Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Courtney,
"This aircraft did not depart from controlled flight as in the other examples you quote".................prove that to me and every other poster in here and ensure we are left with absolutely no doubt whatsoever as to what happened................bear in mind we want 100% FACT and no supposition
"It was in full control when it met the Mull."...............prove that to me and every other poster in here and ensure that we are left with absolutely no doubt whatsoever as to what happened.............bear in mind we want 100% FACT and no supposition.
Also bear in mind you have already agreed on many occasions that THERE IS DOUBT IN THIS CASE so I am not sure how you are going to answer the above without some outstanding spin
"This aircraft did not depart from controlled flight as in the other examples you quote".................prove that to me and every other poster in here and ensure we are left with absolutely no doubt whatsoever as to what happened................bear in mind we want 100% FACT and no supposition
"It was in full control when it met the Mull."...............prove that to me and every other poster in here and ensure that we are left with absolutely no doubt whatsoever as to what happened.............bear in mind we want 100% FACT and no supposition.
Also bear in mind you have already agreed on many occasions that THERE IS DOUBT IN THIS CASE so I am not sure how you are going to answer the above without some outstanding spin
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Guys and gals.
As the meeting with the SoS for Defence gets ever closer, about a week I think, might I suggest it would be wise to wind this current issue down. I am sure you will all see the sense of that.
Best to take a breather now and let us hope that Brian and his team will get the result we all want and they deserve.
Good luck to them.
As the meeting with the SoS for Defence gets ever closer, about a week I think, might I suggest it would be wise to wind this current issue down. I am sure you will all see the sense of that.
Best to take a breather now and let us hope that Brian and his team will get the result we all want and they deserve.
Good luck to them.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Wise words, as always, PPRuNe Pop.
Thank you for gently guiding my attention back to where it should be.
I will be a little busy over the coming week, but will endeavour to keep everyone as updated as I can.
On behalf of the Campaign Group, may I thank everyone for their kind words of support for this latest challenge.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Thank you for gently guiding my attention back to where it should be.
I will be a little busy over the coming week, but will endeavour to keep everyone as updated as I can.
On behalf of the Campaign Group, may I thank everyone for their kind words of support for this latest challenge.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Courtney,
you are correct, and I apologise.
Let's simply agree to disagree.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
you are correct, and I apologise.
Let's simply agree to disagree.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Courtney,
Having just returned from a spot of leave, I have been catching up on the last few pages of posts, and I feel compelled to comment on your assumption that, because ZD576 appears to have been under some sort of control at the moment of impact, the crew must have been negligent.
Obviously, this is the same assumption made by their Airships, and I find it interesting that someone with your background should reach the same conclusion, when so many others have not. However, may I point out that if something odd happened after selecting Waypoint B, which apparently would have necessitated a turn of just 7 degrees to the left to make good the required new track, the manoeuvre being flown at impact could easily indicate that a loss of control had occurred and that the crew was trying to recover from sort of IMC UP (Unusual Position for the unititiated) when they ran out of room and hit the ground. Many (myself included) have attempted to hypothesise what that "something odd" might have been, but we shall never know. Indeed, it is possible that your version of events is correct, but we shall never know that either. Incidentally, I believe the "cruise climb" was an assumption based on connecting the SuperTANS position recorded at Waypoint change to that recorded at power-down (impact).
If you need convincing about how unlikely things can (and do) happen, the incident referred to above by Tandemrotor, involving a similar US Army Chinook, beggars belief (in effect, the aircraft failed to respond to a roll command and, in trying to clear the problem, the pilots finished up rolling the thing through 360 degrees, lost 850 ft in altitude and landed - hard - yet no fault could be found with the aircraft). That such an extreme event did happen once surely makes it more likely that it may have happened again to ZD576? Indeed, following the US Army incident, the pilots stated that they had needed "almost full rudder" to be able to regain control of their aircraft - which should add at least some doubt into your mind, when (if I recall correctly) ZD576's rudder pedals were found at 77% deflection? Sure, this could be a coincidence, but a very similar aircraft failing to roll when requested and needing an illogical rudder input to try to recover from the ensuing UP certainly puts plenty of doubt in my mind, though it's possible that their Airships weren't aware of this other incident at the time of their deliberations and I would guess that you may not have been aware of it either.
I'm not saying that this is what happened, but trying to illustrate that so long as this kind of thing may have happened, there may have been a reason that the crew of ZD576 found themselves there (point of impact) for which they would have been entirely blameless. This possibility renders a finding of "Gross Negligence" to a required standard of proof of "beyond any doubt whatsoever" completely unjustifiable - the conclusion that was reached by the HoL Select Committee several years ago.
I respect your opinion but cannot agree with your argument and urge you to reconsider (not that it will make any difference to the Secretary of State!).
Having just returned from a spot of leave, I have been catching up on the last few pages of posts, and I feel compelled to comment on your assumption that, because ZD576 appears to have been under some sort of control at the moment of impact, the crew must have been negligent.
Obviously, this is the same assumption made by their Airships, and I find it interesting that someone with your background should reach the same conclusion, when so many others have not. However, may I point out that if something odd happened after selecting Waypoint B, which apparently would have necessitated a turn of just 7 degrees to the left to make good the required new track, the manoeuvre being flown at impact could easily indicate that a loss of control had occurred and that the crew was trying to recover from sort of IMC UP (Unusual Position for the unititiated) when they ran out of room and hit the ground. Many (myself included) have attempted to hypothesise what that "something odd" might have been, but we shall never know. Indeed, it is possible that your version of events is correct, but we shall never know that either. Incidentally, I believe the "cruise climb" was an assumption based on connecting the SuperTANS position recorded at Waypoint change to that recorded at power-down (impact).
If you need convincing about how unlikely things can (and do) happen, the incident referred to above by Tandemrotor, involving a similar US Army Chinook, beggars belief (in effect, the aircraft failed to respond to a roll command and, in trying to clear the problem, the pilots finished up rolling the thing through 360 degrees, lost 850 ft in altitude and landed - hard - yet no fault could be found with the aircraft). That such an extreme event did happen once surely makes it more likely that it may have happened again to ZD576? Indeed, following the US Army incident, the pilots stated that they had needed "almost full rudder" to be able to regain control of their aircraft - which should add at least some doubt into your mind, when (if I recall correctly) ZD576's rudder pedals were found at 77% deflection? Sure, this could be a coincidence, but a very similar aircraft failing to roll when requested and needing an illogical rudder input to try to recover from the ensuing UP certainly puts plenty of doubt in my mind, though it's possible that their Airships weren't aware of this other incident at the time of their deliberations and I would guess that you may not have been aware of it either.
I'm not saying that this is what happened, but trying to illustrate that so long as this kind of thing may have happened, there may have been a reason that the crew of ZD576 found themselves there (point of impact) for which they would have been entirely blameless. This possibility renders a finding of "Gross Negligence" to a required standard of proof of "beyond any doubt whatsoever" completely unjustifiable - the conclusion that was reached by the HoL Select Committee several years ago.
I respect your opinion but cannot agree with your argument and urge you to reconsider (not that it will make any difference to the Secretary of State!).
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meadowbank's point:
<<Incidentally, I believe the "cruise climb" was an assumption based on connecting the SuperTANS position recorded at Waypoint change to that recorded at power-down (impact).>>
is important - too many had taken it as gospel that there was an intention to climb.
Understanding how tenuous this assumption was together with the slowing down by 20 kts TAS (as calculated by Boeing for the leg from waypoint change) should help counter the allegation that they had selected an incorrect rate of climb - they weren't going over anyway.
<<Incidentally, I believe the "cruise climb" was an assumption based on connecting the SuperTANS position recorded at Waypoint change to that recorded at power-down (impact).>>
is important - too many had taken it as gospel that there was an intention to climb.
Understanding how tenuous this assumption was together with the slowing down by 20 kts TAS (as calculated by Boeing for the leg from waypoint change) should help counter the allegation that they had selected an incorrect rate of climb - they weren't going over anyway.
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Come on guys! Give it a rest. The much vaunted and much needed meeting with Secretary of Defence is taking place next week so why flog it now? It's not helping anyone. Wait to see how Brian and his team get on. IMHO all you are doing at the moment is making unnecessary waves.
Give it a break.
Give it a break.
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<<Give it a break.>>
Perhaps some of us are concerned that the case being made may not get the job done other than as a technicality, so much time having past that the original reason for firmly blaming the pilots (eg to allay public concerns regarding possible foul play) no longer are a concern.
This new look at the case may be the last chance to ask questions as to the many anomalies apparent on this flight.
I personally believe that there is ample evidence that there was some other intention in the vicinity of the Mull and that full disclosure by the authorities (under pressure!) may lead to not only a full and proper exoneration of the pilots but also a chance of real justice being done.
To date, (the official line) the weather and a/c track have been misrepresented to support the simple case of them being disorientated in IMC and several anomalies/parameters have been ignored that point to some other activity.
The requisite pressure on the authorities to fully open up can only come from such a group of interested parties as the "Mull group" represents if they can present a strong analysis of what the many anomalous parameters may suggest.
Surely a better bet than "nothing can be known".
Perhaps some of us are concerned that the case being made may not get the job done other than as a technicality, so much time having past that the original reason for firmly blaming the pilots (eg to allay public concerns regarding possible foul play) no longer are a concern.
This new look at the case may be the last chance to ask questions as to the many anomalies apparent on this flight.
I personally believe that there is ample evidence that there was some other intention in the vicinity of the Mull and that full disclosure by the authorities (under pressure!) may lead to not only a full and proper exoneration of the pilots but also a chance of real justice being done.
To date, (the official line) the weather and a/c track have been misrepresented to support the simple case of them being disorientated in IMC and several anomalies/parameters have been ignored that point to some other activity.
The requisite pressure on the authorities to fully open up can only come from such a group of interested parties as the "Mull group" represents if they can present a strong analysis of what the many anomalous parameters may suggest.
Surely a better bet than "nothing can be known".
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I personally believe that there is ample evidence that there was some other intention in the vicinity of the Mull and that full disclosure by the authorities (under pressure!) may lead to not only a full and proper exoneration of the pilots but also a chance of real justice being done.
However, the meeting is next week and I suspect that everything that can be done and said has been documented and rehearsed.
Personally, I am very happy to trust that something good will come from the meeting. It will, of course, be a bitter pill to swallow if not. But don't expect a result yet.
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I have already made the case that the weather was misrepresented at all the inquiries such as to support the idea that they were disoriented in IMC whereas I suggest that the actual conditions had them in the clear up until the last moments but with the slopes ahead covered in ground hugging mist that made visual judgment of range to go very unreliable.
Next I would like to make the case that the a/c track was misrepresented such as to support them going straight in.
As you seem reluctant to do the chart work yourselves, I feel obliged to present it.
Below is the 1:10,000 map presented to the Select Committee – it’s not very clear so I have had to add bold red letters to the key points in an immediately following copy:
I reproduce here their key:
POSITION INFORMATION RECOVERED FROM RNS 252 SUPERTANS AND GPS
ANALYSIS
1.
Vector BA is error in RNS 252 SuperTANS position at powerdown.
2.
Vector JK is most likely error in RNS 252 SuperTANS position at point of leg transfer to WP B.
3.
Track KA is most likely aircraft track to impact.
4.
Track LH is possible closing track to WP A assumed by the crew.
It does not emphasise that the SuperTANS (which was found to have been reasonably accurate in the latter stages of the flight) position for waypoint A was probably the best to base analysis on;
It does not show the track from Aldergrove to waypoint change as 027m despite analysis by Boeing (Mitchel – not the simulation) that the a/c had very much held that course for the whole flight until that point, nor that extended this track goes directly to waypoint A;
It does not reflect the known turn to the right that occurred at waypoint change;
It does not represent the course as found on the handling pilot’s HSI;
It does not locate the (locally known) landing area.
So here is my version of that map with what I believe to be relevant emphasised:
It hardly needs saying that it presents a different picture of events – the relevance of the handling pilot’s HSI course selector being on 035 (mag) is self evident.
It is intriguing how they got their position for where the pilots thought they were at waypoint change (blue circle) because if you had planned a flight to run up a distance off, but parallel to, the shoreline until you got 035m to waypoint A then you would have planned an ideal approach to that landing area – perhaps someone who had eyeballed their actual flight plan has made a Freudian slip.
One cannot help wondering that if there was supposed to be something to home on at that landing area and the handling pilot was intending to approach at 035m but in the event the “beacon” (or whatever equipment/procedure) was half a mile or so up the hill then the a/c track makes sense.
That waypoint A was more likely an inner marker for that landing area than a sloppy input for the light house is intuitively obvious.
When one considers that the handling pilot’s baro alt was set for QFI for the height of the ground at the threshold to that landing area and that one of the RADALT warnings was set at minimum (consistent with an imminent landing) it would be reasonable to assume that they were intending landing or passing closely to that landing area.
According to Boeing’s analysis (again, Mitchel – not the simulation), they had already slowed down in TAS terms by 20 kts in that final leg – something that, when at high speed in clean air, would have required a considerably lowered power which would have severely limited their options for an emergency manouevre at short notice – they had flown into a vertical corner.
Next I would like to make the case that the a/c track was misrepresented such as to support them going straight in.
As you seem reluctant to do the chart work yourselves, I feel obliged to present it.
Below is the 1:10,000 map presented to the Select Committee – it’s not very clear so I have had to add bold red letters to the key points in an immediately following copy:
I reproduce here their key:
POSITION INFORMATION RECOVERED FROM RNS 252 SUPERTANS AND GPS
Point
Indication
Indication
A
Aircraft initial impact on Cliff A
B
RNS 252 SuperTANS calculated position at powerdown using Trimble 8000 GPS information
C
Last RNS 252 SuperTANS calculated position used for steering information displayed to pilots
D
Trimble 8000 position at powerdown in GPS processor
E
Trimble 8000 position at powerdown in output buffer of Host processor
F
RNS 252 SuperTANS calculated position at powerdown from Doppler information
G
WP A Lat/Long programmed into RNS 252 SuperTANS
H
Mull of Kintyre Lighthouse true position
J
RNS 252 SuperTANS recorded position of leg transfer to WP B
K
Most likely position of aircraft at leg transfer
L
Most likely position crew believed themselves to be at leg transfer
Aircraft initial impact on Cliff A
B
RNS 252 SuperTANS calculated position at powerdown using Trimble 8000 GPS information
C
Last RNS 252 SuperTANS calculated position used for steering information displayed to pilots
D
Trimble 8000 position at powerdown in GPS processor
E
Trimble 8000 position at powerdown in output buffer of Host processor
F
RNS 252 SuperTANS calculated position at powerdown from Doppler information
G
WP A Lat/Long programmed into RNS 252 SuperTANS
H
Mull of Kintyre Lighthouse true position
J
RNS 252 SuperTANS recorded position of leg transfer to WP B
K
Most likely position of aircraft at leg transfer
L
Most likely position crew believed themselves to be at leg transfer
ANALYSIS
1.
Vector BA is error in RNS 252 SuperTANS position at powerdown.
2.
Vector JK is most likely error in RNS 252 SuperTANS position at point of leg transfer to WP B.
3.
Track KA is most likely aircraft track to impact.
4.
Track LH is possible closing track to WP A assumed by the crew.
It does not emphasise that the SuperTANS (which was found to have been reasonably accurate in the latter stages of the flight) position for waypoint A was probably the best to base analysis on;
It does not show the track from Aldergrove to waypoint change as 027m despite analysis by Boeing (Mitchel – not the simulation) that the a/c had very much held that course for the whole flight until that point, nor that extended this track goes directly to waypoint A;
It does not reflect the known turn to the right that occurred at waypoint change;
It does not represent the course as found on the handling pilot’s HSI;
It does not locate the (locally known) landing area.
So here is my version of that map with what I believe to be relevant emphasised:
It hardly needs saying that it presents a different picture of events – the relevance of the handling pilot’s HSI course selector being on 035 (mag) is self evident.
It is intriguing how they got their position for where the pilots thought they were at waypoint change (blue circle) because if you had planned a flight to run up a distance off, but parallel to, the shoreline until you got 035m to waypoint A then you would have planned an ideal approach to that landing area – perhaps someone who had eyeballed their actual flight plan has made a Freudian slip.
One cannot help wondering that if there was supposed to be something to home on at that landing area and the handling pilot was intending to approach at 035m but in the event the “beacon” (or whatever equipment/procedure) was half a mile or so up the hill then the a/c track makes sense.
That waypoint A was more likely an inner marker for that landing area than a sloppy input for the light house is intuitively obvious.
When one considers that the handling pilot’s baro alt was set for QFI for the height of the ground at the threshold to that landing area and that one of the RADALT warnings was set at minimum (consistent with an imminent landing) it would be reasonable to assume that they were intending landing or passing closely to that landing area.
According to Boeing’s analysis (again, Mitchel – not the simulation), they had already slowed down in TAS terms by 20 kts in that final leg – something that, when at high speed in clean air, would have required a considerably lowered power which would have severely limited their options for an emergency manouevre at short notice – they had flown into a vertical corner.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 10th Jan 2008 at 18:21. Reason: correction to text
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This "green triangle" is the spot where locals say Chinooks had landed in the past (waypoint A is just off the edge) - it's level, firm, roomy, and showed evidence of having been kept clear of vegetation in the past:
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And let us refresh our understanding of the most probable weather conditions that they would have been facing in the immediate vicinity of the Mull (as I have tried to describe in past posts):
Here is a profile shot (from the north) of the Mull in gentle wind conditions that did not produce the surface mist (due to phenomenon of "speed up" as I have previously described) - the orographic cloud has a well defined base and, if you look at the photo closely, you can see that it extends a significant distance out to sea into the wind - in the immediate vicinity of the Mull that day, they would have been underneath this base - a grey ceiling that met with the landmass and prevented visual judgment of range from large topographic features on the hill line ahead:
On the day, the wind was strong and would have been expected (given the humidity etc) to have given rise to the characteristic ground hugging mist in the cooling late afternoon/evening. The following picture is from up wind showing such mist forming on the slopes of Ailsa Craig - note how it follows the ground.
The slopes of the Mull that day, beneath the orographic cloud proper, would have appeared thus from the level of the lighthouse wall and covered the ground, thickening, until it merged with the oro cloud.
They would have been able to see the Mull landmass from a good distance at low level but close in they would have had difficulty judging their distance off visually - and they may not have had confidence enough in their visual judgment to over rule what any other (eg radio) reference was telling them if it was wrongly placed.
Here is a profile shot (from the north) of the Mull in gentle wind conditions that did not produce the surface mist (due to phenomenon of "speed up" as I have previously described) - the orographic cloud has a well defined base and, if you look at the photo closely, you can see that it extends a significant distance out to sea into the wind - in the immediate vicinity of the Mull that day, they would have been underneath this base - a grey ceiling that met with the landmass and prevented visual judgment of range from large topographic features on the hill line ahead:
On the day, the wind was strong and would have been expected (given the humidity etc) to have given rise to the characteristic ground hugging mist in the cooling late afternoon/evening. The following picture is from up wind showing such mist forming on the slopes of Ailsa Craig - note how it follows the ground.
The slopes of the Mull that day, beneath the orographic cloud proper, would have appeared thus from the level of the lighthouse wall and covered the ground, thickening, until it merged with the oro cloud.
They would have been able to see the Mull landmass from a good distance at low level but close in they would have had difficulty judging their distance off visually - and they may not have had confidence enough in their visual judgment to over rule what any other (eg radio) reference was telling them if it was wrongly placed.
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Walter
I'm not going to comment on the whole of your post as I have a life to lead too. However,
No it's not! He may have simply forgotten to set the bug, or decided that setting the bug prior to turning onto a new heading just a few degrees from the one he was on (and for which he would need less than 10 degrees of bank) was unnecessary.
Remind me again how many times you've piloted a large military helicopter
I'm not going to comment on the whole of your post as I have a life to lead too. However,
the relevance of the handling pilot’s HSI course selector being on 035 (mag) is self evident.
Remind me again how many times you've piloted a large military helicopter
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meadowbank
<<Remind me again how many times you've piloted a large military helicopter>>
The reason I post here is to ask those of you who have to consider perspectives that you may have missed - because there sure as hell are a lot of anomalies that should have been addressed by you - and if someone who has not had the priviledge of flying such can pick them out, why can't you?
When a particular point is brought up by a contributor, relating to one of the unexplained parameters, instead of shouting the suggested interpretation down when it is wrong, why not take the prompt and give your understanding of it.
Oh, of course, you did in this instance - the course setting was just a coincidence ...
no hang on, you said <<or decided that setting the bug prior to turning onto a new heading just a few degrees from the one he was on (and for which he would need less than 10 degrees of bank) was unnecessary>>
Er, to me that doesn't make sense - the driver was on 027m, and must have turned the Horizontal Situation Indicator course selector (not the heading bug) - the course selector that your track bars work off when you're referring to a radio navaid or STANS waypoint - a whole 8 degrees. How does not bothering square with that?
I agree that one may not bother with a heading bug for a small turn (as I understand the system, the setting the heading bug will give a recommended angle of bank on the right instrument (AI?)) - I hope you yourself were slightly forgetful and not intentionally misguiding other readers of this thread.
.
suppose the altimeter settings didn't matter either?
Callsign?
Oh, and I suppose waypoint A was after all just a sloppy effort for the lighthouse.
And I suppose the locals were mistaken about Chinooks landing near waypoint A - none of you has volunteered that this ever happened (although an AVM did, at one of the inquiries as I recall, but not on this thread).
Enough, I think I have done my best to throw some light on this tragedy - it would have been nice to have had a bit more constructive feedback - I believe that there is enough evidence that something else was going on but without help from people like yourselves it is impossible to determine what it was with sufficient credibility to get political support for action.
<<Remind me again how many times you've piloted a large military helicopter>>
The reason I post here is to ask those of you who have to consider perspectives that you may have missed - because there sure as hell are a lot of anomalies that should have been addressed by you - and if someone who has not had the priviledge of flying such can pick them out, why can't you?
When a particular point is brought up by a contributor, relating to one of the unexplained parameters, instead of shouting the suggested interpretation down when it is wrong, why not take the prompt and give your understanding of it.
Oh, of course, you did in this instance - the course setting was just a coincidence ...
no hang on, you said <<or decided that setting the bug prior to turning onto a new heading just a few degrees from the one he was on (and for which he would need less than 10 degrees of bank) was unnecessary>>
Er, to me that doesn't make sense - the driver was on 027m, and must have turned the Horizontal Situation Indicator course selector (not the heading bug) - the course selector that your track bars work off when you're referring to a radio navaid or STANS waypoint - a whole 8 degrees. How does not bothering square with that?
I agree that one may not bother with a heading bug for a small turn (as I understand the system, the setting the heading bug will give a recommended angle of bank on the right instrument (AI?)) - I hope you yourself were slightly forgetful and not intentionally misguiding other readers of this thread.
.
suppose the altimeter settings didn't matter either?
Callsign?
Oh, and I suppose waypoint A was after all just a sloppy effort for the lighthouse.
And I suppose the locals were mistaken about Chinooks landing near waypoint A - none of you has volunteered that this ever happened (although an AVM did, at one of the inquiries as I recall, but not on this thread).
Enough, I think I have done my best to throw some light on this tragedy - it would have been nice to have had a bit more constructive feedback - I believe that there is enough evidence that something else was going on but without help from people like yourselves it is impossible to determine what it was with sufficient credibility to get political support for action.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 10th Jan 2008 at 22:34. Reason: forgot text
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Walter
You have come up with some remarkable suggestions over the years that we have been having this debate. Between us, we fellow-posters have done our best to be patient and to explain in layman's terms where we are able. However, whatever the cause of this accident (and we'll never know what it was) our campaign is merely trying to demonstrate that it is not possible to affirm "beyond any doubt whatsoever" that the pilots were negligent, that the 2 Air-ranking reviewing-officers were wrong to reach this conclusion and that the 2 pilots concerned should have the finding of Gross Negligence (tantamount to Manslaughter) removed and their names cleared.
I am sure that you are a very intelligent person, who would love, like us all, to be able to come up with the vital piece of evidence that would exonerate our departed colleagues. However, this is not going to happen. So that I cannot be accused of ignoring your thoughts, I shall provide as much 'constructive feedback as I can muster:
There is no 'must have' here. A pilot flying towards the end of the Mull has most probably selected it as an unmistakable feature with vertical extent, which he could probably see from 30 miles away and would therefore have no need of the course track bars.
Even if it does (and I haven't flown the Chinook either, but I doubt it) there would be no need to refer to a recommended bank angle for a turn of this small magnitude. I doubt very much that the pilots would even have intended to roll out on a new heading as their next task would have been to follow the coast by visual reference, until reaching their next easily-identifiable waypoint.
I guess you're making this remark somewhat facetiously but, actually, in the big scheme of things they didn't. If flying VFR, the altitude reference would be the Radalt and even that would not be followed exactly.
You must have the Conspiracy Bug real bad!!
As I've hinted above, yes it probably was if the intention was to locate the end of the Mull then fly up the coast, which appears to have been their intention.
No, they may be right about Chinooks having landed there in the past, but that simply isn't relevant. There's no evidence that there was ever any intention of landing there during this flight that was intended to ferry passengers from Aldergrove to Inverness, without stopping on the Mull to pick up or drop off anybody.
No there isn't. Your thoughts have received plenty of attention in the past and nobody, as far as I'm aware, has leant any support for your (occasionally wild) theories, such as a 3rd party luring ZD576 to its doom on the hillside, in much the same way as mermaids are supposed to have done to sailors.
I should have thought that many of the negative comments posted on this site in response to your (sometimes wild) theories, however well-intentioned, would have left you feeling too embarrassed to post further. I know that, if it was me, I would feel pretty embarrassed to read that several of our most ardent campaigners had gone so far as to block my comments from appearing on their screens. But I am a tolerant soul and your skin is obviously far thicker than mine, as you continue to post from your position of relative ignorance. I have therefore taken the trouble to answer your comments. Thank you for your thoughts, but please keep them to yourself until after the Gross Negligence finding has been removed.
Enough, I think I have done my best to throw some light on this tragedy - it would have been nice to have had a bit more constructive feedback - I believe that there is enough evidence that something else was going on but without help from people like yourselves it is impossible to determine what it was with sufficient credibility to get political support for action.
I am sure that you are a very intelligent person, who would love, like us all, to be able to come up with the vital piece of evidence that would exonerate our departed colleagues. However, this is not going to happen. So that I cannot be accused of ignoring your thoughts, I shall provide as much 'constructive feedback as I can muster:
the driver was on 027m, and must have turned the Horizontal Situation Indicator course selector (not the heading bug) - the course selector that your track bars work off when you're referring to a radio navaid or STANS waypoint - a whole 8 degrees
setting the heading bug will give a recommended angle of bank on the right instrument (AI?)
suppose the altimeter settings didn't matter either
intentionally misguiding other readers of this thread
Oh, and I suppose waypoint A was after all just a sloppy effort for the lighthouse
And I suppose the locals were mistaken about Chinooks landing near waypoint A
there is enough evidence that something else was going on
I should have thought that many of the negative comments posted on this site in response to your (sometimes wild) theories, however well-intentioned, would have left you feeling too embarrassed to post further. I know that, if it was me, I would feel pretty embarrassed to read that several of our most ardent campaigners had gone so far as to block my comments from appearing on their screens. But I am a tolerant soul and your skin is obviously far thicker than mine, as you continue to post from your position of relative ignorance. I have therefore taken the trouble to answer your comments. Thank you for your thoughts, but please keep them to yourself until after the Gross Negligence finding has been removed.
Last edited by meadowbank; 11th Jan 2008 at 12:43.
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Meadowbank
I cannot leave your last post unanswered.
You wrote:
<< Quote:
the driver was on 027m, and must have turned the Horizontal Situation Indicator course selector (not the heading bug) - the course selector that your track bars work off when you're referring to a radio navaid or STANS waypoint - a whole 8 degrees
There is no 'must have' here. A pilot flying towards the end of the Mull has most probably selected it as an unmistakable feature with vertical extent, which he could probably see from 30 miles away and would therefore have no need of the course track bars.>>
From Aldergrove to getting their feet wet was about 24 naut miles, about 10 miles of it over the Antrim hills; this left them 16 n miles to the Mull.
On a clear day you would have to be above the Antrim hills to have LOS to the Mull.
A contributor on this thread who was flying in the Antrim hills area that day has said that vis was sh**ty there.
Boeing’s analysis concluded that they had held 027m closely from Aldergrove to the posn of waypoint change.
Are you seriously suggesting that a professional pilot in those conditions, the one that was doing the driving, would not have had that track (027) on his HSI course selector? – and that he had held to that track for so long and so well in those conditions without doing so?
And that it just happened to have been left on 035? – a coincidence?
And you wonder why I cannot take statements from you lot at face value.
The other points briefly:
Heading bug – I was agreeing with you that it wouldn’t have been worthwhile setting it for such a small turn but I was also clearing up your apparent confusion between the Attitude Indicator and the Horizontal Situation Indicator in a 47D/HC2 – try reading that bit again.
<<Quote:
suppose the altimeter settings didn't matter either
I guess you're making this remark somewhat facetiously but, actually, in the big scheme of things they didn't. If flying VFR, the altitude reference would be the Radalt and even that would not be followed exactly.>>
Was it not Cazatou who commented some time ago that there was a requirement to have the regional QNH set on the baro alts unless immediately approaching an aerodrome? The handling pilot’s baro alt was set as per a QFI at the level of that landing area.
That one of the RADALT alarms was set at minimum suggests an imminent landing or close pass in marginal conditions.
So you are saying that they were not following basic practices? – or that it was another coincidence that the settings were found as so?
<<Quote:
And I suppose the locals were mistaken about Chinooks landing near waypoint A
No, they may be right about Chinooks having landed there in the past, but that simply isn't relevant. There's no evidence that there was ever any intention of landing there during this flight that was intended to ferry passengers from Aldergrove to Inverness, without stopping on the Mull to pick up or drop off anybody.>>
“… isn’t relevant.” !!!!!????? Whatever they were supposed to have been doing, does it not merit mention that they crashed within a few hundred yards of a known landing area for that a/c type? Should this not have been brought up at the inquiries? With what little is said to be known about this crash, could this proximity to a suitable landing area have been considered as an indication that they were in trouble, for example, and wanted to land? Why was it not even brought up? Especially when waypoint A was spot on for an inner marker for this area.
Your comparison of my suggested scenario <<, such as a 3rd party luring ZD576 to its doom on the hillside, in much the same way as mermaids are supposed to have done to sailors.>> didn’t have to relate to anything mythical – others have given examples of false signals deceiving a/c on this thread in the recent past.
If this is the best that you can do, it is you who should be embarrassed.
While I do not enjoy being embarrassed myself, it is a small price to pay to ask questions that I think may be relevant, or to put forward suggestions for others to think outside the box – I have always hoped that by boldly pushing forward such views, I may have opened the scope for others to contribute who, for obvious reasons, may have been reluctant.
I do not abide by Homer Simpson’s First Rule of the Playground: “Never say anything unless you are sure that everyone around you will agree” – seems like many of you share the intellectual courage of Homer.
I cannot leave your last post unanswered.
You wrote:
<< Quote:
the driver was on 027m, and must have turned the Horizontal Situation Indicator course selector (not the heading bug) - the course selector that your track bars work off when you're referring to a radio navaid or STANS waypoint - a whole 8 degrees
There is no 'must have' here. A pilot flying towards the end of the Mull has most probably selected it as an unmistakable feature with vertical extent, which he could probably see from 30 miles away and would therefore have no need of the course track bars.>>
From Aldergrove to getting their feet wet was about 24 naut miles, about 10 miles of it over the Antrim hills; this left them 16 n miles to the Mull.
On a clear day you would have to be above the Antrim hills to have LOS to the Mull.
A contributor on this thread who was flying in the Antrim hills area that day has said that vis was sh**ty there.
Boeing’s analysis concluded that they had held 027m closely from Aldergrove to the posn of waypoint change.
Are you seriously suggesting that a professional pilot in those conditions, the one that was doing the driving, would not have had that track (027) on his HSI course selector? – and that he had held to that track for so long and so well in those conditions without doing so?
And that it just happened to have been left on 035? – a coincidence?
And you wonder why I cannot take statements from you lot at face value.
The other points briefly:
Heading bug – I was agreeing with you that it wouldn’t have been worthwhile setting it for such a small turn but I was also clearing up your apparent confusion between the Attitude Indicator and the Horizontal Situation Indicator in a 47D/HC2 – try reading that bit again.
<<Quote:
suppose the altimeter settings didn't matter either
I guess you're making this remark somewhat facetiously but, actually, in the big scheme of things they didn't. If flying VFR, the altitude reference would be the Radalt and even that would not be followed exactly.>>
Was it not Cazatou who commented some time ago that there was a requirement to have the regional QNH set on the baro alts unless immediately approaching an aerodrome? The handling pilot’s baro alt was set as per a QFI at the level of that landing area.
That one of the RADALT alarms was set at minimum suggests an imminent landing or close pass in marginal conditions.
So you are saying that they were not following basic practices? – or that it was another coincidence that the settings were found as so?
<<Quote:
And I suppose the locals were mistaken about Chinooks landing near waypoint A
No, they may be right about Chinooks having landed there in the past, but that simply isn't relevant. There's no evidence that there was ever any intention of landing there during this flight that was intended to ferry passengers from Aldergrove to Inverness, without stopping on the Mull to pick up or drop off anybody.>>
“… isn’t relevant.” !!!!!????? Whatever they were supposed to have been doing, does it not merit mention that they crashed within a few hundred yards of a known landing area for that a/c type? Should this not have been brought up at the inquiries? With what little is said to be known about this crash, could this proximity to a suitable landing area have been considered as an indication that they were in trouble, for example, and wanted to land? Why was it not even brought up? Especially when waypoint A was spot on for an inner marker for this area.
Your comparison of my suggested scenario <<, such as a 3rd party luring ZD576 to its doom on the hillside, in much the same way as mermaids are supposed to have done to sailors.>> didn’t have to relate to anything mythical – others have given examples of false signals deceiving a/c on this thread in the recent past.
If this is the best that you can do, it is you who should be embarrassed.
While I do not enjoy being embarrassed myself, it is a small price to pay to ask questions that I think may be relevant, or to put forward suggestions for others to think outside the box – I have always hoped that by boldly pushing forward such views, I may have opened the scope for others to contribute who, for obvious reasons, may have been reluctant.
I do not abide by Homer Simpson’s First Rule of the Playground: “Never say anything unless you are sure that everyone around you will agree” – seems like many of you share the intellectual courage of Homer.
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Walter,
"And you wonder why I cannot take statements from you lot at face value."
Have you considered that "this lot" include some of the most experienced SH/Rotary folk there is and not one of them has offered any input on this thread that supports your theory, in fact there is not ONE SINGLE PERSON in the history of this thread who supports your theory
Wake up call Walter............a whole swathe of the UK Military have put you on "ignore"..........................................does that not embarrass you
"And you wonder why I cannot take statements from you lot at face value."
Have you considered that "this lot" include some of the most experienced SH/Rotary folk there is and not one of them has offered any input on this thread that supports your theory, in fact there is not ONE SINGLE PERSON in the history of this thread who supports your theory
Wake up call Walter............a whole swathe of the UK Military have put you on "ignore"..........................................does that not embarrass you
Last edited by Seldomfitforpurpose; 11th Jan 2008 at 23:44.
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You have been on my ignore for over a year but every now and then I weaken and read your posts. Its a free world and because of that your theories (!!) are tolerated by me and others. To be totally honest, really really sorry about this, I think you are a bit of a looney. The reason for that is because I know that your 'kit' was not fitted to the chinook that day and you just will not listen. If you want us to start giving you statements to take at face value, well, I can't type it, I will just think it very hard........... Are you getting it yet???? Concentrate, its easy..........
Note the above, embarrassed is an understatement.
PS. For those not familiar with helicopter operations, this is not rocket science. Low level VFR ops are not airliners in airways. My current heli has a glass cockpit with HSI, OBI and probably MFI, but this doesn't mean I use them. If I select a heading I can remember it without setting a bug or HSI, sometimes I even move the HSI out of the way to declutter the view. This is even more relevant in an old style instrument where you can't get rid of the bars and bugs from the 'screen'. Like many posts on this thread, it is a 'guess' to what was selected on that day. The RNS 252 does give out useful information to BOIs but as said above, I (like others) would often whizz the bugs out of the way to give a clearer view of the screen.
Note the above, embarrassed is an understatement.
PS. For those not familiar with helicopter operations, this is not rocket science. Low level VFR ops are not airliners in airways. My current heli has a glass cockpit with HSI, OBI and probably MFI, but this doesn't mean I use them. If I select a heading I can remember it without setting a bug or HSI, sometimes I even move the HSI out of the way to declutter the view. This is even more relevant in an old style instrument where you can't get rid of the bars and bugs from the 'screen'. Like many posts on this thread, it is a 'guess' to what was selected on that day. The RNS 252 does give out useful information to BOIs but as said above, I (like others) would often whizz the bugs out of the way to give a clearer view of the screen.
Last edited by jayteeto; 12th Jan 2008 at 07:03.