Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Twin Act
Gross negligence is a criminal offence not a civil tort and in this case as people died it is equivalent to manslaughter or culpable homicide - that's what my barrister son in law tells me, but I am happy to listen to your definition if different! It is because the “slur” on the pilots’ names is so serious that the campaign continues despite everyone else who has investigated the issues finding against MOD. You may also like to look at the summary of the excellent article in the highly respected Juridical Review, published in 2001, which says:
AN ABUSE OF POWER? An Analysis of the Royal Air Force
Inquiry into the Chinook Crash
ANDREA BATEY
(Dept of Law Dundee University)
This article examines the controversial circumstances surrounding the Royal Air Force Chinook helicopter crash in June 1994. This particular case has lead to a public scrutiny of the machinery of military accident investigation and has given rise to a strong sense of injustice. It highlights the unfettered authority of military boards of inquiry to pass judgement on the conduct of aircrew in a manner which is equivalent to a determination of a criminal charge, and raises general questions as to the proper function of Royal Air Force boards of inquiry.
We have a soft copy of the complete article and permission to distribute it – drop me a PM if you would like to see it.
I am sure that today's RTS does not contain warnings such as this:
Pending manufacturer’s investigation and a remedial solution, the “Eng Fail” caption may illuminate spuriously on the CAP, with a corresponding illumination of the master caution light. The pilot must immediately verify the status of the engines be a scan of the engine instruments. If all indications are normal the master caution may be re-set. If engine operation is normal aircrew should expect the “Eng Fail” light to extinguish after a 12 second lapse.
If it does and if you are still having uncommanded engine run-ups and run-downs then I suggest you should be running a campaign to ground the aircraft, but it is not what this campaign is trying to achieve. However, I had assumed that the Block 1 FADEC modifications and answers to the host of defect investigations running in 1994, as well as rectification of the many wiring defects I have been told the aircraft suffered from post conversion, have now led to a “safe” aircraft which also fully meets Boscombe’s standards, and where the full airworthiness chain including such issues as pilot’s notes, a full ODM etc is complete.
The reason for my comment on the Mk 3 is that I understand that once again the data provided under the contract for the software verification and validation trail does not meet the UK standards, and this time nobody at Boscombe is prepared to put their head above the parapet as happened on the Mk2 – if you know differently I would be happy to be corrected.
JB
AN ABUSE OF POWER? An Analysis of the Royal Air Force
Inquiry into the Chinook Crash
ANDREA BATEY
(Dept of Law Dundee University)
This article examines the controversial circumstances surrounding the Royal Air Force Chinook helicopter crash in June 1994. This particular case has lead to a public scrutiny of the machinery of military accident investigation and has given rise to a strong sense of injustice. It highlights the unfettered authority of military boards of inquiry to pass judgement on the conduct of aircrew in a manner which is equivalent to a determination of a criminal charge, and raises general questions as to the proper function of Royal Air Force boards of inquiry.
We have a soft copy of the complete article and permission to distribute it – drop me a PM if you would like to see it.
I am sure that today's RTS does not contain warnings such as this:
Pending manufacturer’s investigation and a remedial solution, the “Eng Fail” caption may illuminate spuriously on the CAP, with a corresponding illumination of the master caution light. The pilot must immediately verify the status of the engines be a scan of the engine instruments. If all indications are normal the master caution may be re-set. If engine operation is normal aircrew should expect the “Eng Fail” light to extinguish after a 12 second lapse.
If it does and if you are still having uncommanded engine run-ups and run-downs then I suggest you should be running a campaign to ground the aircraft, but it is not what this campaign is trying to achieve. However, I had assumed that the Block 1 FADEC modifications and answers to the host of defect investigations running in 1994, as well as rectification of the many wiring defects I have been told the aircraft suffered from post conversion, have now led to a “safe” aircraft which also fully meets Boscombe’s standards, and where the full airworthiness chain including such issues as pilot’s notes, a full ODM etc is complete.
The reason for my comment on the Mk 3 is that I understand that once again the data provided under the contract for the software verification and validation trail does not meet the UK standards, and this time nobody at Boscombe is prepared to put their head above the parapet as happened on the Mk2 – if you know differently I would be happy to be corrected.
JB
Guest
Posts: n/a
Chinook
John Blakely.
Never mind later events, if there were these serious concerns over the Chinook airworthiness, how come the whole fleet was not at once grounded? Unless of course you subscribe to the remarkable implied assertion on this thread several posts back, that the whole chain of command was involved in some kind of cover up. Tell us why, at the time?
The technical background to all this is of course fascinating to an engineer like yourself, but you are again ignoring the airmanship aspects of the tragedy. Shall I say it again? The aircraft was about a quarter of a mile to the right of its track towards the lighthouse, and most unfortunatetly there is a fog station site which, given the very poor weather conditions at the time, could all too easily be mistaken for the lighthouse site (both have a couple of large rocks just offshore). Had the aircraft been on track, then the rate of climb would have cleared the hills with around 200-300 feet to spare. But a quarter of a mile to the right of that track, the hills were around 500 feet higher, leaving no room whatever for safety, and the crew found themselves faced with a granite hillside (hence the last minute severe control inputs).
Even without technical evidence in the form of CVR or whatever, this explanation fits all the facts, and leaves all talk of mysterious and rapidly vanishing technical failures, attempts by the IRA or whoever to lure the aircrat to its destruction, major distraction of the two pilots (remembering the golden rule 'keep flying the aircraft') or whatever, floundering in its wake. Any takers for little green men in the cockpit? I do not mean to be facitious, just trying to keep the discussion on a sensible level.. Regards to all serious contributers. JP
Never mind later events, if there were these serious concerns over the Chinook airworthiness, how come the whole fleet was not at once grounded? Unless of course you subscribe to the remarkable implied assertion on this thread several posts back, that the whole chain of command was involved in some kind of cover up. Tell us why, at the time?
The technical background to all this is of course fascinating to an engineer like yourself, but you are again ignoring the airmanship aspects of the tragedy. Shall I say it again? The aircraft was about a quarter of a mile to the right of its track towards the lighthouse, and most unfortunatetly there is a fog station site which, given the very poor weather conditions at the time, could all too easily be mistaken for the lighthouse site (both have a couple of large rocks just offshore). Had the aircraft been on track, then the rate of climb would have cleared the hills with around 200-300 feet to spare. But a quarter of a mile to the right of that track, the hills were around 500 feet higher, leaving no room whatever for safety, and the crew found themselves faced with a granite hillside (hence the last minute severe control inputs).
Even without technical evidence in the form of CVR or whatever, this explanation fits all the facts, and leaves all talk of mysterious and rapidly vanishing technical failures, attempts by the IRA or whoever to lure the aircrat to its destruction, major distraction of the two pilots (remembering the golden rule 'keep flying the aircraft') or whatever, floundering in its wake. Any takers for little green men in the cockpit? I do not mean to be facitious, just trying to keep the discussion on a sensible level.. Regards to all serious contributers. JP
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: England
Posts: 339
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JP
That is a possible interpretation of events, but it is just that - an interpretation, which may be fallible. Be wary of using the "it fits the facts" approach to determining guilt. Facts are not necessarily as factual as they may seem.
Think back to 1974, and the Birmingham pub bombings. The "Birmingham Six" were convicted largely on the basis of what was considered at the time to be incontrovertible forensic evidence; a positive chemical test for the presence of nitroglycerine which was held to be proof that they had handled explosives.
Unfortunately, and rather a number of years later, it was shown that the test could be fooled by the presence of nitrocellulose,a harmless substance present, amongst other uses, in the glossy coating used on playing cards.
The defendants had always stated that they had been playing cards shortly before their arrest.
The case against them collapsed, but only after they had served several years in jail (and one had died there).
It is, of course, just possible that they were guilty anyway. But they would never have been convicted if the real weakness of the evidence against them had been appreciated at the time.
Regards
Ginseng
Think back to 1974, and the Birmingham pub bombings. The "Birmingham Six" were convicted largely on the basis of what was considered at the time to be incontrovertible forensic evidence; a positive chemical test for the presence of nitroglycerine which was held to be proof that they had handled explosives.
Unfortunately, and rather a number of years later, it was shown that the test could be fooled by the presence of nitrocellulose,a harmless substance present, amongst other uses, in the glossy coating used on playing cards.
The defendants had always stated that they had been playing cards shortly before their arrest.
The case against them collapsed, but only after they had served several years in jail (and one had died there).
It is, of course, just possible that they were guilty anyway. But they would never have been convicted if the real weakness of the evidence against them had been appreciated at the time.
Regards
Ginseng
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hi Mr Purdey,
your reference to the 'misidentification' of the fog station comes straight out of the book by Steuart Campbell.
All four crew flew in that location on a regular basis (indeed, Rick Cook had performed a low-level abort there only some weeks previously). Are you saying that all four misidentified an area that they were all familiar with?
Also, what hard evidence do you have to support your exact 'line on the map' statement?
To everyone,
I have been asked to advise everyone that Cazatou, due to some more pressing issues, may not be in a position to reply as usual. May I make a personal plea that no-one posts the old "Where are you??" type stuff. I am sure that normal debate will resume as and when circumstances allows.
Thank you.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
your reference to the 'misidentification' of the fog station comes straight out of the book by Steuart Campbell.
All four crew flew in that location on a regular basis (indeed, Rick Cook had performed a low-level abort there only some weeks previously). Are you saying that all four misidentified an area that they were all familiar with?
Also, what hard evidence do you have to support your exact 'line on the map' statement?
To everyone,
I have been asked to advise everyone that Cazatou, due to some more pressing issues, may not be in a position to reply as usual. May I make a personal plea that no-one posts the old "Where are you??" type stuff. I am sure that normal debate will resume as and when circumstances allows.
Thank you.
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: The sunny south
Posts: 4
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
John Purdey
I’m not sure if you are referring to any of my posts when you say:
“Unless of course you subscribe to the remarkable implied assertion on this thread several posts back, that the whole chain of command was involved in some kind of cover up.”
If so then I need to apologise and try to correct your perception. The reason I was moved to post on this thread, which is often mired in trivia that hides the full picture, was to highlight the similarities of the situation in NI at the time of the crash and what I read on another thread regarding Hercules and their apparent lack of a suitable defensive aids fit. A great many contributors on this thread seem to operate under the illusion that the ‘system’ would never expect an airman to operate an aircraft they thought unfit for purpose. There was no PPRUNE (that I was aware of) at that time. If there where I suspect a thread involving the introduction of the MkII Chinook would have been well subscribed. I firmly believe there is no ‘cover up’ involved in the case of the Hercules, merely personnel of all ranks getting on and making do with what they have got whilst trying get the system to listen to their concerns. As it was with the MkII. These situations do involve the whole chain of command however we all need to support our families and remain employed; the boat can only be pushed so far. I complained at Sqn level about the introduction, no more, and that was when, in those early days, the MkII scared the pants of me, the slightest new noise, vibration, cockpit indication or unannounced manoeuvre received a disproportionate response. I am not claiming cause, merely mitigation which is so often ignored.
No scandal or finger pointing, merely trying to say how it was.
K52/Cazatou
Like JP you post eloquently and you have the advantage of many years aviation experience. However please try to accept that a helicopter is more akin a four ton truck than a fast jet. Navigation is performed by looking out of the window, slowing down if it gets hard and landing in any old field when it gets too bad. Acceleration is not in our blood.
Twinact
Any news on the availability of an aircrew manual, one for the MkII with MkII data, at the time of the crash?
Regards
W 5
I’m not sure if you are referring to any of my posts when you say:
“Unless of course you subscribe to the remarkable implied assertion on this thread several posts back, that the whole chain of command was involved in some kind of cover up.”
If so then I need to apologise and try to correct your perception. The reason I was moved to post on this thread, which is often mired in trivia that hides the full picture, was to highlight the similarities of the situation in NI at the time of the crash and what I read on another thread regarding Hercules and their apparent lack of a suitable defensive aids fit. A great many contributors on this thread seem to operate under the illusion that the ‘system’ would never expect an airman to operate an aircraft they thought unfit for purpose. There was no PPRUNE (that I was aware of) at that time. If there where I suspect a thread involving the introduction of the MkII Chinook would have been well subscribed. I firmly believe there is no ‘cover up’ involved in the case of the Hercules, merely personnel of all ranks getting on and making do with what they have got whilst trying get the system to listen to their concerns. As it was with the MkII. These situations do involve the whole chain of command however we all need to support our families and remain employed; the boat can only be pushed so far. I complained at Sqn level about the introduction, no more, and that was when, in those early days, the MkII scared the pants of me, the slightest new noise, vibration, cockpit indication or unannounced manoeuvre received a disproportionate response. I am not claiming cause, merely mitigation which is so often ignored.
No scandal or finger pointing, merely trying to say how it was.
K52/Cazatou
Like JP you post eloquently and you have the advantage of many years aviation experience. However please try to accept that a helicopter is more akin a four ton truck than a fast jet. Navigation is performed by looking out of the window, slowing down if it gets hard and landing in any old field when it gets too bad. Acceleration is not in our blood.
Twinact
Any news on the availability of an aircrew manual, one for the MkII with MkII data, at the time of the crash?
Regards
W 5
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Whooper 5
You said you were involved in the planning of this trip and I asked you what was your recollection of their intentions in the vicinity of the Mull – the answer to which could be very enlightening to us all. If you were to confirm their close in turn at low level then they could only be “blamed” for an error of judgment at worst and then the bit from John Blakeley’s recent post would be very relevant:
(regarding the Tornado crash)
<<the Board concluded that Flt Lt XXXXX"s actions constituted an ERROR OF JUDGEMENT and therefore the Board recommends that he be absolved from blame.>>
That is, if they misjudged their distance off to begin their turn, it was just an error – not breaking any regs or being reckless in this common approach to the Mull.
I believe that it is a far better strategy to establish that they were intending to turn thus and use the comparison in judgment on the Tornado case to argue for their names to be cleared rather than trying to keep EVERYTHING unknown and relying upon there being insufficient proof beyond all possible doubt , etc. From what I have heard about historical BOIs, it is most probable that the latter strategy is futile – and certainly gags debate.
John Blakeley
Re your post 2064
<< …would it not be quite reasonable for MALM Forbes in the middle seat to have selected the next waypoint as the safe heading to fly?>>
I thought that only the pilots were up front at the critical time.
Also, your comment
<< …If we accept the TANS data as correct is 0.81NM, even with a GS of around 150kts (an assumption still based on TANS data – not a fact), an unusually close (or even dangerously close) distance to turn 7 degrees left in VFR conditions?>>
From my own observation in identical conditions and from what the lighthouse keeper (who was standing next to me at the time) told me, this was a common practice.
I believe that others on this thread CAN confirm this.
Despite what you have written on the distance of waypoint change from the Mull, I doubt that you can stretch it out enough to significantly enlarge the window of opportunity for mechanical/ control/ technical problems – as I have said before, they were already very close in at waypoint change and should have started turning by then if they had had confidence (which they did not) in the position given to them by the SuperTANS – further, if they had had a good visual reference by which they could have estimated their distance (ie they knew how far out they actually were) they should have started their turn at about the point of waypoint change.
What I am saying is that something delayed their decision to turn rather than something prevented it.
John Purdey
As I have put to you before, if you plot the course on a map/ chart, the argument about the fog station is rubbish because of the oblique approach – it would be more accurate to describe it as closer rather than to the right. As Brian Dixon asks (2098), what are you basing the line of approach on?
You said you were involved in the planning of this trip and I asked you what was your recollection of their intentions in the vicinity of the Mull – the answer to which could be very enlightening to us all. If you were to confirm their close in turn at low level then they could only be “blamed” for an error of judgment at worst and then the bit from John Blakeley’s recent post would be very relevant:
(regarding the Tornado crash)
<<the Board concluded that Flt Lt XXXXX"s actions constituted an ERROR OF JUDGEMENT and therefore the Board recommends that he be absolved from blame.>>
That is, if they misjudged their distance off to begin their turn, it was just an error – not breaking any regs or being reckless in this common approach to the Mull.
I believe that it is a far better strategy to establish that they were intending to turn thus and use the comparison in judgment on the Tornado case to argue for their names to be cleared rather than trying to keep EVERYTHING unknown and relying upon there being insufficient proof beyond all possible doubt , etc. From what I have heard about historical BOIs, it is most probable that the latter strategy is futile – and certainly gags debate.
John Blakeley
Re your post 2064
<< …would it not be quite reasonable for MALM Forbes in the middle seat to have selected the next waypoint as the safe heading to fly?>>
I thought that only the pilots were up front at the critical time.
Also, your comment
<< …If we accept the TANS data as correct is 0.81NM, even with a GS of around 150kts (an assumption still based on TANS data – not a fact), an unusually close (or even dangerously close) distance to turn 7 degrees left in VFR conditions?>>
From my own observation in identical conditions and from what the lighthouse keeper (who was standing next to me at the time) told me, this was a common practice.
I believe that others on this thread CAN confirm this.
Despite what you have written on the distance of waypoint change from the Mull, I doubt that you can stretch it out enough to significantly enlarge the window of opportunity for mechanical/ control/ technical problems – as I have said before, they were already very close in at waypoint change and should have started turning by then if they had had confidence (which they did not) in the position given to them by the SuperTANS – further, if they had had a good visual reference by which they could have estimated their distance (ie they knew how far out they actually were) they should have started their turn at about the point of waypoint change.
What I am saying is that something delayed their decision to turn rather than something prevented it.
John Purdey
As I have put to you before, if you plot the course on a map/ chart, the argument about the fog station is rubbish because of the oblique approach – it would be more accurate to describe it as closer rather than to the right. As Brian Dixon asks (2098), what are you basing the line of approach on?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Chinook
Ginseng. The Birmingham bombing attair was a very rum one. Among other things the suspects were hot-footing it to Ireland when arrested. I note what you say about the unreliability of the forensic evidence, but the second odd thing about the matter was that the Police dropped any further investigation.
Brian, yes indeed the point about the two sites was raised in Campell's book. The surprising thing about it is that the BofI made nothing of it. By the way, it would be particularly interesting to be able to compare photos of the two sites and the apparently similar rocks of shore. Any takers?
Whooper 5. Very helpful and interesting.
Happy Easter to all, and thanks for courteous contributions from you. JP
Brian, yes indeed the point about the two sites was raised in Campell's book. The surprising thing about it is that the BofI made nothing of it. By the way, it would be particularly interesting to be able to compare photos of the two sites and the apparently similar rocks of shore. Any takers?
Whooper 5. Very helpful and interesting.
Happy Easter to all, and thanks for courteous contributions from you. JP
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Walter Kennedy
Thank you for your comment that the WP was neither unusually nor dangerously close to the Mull - I am sure that I have seen other SH pilot comments to the same effect. I also note that the VFR rules applicable to the flight as outlined by Sir John Day to the House of Lords would have allowed the aircraft to be flown as low as 50 feet above ground with a minimum cloud base of 250 feet and minimum visibility of 1 kilometre - 0.81NM, the minimum calcluated distance for the WP change is almost 1.5km, and the question then is whether at 150 kts the Chinook can safely turn port through 7 degrees before before hitting land - I would have expected so having spent a fair number of hours flying around the Falklands hills in a Mk1, but an operator needs to answer that.
The AAIB Report on the wreckage pattern indicated that one of the loadmasters was with the pilots (MALM Forbes), and I seem to recall reading somewhere, but I cannot instantly find it, that it was normal SF practise for one of the loadmasters to be third member of the cockpit crew - again I am sure that somebody will correct me if necessary.
I do not think that either of us could possibly know whether the turn they clearly planned to make (since they had changed WP) was prevented or delayed - contrary to your views and indeed those of John Purdey to whom I will reply later, there were several technical problems that could have developed even in the short time between WP change and impact, as an obvious example the potential 12 second distraction of an engine fail caption quoted in the CA Release (and I assume also included in the MAR). Also, as I tried to point out there is only an assumtion that the aircraft was serviceable with no real or distracting problems at the WP change - we do not know this as a fact, and it is a series of compatible facts that are needed to support gross negligence -not a series of hypotheses turned into facts.
JB
The AAIB Report on the wreckage pattern indicated that one of the loadmasters was with the pilots (MALM Forbes), and I seem to recall reading somewhere, but I cannot instantly find it, that it was normal SF practise for one of the loadmasters to be third member of the cockpit crew - again I am sure that somebody will correct me if necessary.
I do not think that either of us could possibly know whether the turn they clearly planned to make (since they had changed WP) was prevented or delayed - contrary to your views and indeed those of John Purdey to whom I will reply later, there were several technical problems that could have developed even in the short time between WP change and impact, as an obvious example the potential 12 second distraction of an engine fail caption quoted in the CA Release (and I assume also included in the MAR). Also, as I tried to point out there is only an assumtion that the aircraft was serviceable with no real or distracting problems at the WP change - we do not know this as a fact, and it is a series of compatible facts that are needed to support gross negligence -not a series of hypotheses turned into facts.
JB
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Reply to John Purdey
From the way you write it sounds like you are in a better position than me to answer the question as to why the fleet was not grounded – plenty of the experts certainly wanted it to be. In their report TM 2210 Chinook Mk2 Interim Release Recommendations A&AEE were UNABLE to recommend CA Release for the Chinook Mk2. However, after clear pressure from the RAF (A&AEE Letter ADD/308/04 dated 6 June 1994 describes the background) which I assume was based on operational imperatives a CA Release at Issue 1 with many flight restrictions to "overcome" the “unquantifiable risks associated with the unverifiable nature of the FADEC software”, was provided in November 1993 – this was updated by AL1 in Mar 1994 and was the standard against which ZD 576 would have been operating in June.
On 25 May 1994 A&AEE held a meeting at which in-service engine related defects, of which there had been at least 15, were discussed. Of the 15 incidents discussed 4 were considered to have “particularly serious implications” – these included one on ZD 576 on 19 May during which engine over-temp damage occurred in the air and on the ground, but the fault could not be identified. In their letter to MOD of 6 June A&AEE stated that they “now considered the consequences of the risks and the probability of their occurrence to be unacceptable” – it was on this basis that they grounded the flight trials aircraft. In the same letter to MOD A&AEE “strongly recommend that MOD makes their (Boscombe’s) concerns known to the RAF in order that they (the RAF) may consider their own position”. From the other end of the scale we know that Jon Tapper also worried about the use of a Chinook Mk 2 tried to keep a Mk1 in NI for this task.
At the House of Lords Committee hearings, Witness A, a very experienced and highly decorated Special Forces Chinook pilot who was at the time based at Odiham, in answer to a question as to how much the unforeseen malfunctions occurring in the Chinook Mk 2 since its introduction were a matter of discussion among helicopter pilots, answered,
"They occupied our minds to a great degree, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well" (Q 852).
Hardly a ringing endorsement for what was going on.
I would like more information on where you see the accusation of a cover-up. Certainly I assume that the RAF made its decision to continue flying the Mk 2 as a result of the operational imperative, and one could argue that as there were no more accidents (but plenty of incidents) they made a good decision – but this does not mean that the choice of the Mk 2 and ZD 576 in particular for such a non-operational but VIP sortie was a good one – nor does it mean that the pilots must have been to blame for the accident. I do not think that there was a “conspiracy” involved in bringing the Chinook Mk 2 into service, but given MOD’s behaviour since then in the face of almost total, informed, opposition to the verdict one has to start wondering what is going on – again perhaps you know. I suppose that in many ways the MOD position on ZD 576 merely reflects MOD’s usual approach to having its judgement questioned – Deepcut, Porton Down, Gulf War Syndrome, Body Armour, Tactical Radios, etc all spring to mind. Certainly as an organisation MOD does not always seem to have grasped the old adage that when you are in a hole you should stop digging!
You go on to say:
“Even without technical evidence in the form of CVR or whatever, this explanation [navigation error?] fits all the facts, and leaves all talk of mysterious and rapidly vanishing technical failures, attempts by the IRA or whoever to lure the aircraft to its destruction, major distraction of the two pilots (remembering the golden rule 'keep flying the aircraft') or whatever, floundering in its wake.”
I do not know why you raise the “golden rule” issue of keeping the aircraft flying – there is every indication from the Board evidence that the pilots were doing this until the very end. I am surprised, and disappointed, that you equate the potential engineering aspects of this accident with “little green men” and IRA bomb attempts – the potential airworthiness and engineering issues are certainly not floundering in the wake of yours and Campbell’s navigation error theory – a theory which if true would anyway be an error of judgment and not a gross negligence verdict – remember what this campaign is about – it is not to find out the cause of the accident that is impossible – even Campbell, despite his claims, has not done that – it is to clear an unjust and criminal slur on the pilot’s names. You imply that I do not understand the airmanship issues – if you knew my background you would realise that I probably recognise these issues at least as well as you do despite what I assume is a much smaller number of flying hours. You happily ignore the airworthiness and engineering issue many of which far from being “mysterious and vanishing” are well documented facts, even in the CA Release and Board evidence, in favour of operational hypotheses, but worst of all you seem to be happy to support leaving the slur against two pilots names against the clear rules which should have stopped the Reviewing Officers making such a decision regardless of any inputs on the airworthiness and engineering problems.
JB
On 25 May 1994 A&AEE held a meeting at which in-service engine related defects, of which there had been at least 15, were discussed. Of the 15 incidents discussed 4 were considered to have “particularly serious implications” – these included one on ZD 576 on 19 May during which engine over-temp damage occurred in the air and on the ground, but the fault could not be identified. In their letter to MOD of 6 June A&AEE stated that they “now considered the consequences of the risks and the probability of their occurrence to be unacceptable” – it was on this basis that they grounded the flight trials aircraft. In the same letter to MOD A&AEE “strongly recommend that MOD makes their (Boscombe’s) concerns known to the RAF in order that they (the RAF) may consider their own position”. From the other end of the scale we know that Jon Tapper also worried about the use of a Chinook Mk 2 tried to keep a Mk1 in NI for this task.
At the House of Lords Committee hearings, Witness A, a very experienced and highly decorated Special Forces Chinook pilot who was at the time based at Odiham, in answer to a question as to how much the unforeseen malfunctions occurring in the Chinook Mk 2 since its introduction were a matter of discussion among helicopter pilots, answered,
"They occupied our minds to a great degree, crew room talk was of little else at the time. The crews felt extremely uneasy about the way the aircraft had been introduced into service. This perception was reinforced by the lack of information contained in the aircrew manual, the poor state of repair of the flight reference cards and such like as well" (Q 852).
Hardly a ringing endorsement for what was going on.
I would like more information on where you see the accusation of a cover-up. Certainly I assume that the RAF made its decision to continue flying the Mk 2 as a result of the operational imperative, and one could argue that as there were no more accidents (but plenty of incidents) they made a good decision – but this does not mean that the choice of the Mk 2 and ZD 576 in particular for such a non-operational but VIP sortie was a good one – nor does it mean that the pilots must have been to blame for the accident. I do not think that there was a “conspiracy” involved in bringing the Chinook Mk 2 into service, but given MOD’s behaviour since then in the face of almost total, informed, opposition to the verdict one has to start wondering what is going on – again perhaps you know. I suppose that in many ways the MOD position on ZD 576 merely reflects MOD’s usual approach to having its judgement questioned – Deepcut, Porton Down, Gulf War Syndrome, Body Armour, Tactical Radios, etc all spring to mind. Certainly as an organisation MOD does not always seem to have grasped the old adage that when you are in a hole you should stop digging!
You go on to say:
“Even without technical evidence in the form of CVR or whatever, this explanation [navigation error?] fits all the facts, and leaves all talk of mysterious and rapidly vanishing technical failures, attempts by the IRA or whoever to lure the aircraft to its destruction, major distraction of the two pilots (remembering the golden rule 'keep flying the aircraft') or whatever, floundering in its wake.”
I do not know why you raise the “golden rule” issue of keeping the aircraft flying – there is every indication from the Board evidence that the pilots were doing this until the very end. I am surprised, and disappointed, that you equate the potential engineering aspects of this accident with “little green men” and IRA bomb attempts – the potential airworthiness and engineering issues are certainly not floundering in the wake of yours and Campbell’s navigation error theory – a theory which if true would anyway be an error of judgment and not a gross negligence verdict – remember what this campaign is about – it is not to find out the cause of the accident that is impossible – even Campbell, despite his claims, has not done that – it is to clear an unjust and criminal slur on the pilot’s names. You imply that I do not understand the airmanship issues – if you knew my background you would realise that I probably recognise these issues at least as well as you do despite what I assume is a much smaller number of flying hours. You happily ignore the airworthiness and engineering issue many of which far from being “mysterious and vanishing” are well documented facts, even in the CA Release and Board evidence, in favour of operational hypotheses, but worst of all you seem to be happy to support leaving the slur against two pilots names against the clear rules which should have stopped the Reviewing Officers making such a decision regardless of any inputs on the airworthiness and engineering problems.
JB
Guest
Posts: n/a
Chinook
John Blakeley.
Many thanks for your lengthy and very detailed comment. The accusation of a 'cover-up' is not of course mine, but if you go back through the numerous posts on this thread, you will see the suggestion that their airships might have had something to hide, post the accident. It is nonsense.
As to MOD's attitude to various accusations of incompetence or worse in the past, very interesting, but it does not advance our understanding of the causes of this disaster.
I emphasised the golden rule of 'keep flying the aircraft' merely to discount the often mentioned theory in this thread that both (or all three) crew members might have been distracted by something odd in the cockpit. Not if they were the highly competent folk we understand they were. Regards. JP
Many thanks for your lengthy and very detailed comment. The accusation of a 'cover-up' is not of course mine, but if you go back through the numerous posts on this thread, you will see the suggestion that their airships might have had something to hide, post the accident. It is nonsense.
As to MOD's attitude to various accusations of incompetence or worse in the past, very interesting, but it does not advance our understanding of the causes of this disaster.
I emphasised the golden rule of 'keep flying the aircraft' merely to discount the often mentioned theory in this thread that both (or all three) crew members might have been distracted by something odd in the cockpit. Not if they were the highly competent folk we understand they were. Regards. JP
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: England
Posts: 339
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
JP
Your reply as to the Birmingham affair illustrated my point about assumptions very nicely. The suspects were certainly travelling from Birmingham to Ireland whan arrested, but travelling from Birmingham to Ireland was not a crime then, nor is it now. It is not surprising, in the climate of the moment, that they would have aroused suspicion, but your use of the term "hot-footing" indicates the same pre-disposition to assume guilt which was likely to have been prevalent at the time. As for the fact that the Police made no further investigations (so far as we know) once the convictions collapsed, are you assuming again that this is significant? Perhaps that the Police believed they had got the right target the first time? Well, possibly. But it might also mean that the Police recognised that many years after the event, and in the light of adverse publicity in the meantime, there was little likelihood of finding evidence against anyone else when they hadn't looked for it closer to the event. Or perhaps they just considered it not in the public interest to devote any further resources to the case. I don't know.
Since we have both said our piece, and we risk straying off the main point, let's call it quits and allow the debate to continue.
By the way, thank you for the politeness of your posts. They are a pleasure to read, even if I disagree with you.
Regards
Ginseng
Since we have both said our piece, and we risk straying off the main point, let's call it quits and allow the debate to continue.
By the way, thank you for the politeness of your posts. They are a pleasure to read, even if I disagree with you.
Regards
Ginseng
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Norfolk England
Posts: 247
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
John Purdey
I will take your last post as a request and forgive the misspelling of my name.
At the time of the A&AEE letter of 6 June Boscombe was aware of at least 15 in-service engine related (and by implication FADEC related) incidents in some 1258 hours of RAF flying. I would have expected there to have been further incidents during the trials as based on FADEC issues, especially the software audit trail, Boscombe did not want to recommend a release at all - as detailed in the post above. I do not know the RAF policy for reporting things such as spurious engine fail indications as these were anyway detailed in the RTS. I can imagine that far too many problems had become so routine that they were being ignored in terms of incident reports and, worse, MWOs - I am sure that like me you have seen this happen.
I believe that the campaign did get information on further FADEC incidents after the crash, but I do not have access to this - perhaps Brian Dixon can help.
Unless there have been any accidents with the US Army's SDs I am not aware of any accidents, including ZD 576, that can be directly attributed to the FADEC, and I would anyway hope that FADEC is no longer an issue with the Block 1 modifications. Perhaps a current Chinook operator could comment on this.
To say that FADEC caused the accident to ZD 576 would be just as much conjecture as saying on the basis of operational hypotheses that the pilots were grossly negligent or that they made a navigation error! FADEC may have played a major part, but who knows?
JB
At the time of the A&AEE letter of 6 June Boscombe was aware of at least 15 in-service engine related (and by implication FADEC related) incidents in some 1258 hours of RAF flying. I would have expected there to have been further incidents during the trials as based on FADEC issues, especially the software audit trail, Boscombe did not want to recommend a release at all - as detailed in the post above. I do not know the RAF policy for reporting things such as spurious engine fail indications as these were anyway detailed in the RTS. I can imagine that far too many problems had become so routine that they were being ignored in terms of incident reports and, worse, MWOs - I am sure that like me you have seen this happen.
I believe that the campaign did get information on further FADEC incidents after the crash, but I do not have access to this - perhaps Brian Dixon can help.
Unless there have been any accidents with the US Army's SDs I am not aware of any accidents, including ZD 576, that can be directly attributed to the FADEC, and I would anyway hope that FADEC is no longer an issue with the Block 1 modifications. Perhaps a current Chinook operator could comment on this.
To say that FADEC caused the accident to ZD 576 would be just as much conjecture as saying on the basis of operational hypotheses that the pilots were grossly negligent or that they made a navigation error! FADEC may have played a major part, but who knows?
JB
“The accusation of a 'cover-up' is not of course mine, but if you go back through the numerous posts on this thread, you will see the suggestion that their airships might have had something to hide, post the accident. It is nonsense”.
I have never openly criticised a poster on this forum, because everyone is entitled to their own opinion. And I believe most hold these opinions honestly. However, the notion that the MoD has nothing to hide is risible. The disingenuous and misleading replies to questions, the half truths, and the downright lies that have issued forth from the MoD on this subject are legion. I cannot comment with any authority whatsoever on aircrew issues, but I can assure you that I have personally witnessed the above deceits on the engineering issues which John Blakeley talks of. ANY knowledgeable aircraft or aircraft equipment project manager in DPA or DLO, or trials officer at Boscombe, will tell you that what John says on airworthiness is absolutely true – and the MoD don’t like it one little bit. They cannot withstand scrutiny. If they have nothing to hide, why the lies and deceit?
One of the best posts I’ve read here was along these lines…. Before Labour came to power they promised to overturn this verdict. Since coming to power, they have fully supported the previous administration. Question: What new evidence, not available to Labour between 1994 and 1997, has been brought to light which proves negligence beyond all doubt? If any exists, it has been hidden. If it does not exist, they are hiding something else.
I have never openly criticised a poster on this forum, because everyone is entitled to their own opinion. And I believe most hold these opinions honestly. However, the notion that the MoD has nothing to hide is risible. The disingenuous and misleading replies to questions, the half truths, and the downright lies that have issued forth from the MoD on this subject are legion. I cannot comment with any authority whatsoever on aircrew issues, but I can assure you that I have personally witnessed the above deceits on the engineering issues which John Blakeley talks of. ANY knowledgeable aircraft or aircraft equipment project manager in DPA or DLO, or trials officer at Boscombe, will tell you that what John says on airworthiness is absolutely true – and the MoD don’t like it one little bit. They cannot withstand scrutiny. If they have nothing to hide, why the lies and deceit?
One of the best posts I’ve read here was along these lines…. Before Labour came to power they promised to overturn this verdict. Since coming to power, they have fully supported the previous administration. Question: What new evidence, not available to Labour between 1994 and 1997, has been brought to light which proves negligence beyond all doubt? If any exists, it has been hidden. If it does not exist, they are hiding something else.
Tucumseh
I believe the post you may be kindly referring to was #1935, which was in turn sparked by posts from Brian Dixon, BEagle and ginseng. Briefly, my MP, Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, told me on 16 March that he had written on my behalf to Adam Ingram (Minister of State for the Armed Forces) pointing out that the Sec of State, Dr Reid, had said:
“.... when the Labour Government came into office in 1997, it was our opinion that an injustice had been done which we could put right. Despite having looked closely at the case then, and again when Geoff became Defence Secretary, we were not able to justify overturning the findings. My opinion continues to be that the finding should remain undisturbed.”
I had also pointed out that, in contrast to the views expressed in his letter, ..... two of the bodies adduced by Dr Reid in his support, the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry and the House of Lords Select Committee, plus the Public Accounts Committee, had all failed to find the pilots negligent.
My MP was to ask Mr Ingram what was the further evidence, presented to him in 1997 and since, that changed his opinion from one of an injustice to that of negligence with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
I have heard nothing since, and I plan to try and find out what is happening after Easter.
airsound
“.... when the Labour Government came into office in 1997, it was our opinion that an injustice had been done which we could put right. Despite having looked closely at the case then, and again when Geoff became Defence Secretary, we were not able to justify overturning the findings. My opinion continues to be that the finding should remain undisturbed.”
I had also pointed out that, in contrast to the views expressed in his letter, ..... two of the bodies adduced by Dr Reid in his support, the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry and the House of Lords Select Committee, plus the Public Accounts Committee, had all failed to find the pilots negligent.
My MP was to ask Mr Ingram what was the further evidence, presented to him in 1997 and since, that changed his opinion from one of an injustice to that of negligence with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
I have heard nothing since, and I plan to try and find out what is happening after Easter.
airsound
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Hampshire
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
John,
Although not a current Chinook operator , perhaps I can shed some light. The block 1 upgrade to FADEC simply changed the Eng Fail Caption counter software from a single detection count to about 6 counts, thereby ensuring that if a fail was detected it had to exist for 6 counts rather than the spurious single. But thats all they changed. FADEC is the same. BD refused to certify it not because it was unsafe, per se, but they couldn't read the code using their static code analysis to their required standards.
Although not a current Chinook operator , perhaps I can shed some light. The block 1 upgrade to FADEC simply changed the Eng Fail Caption counter software from a single detection count to about 6 counts, thereby ensuring that if a fail was detected it had to exist for 6 counts rather than the spurious single. But thats all they changed. FADEC is the same. BD refused to certify it not because it was unsafe, per se, but they couldn't read the code using their static code analysis to their required standards.
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Hampshire
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Any news on the availability of an aircrew manual
At the House of Lords Committee hearings, Witness A, a very experienced and highly decorated Special Forces Chinook pilot who was at the time based at Odiham
contained in the aircrew manual