they not have had the very basics done (ie the extra waypoint(s)) for the simple ferry flight?
I conclude that there was an intention to closely approach the area of the LZ.
Some bright spark will probably say that, even if passing by/landing at that LZ was the objective, what would they have done thereafter? Well, as the LZ was low compared with the hill and the orographic cloud was only about 800 ft, they would have had to turn back out to sea and so the logical thing for them to do (whether leaving the site after a touch and go or waving off) would have been for them to have had set waypoint B (which they did) and just head out generally NW until the bearing to B was at a predetermined figure.
Pulse1 – perhaps you should appologise to Cazatou? - the gist of his views on planning was correct as there was a handover of the basic planning – and, in addressing this, hopefully we can see that there was a lot more to the planning aspect – so Cazatou was being constructive. In contrast, BOAC is, well, words fail me …
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Baston
Glad to see you got the message on DR. The Navigation Manual (3456A?) gives you figures to work too. I also thought that I beat these figures "most of the time", but it is unreasonable to expect any crew to beat them "all of the time."
Now go back to my original scenario. You have shown at Aldergrove that the visibility is 3 nms and have seen nothing to suggest it has changed. You have the visibility you require to acquire the coast with a considerable safety margin. Why not transit at normal speed?
Remember the C130 example I gave.
Approaching the Mull I call "penetrate, penetrate go", the Captain will obey the script and abandon low level. However, once safely on the ground I will be asked to justify the call.
Can you imagine the reaction if I were to say. "Look, I know the vis was 3nms and we were flying in legal conditions, but I wasn,t very comfortable that close to the margins."
If I did that more than once the Squadron would quickly find a Navigator with more b*lls, and I would be flying a desk.
Glad to see you got the message on DR. The Navigation Manual (3456A?) gives you figures to work too. I also thought that I beat these figures "most of the time", but it is unreasonable to expect any crew to beat them "all of the time."
Now go back to my original scenario. You have shown at Aldergrove that the visibility is 3 nms and have seen nothing to suggest it has changed. You have the visibility you require to acquire the coast with a considerable safety margin. Why not transit at normal speed?
Remember the C130 example I gave.
Approaching the Mull I call "penetrate, penetrate go", the Captain will obey the script and abandon low level. However, once safely on the ground I will be asked to justify the call.
Can you imagine the reaction if I were to say. "Look, I know the vis was 3nms and we were flying in legal conditions, but I wasn,t very comfortable that close to the margins."
If I did that more than once the Squadron would quickly find a Navigator with more b*lls, and I would be flying a desk.
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BOAC
You have such a way with words.
May I draw your attention to the words of Lord Jauncy of Tullichettle in his opening remarks in the House of Lords debate 5 November 2002. To be fair to his Lordship; I would point out that these remarks were his response to a criticism from the MOD regarding the HOL Report.
"If the manner of flying was such that an aircraft was exposed to serious risk, one would have thought that a properly trained and competent pilot should forsee the probable consequences of incurring that risk. If the results were fatal or catastrophic, then I should have thought that he would be negligent"
I must confess that I was not present that evening but I presume that the Official HOL transcript is accurate. If that is so, then his Lordship and I are in complete agreement.
You have such a way with words.
May I draw your attention to the words of Lord Jauncy of Tullichettle in his opening remarks in the House of Lords debate 5 November 2002. To be fair to his Lordship; I would point out that these remarks were his response to a criticism from the MOD regarding the HOL Report.
"If the manner of flying was such that an aircraft was exposed to serious risk, one would have thought that a properly trained and competent pilot should forsee the probable consequences of incurring that risk. If the results were fatal or catastrophic, then I should have thought that he would be negligent"
I must confess that I was not present that evening but I presume that the Official HOL transcript is accurate. If that is so, then his Lordship and I are in complete agreement.
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My 'way with words' enables me to ask - did you fail to notice the very first word in your quote or fail to understand its meaning?
If
I have no dispute with his statement, as long as wild inferences are not extruded as fact by others who do not know the facts.This quote from the HoL fits you to a 'tee':
"There is no doubt in my mind that some of your Lordships who are confident of the propriety of the verdict of gross negligence have recounted the story of what happened as a narrative, telling us what the pilots did and where they went wrong and asserting that they were rash, that they did not take the weather into account and that they were flying too fast and too low. Like many narratives, it is delivered with great conviction. The people who have told it have frequently said that it is the only realistic or credible explanation. That is the power of the good story teller, who proceeds on the assumption that they know how it must have been and then we all believe it. As regards the standard of proof and there being no doubt whatsoever of the propriety of the verdict, one must begin to doubt—as, indeed, people, including the unanimous body of the Select Committee, did doubt—that that standard had been reached. One may argue that it is an impossibly high standard and that there can be no past events for which it is proper to say that there can be no doubt whatsoever as regards what happened. Nevertheless, those are the relevant words."
If
I have no dispute with his statement, as long as wild inferences are not extruded as fact by others who do not know the facts.This quote from the HoL fits you to a 'tee':
"There is no doubt in my mind that some of your Lordships who are confident of the propriety of the verdict of gross negligence have recounted the story of what happened as a narrative, telling us what the pilots did and where they went wrong and asserting that they were rash, that they did not take the weather into account and that they were flying too fast and too low. Like many narratives, it is delivered with great conviction. The people who have told it have frequently said that it is the only realistic or credible explanation. That is the power of the good story teller, who proceeds on the assumption that they know how it must have been and then we all believe it. As regards the standard of proof and there being no doubt whatsoever of the propriety of the verdict, one must begin to doubt—as, indeed, people, including the unanimous body of the Select Committee, did doubt—that that standard had been reached. One may argue that it is an impossibly high standard and that there can be no past events for which it is proper to say that there can be no doubt whatsoever as regards what happened. Nevertheless, those are the relevant words."
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Chinook
Chugalug2.
Quote "I merely suggest that the Operating/Airworthiness Authority Accident Investigation, ie the BoI, failed to investigate that most glaring deficiency in the aircraft".
Not good enough; you said there was a conspiracy. (OED definition: "A combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose".
While you are looking up the meaning of conspiracy for yourself, please also check on your word dichotomy.
Apologies for reverting to my DS mode, but you do ask for it!
Regards. John
Quote "I merely suggest that the Operating/Airworthiness Authority Accident Investigation, ie the BoI, failed to investigate that most glaring deficiency in the aircraft".
Not good enough; you said there was a conspiracy. (OED definition: "A combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose".
While you are looking up the meaning of conspiracy for yourself, please also check on your word dichotomy.
Apologies for reverting to my DS mode, but you do ask for it!
Regards. John
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Chugalug2.
Quote "I merely suggest that the Operating/Airworthiness Authority Accident Investigation, ie the BoI, failed to investigate that most glaring deficiency in the aircraft".
Not good enough; you said there was a conspiracy. (OED definition: "A combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose".
While you are looking up the meaning of conspiracy for yourself, please also check on your word dichotomy.
Quote "I merely suggest that the Operating/Airworthiness Authority Accident Investigation, ie the BoI, failed to investigate that most glaring deficiency in the aircraft".
Not good enough; you said there was a conspiracy. (OED definition: "A combination of persons for an evil or unlawful purpose".
While you are looking up the meaning of conspiracy for yourself, please also check on your word dichotomy.
Also, for the word "dichotomy", I found the following definition: "something with seemingly contradicting terms".
I feel that fits the idea of the same people releasing the aircraft into service and being called to judge on an accident in which its airworthiness is called into question.
Chugalug2, apologies for stepping in. I couldn't resist.
TN
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bast0n,
I was simply trying to clarify my last post, and didn't do it very well.
Just ignore. I think we have flogged the TANS error, DR accuracy, and visual illusion theory to death.
I tried to show that a combination of a small Navaid error, coupled with visual illusion, could lead to a very serious situation.
At best, it is only a theory with a small probability of being factual.
I still think it more likely than three experienced, cautious individuals deliberately planning to crest a hill by less than 300ft in IMC, and then hitting it because they were 400m off track.
Now that I do call stretching credibility, a lot.
I was simply trying to clarify my last post, and didn't do it very well.
Just ignore. I think we have flogged the TANS error, DR accuracy, and visual illusion theory to death.
I tried to show that a combination of a small Navaid error, coupled with visual illusion, could lead to a very serious situation.
At best, it is only a theory with a small probability of being factual.
I still think it more likely than three experienced, cautious individuals deliberately planning to crest a hill by less than 300ft in IMC, and then hitting it because they were 400m off track.
Now that I do call stretching credibility, a lot.
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Chinook
Thor Nogson.
I'm sure Chug is capable of answering for himself, but i have re-read his several posts and, as he himself tells us "I would summarise my thoughts as any and every theory of why this aircraft crashed become a candidate when it is perceived that the Aircraft Operator and the Air Worthiness Authority are in a conspiracy to cover the real reason up.
It really could not be more clear than that.
JP
I'm sure Chug is capable of answering for himself, but i have re-read his several posts and, as he himself tells us "I would summarise my thoughts as any and every theory of why this aircraft crashed become a candidate when it is perceived that the Aircraft Operator and the Air Worthiness Authority are in a conspiracy to cover the real reason up.
It really could not be more clear than that.
JP