Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[Brian Dixon]

d246,
It wouldn't be negligence (on the driver's part) if they were forced to drive an unroadworthy vehicle.

There was no evidence of anything, because there was no cockpit voice recorder or accident data recorder fitted. Therefore, you cannot satisfy the required burden of proof. Possibility, probability and speculation (as acknowledged by Mr Wratten) all fall below that which is needed to find deceased pilots guilty of negligence.

I'm not grasping at straws either. Simply asking why the Reviewing Officers failed to stick to the rules in place at the time of the accident.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Pulse1.
Are you saying that at waypoint change the crew could not see that the hills ahead, towards which they were heading, were covered in cloud (as the lighthouse keeper and several others testified)? JP

[John Purdey]

Chinook

ArkRoyal
I seem to recall that Holbrook saw a discolouration in the mist that he took to be the lighthouse, rather than that he clearly saw that feature; am I right? jp

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Purdey,
I'm sure Pulse1 can take care of himself, but you appear to have missed the point of his comment. His question is this: How can Mr Wratten, you, me or anyone else for that matter say that you know, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, what the two pilots could see from their vantage point in the cockpit?

The only person looking at the Mull from the same direction as the pilots was the yachtsman, Mr Holbrook. He has testified that he could make out the water breaking on the coastline and also see the white wall surrounding the lighthouse.

I have seen a copy of the holidaymaker's video, taken at the Mull lighthouse only a few minutes prior to the accident. You can clearly see the lighthouse, down to the coast and out over the water.

Make of all that, what you will, but unless you can tell me exactly what the pilots were looking out at, and provide evidence, your argument is weakened.

Kind regards, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

Here's the witness testimony given by Mr Holbrook to the House of Lords' select Committee on 16 October 2001:

"When I saw the Chinook at approximately 6 pm the visibility back toward the cliffs was, again I estimated, about one mile but the visibility towards the Antrim coast and Rathlin was very much better, between three and five miles.

I understand the issue of visibility towards the Mull to be crucial. I have been asked before "Could you distinguish the physical features of the cliffs on the Mull?" To which I answered "No". If, however, I had been asked "Could you distinguish the physical features of the lighthouse?" My answer would have been also "No", but again if I had been asked "Could you distinguish the location of the lighthouse compound?", my answer would have been "Yes". I could not distinguish the lighthouse itself but the building complex and the white fence lower down could be distinguished as a contrasting colour change against the grey/green/brown of the land mass.

I want to make the point, My Lord Chairman, that poor visibility was local to the Mull and even further localised to different altitudes on the Mull. The low cloud, and I really would not call it fog, clung to the contours of the high ground so that the location of the Mull massif itself was in no doubt whatsoever from sea level If I had been asked to speculate on whether the aircraft, which undoubtedly to my personal observation was in an area of better visibility, at the time I saw it could determine without ambiguity where the Mull and its hills were I would answer without any doubt Yes that the low cloud following the contours of the land faithfully would give its location without ambiguity.

Furthermore, if I had been asked to speculate if the crew could see from their vantage point the cliffs, beach and lower perimerter walls of the lighthouse complex I would again answer Yes."

Worth remembering that Mr Holbrook was actually in the vicinity. The BoI, Reviewing Officers, you, nor I, were.

I hope this helps.
Regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[d246]

They were not 'forced' to fly an 'un roadworthy' vehicle. The chances of the aircraft suffering some strange malfunction, that cannot be determined in any investigation, at the critical moment when they were putting themselves in a dangerous situation is infinitesimal. They shouldn’t have been in that position at that speed, end of argument. The fact that they did caused the crash. Argue all you like about the level of culpability and how they should be judged, the simple fact is that they were responsible for the safe conduct of the flight and the safety of all on board. In the context of SH heli ops these were not unusual or difficult conditions, they had the option of descending to remain vmc, slowing down, turning away to follow the shoreline or beach or even land the thing. We have all done it, there are no excuses.

[Sven Sixtoo]

How many times does it have to be said?

You, and I, and everybody else, don't know.
We can apply experience, infer, reason, guess, assume, pontificate, extrapolate . . .
but we don't know.

And if we don't know we cannot prove beyond any doubt whatsoever.

Why is this such a difficult concept?

Sven

[pulse1]

d246

They shouldn’t have been in that position at that speed

What position exactly?

John Purdey

Like you, I do not know what the two pilots could see. I suppose that at least some parts of the hills were obscured by mist or cloud but how much, we don't know, do we?

I do find it difficult to understand how you can assume that a single point observation by the lighthouse keeper can be extrapolated to include the whole area. Brian's video would appear to show how wrong that might be.

[Tandemrotor]

Brian, well done.

I have little doubt there will be no response WHATSOEVER from those contributors to this thread, who are determined in their view, that the crew FLUNG themselves in weather unsuitable for VFR, at the land mass!

As you have pointed out, 'best evidence' does not support their 'OPINION'

We do not need to rehearse the relevance of 'opinion' when assessing an issue on the required standard of 'absolutely no doubt WHATSOEVER', nor indeed on the very much lower standard of proof of 'balance of probability' as used by Sheriff Sir Steven Young in the FAI of 1995, which effectively (and in my OPINION, correctly) decided that it was not possible, on the evidence available, to criticise - never mind blame! - the pilots.

I well remember the day of Mr Holbrook's evidence at that inquiry, and the impact his evidence had on those representing the MOD.

I WAS THERE!!!!

Forgive me, if I MUCH prefer the verdict of an INDEPENDENT inquiry at which ALL PARTIES are represented, to a management 'stitch up' by an organisation with a vested interest in the outcome, in which those most heavily criticised received 'NO REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER!'

Do we REALLY need to produce the long list of other INDEPENDENT inquiries which have resulted in the SAME verdict as the FAI????

This injustice MUST NOT STAND!

[d246]

So the aircraft 'flung itself' into this cloud covered rock. Makes one wonder why put pilots in it.

[pulse1]

d246,

I don't want to be rude, but do you have some kind of problem reading?

Tandemrotor did not say "flung itself". He said

.......that the crew FLUNG themselves in weather unsuitable for VFR

.

You seem to be more interested in trying to score silly points than justifying your opinions. PLEASE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Brian. A very helpful quote; thanks. Holbrook did not 'clearly see the lighthouse' but could make out its location etc. This is the point made in the 'Chinook Crash' book, ie that the crew were actually looking at the location of the fog station which lies about a quarter of a mile to the right, and as we know they crashed about that distance laterally from the lighthouse. I'm surprised that the BoI did not (as far as I recall because I do not have it in front of me) stress this point.
With all good wishes JP

[walter kennedy]

Brian
You wrote:
<<What we don't know, with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, are the following:
- What time was the waypoint change made?
- How far from landmass was the waypoint change made?
- Why a waypoint change was made, yet an apparent change of direction was not made.
- What the intention of the pilots was (ah for the luxury of a cockpit voice recorder!).
- Whether something untoward happened with an aircraft (and fleet), notorious for problems (ah for the luxury of an accident data recorder!).>>
But we can make make reasonable judgments on these points:
<<- What time was the waypoint change made?
- How far from landmass was the waypoint change made?>>
I recommend to all interested parties that they download a copy of the Boeing report by Mitchel – “Analysis of Available Data” – this is not the simulation but a reconstruction that you can all follow and is a good framework for you to start from; then plot the relevant positions and headings on an OS map of the Mull – you will then probably be surprised at the oblique angle of approach (not at all straight in) and just how close in waypoint A was – that’s just for starters.

<<- Why a waypoint change was made, yet an apparent change of direction was not made.>>
There was a change in direction – a small correction TO THE RIGHT – this should be of concern to all, happening so close to waypoint change when one could assume that they had no control problems or they would surely not have been bothering with the next route waypoint – not forgotten about – I believe it was indicative of them carrying on intentionally towards a specific point (waypoint A defined by another system perhaps) – don’t forget that they would not have regarded waypoint A defined by the SuperTANS to be more accurate than ½ a mile or so after a sea crossing).

<<- What the intention of the pilots was (ah for the luxury of a cockpit voice recorder!).>>
Well apart from constraints like icing, the conditions for continuing up the coast VFR would have suggested that that was the obvious intended route which, as should have been made very clear in all proceedings, was the usual route for mil helos doing that passage from NI. While I was observing a helo do a close in turn (at speed) in identical weather conditions as the day of the crash, a witness (who was in a position to know) pointed out the feature where it crossed the shoreline to begin the turn and said “ … they do that all the time …”.

<<- Whether something untoward happened with an aircraft (and fleet), notorious for problems (ah for the luxury of an accident data recorder!).>>
A very small window of opportunity, I suggest.

Thank you for posting Mr Holbrook’s description - I recognize the conditions described to be typical in that locale at that time of day at that time of year with the prevailing wind blowing – I have spent quite some time just off the coast of NW Scotland doing sea trials and know those conditions well – you could predict them the day before from a forecast - these conditions should have been recognized by enough people such that no inquiry should have been in any way confused about the local weather conditions – the strong wind would not have allowed sporadic patches of fog offshore (so clear at sea) but would generate mist as it rose on the land (but not before). Mr Holbrook described it well in that some features could be seen but their features were indistinct – that the Mull could be seen from a long way off effectively but with no clear detail easy to give a wide berth but very difficult to visually judge distance accurately if wanting to turn close in for whatever reason. The problem of judging range visually in these conditions is a pivotal point and I would like to give an actual personal experience to better describe the problem:
I was approaching a familiar wreck dive site on the SW of the Isle of Wight (IoW); it was close in under the cliffs; I could see the shoreline from a long way off but the landmass was shrouded in low cloud (same principal as on the Mull) and was approaching the position using Decca as a reference, the idea being to stop at the Decca position and loiter until a break in the cloud/mist allowed the transits to be visible (necessary for marking this wreck accurately); bearing in mind that I could see the landmass for miles and I could see the shoreline for the entire approach, one would not expect to make a significant error in visual judgment in getting to within a few hundred metres of that shoreline; in that immediate locale, the Decca was not so good as in open sea (hence the need for transits to accurately mark that wreck) and in any case lagged by its update rate; at 21kts I nearly came to grief on the rocky shoreline – at 50kts I would have been stuffed, let alone 175kts (the probable ground speed of ZD576 as it crossed the shoreline on the Mull). The point is that I was relying upon an aid to get me close enough in to then rely on other means of conducting myself – at any time on that approach my visual judgment could have cut in, but on that occasion it was almost too late. You know the conditions for judgment are difficult but you use an aid to get you most of the way to a point which you believe would still be safely clear of the danger – this method you would use to take a safe course well clear of such a danger in route navigation. The problem that day on the IoW was that I wanted to get to a specific point close in to the hazard – the performance of the Decca that day would have been on a par with that which could be expected from SuperTANS after a sea crossing – using either to define a safe turning point should have called for a conservative/prudent approach – I relied upon visual judgment for the last bit at 21kts and nearly came unstuck – ZD576 should have been more conservative at their speed and if they had nothing else to go on other than SuperTANS should have started their turn BEFORE waypoint A (look at your chart/map for how close in waypoint A was) - at the time of waypoint change - AND THEREFORE BEFORE TECH PROBLEMS WITH CONTROLS OR INDICATORS COULD HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE.
They HAD to be using another reference to shave their safety margin – and in those conditions, something they trusted more than the SuperTANS - BUT what?
Assuming they had thought that they we ½ - 1 mile further out, their cruise climb would have had them high enough to get Mac TACAN/DME (appropriate ch 107 was found set on their TACAN CU) - do a transaction on your OS map – you could also notice that the aerodrome lay approximately in line ahead, a point Mr Mitchel of Boeing makes in that report that I have suggested you read.
But this would have been of no use to them on their approach to that point as previously they would have been below the altitude to get LOS to that navaid.
So what could they have been referring to? – something that overrode their senses such that they thought they were ½ - 1 mile further out?
If you look at your chart/OS map with the course plotted, the oblique angle of approach to the coast makes it a nonsense that confusion with the fog signal station (a little along the coast) could have made a significant difference to their path – ie an insignificant azimuth error to a visual reference displaced laterally only slightly from the lighthouse at their approach angle would not account for this error in range judgment – indeed, rather than saying that the fog station was Ό of a mile to the right (if they were approaching the shoreline directly) it should be said that the fog station was Ό of a mile closer than the lighthouse at their (oblique) approach heading and so if mistakenly taken for the lighthouse would have been an error on the side of safety.
(Mr Purdey pls take note.)

While an error in range judgment appears the significant parameter here, the small steer to the right at waypoint change should not be forgotten – there is only one candidate for giving a range and bearing in that area that helo crews would trust and that is a UHF Personnel Locator System; suitable ground equipment was in abundance on the Mull that day (thanks to US SEAL section who had the PRC112 handsets issued down to a man); there was the opportunity to plug in the on board equipment (ARS6) in the nav racks when techs did an informal job on them before t/o at Aldergrove – and this came to light because of anomalies in those racks (stowage of unused connectors, etc?) found in the wreckage (I suggest evidence of the inexpert or hurried removal of the ARS6 module); the cherry on top is the admission by one of the SEALS, when challenged as to what they were doing all over the crash site, that they were looking for their equipment (so nice of them to lend it, eh? – the special relationship that requires copious amounts of preparation H).

You don’t have to accept the whole scenario – but following it in detail gives a framework to hang the known parameters on – at least some of the basic issues should be able to be agreed so that other scenarios have something to be based upon – there should be no doubt at this stage what the local weather conditions were, whether they were in breach of flying regs, what accuracy the SuperTANS had, whether they were going to turn or go over, etc, etc,.

[FJJP]

We're just running around in circles here, wasting bandwidth.

It really is tedious to watch - I visit this thread to check for the latest news, not to look at all the old arguments again.

I suggest recent posters should read the original topic from start to finish - all the arguments have already been made and old ground is being raked over.

[cazatou]

Brian

With regard to Mr Holbrook; he came forward after the accident and volunteered information as to what he had seen whilst sailing off the Mull of Kintyre.

Interviewed by the BOI he gave evidence under oath as to what he had seen. This evidence (under oath) gave rise to the BOI statement that the Chinook was seen heading towards the Mull at high speed just under the cloudbase.

At the FAI he amended his evidence (under oath) and stated that he did not now consider the speed to be as high as he had previously stated and that he had amended his viewpoint after watching RN Sea Kings approach to land at Prestwick.

It now appears thet he has amended his evidence yet again to say that he was never asked what he had observed -(see para 2)

[Tandemrotor]

Oh dear

As FJJP so rightly states, we have, of course been round this particular block before. You do however raise an intesesting point, that I at least had not previously noted.

There is indeed a paragraph in the BOI which states:

"The aircraft was sighted by a yachtsman approximately 2-3 nm from the Mull of Kintyre, flying at high speed in a level attitude towards the Mull."

This can only have come from a question, and response, in his evidence to the BOI, which was:

Q2. How does the height and speed of the helicopter you saw on 2 Jun 94 compare with the Sea Kings you have seen in the past?

A2. I have seen Sea Kings in 2 attitudes firstly in level flight and secondly in the hover, I would comment that in terms of speed the aircraft I saw on 2 Jun 94 was somewhat faster than Sea Kings in level flight and at a height higher than Sea Kings when they are hovering but comparable with Sea Kings in level flight.

No other information regarding aircraft speed was either sought by the BOI, nor given by the yachtsman!

You will of course note that while the term "high speed" in the BOI is attributed to the yachtsmans evidence, no such term is present in that evidence!

We now turn to his evidence at the FAI when, standing in the dock, he stated:

"Again, with the proviso that I only saw this aircraft for a few seconds and I am not an expert in these matters but I would have estimated it's speed to be something between 60 and 80 knots if I had to put a figure on it.

Cross examined: "I take it you accept that that is just, as you have said very fairly, your estimate of it?" -

"Sure, but it was not moving any more rapidly......This is the first time I had seen a twin-rotor blade helicopter and it wasn't moving at an undue speed relative to a Sea King which would have been engaged in looking at the sea surface for example."

Later in his evidence he states:

Cross examined "Your estimate of the speed of this helicopter, how was that done?"

"I was asked how was that done? Probably the only reference I have to that is helicopter activity off Troon. The movement from moving to being stationary.

Cross examined "So you had seen other helicopters flying around?"

"I know what 30 knots looks like in a boat so I would have been able to multiply that up and that is it. That is the limit of my understanding of speed.

Cross examined: "So you think it might have been between two or three times faster".....? -

"Yes, it was not going at a helluva speed. It wasn't moving at a speed that would have caused me to remark on it in any way (at) all in terms of moving very rapidly from A to B and that is what caused me to think maybe it was looking, that there was some sort of event and it was looking for somebody."

So cazatou, and in summary, you will see:

1) Nothing in the yachtsman's evidence to the FAI either contradicted, or even "amended" (correct error in, make minor alteration in) his original evidence to the BOI. He simply had more opportunity to clarify.

2) The BOI's only question regarding aircraft speed, was too limited to illicit the accurate information that may otherwise have been available. And there was no follow up question. It was a 'bad' question.

3) It would appear the BOI were incorrect to cite the yachtsman's testimony, as evidence of the aircraft's 'high speed'. He simply NEVER said that!

As you will know, and now it has been demonstrated he was a reliable witness, he also had some very interesting things to say about the weather.

Would you like to debate that next?

BTW

Could you please point me in the direction of the testimony that leads you to suggest he does "not now consider the speed to be as high as he had previously stated and that he had amended his viewpoint after watching RN Sea Kings approach to land at Prestwick."

I can't seem to find it.

[John Purdey]

Chinook

Tandemrotor. Will someone please tell us why the exact speed of the Chinook is so relevant? JP

[antenna]

witnesses

Tandemrotor. I'm obliged. Too much time and effort going round in circles with so much revisited testimony. To those who have met Mr Holbrook it is hard to fnd a more precise man. He answered the questions he was asked. The MoD attempted to spin his comments as inconsistent. Again and again the BoI has been shown wanting in terms of the line of questioning.

See responses passim, specifically John Blakeley's excellent report on the (lack of) engineering aspects of the investigation.

To support Brian and his oft-repeated view - we have to get back to basics. Show us the proof the boys were grossly negligent or expunge the finding from their records.
It really is that simple.

[Tandemrotor]

JP

The speed of the aircraft, as it approached the Mull, is of little interest to me at all, except in 2 respects:

1) In each of their contributions, Day and Wratten both referred to the aircraft approaching the Mull at high speed. This statement is not based in 'fact'. Indeed 'best evidence' suggests it is wrong.

This is far from the 'meticulous' approach their subsequent verdict required, and probably reflects their level of understanding of other evidence.

2) When contributors like cazatou seek to imply that evidence which disagrees with their version of events, has been adduced from an 'unreliable' witness, prone to changing his recollections, it is important he/she is corrected.

Don't you agree?

Indeed, if any contributors voice opinions which are not supported by the 'factual evidence', it is important that they are reminded of the 'factual evidence', lest these opinions themselves become accepted as fact!

The MOD, should of course, be the first people reminded of this!

Antenna:

I too am obliged m'lord. Now remove that doily from your head!

Mr Holbrook was indeed a very precise man, perhaps reflected in the fact he was (I recall) an 'instrument maker' by trade.

How is 'Zanzibar'

[polyglory]

Nice to see the Scotsman is keeping it in the news.

http://heritage.scotsman.com/people.cfm?id=378032006