Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Ginseng and John Purdey re Birmingham bombing
Just for the record, the basis of 90+% of all anti-terrorist work comes from informants.
For many obvious reasons, one cannot use those confidential informants as witnesses in court nor rely solely upon them – hence the need for forensic or other more tangible evidence (pre 911 anyway) to actually nail them.
That is to say, the police would have “known” who were probably involved but could not prove it.
Just for the record, the basis of 90+% of all anti-terrorist work comes from informants.
For many obvious reasons, one cannot use those confidential informants as witnesses in court nor rely solely upon them – hence the need for forensic or other more tangible evidence (pre 911 anyway) to actually nail them.
That is to say, the police would have “known” who were probably involved but could not prove it.
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Walter
Nonsense! This group were arrested very quickly, as they travelled away from Birmingham, probably because they fitted the profile for the likely suspects.
If the Police had an informant who could identify the group involved, why were they not arrested before the event? Or do you believe that the Police allowed the bombing to happen to protect the existence of an informant?
Sorry, but I think you are talking absolute tosh. But anyway, as I said, this is in danger of diverting us from the main argument.
Regards
Ginseng
If the Police had an informant who could identify the group involved, why were they not arrested before the event? Or do you believe that the Police allowed the bombing to happen to protect the existence of an informant?
Sorry, but I think you are talking absolute tosh. But anyway, as I said, this is in danger of diverting us from the main argument.
Regards
Ginseng
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Twinact
You give the appearance of speaking with some authority on the introduction of the Chinook HC2 into service in 1994.
Just wondering where your knowledge comes from, since it seems you weren't around at the time?
You give the appearance of speaking with some authority on the introduction of the Chinook HC2 into service in 1994.
Just wondering where your knowledge comes from, since it seems you weren't around at the time?
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FADEC Software
Twin Act,
I was certainly aware that some, if not the majority, of the BD issues related to the software audit trail and the fact that as far as I can remember the software, which by any normal definition was flight critical, had neither been procured nor tested to UK flight critical software standards - I understand that this is the issue with the Chinook Mk 3 as the contract did not require this data to be provided.
There were also wiring defects, that undoubtedly contributed some problems eg the PTIT gauge on ZD 576 was possibly one of these, and I have been told that many hours were spent resolving wiring defects and indeed wiring configuration problems for the first 20 or so aircraft delivered - again if you can provide it I would welcome further confirmation of this.
However, the fact remains that it was not just an audit trail problem, and the aircraft was suffering real FADEC related problems - see earlier posts.
Witness No 20 to the Board, Sqn Ldr Morgan, a QHI on the Chinook OCU, commented:
“The unforeseen malfunctions on the Chinook HC2 of a flight critical nature have mainly been associated with the engine system FADEC. They have resulted in undemanded engine shutdown, engine run-up, spurious engine failure captions and misleading and confusing cockpit indications.”
In a internal memorandum dated 3 June 1994 Boscombe Down EAS produced a damning verdict on a paper that Textron Lycoming had produced to defend themselves against an independent study from EDS Scicon in July 1993 which in turn had agreed with the Boscombe Down conclusion that the software code was poorly developed and poorly documented, and in the view of one expert employed by MOD "not of sufficient good quality to be used in a saftey critical application". The EAS memo, which is some 4 pages long, referring to the Textron White Paper, makes some 24 statements, none of which are complimentary, such as:
Notwithstanding the claims made in Textron's white paper the problem remains that the product (T55-L-712F software) has been shown to be unverifaible and is therefore unsuitable for its intended purpose (ie the in-flight management of the Chinook engines!).
The traceability study of the documentation revealed inconsistencies such as requirements not being implemented and conversely things appearing in the code which did not appear in the requirements. There were a total of 34 category 1 anomalies and 48 Category 2 anomalies in the traceability study (I do not know the definitions of Cat 1 and Cat 2, but I beleive they were then defined in JSP188).
Given your comments on the content of Block 1 I do not now know how the gaps between the FADEC software standards and documentation in 1994, and what I assume are acceptable standards today, have been bridged - do you?
What we do know is that in late 1993 the DPA (or PE as it then was), presumably under very significant customer pressure to get the already delayed Chinook Mk 2 into service, decided to accept the assurances of Textron and ignore EDS Scicon and its own specialists and issue a RTS for the Chinook Mk 2 - relying upon the flight limitations to try to keep the aircraft safe.
We do not of course know if the accident to ZD 576 could be attributed in whole or in part to the FADEC - but it is certainly a possibility supported by facts not hypotheses. As we know none of this came out at the Board - an outrageous shortfall of TORs and investigation in my view. If it had it is difficult to see how even a balance of probabilities verdict of pilot error could have come about. It was not a conspiracy, people were I am sure trying to do their best in difficult circumstances, but the cynics amongst you might even think that this sorry tale of the development and procurement of the Chinook FADEC software was a major (if not the) reason for the RAF and MOD to cover up some bad news, and even today to continue to defend the indefensible. As they say - you might think that, but I could not possibly comment!
JB
I was certainly aware that some, if not the majority, of the BD issues related to the software audit trail and the fact that as far as I can remember the software, which by any normal definition was flight critical, had neither been procured nor tested to UK flight critical software standards - I understand that this is the issue with the Chinook Mk 3 as the contract did not require this data to be provided.
There were also wiring defects, that undoubtedly contributed some problems eg the PTIT gauge on ZD 576 was possibly one of these, and I have been told that many hours were spent resolving wiring defects and indeed wiring configuration problems for the first 20 or so aircraft delivered - again if you can provide it I would welcome further confirmation of this.
However, the fact remains that it was not just an audit trail problem, and the aircraft was suffering real FADEC related problems - see earlier posts.
Witness No 20 to the Board, Sqn Ldr Morgan, a QHI on the Chinook OCU, commented:
“The unforeseen malfunctions on the Chinook HC2 of a flight critical nature have mainly been associated with the engine system FADEC. They have resulted in undemanded engine shutdown, engine run-up, spurious engine failure captions and misleading and confusing cockpit indications.”
In a internal memorandum dated 3 June 1994 Boscombe Down EAS produced a damning verdict on a paper that Textron Lycoming had produced to defend themselves against an independent study from EDS Scicon in July 1993 which in turn had agreed with the Boscombe Down conclusion that the software code was poorly developed and poorly documented, and in the view of one expert employed by MOD "not of sufficient good quality to be used in a saftey critical application". The EAS memo, which is some 4 pages long, referring to the Textron White Paper, makes some 24 statements, none of which are complimentary, such as:
Notwithstanding the claims made in Textron's white paper the problem remains that the product (T55-L-712F software) has been shown to be unverifaible and is therefore unsuitable for its intended purpose (ie the in-flight management of the Chinook engines!).
The traceability study of the documentation revealed inconsistencies such as requirements not being implemented and conversely things appearing in the code which did not appear in the requirements. There were a total of 34 category 1 anomalies and 48 Category 2 anomalies in the traceability study (I do not know the definitions of Cat 1 and Cat 2, but I beleive they were then defined in JSP188).
Given your comments on the content of Block 1 I do not now know how the gaps between the FADEC software standards and documentation in 1994, and what I assume are acceptable standards today, have been bridged - do you?
What we do know is that in late 1993 the DPA (or PE as it then was), presumably under very significant customer pressure to get the already delayed Chinook Mk 2 into service, decided to accept the assurances of Textron and ignore EDS Scicon and its own specialists and issue a RTS for the Chinook Mk 2 - relying upon the flight limitations to try to keep the aircraft safe.
We do not of course know if the accident to ZD 576 could be attributed in whole or in part to the FADEC - but it is certainly a possibility supported by facts not hypotheses. As we know none of this came out at the Board - an outrageous shortfall of TORs and investigation in my view. If it had it is difficult to see how even a balance of probabilities verdict of pilot error could have come about. It was not a conspiracy, people were I am sure trying to do their best in difficult circumstances, but the cynics amongst you might even think that this sorry tale of the development and procurement of the Chinook FADEC software was a major (if not the) reason for the RAF and MOD to cover up some bad news, and even today to continue to defend the indefensible. As they say - you might think that, but I could not possibly comment!
JB
John Purdey said:
Two years ago I suggested that a photograph of the Mull, taken from the position and altitude of waypoint change would help to resolve the arguments about what the crew could actually see from the cockpit. I'm sure that some clever person could even digitally change them to introduce varying amounts of cloud over the Mull to give us an even better idea.
I would do this myself if I lived a bit closer (about four hours flying for me just to get there) but there must be some ppruner who is based near the Mull who has access to a suitable aeroplane. Perhaps we should ask on Private Flying or Rotorhead.
By the way, it would be particularly interesting to be able to compare photos of the two sites and the apparently similar rocks of shore. Any takers?
I would do this myself if I lived a bit closer (about four hours flying for me just to get there) but there must be some ppruner who is based near the Mull who has access to a suitable aeroplane. Perhaps we should ask on Private Flying or Rotorhead.
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John,
Thank you for your extremely well written and, as ever, logical response. I can say no more on how the FADEC issues were resolved, although a change in working practice and increased familiarity played their part. My thrust was that the aircraft has remained essentially unchanged for the last 13 years, despite the fears of some at the time. Many contributors here went on to win medals in the same aircraft.
Clearly professionals wish to know everything they can about the machines they work with and are wary of things they cannot explain.
Thank you for your extremely well written and, as ever, logical response. I can say no more on how the FADEC issues were resolved, although a change in working practice and increased familiarity played their part. My thrust was that the aircraft has remained essentially unchanged for the last 13 years, despite the fears of some at the time. Many contributors here went on to win medals in the same aircraft.
Clearly professionals wish to know everything they can about the machines they work with and are wary of things they cannot explain.
Just a numbered other
John Blakeley,
Thank you for your excellent posts, which have saved me a lot of delving through my records ro retrieve the data.
I certainly think that way.
Add to the mix the then recent change to crown indemnity rules, and there is a powerful case to find the crew responsible.
And therein lies the greatest difference between the concurrent investigations. One into a Tornado, which even with the benefit of factual evidence of likely error, but only two dead servicemen, who rightly received the benefit of the doubt; and our hapless helicopter, full (due to someone's lack of judgement) with passengers whose families may have been expected to seek large sums in compensation from the MOD, had the truth of the fiasco of the entry into service of the type been blamed rather than two guys unable to defend the finding against them.
Thank you for your excellent posts, which have saved me a lot of delving through my records ro retrieve the data.
but the cynics amongst you might even think that this sorry tale of the development and procurement of the Chinook FADEC software was a major (if not the) reason for the RAF and MOD to cover up some bad news,
Add to the mix the then recent change to crown indemnity rules, and there is a powerful case to find the crew responsible.
And therein lies the greatest difference between the concurrent investigations. One into a Tornado, which even with the benefit of factual evidence of likely error, but only two dead servicemen, who rightly received the benefit of the doubt; and our hapless helicopter, full (due to someone's lack of judgement) with passengers whose families may have been expected to seek large sums in compensation from the MOD, had the truth of the fiasco of the entry into service of the type been blamed rather than two guys unable to defend the finding against them.
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Twinact
I do not wish to get into an argument over what I remember from being there and what you have apparently gleaned from other sources, other than to use this exchange to highlight what I consider to be both baffling and very sad about this whole affair.
Whilst replying to my question about the availability of an aircrew manual at the time of the accident in post 2111 you selectively quote from John Blakeley’s post 2103:
“At the House of Lords Committee hearings, Witness A, a very experienced and highly decorated Special Forces Chinook pilot who was at the time based at Odiham………..contained in the aircrew manual”
The original text of 2103:
“At the House of Lords Committee hearings, Witness A, a very experienced and highly decorated Special Forces Chinook pilot who was at the time based at Odiham, in answer to a question as to how much the unforeseen malfunctions occurring in the Chinook Mk 2 since its introduction were a matter of discussion among helicopter pilots, answered,
"They occupied our minds to a great degree, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well" (Q 852).”
Through selective collection of facts you achieved a black and white answer to a grey subject. The original manual was at best weak, worst misleading and thin on information throughout. This lead to a virtual ‘swap shop’ trade in various photocopies from whatever sources could be found which appeared to match the aircraft sat on dispersal. To compound the situation we found ourselves out of the ‘underground/crewroom’ loop through our isolation in NI. Email was not widely used and free talk on telephones about such matters was forbidden due to the nature of the theatre. I could ‘Google’ some pictures and diagrams of a Typhoon, string them together with some text and write Aircrew Manual on the front; would that make it one?
This leads to what I find so baffling and sad; what motivates people to so easily damn two aviators on flimsy evidence. You appear endorse the charge of Gross Negligence and yet are “Not sure what I was expected to provide 13 years later.” You seem to accept the final version of the board yet don't research/listen to opposing evidence to support the not proven (notice I didn’t say anyone was wrong) argument.
In aviation it is recognised that we should all learn from accidents. To achieve this we investigate them thoroughly and publish the findings; perfectly correct and professional. What must be remembered is that blame does not have to be apportioned for this process to be effective. What is lost or what harm is done if Jon and Rick were cleared of these charges?
W 5
Twinact; I know this will read like a personal dig at you but it honestly isn't. Please take it as a sign of my frustration at people taking tiny fragments of a huge picture in isolation and using them to besmirch two airman.
I do not wish to get into an argument over what I remember from being there and what you have apparently gleaned from other sources, other than to use this exchange to highlight what I consider to be both baffling and very sad about this whole affair.
Whilst replying to my question about the availability of an aircrew manual at the time of the accident in post 2111 you selectively quote from John Blakeley’s post 2103:
“At the House of Lords Committee hearings, Witness A, a very experienced and highly decorated Special Forces Chinook pilot who was at the time based at Odiham………..contained in the aircrew manual”
The original text of 2103:
“At the House of Lords Committee hearings, Witness A, a very experienced and highly decorated Special Forces Chinook pilot who was at the time based at Odiham, in answer to a question as to how much the unforeseen malfunctions occurring in the Chinook Mk 2 since its introduction were a matter of discussion among helicopter pilots, answered,
"They occupied our minds to a great degree, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well" (Q 852).”
Through selective collection of facts you achieved a black and white answer to a grey subject. The original manual was at best weak, worst misleading and thin on information throughout. This lead to a virtual ‘swap shop’ trade in various photocopies from whatever sources could be found which appeared to match the aircraft sat on dispersal. To compound the situation we found ourselves out of the ‘underground/crewroom’ loop through our isolation in NI. Email was not widely used and free talk on telephones about such matters was forbidden due to the nature of the theatre. I could ‘Google’ some pictures and diagrams of a Typhoon, string them together with some text and write Aircrew Manual on the front; would that make it one?
This leads to what I find so baffling and sad; what motivates people to so easily damn two aviators on flimsy evidence. You appear endorse the charge of Gross Negligence and yet are “Not sure what I was expected to provide 13 years later.” You seem to accept the final version of the board yet don't research/listen to opposing evidence to support the not proven (notice I didn’t say anyone was wrong) argument.
In aviation it is recognised that we should all learn from accidents. To achieve this we investigate them thoroughly and publish the findings; perfectly correct and professional. What must be remembered is that blame does not have to be apportioned for this process to be effective. What is lost or what harm is done if Jon and Rick were cleared of these charges?
W 5
Twinact; I know this will read like a personal dig at you but it honestly isn't. Please take it as a sign of my frustration at people taking tiny fragments of a huge picture in isolation and using them to besmirch two airman.
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Just to follow up on John B's posting regarding the Tornado accident. In early 1995 came the following from the pen of Bill Wratten. I think it helps frame the contemporaneous internal MoD discussions going on at the time of the Chinook and Tornado BoI reviews. But it also confuses, adding to what indeed appears to be an inconsistent application of Sir William's own hopes regarding discipline and uniformity of application re: blame/AP3207.
This memo was presented to the House of Lords in 2001/2 and also posted by Meadowbank posting number 1262 back in 2004.
----
"DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
1. You will know that, since taking up my appointment as Air Officer Commanding in Chief, I have been particularly concerned about aircraft accidents brought about by carelessness or indiscipline. By definition, such accidents are avoidable and I have made my views known on a number of occasions. In particular, I addressed the subject in the foreword to the Stike Command Flight Safety Review, published last October, and I spoke about it at my first Group Commanders' Conference in November and again in the presence of Group, Station and Squadron Commanders at the Waddington Air Power Symposium. You will remember that I also touched on the subject during my address to the Air Rank Officers' Conference in December. Nobody involved in the conduct or supervision of flying operations in Strike Command should therefore be in any doubt as to my stance on this issue which is, simply, that I will not tolerate shortcomings of concentration or personal discipline in aircrew.
2. It follows that I wish to put this policy into practical effect by ensuring that formal disciplinary action is taken whenever, following Board of Inquiry or Unit Inquiry investigations, clear evidence emerges of unmitigated indiscipline or negligence. The increasing incidence of such cases suggests that past practice, which has been to shun the disciplinary approach (even in some quite serious cases) is no longer appropriate to the high standards the Royal Air Force is entitled to expect from its aircrew, although of course an interview with the AOC remains available in cases of minor negligence, or where there is judged to be considerable mitigation. Formal disciplinary action has always been an option open to us and we should not steer away from it when it is clearly appropriate.
3. To give effect to this policy and in order to ensure consistency throughout the Command, aircrew who are involved in a flying accident are not to be cleared to resume flying duties until sufficient evidence has emerged to indicate whether or not there are possible issues of serious negligence, indiscipline or incompetence to address. Once that position is reached, which in most cases should only be a week or two into the inquiry, I wish you to refer the decision on resumption of flying to me, with your recommendation. In this respect I do not anticipate that all aircrew who are warned under QR 1269 will necessarily be grounded. Equally, a decision to ground would not necessarily imply that disciplinary action will follow. But I would hope and expect that a grounding decision would capture all those aircrew against whom subsequent disciplinary action, or action under QR 1021, proved necessary for reasons of carelessness, indiscipline or incompetence. However, a decision to allow an individual to resume flying would not necessarily preclude disciplinary or administrative action being taken subsequently.
4. In such cases of serious human failing, when it comes to forming your recommendations for disposal, I would wish you to consult with AOA and with DLS(RAF) and, if they advise that there is a prima facie case to answer, to prepare either a formal charge for disposal by the Appropriate Superior Authority or, in the most serious cases, disposal by Court Martial. This will also ensure consistent treatment across the Command. No action should of course be taken on your recommendation until endorsed by me in the usual way.
5. In summary, aircrew and their supervisors should be in no doubt that honest professional endeavour will never bring censure - and will indeed attract my strong support - even when in trying circumstances mistakes are made, as they surely will be. On the other hand, I wish you also to convey, once again, the clear message through the command chain that unmitigated carelessness or indiscipline will not be tolerated and will be met with formal proceedings. This will of course in no way undermine the certainty for those affected of a fair and unbiased hearing with all the safeguards entailed in the legal process.
6. I am content for this letter to be copied verbatim to Station Commanders."
The letter is signed by W. J. Wratten, AOCINC, STC
PS
Tandemrotor: The natives in Zanzibar remain friendly
This memo was presented to the House of Lords in 2001/2 and also posted by Meadowbank posting number 1262 back in 2004.
----
"DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
1. You will know that, since taking up my appointment as Air Officer Commanding in Chief, I have been particularly concerned about aircraft accidents brought about by carelessness or indiscipline. By definition, such accidents are avoidable and I have made my views known on a number of occasions. In particular, I addressed the subject in the foreword to the Stike Command Flight Safety Review, published last October, and I spoke about it at my first Group Commanders' Conference in November and again in the presence of Group, Station and Squadron Commanders at the Waddington Air Power Symposium. You will remember that I also touched on the subject during my address to the Air Rank Officers' Conference in December. Nobody involved in the conduct or supervision of flying operations in Strike Command should therefore be in any doubt as to my stance on this issue which is, simply, that I will not tolerate shortcomings of concentration or personal discipline in aircrew.
2. It follows that I wish to put this policy into practical effect by ensuring that formal disciplinary action is taken whenever, following Board of Inquiry or Unit Inquiry investigations, clear evidence emerges of unmitigated indiscipline or negligence. The increasing incidence of such cases suggests that past practice, which has been to shun the disciplinary approach (even in some quite serious cases) is no longer appropriate to the high standards the Royal Air Force is entitled to expect from its aircrew, although of course an interview with the AOC remains available in cases of minor negligence, or where there is judged to be considerable mitigation. Formal disciplinary action has always been an option open to us and we should not steer away from it when it is clearly appropriate.
3. To give effect to this policy and in order to ensure consistency throughout the Command, aircrew who are involved in a flying accident are not to be cleared to resume flying duties until sufficient evidence has emerged to indicate whether or not there are possible issues of serious negligence, indiscipline or incompetence to address. Once that position is reached, which in most cases should only be a week or two into the inquiry, I wish you to refer the decision on resumption of flying to me, with your recommendation. In this respect I do not anticipate that all aircrew who are warned under QR 1269 will necessarily be grounded. Equally, a decision to ground would not necessarily imply that disciplinary action will follow. But I would hope and expect that a grounding decision would capture all those aircrew against whom subsequent disciplinary action, or action under QR 1021, proved necessary for reasons of carelessness, indiscipline or incompetence. However, a decision to allow an individual to resume flying would not necessarily preclude disciplinary or administrative action being taken subsequently.
4. In such cases of serious human failing, when it comes to forming your recommendations for disposal, I would wish you to consult with AOA and with DLS(RAF) and, if they advise that there is a prima facie case to answer, to prepare either a formal charge for disposal by the Appropriate Superior Authority or, in the most serious cases, disposal by Court Martial. This will also ensure consistent treatment across the Command. No action should of course be taken on your recommendation until endorsed by me in the usual way.
5. In summary, aircrew and their supervisors should be in no doubt that honest professional endeavour will never bring censure - and will indeed attract my strong support - even when in trying circumstances mistakes are made, as they surely will be. On the other hand, I wish you also to convey, once again, the clear message through the command chain that unmitigated carelessness or indiscipline will not be tolerated and will be met with formal proceedings. This will of course in no way undermine the certainty for those affected of a fair and unbiased hearing with all the safeguards entailed in the legal process.
6. I am content for this letter to be copied verbatim to Station Commanders."
The letter is signed by W. J. Wratten, AOCINC, STC
PS
Tandemrotor: The natives in Zanzibar remain friendly
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Chinook
Ginseng; noted, we agree.
John Blakeley. Thanks, but you have still not answered the question, yet you seem to have access to all the relevant facts and figures. Meanwhile, I have explained what must be the explanation for this terrible tragedy, ie the crew were not where they thought they they were, and thus faced a hillside about 500 feet higher than they expected. This is, I hope, clear and unambiguous. Please now be good enough to give us an equally clear and unambiguous explanation of how some kind of technical failure (and say what it was likely to be) could have been beyond the capability of this experienced crew to manage; what was it, why has it apparently never happened again; and why on earth were not all Chinooks at once grounded until experts like you could get a grip on thinga?
Tucumseh. Thanks for you post, but you seem to be saying that there was indeed some kind of attempt by MOD or whoever to hide something. I must say that you are very dangerous ground here. As to the attitude by sundry politicians, surely you are mature enough to realise that a politician not in government will promise to do all kinds of things, including reopening an inquiry such as this one; but once in a position where they have to actually carry responsibility, then...re, um, ar., perhaps, and are there any votes in it...?
I do not wish to sound offensive, but do join the real world. Regards to all JP
John Blakeley. Thanks, but you have still not answered the question, yet you seem to have access to all the relevant facts and figures. Meanwhile, I have explained what must be the explanation for this terrible tragedy, ie the crew were not where they thought they they were, and thus faced a hillside about 500 feet higher than they expected. This is, I hope, clear and unambiguous. Please now be good enough to give us an equally clear and unambiguous explanation of how some kind of technical failure (and say what it was likely to be) could have been beyond the capability of this experienced crew to manage; what was it, why has it apparently never happened again; and why on earth were not all Chinooks at once grounded until experts like you could get a grip on thinga?
Tucumseh. Thanks for you post, but you seem to be saying that there was indeed some kind of attempt by MOD or whoever to hide something. I must say that you are very dangerous ground here. As to the attitude by sundry politicians, surely you are mature enough to realise that a politician not in government will promise to do all kinds of things, including reopening an inquiry such as this one; but once in a position where they have to actually carry responsibility, then...re, um, ar., perhaps, and are there any votes in it...?
I do not wish to sound offensive, but do join the real world. Regards to all JP
John Purdey
You query the possibility of a technical failure (or malfunction) and say… “the crew were not where they thought they were, and thus faced a hillside about 500 feet higher than they expected”.
While I would never claim that navigation error was the cause (and there is human error based on accurate nav data, and error caused by – perhaps intermittent or temporarily inaccurate - data), clearly such an error MAY have had a bearing. I believe some here only think of the former (human error) while ignoring the latter. That is, they equate “error” with negligence. Was there scope for Nav error? The AAIB reported design defects in the Rad Alt, and the concerns over the accuracy of TANS have been well aired here. Perhaps a pilot or navigator would confirm that incorrect nav data, for whatever reason, could result in “the crew were not where they thought they were, and thus faced a hillside about 500 feet higher than they expected”. My point has always been, given the MoD’s own acknowledgement of Nav system defects, this constitutes reasonable doubt, when the criterion for finding gross negligence is “beyond doubt”. “Our side” should only have to demonstrate ANY doubt (the higher requirement of “reasonable doubt” is not required) whereas MoD must prove negligence beyond all doubt. This basic concept has been ignored all along.
You say I am on dangerous ground opining that the MoD has something to hide. This sounds remarkably like the warnings issued by senior staffs when a junior looks like departing from the party line by telling the truth. (At which point one tables the tape recorder!! Or better still, a digital recorder, as they are less susceptible to mic jammers. Sir Ian Blair wasn't the first, by any means). Some of their responses are arrant nonsense, and others are completely unrelated to the question. Why, if there is nothing to hide?
No, I don’t take offence. Everyone is entitled to their opinion. Mine is that there is reasonable doubt, the pilots should be cleared, and the MoD is very nervous that it cannot withstand scrutiny as regards the processes and procedures employed during the introduction of the Mk2. And yes, you are correct about politicians. Their willingness to deceive rather proves my point.
You query the possibility of a technical failure (or malfunction) and say… “the crew were not where they thought they were, and thus faced a hillside about 500 feet higher than they expected”.
While I would never claim that navigation error was the cause (and there is human error based on accurate nav data, and error caused by – perhaps intermittent or temporarily inaccurate - data), clearly such an error MAY have had a bearing. I believe some here only think of the former (human error) while ignoring the latter. That is, they equate “error” with negligence. Was there scope for Nav error? The AAIB reported design defects in the Rad Alt, and the concerns over the accuracy of TANS have been well aired here. Perhaps a pilot or navigator would confirm that incorrect nav data, for whatever reason, could result in “the crew were not where they thought they were, and thus faced a hillside about 500 feet higher than they expected”. My point has always been, given the MoD’s own acknowledgement of Nav system defects, this constitutes reasonable doubt, when the criterion for finding gross negligence is “beyond doubt”. “Our side” should only have to demonstrate ANY doubt (the higher requirement of “reasonable doubt” is not required) whereas MoD must prove negligence beyond all doubt. This basic concept has been ignored all along.
You say I am on dangerous ground opining that the MoD has something to hide. This sounds remarkably like the warnings issued by senior staffs when a junior looks like departing from the party line by telling the truth. (At which point one tables the tape recorder!! Or better still, a digital recorder, as they are less susceptible to mic jammers. Sir Ian Blair wasn't the first, by any means). Some of their responses are arrant nonsense, and others are completely unrelated to the question. Why, if there is nothing to hide?
No, I don’t take offence. Everyone is entitled to their opinion. Mine is that there is reasonable doubt, the pilots should be cleared, and the MoD is very nervous that it cannot withstand scrutiny as regards the processes and procedures employed during the introduction of the Mk2. And yes, you are correct about politicians. Their willingness to deceive rather proves my point.
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John Purdey
Wow
How have you managed to determine, the sequence of events leading up to the accident, when nobody else has managed such a thing:
Not only that, but you can even tell us what was going through the minds of the crew at the time!
Would it be churlish of me to suggest you have simply offered another possible explanation which may or may not accord with the actual events, but which in any case falls short of the standard of proof required?
The simple question being:
(And the one considered by every subsequent, independent inquiry)
Where is your proof??
Wow
How have you managed to determine, the sequence of events leading up to the accident, when nobody else has managed such a thing:
Meanwhile, I have explained what must be the explanation for this terrible tragedy,
the crew were not where they thought they they were
The simple question being:
(And the one considered by every subsequent, independent inquiry)
Where is your proof??
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John Purdey
I can only assume that your post 2121 was written with tongue firmly in cheek after your earier comments about going round the bouy.
I find your position quite amazing, but both Tandemrotor and Tucumseh's posts cover my views as well - you do not KNOW the cause of this accident any more than we do. Even if your theory were to be correct, and I am not denying that has to be a possibility, then this would be a navigation error accident not Gross Negligence. I have made this point to you several times, but you have never responded to it.
This campaign is about clearing the pilots names not the "mission impossible" aim of saying what caused the accident. The reason many of us are concentrating on airworthiness and engineering issues is because these were badly (in the case of the Senior Reviewing Officers totally) neglected by the Board. I have given you several examples where short-term and potentially flight critical problems could have occurred - read post 2031 for Shy Toruqe's view as a helicopter pilot concerning engine run-aways and control restrictions - read Sqn Ldr Morgan's evidence to the Board concerning flight critical short-term defects - read Stn Cdr Odiham's comments (before the bit that looks like it had to be re-written) concerning possible crew distraction - even read Mr Cable's AAIB report where he accepted that the bracket that had detached a few days earlier causing a control restriction and which was found detached in the wreckage might have been detached pre-impact. You may not have the AAIB report so to help you here is the relevant paragraph:
It was noted that during ZD576’s service since MLU the thrust balance spring attachment bracket had detached from the thrust/yaw control pallet (Ref 27) as a result of the release of two threaded attachment inserts bonded into the pallet. Each of the two control pallets comprised a 7.5x24 inch, 1.1 inch thick, aluminium honeycomb panel with a 0.02 inch thick aluminium skin bonded to each face and contained respectively 23 and 26 threaded inserts for component attachment. Each insert was bonded into a blind hole bored through the outer skin and part way into the honeycomb, to approximately half the thickness; its integrity appeared to rely on adhesion between the exterior of the insert and the damaged honeycomb around the hole, together with some keying effect between the adhesive and the rim of the skin hole by virtue of the boring producing a marginally larger diameter hole in the honeycomb than in the skin. Inspection of the pallet remains after the accident showed that both inserts for the thrust balance spring attachment bracket had detached, together with most of the similar inserts on both pallets. This was unsurprising in view of the attachment method and, as an insert could apparently pull out of the pallet without appreciable distress to the components necessarily resulting, the possibility that insert(s) had detached prior to the accident could not be dismissed. Few signs were apparent of extensive strong bonding of the adhesive to some inserts or to the panel.
I have tried to explain why the aircraft were not grounded despite the Boscombe Down advice, but you do not seem to want to listen - why don't you write to the MOD under the FOIA and ask for the relevant correspondence - then you can see that we are not misleading you. You could also ask them for all the FADEC Incident Reports and MWOs at the same time if you see these as being relevant - I am sure that you will find MOD to be most helpful.
JB
I find your position quite amazing, but both Tandemrotor and Tucumseh's posts cover my views as well - you do not KNOW the cause of this accident any more than we do. Even if your theory were to be correct, and I am not denying that has to be a possibility, then this would be a navigation error accident not Gross Negligence. I have made this point to you several times, but you have never responded to it.
This campaign is about clearing the pilots names not the "mission impossible" aim of saying what caused the accident. The reason many of us are concentrating on airworthiness and engineering issues is because these were badly (in the case of the Senior Reviewing Officers totally) neglected by the Board. I have given you several examples where short-term and potentially flight critical problems could have occurred - read post 2031 for Shy Toruqe's view as a helicopter pilot concerning engine run-aways and control restrictions - read Sqn Ldr Morgan's evidence to the Board concerning flight critical short-term defects - read Stn Cdr Odiham's comments (before the bit that looks like it had to be re-written) concerning possible crew distraction - even read Mr Cable's AAIB report where he accepted that the bracket that had detached a few days earlier causing a control restriction and which was found detached in the wreckage might have been detached pre-impact. You may not have the AAIB report so to help you here is the relevant paragraph:
It was noted that during ZD576’s service since MLU the thrust balance spring attachment bracket had detached from the thrust/yaw control pallet (Ref 27) as a result of the release of two threaded attachment inserts bonded into the pallet. Each of the two control pallets comprised a 7.5x24 inch, 1.1 inch thick, aluminium honeycomb panel with a 0.02 inch thick aluminium skin bonded to each face and contained respectively 23 and 26 threaded inserts for component attachment. Each insert was bonded into a blind hole bored through the outer skin and part way into the honeycomb, to approximately half the thickness; its integrity appeared to rely on adhesion between the exterior of the insert and the damaged honeycomb around the hole, together with some keying effect between the adhesive and the rim of the skin hole by virtue of the boring producing a marginally larger diameter hole in the honeycomb than in the skin. Inspection of the pallet remains after the accident showed that both inserts for the thrust balance spring attachment bracket had detached, together with most of the similar inserts on both pallets. This was unsurprising in view of the attachment method and, as an insert could apparently pull out of the pallet without appreciable distress to the components necessarily resulting, the possibility that insert(s) had detached prior to the accident could not be dismissed. Few signs were apparent of extensive strong bonding of the adhesive to some inserts or to the panel.
I have tried to explain why the aircraft were not grounded despite the Boscombe Down advice, but you do not seem to want to listen - why don't you write to the MOD under the FOIA and ask for the relevant correspondence - then you can see that we are not misleading you. You could also ask them for all the FADEC Incident Reports and MWOs at the same time if you see these as being relevant - I am sure that you will find MOD to be most helpful.
JB
Avoid imitations
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John Purdey,
I recall taking you to task some time ago over a similar statement that you "knew" what the crew were thinking just before the acident. That sort of comment completely undermines your side of the argument.
Even with a CVR we would only know what they said.
I recall taking you to task some time ago over a similar statement that you "knew" what the crew were thinking just before the acident. That sort of comment completely undermines your side of the argument.
Even with a CVR we would only know what they said.
Just a numbered other
JP
Your arrogance is astounding.
No, it is not.
Why can't you see that your explanations are simply your opinions and not fact?
I am willing to believe that any cause (within reason) put forward is possible.
I simply require that cause to be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Would you now consult your crystal ball and answer Whooper 5's question:
Meanwhile, I have explained what must be the explanation for this terrible tragedy
This is, I hope, clear and unambiguous.
Why can't you see that your explanations are simply your opinions and not fact?
I am willing to believe that any cause (within reason) put forward is possible.
I simply require that cause to be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Would you now consult your crystal ball and answer Whooper 5's question:
May I ask if you feel the tornado pilot in John Blakeley’s post was grossly negligent?
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Chinook
Whooper5. I am not familiar with the details, and anyway this thread has strayed often enough withour introducing an unrelated case.
Tucumseh.Very interesting, but several contributers have insisted that the hills were only partly covered in cloud; what is more, the yachtsman could make out the site of the lighthouse. It seems to me thereore that the crew were likely to be relying on a visual fix as they coasted in, and tragically got it wrong. 'Something to hide' sounds like a conspiracy theory, hence dangerous ground. As to the unreliability of many politicians, I agree, but surely not the whole RAF chain of comand???
Tandemrotor. We have been here before.
John Blakeley. Thanks for the helpful details, very interesting. But none of this explains why, if there was even a sniff of suspicion about the fitness of the Chinooks, they were not at once all grounded. And you have really not explained this simple omission. What had Day, Wratten, Boscombe et al to lose by taking this obvious step.
Regards. JP
Tucumseh.Very interesting, but several contributers have insisted that the hills were only partly covered in cloud; what is more, the yachtsman could make out the site of the lighthouse. It seems to me thereore that the crew were likely to be relying on a visual fix as they coasted in, and tragically got it wrong. 'Something to hide' sounds like a conspiracy theory, hence dangerous ground. As to the unreliability of many politicians, I agree, but surely not the whole RAF chain of comand???
Tandemrotor. We have been here before.
John Blakeley. Thanks for the helpful details, very interesting. But none of this explains why, if there was even a sniff of suspicion about the fitness of the Chinooks, they were not at once all grounded. And you have really not explained this simple omission. What had Day, Wratten, Boscombe et al to lose by taking this obvious step.
Regards. JP
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Chinook
ArkRoyal.
Apologies if it sounds arrogant, it was not meant to be. Trouble is we are loosing sight of the larger picture, ie the aircraft was, just a few seconds before impact, seen at low level and high speed heading towards cloud covered hills. This was the negligence - defined as doing something which a reasonable person would not do, given the same circumstances. Sorry if this is not clear. JP
Apologies if it sounds arrogant, it was not meant to be. Trouble is we are loosing sight of the larger picture, ie the aircraft was, just a few seconds before impact, seen at low level and high speed heading towards cloud covered hills. This was the negligence - defined as doing something which a reasonable person would not do, given the same circumstances. Sorry if this is not clear. JP
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I seem to recall the phrase 'Unwarrantable Arrogance' being coined by a major player in this case. We now have contributor whose opinion he sees as fact despite the fact that numerous MPs, Aerospace specialists, a Scots Sherriff and an assortment of Lords (including eminent Law Lords) feel unable to raise such supposition to the status of fact.
Gentlemen, I fear that trying to argue the points with someone with such a closed mind who cannot see that he is raising his opinion to the status of fact is somewhat akin to feeding a troll. He conveniently sidesteps every direct question put to him so I suggest it may serve the thread better if he were just ignored and left to nurse his opinions.
Gentlemen, I fear that trying to argue the points with someone with such a closed mind who cannot see that he is raising his opinion to the status of fact is somewhat akin to feeding a troll. He conveniently sidesteps every direct question put to him so I suggest it may serve the thread better if he were just ignored and left to nurse his opinions.
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John Purdey
I will explain thois only one more time and then heed An Teallach's advice.
The pressure not to fly the Mk2 happened long before the accident. The RAF, as was their right, and presumably because they were very short of SH assets, elected to take a CA Release with significant limitations. After the accident there would only have been strong pressure to ground the in-service aircraft if there had been a full technical investigation - as this did not happen as a deliberate decision of the Board (or higher authority?) there would not, I assume, be any further pressure from within the RAF to ground them (although I would bet that there was a lot of dicsuion on this within the Chinook community) - grounding would have called into question the original decision to bring them into service, would have left the RAF desperately short of SH assets, and, who knows, might have had few influential people questioning why the Mk2 was chosen against the detachment commanders advice and request (and remember this was the first Mk 2 in NI and the Mk 1 was available in NI until I think about 3 days beforehand) to fly a VIP non-operational mission with reduced margins of safety and all the known operating problems - some of which were clearly detailed in the RTS, and others which were also taking place on a regular basis. Boscombe Down had of course grounded the aircraft and had asked MOD to make their concerns known to the RAF.
Hopefully you have got it this time and you should now be able to answer your own question on what RAF senior management might feel they had to lose.
The pressure not to fly the Mk2 happened long before the accident. The RAF, as was their right, and presumably because they were very short of SH assets, elected to take a CA Release with significant limitations. After the accident there would only have been strong pressure to ground the in-service aircraft if there had been a full technical investigation - as this did not happen as a deliberate decision of the Board (or higher authority?) there would not, I assume, be any further pressure from within the RAF to ground them (although I would bet that there was a lot of dicsuion on this within the Chinook community) - grounding would have called into question the original decision to bring them into service, would have left the RAF desperately short of SH assets, and, who knows, might have had few influential people questioning why the Mk2 was chosen against the detachment commanders advice and request (and remember this was the first Mk 2 in NI and the Mk 1 was available in NI until I think about 3 days beforehand) to fly a VIP non-operational mission with reduced margins of safety and all the known operating problems - some of which were clearly detailed in the RTS, and others which were also taking place on a regular basis. Boscombe Down had of course grounded the aircraft and had asked MOD to make their concerns known to the RAF.
Hopefully you have got it this time and you should now be able to answer your own question on what RAF senior management might feel they had to lose.