Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: essex
Posts: 39
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Re: Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
to Brian Cook
I spoke to my MP by the name of O'Brien a new labour mp, and suggested that the chances of 2 experienced chinnook pilots would be UNLIKLY to consider taking that load below msa at night in dubious wx on that route. so poss the polico's or the air generals did not wish to admit they had purchased a system that was not quite the ticket as they say (FADEC).
he said the MOD would not cover up such a thing and I knew nothing as an ex armourer, notwithstanding that I also had CPL/IR and had instructed at that level. (SFT Bournmouth, and Leavesden)
he is I belive still MP for North Warwickshire,
Keep up the pressure!!
I spoke to my MP by the name of O'Brien a new labour mp, and suggested that the chances of 2 experienced chinnook pilots would be UNLIKLY to consider taking that load below msa at night in dubious wx on that route. so poss the polico's or the air generals did not wish to admit they had purchased a system that was not quite the ticket as they say (FADEC).
he said the MOD would not cover up such a thing and I knew nothing as an ex armourer, notwithstanding that I also had CPL/IR and had instructed at that level. (SFT Bournmouth, and Leavesden)
he is I belive still MP for North Warwickshire,
Keep up the pressure!!
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Longton, Lancs, UK
Age: 80
Posts: 1,527
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Re: Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Brian,
Re my 21 Dec post. 'Twas on 13 Dec that I was told that he would sign up - to date he hasn't. Please feel free to drop him a line if you wish.
Re my 21 Dec post. 'Twas on 13 Dec that I was told that he would sign up - to date he hasn't. Please feel free to drop him a line if you wish.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Re: Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
trilander
The BOI was not released until more than a year after the crash; also, even at the Latitude of the accident, it is still daylight at 1930hrs on the 2nd of June.
The BOI was not released until more than a year after the crash; also, even at the Latitude of the accident, it is still daylight at 1930hrs on the 2nd of June.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
trilander
Just for the record, they were flying in good visibility in all directions apart from straight ahead and to the right (they were approaching the Mull at quite an obtuse angle) until they actually entered the mist which was on the Mull land mass itself (caused by the rising moist air in the prevailing strong wind – a common condition at that location at that time of the year) – and of course there was plenty of light at that time at that latitude at that time of the year. The only problem that those local weather conditions would have posed for the crew was the judgment of their distance to go to the Mull shoreline (which they were approaching at quite a speed with the strong tailwind) with the ground detail obscured.
It has been suggested that they may have been distracted by such things as spurious engine warnings and the like or perhaps an actual malfunction in control or performance; given that they were already very close to the rock, if they had known how close they actually were, surely such a quality and experienced crew would not have allowed any such warning or actual performance anomaly to distract them from the immediately essential flying. Surely had they known how close they actually were, their first reaction should have been to give themselves some room to manoeuvre while they addressed any such problem – a slight turn to the left would have achieved this, turning a bit earlier than planned, anything but to carry straight on as they did.
So I say, even the suggested distraction theories require that they were somehow misled as to their proximity to the Mull.
As they had already got so very close to the Mull when they changed waypoints in conditions where they could not have visually judged their distance (or they would surely have started to turn, OK?) their slight turn to the right and continuation suggests that they were under some obligation to get in very close and must have had a reference to something.
One would have thought that some discussion of this obvious aspect would have been warranted but it would appear that it is taboo. And yet every known, or reasonably assumed, characteristic of this flight is consistent with them pressing on to a close in position and being surprised (remember the very last manoeuvre – extreme left yaw pedal and pull up) as though they thought they were further out.
As a point of interest, if they had started their (apparent) cruise climb ½ to 1 mile further out they would have been high enough to get (radio) LOS to the Macrihanish TACAN (or DME, whichever it was that was operational at the time) and to which the TACAN CU was found to have been set (ch 107) which would have allowed them an accurate distance from that navaid to, say, waypoint A. Popping their heads up a bit to check on something, perhaps – maybe salvaging something from a test where conditions did not allow visual confirmation or a touchdown. No other scenario explains both cruise climb and the selection of ch 107.
ZD576 was the first RAF HC2 Chinook to have the ability to have the on board equipment plugged into the nav avionics racks to try out the personnel locator system procured for RAF Chinooks only a year later; the groundside equipment was available at that time in the hands of US SEALS present on the Mull and they were experienced in its use – what an opportunity for a test!; but no such on board equipment was found in the wreckage? - the nav avionics racks had apparently incorrectly stowed connectors (or something like that) consistent with inexpert removal of a piece of equipment (the ground crew who had worked on the racks immediately before the flight was blamed for incorrect procedures, I believe); and of course there was the response from one of the SEALS, who were all over the crash site when UK authorities turned up, when challenged – they were looking for their equipment. All that was required was for the ground equipment (hand held) to be, say, ½ a mile up the hill from where it was supposed to have been (say, the lighthouse helipad) and an obstruction to the peace process was removed.
Yeh, you could count on that local weather at that time of year near the evening ....
Just for the record, they were flying in good visibility in all directions apart from straight ahead and to the right (they were approaching the Mull at quite an obtuse angle) until they actually entered the mist which was on the Mull land mass itself (caused by the rising moist air in the prevailing strong wind – a common condition at that location at that time of the year) – and of course there was plenty of light at that time at that latitude at that time of the year. The only problem that those local weather conditions would have posed for the crew was the judgment of their distance to go to the Mull shoreline (which they were approaching at quite a speed with the strong tailwind) with the ground detail obscured.
It has been suggested that they may have been distracted by such things as spurious engine warnings and the like or perhaps an actual malfunction in control or performance; given that they were already very close to the rock, if they had known how close they actually were, surely such a quality and experienced crew would not have allowed any such warning or actual performance anomaly to distract them from the immediately essential flying. Surely had they known how close they actually were, their first reaction should have been to give themselves some room to manoeuvre while they addressed any such problem – a slight turn to the left would have achieved this, turning a bit earlier than planned, anything but to carry straight on as they did.
So I say, even the suggested distraction theories require that they were somehow misled as to their proximity to the Mull.
As they had already got so very close to the Mull when they changed waypoints in conditions where they could not have visually judged their distance (or they would surely have started to turn, OK?) their slight turn to the right and continuation suggests that they were under some obligation to get in very close and must have had a reference to something.
One would have thought that some discussion of this obvious aspect would have been warranted but it would appear that it is taboo. And yet every known, or reasonably assumed, characteristic of this flight is consistent with them pressing on to a close in position and being surprised (remember the very last manoeuvre – extreme left yaw pedal and pull up) as though they thought they were further out.
As a point of interest, if they had started their (apparent) cruise climb ½ to 1 mile further out they would have been high enough to get (radio) LOS to the Macrihanish TACAN (or DME, whichever it was that was operational at the time) and to which the TACAN CU was found to have been set (ch 107) which would have allowed them an accurate distance from that navaid to, say, waypoint A. Popping their heads up a bit to check on something, perhaps – maybe salvaging something from a test where conditions did not allow visual confirmation or a touchdown. No other scenario explains both cruise climb and the selection of ch 107.
ZD576 was the first RAF HC2 Chinook to have the ability to have the on board equipment plugged into the nav avionics racks to try out the personnel locator system procured for RAF Chinooks only a year later; the groundside equipment was available at that time in the hands of US SEALS present on the Mull and they were experienced in its use – what an opportunity for a test!; but no such on board equipment was found in the wreckage? - the nav avionics racks had apparently incorrectly stowed connectors (or something like that) consistent with inexpert removal of a piece of equipment (the ground crew who had worked on the racks immediately before the flight was blamed for incorrect procedures, I believe); and of course there was the response from one of the SEALS, who were all over the crash site when UK authorities turned up, when challenged – they were looking for their equipment. All that was required was for the ground equipment (hand held) to be, say, ½ a mile up the hill from where it was supposed to have been (say, the lighthouse helipad) and an obstruction to the peace process was removed.
Yeh, you could count on that local weather at that time of year near the evening ....
Walter, whether the crash was caused by distraction, FADEC runaway, your SEALs with their mysterious hand-held DMEs, or little green men from Venus in a UFO, the bottom line is that nobody knows for sure.
Not even Wratten or Day.
Which is why their personal opinions need to be discounted and the unsafe verdict quashed.
Not even Wratten or Day.
Which is why their personal opinions need to be discounted and the unsafe verdict quashed.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Beagle
Perhaps 11 years ago the strategy of saying that nothing can be proved and therefore the verdict was unsafe may have seemed a good option for clearing the pilots’ names.
Don’t you think it is time for a rethink?
The full picture may never be proven and therefore would remain “conspiracy theory” but I believe that the basic cause of the accident can be established by you (collectively) broadening the debate, using the available data fully, and asking questions (eg of the ground crew who worked on the avionics racks immediately before the flight). Surely, the exposure of any kind of extra task that they were given that could have affected their judgment would surely only serve to clear their names.
I can understand the desirability of trying to clear their names without embarrassing the RAF as a body but this may not be possible – surely the injustice of their blame far outweighs any such embarrassment – it is your choice. If the powers that be organised something extraordinary which led to the exposure of these passengers to action of a third party then we need to know – this goes beyond just clearing the pilots’ names.
Your sarcastic comment “… SEALs with their mysterious hand-held DMEs …” shows the narrow mindedness typical of the debate – in this case not acknowledging even the existence of the equipment to which I referred. This equipment was in the RAF inventory in time for Bosnia (about a year after this incident) – the presence of the particular American unit meant that it could have been made available for a demo and so should have been considered in a broad, comprehensive analysis of possible scenarios.
The old adage “you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make it drink” springs to mind.
Perhaps 11 years ago the strategy of saying that nothing can be proved and therefore the verdict was unsafe may have seemed a good option for clearing the pilots’ names.
Don’t you think it is time for a rethink?
The full picture may never be proven and therefore would remain “conspiracy theory” but I believe that the basic cause of the accident can be established by you (collectively) broadening the debate, using the available data fully, and asking questions (eg of the ground crew who worked on the avionics racks immediately before the flight). Surely, the exposure of any kind of extra task that they were given that could have affected their judgment would surely only serve to clear their names.
I can understand the desirability of trying to clear their names without embarrassing the RAF as a body but this may not be possible – surely the injustice of their blame far outweighs any such embarrassment – it is your choice. If the powers that be organised something extraordinary which led to the exposure of these passengers to action of a third party then we need to know – this goes beyond just clearing the pilots’ names.
Your sarcastic comment “… SEALs with their mysterious hand-held DMEs …” shows the narrow mindedness typical of the debate – in this case not acknowledging even the existence of the equipment to which I referred. This equipment was in the RAF inventory in time for Bosnia (about a year after this incident) – the presence of the particular American unit meant that it could have been made available for a demo and so should have been considered in a broad, comprehensive analysis of possible scenarios.
The old adage “you can lead a horse to water but you can’t make it drink” springs to mind.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
walter kennedy,
I see that you have changed your original theory and decided that the crew were ordered to carry out this "trial" of US Navy equipment which is why they were on that route at low level.
Well, there is a very easy way to prove whether you are right or not.
You may not have noticed, but the writing on the photocopied chart left behind at Aldergrove belonged to neither of the 2 Pilots involved in the accident.
The chart was drawn up by the RN Captain of the other detatchment crew because he assumed that crew duty considerations would require the use of both crews to complete the days tasking.
Thus, there is someone who can give a categorical "YES" or "NO" to your theory that the crew were detailed to carry out such a trial.
I see that you have changed your original theory and decided that the crew were ordered to carry out this "trial" of US Navy equipment which is why they were on that route at low level.
Well, there is a very easy way to prove whether you are right or not.
You may not have noticed, but the writing on the photocopied chart left behind at Aldergrove belonged to neither of the 2 Pilots involved in the accident.
The chart was drawn up by the RN Captain of the other detatchment crew because he assumed that crew duty considerations would require the use of both crews to complete the days tasking.
Thus, there is someone who can give a categorical "YES" or "NO" to your theory that the crew were detailed to carry out such a trial.
I'm still of the opinion that a contributory cause was the lack of radar cover at low level in the area.
Macrihanish radar had been withdrawn about 2 months previously; the crew would know this and rather than fly IMC without radar above safety altitude in an area where there might be other traffic doing the same thing, they elected to stay VMC below. Of course the official inquiry would cover up this fact to cover their superiors from any blame (as far as I can recall, RAF Macrihanish still operated, it was just the radar that had been terminated, probably to re-site it elsewhere).
Macrihanish radar had been withdrawn about 2 months previously; the crew would know this and rather than fly IMC without radar above safety altitude in an area where there might be other traffic doing the same thing, they elected to stay VMC below. Of course the official inquiry would cover up this fact to cover their superiors from any blame (as far as I can recall, RAF Macrihanish still operated, it was just the radar that had been terminated, probably to re-site it elsewhere).
Just a numbered other
Chevron,
Medium level was out of the question due to the Mk 2 being allowed to enter service with NO icing clearance.
They had no choice but a low level transit.
Medium level was out of the question due to the Mk 2 being allowed to enter service with NO icing clearance.
They had no choice but a low level transit.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ark Royal
I trust you are not inferring any criticism of the evidence of the RN Officer who was the other Chinook Captain of the Detatchment.
He, after all, was qualified on the Chinook Mk2 - unlike some who contribute to this thread.
That RN Officer did the planning for the fatal sortie because he (quite rightly) assumed that crew duty considerations would require the use of both crews.
Perhaps more attention should be paid to this aspect of the circumstaces surrounding the tragedy, rather than whether the crew were lured to their death by the Special Foces of an allied Nation!!
I trust you are not inferring any criticism of the evidence of the RN Officer who was the other Chinook Captain of the Detatchment.
He, after all, was qualified on the Chinook Mk2 - unlike some who contribute to this thread.
That RN Officer did the planning for the fatal sortie because he (quite rightly) assumed that crew duty considerations would require the use of both crews.
Perhaps more attention should be paid to this aspect of the circumstaces surrounding the tragedy, rather than whether the crew were lured to their death by the Special Foces of an allied Nation!!
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ark Royal,
My apologies; I forgot to remind you, yet again, that the aircraft was operating within its release to service.
The RN Officer, who was the Captain of the other crew (and who had done the planning for the fatal sortie), was content that the sorie was undertaken within the Release to Service parameters available for the Aircraft.
This viewpoint was endorsed by the BOI.
My apologies; I forgot to remind you, yet again, that the aircraft was operating within its release to service.
The RN Officer, who was the Captain of the other crew (and who had done the planning for the fatal sortie), was content that the sorie was undertaken within the Release to Service parameters available for the Aircraft.
This viewpoint was endorsed by the BOI.
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: Nova
Posts: 1,242
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
cazatou
I cannot recall whether it was a chart, or a photocopy of a chart left behind, simply in an attempt to satisfy the outbrief procedure (the DAO was absent at the crucial time)
You are however, of course correct that this was the chart prepared by Lt K.
Nontheless, let us not run away with the idea that this particular document was terribly significant. It may have been, it may not.
The reason being that nobody can tell us if this chart was used by the crew in flight, or whether they had prepared their own, (similar?) version.
Just another example of the limitations of the evidence available. People should have been meticulous in what was adducible to support their postulations!
And incidentally, I am not quite sure you are necessarily correct when you say:
Couldn't it simply have been that Lt K took the tasking request in operations, whilst the other crew were engaged in flying duties, and decided to make basic preparations for WHOEVER was going to fly the actual sortie the next day??
If it's important to you, I can of course check his evidence, given on oath, at the Fatal Accident Inquiry.
I cannot recall whether it was a chart, or a photocopy of a chart left behind, simply in an attempt to satisfy the outbrief procedure (the DAO was absent at the crucial time)
You are however, of course correct that this was the chart prepared by Lt K.
Nontheless, let us not run away with the idea that this particular document was terribly significant. It may have been, it may not.
The reason being that nobody can tell us if this chart was used by the crew in flight, or whether they had prepared their own, (similar?) version.
Just another example of the limitations of the evidence available. People should have been meticulous in what was adducible to support their postulations!
And incidentally, I am not quite sure you are necessarily correct when you say:
That RN Officer did the planning for the fatal sortie because he (quite rightly) assumed that crew duty considerations would require the use of both crews
If it's important to you, I can of course check his evidence, given on oath, at the Fatal Accident Inquiry.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DUTY HOURS
To clear up the crew duty hours question, I was sitting in at the FAI when this aspect was raised. As I recall (from memory now without referring to notes), the aircraft had set out on its journey which, if it had completed the flight to Ft George in one go would indeed have the crew exceeding their duty hours and this would have been known before the flight.
The witness who had been CO (if I recall rightly) of Aldergrove at the time said that exceptions to the limit could be made but no application had been made in this instance and he added that he could not recall ANY previous instance of an extension being asked for on this type of flight (helo from NI to mainland on this route?).
The point is that the limitation in question was one for crews working in an operational area (ie NI) – was it 10 hrs? – because of the perceived increased stress levels – or something like that – and did not apply to the mainland at that time; this left a grey area for a/c leaving the op area for the mainland (as ZD576 was doing), from what I can gather.
This perspective should help in understanding that the duty hours was not a rigid limitation in the appreciation of what happened here.
Of course, they would still have been within their duty hours when in the Macrihanish area and so a brief touch down (for whatever reason) would have cleared the technicality of the duty hours limitation anyway as the remainder of the journey would have not been in an operational area – perhaps they had intended a brief landing and so did not stretch the rules at all by not applying for an extension. From what I can gather, it would have been out of character for these very professional men to not adhere strictly to such rules and so I am inferring that they did indeed intend such a stop (let the passengers have some putting practice, hand back some equipment, whatever …).
Regarding the flight plan, whatever the intentions on the return leg, from talking with locals I believe it was the common practice for helos making this crossing in this area from NI to come in close and turn just south of the lighthouse at low level and continue up the coast – on one occasion, I observed this myself in identical local mist conditions to that dreadful day.
To clear up the crew duty hours question, I was sitting in at the FAI when this aspect was raised. As I recall (from memory now without referring to notes), the aircraft had set out on its journey which, if it had completed the flight to Ft George in one go would indeed have the crew exceeding their duty hours and this would have been known before the flight.
The witness who had been CO (if I recall rightly) of Aldergrove at the time said that exceptions to the limit could be made but no application had been made in this instance and he added that he could not recall ANY previous instance of an extension being asked for on this type of flight (helo from NI to mainland on this route?).
The point is that the limitation in question was one for crews working in an operational area (ie NI) – was it 10 hrs? – because of the perceived increased stress levels – or something like that – and did not apply to the mainland at that time; this left a grey area for a/c leaving the op area for the mainland (as ZD576 was doing), from what I can gather.
This perspective should help in understanding that the duty hours was not a rigid limitation in the appreciation of what happened here.
Of course, they would still have been within their duty hours when in the Macrihanish area and so a brief touch down (for whatever reason) would have cleared the technicality of the duty hours limitation anyway as the remainder of the journey would have not been in an operational area – perhaps they had intended a brief landing and so did not stretch the rules at all by not applying for an extension. From what I can gather, it would have been out of character for these very professional men to not adhere strictly to such rules and so I am inferring that they did indeed intend such a stop (let the passengers have some putting practice, hand back some equipment, whatever …).
Regarding the flight plan, whatever the intentions on the return leg, from talking with locals I believe it was the common practice for helos making this crossing in this area from NI to come in close and turn just south of the lighthouse at low level and continue up the coast – on one occasion, I observed this myself in identical local mist conditions to that dreadful day.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Cazatou
You wrote:
<< Perhaps more attention should be paid to this aspect of the circumstaces surrounding the tragedy, rather than whether the crew were lured to their death by the Special Foces of an allied Nation!!>>
I take it you meant “forces” and not “faeces”?
The team on board were seen as an obstacle to the peace process by the (UK) intelligence community and the US Special Forces have a sordid history of “helping” their “allies” with politically expedient solutions – there is a relevant precedent for this:
Airey Neave was not impressed by the performance in NI of MI5 and MI6;
He planned to replace the heads in a major shake up;
The mercury tilt switch that triggered the bomb which killed him was identifiable;
It was a special that the CIA had just got hold of;
It could only have come from the Americans.
You wrote:
<< Perhaps more attention should be paid to this aspect of the circumstaces surrounding the tragedy, rather than whether the crew were lured to their death by the Special Foces of an allied Nation!!>>
I take it you meant “forces” and not “faeces”?
The team on board were seen as an obstacle to the peace process by the (UK) intelligence community and the US Special Forces have a sordid history of “helping” their “allies” with politically expedient solutions – there is a relevant precedent for this:
Airey Neave was not impressed by the performance in NI of MI5 and MI6;
He planned to replace the heads in a major shake up;
The mercury tilt switch that triggered the bomb which killed him was identifiable;
It was a special that the CIA had just got hold of;
It could only have come from the Americans.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Chevvron
You wrote
<< Macrihanish radar had been withdrawn about 2 months previously … (as far as I can recall, RAF Macrihanish still operated, it was just the radar that had been terminated, probably to re-site it elsewhere).>>
Have you read my previous postings which referred to a radar recording at Prestwick?
An article by a reputable journalist implied that the a/c was observed sufficiently close to the Mull to conclude that the last part of its flight was very much straight in.
The interesting thing is that the very existence of this recording has been denied by many on this thread and yet the journalist is adamant that his contact was in a position to know.
It is typical of the lack of positive feedback on this thread that no one mentioned that there had been a radar at Macrihanish – all the learned contributors mentioning only major sites nowhere near as being the only radars in the area.
One would have thought that, with the sometimes intense air activity in the area (eg when exercises held) that there would be low level coverage.
You wrote
<< Macrihanish radar had been withdrawn about 2 months previously … (as far as I can recall, RAF Macrihanish still operated, it was just the radar that had been terminated, probably to re-site it elsewhere).>>
Have you read my previous postings which referred to a radar recording at Prestwick?
An article by a reputable journalist implied that the a/c was observed sufficiently close to the Mull to conclude that the last part of its flight was very much straight in.
The interesting thing is that the very existence of this recording has been denied by many on this thread and yet the journalist is adamant that his contact was in a position to know.
It is typical of the lack of positive feedback on this thread that no one mentioned that there had been a radar at Macrihanish – all the learned contributors mentioning only major sites nowhere near as being the only radars in the area.
One would have thought that, with the sometimes intense air activity in the area (eg when exercises held) that there would be low level coverage.
Join Date: Jul 2005
Location: northside
Posts: 472
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Medium level was out of the question due to the Mk 2 being allowed to enter service with NO icing clearance.
They had no choice but a low level transit.
They had no choice but a low level transit.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
southside
Please do not complicate the debate by raising logical and practical points.
You are, of course, quite correct. The aspect that Ark Royal has consistantly refused to acknowledge is that the return flight was planned at medium level. In addition, the BOI confirmed that a climb to Safety Altitude at the Mull could have been made within the Icing Clearance parameters.
Walter Kennedy
Do I understand that you seriously believe that the late Airey Neave was killed by the CIA?
You are, I trust, aware that he worked closely with the CIA's predecessor (OSS) during WW2 in his role in coordinating and assisting escaped POW's to return safely to UK. A role that he was uniquely qualified for after his escape from Colditz.
PS Is there such an animal as "A reputable journalist"?
Please do not complicate the debate by raising logical and practical points.
You are, of course, quite correct. The aspect that Ark Royal has consistantly refused to acknowledge is that the return flight was planned at medium level. In addition, the BOI confirmed that a climb to Safety Altitude at the Mull could have been made within the Icing Clearance parameters.
Walter Kennedy
Do I understand that you seriously believe that the late Airey Neave was killed by the CIA?
You are, I trust, aware that he worked closely with the CIA's predecessor (OSS) during WW2 in his role in coordinating and assisting escaped POW's to return safely to UK. A role that he was uniquely qualified for after his escape from Colditz.
PS Is there such an animal as "A reputable journalist"?
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Hampshire
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
To prevent another trip round the roundabout the Mk 2 icing clearance was discussed in pages 79 - 81 of this thread (and probably earlier). The aircraft entered service with the same clearance that the Puma (an aircraft close to my heart) operates with today; although inferior to the Mk1 it replaced, it was summer and trials to provide a clearance were ongoing at BD.