Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Aircrew Forums > Military Aviation
Reload this Page >

Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

Military Aviation A forum for the professionals who fly military hardware. Also for the backroom boys and girls who support the flying and maintain the equipment, and without whom nothing would ever leave the ground. All armies, navies and air forces of the world equally welcome here.

Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

Old 8th Nov 2004, 12:38
  #1281 (permalink)  
Just a numbered other
 
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Earth
Age: 72
Posts: 1,169
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
fish

Carlton,

I think (hope!) that you sre being too cynical.

Both Rifkin and Major have had the grace to admit that they made a mistake back in 1994, in taking their briefings from MOD with too much trust.
Arkroyal is offline  
Old 10th Nov 2004, 18:51
  #1282 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Bedfordshire
Posts: 243
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Brian

Excellent work! Staggering to get a Day One promise too, though I admit to being just a touche cynical!
meadowbank is offline  
Old 11th Nov 2004, 20:46
  #1283 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Surrey
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
For what it's worth:

I met Gerald Howarth in 2000 when he came to have a look around the company I worked for "as a local MP keen to show his support for local business". As soon as someone mentioned that I used to be "on Chinooks" he ignored the bosses and spent half an hour quizzing me on my view of the Mull crash.

Mr Howarth would seem to be well versed in the case and I'm sure wouldn't sweep it under the table as other people may think.
GREXLM is offline  
Old 11th Nov 2004, 22:23
  #1284 (permalink)  
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
GREXLM,
that's very reassuring, thank you.

Kind regards,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Brian Dixon is offline  
Old 12th Nov 2004, 02:23
  #1285 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: London
Posts: 507
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
I was a colleague of Gerald Howarth when he worked in the City 20 or more years ago. In those days he was more Thatcherite than Mrs Thatcher herself. I am not convinced he will help this cause over and above whatever political benefit it will bring, as opposed to moral or human benefit, but I will say he was passionate about aviation and extremely knowledgeable and informed about the defence sector.
Golf Charlie Charlie is offline  
Old 17th Nov 2004, 13:57
  #1286 (permalink)  
invertron
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Angry Confused?

I have read, re-read and read again just about every thread on this topic and the one thing that still confuses is me is that every one continues to blame the aircraft. The reason the aircraft crashed was that it was being flown IMC below the safety altitude...WHY ? What was it doing in IMC below the safety altitude?
 
Old 17th Nov 2004, 15:36
  #1287 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: May 1999
Location: Quite near 'An aerodrome somewhere in England'
Posts: 26,783
Received 257 Likes on 103 Posts
Can you prove that beyond any doubt whatsoever?

No.

Neither could Day or Wratten.
BEagle is offline  
Old 17th Nov 2004, 16:04
  #1288 (permalink)  
invertron
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Of course

So, if the aircraft wasnt in IMC and below safety altitude...it was VMC and above safety altitude... was it...?
 
Old 17th Nov 2004, 18:36
  #1289 (permalink)  
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Invertron,
welcome to this particular thread.

On the ones that I contribute to, I always say that I don't know what happened - not that the aircraft was to blame. It may have been, but I don't know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

Without the benefit of a cockpit voice recorder or an accident data recorder, we will never know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever what took place in the cockpit either.

Both the Reviewing Officers reached their decision based upon information available to them at that time (ie the first Boeing simulation, a review of their own flight plan and an admitted degree of speculation, to name a few), but neither can say what happened with absolutely no doubt whatsoever - and that is the level of proof required to find deceased aircrew negligent.

Anything less is unacceptable. Wouldn't you agree?

If you re-posted your views with "It was in IMC below the safety altitude because [place your known, evidenced fact here]", I would say that that particular argument has a point. Unfortunately, no-one can fill the bit in brackets in, so that particular argument is, in my humble opinion, a non-starter.

I'm not being flippant, but that is the whole point of the campaign.

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Brian Dixon is offline  
Old 17th Nov 2004, 23:30
  #1290 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
invertron
If you read the thread far enough back, I think that you will find the visual versus instrument argument well covered – one of the points that I made was that the details of the local weather conditions and the aircrafts flight intentions were never clarified as a starting point – indeed with hindsight, it would seem like there was a conscious effort by many to keep these basics confused.
As I understand it, the conditions at low level over the sea were very good with the mist localized on the landmass ahead; taking the visibility ahead as the worst case (clear in all other directions and with the sea below in clear view) it was acceptable for a helicopter to be VFR there as close in as, say, waypoint A because a helicopter can always slow down (a point that experienced pilots on this thread could have made years ago but for some reason did not). Of course, the speed of the aircraft would be at the discretion of the pilot.

When I first pointed out this concession to helicopters under these conditions I made the mistake of describing it as part of Special VFR – I was thoroughly dumped upon for this technicality by many who suddenly appeared knowledgeable about Special VFR etc – the point is the concession is valid and appropriate to this flight.

If you want a really brief summary of what the aircraft was doing, I suggest not the simulation but the Boeing Analysis of Available Data (by Mitchell – available on the web). My personal view is that they were approaching the shoreline at low level intending to turn up that shoreline (continuing below the cloudbase in comfortable visual conditions) but simply misjudged the start of their turn – how they were judging their distance off that mist covered landmass for that start is a matter for debate. If they were not experiencing control difficulties and it was just a judgment issue then I would say that they were not relying upon visual recognition of a feature as they were heading right of the lighthouse (inland); if they could see the lighthouse, they would have gone to it or to the left of it, surely?; further, their speed was high for relying on picking up such a specific visual reference so close in. The squawk code set (7760) could offer a clue (highly contentious, as explained below under “NOTES”!) as it could have indicated that they were working off a ground transponder (located at the lighthouse helipad, perhaps) for the range to the start off that turn (very accurate normally – DME thing) – and here’s the rub: if they were, it would have had to have been giving a false reading.
Now, DME systems normally are accurate if they are working otherwise you don’t get a signal – you don’t get a wrong reading, you get a good one or nothing – but they are very easy to mess with.
If someone tampered with one, they would have to have Motive, Means, and Opportunity.
America was brokering a peace initiative needing some compromise with the IRA while this team (on ZD576) believed new military initiatives would weaken the IRA bargaining position – the team could have been seen as an obstacle to this peace process by the powers that be in the UK who saw such a process as a/the way forward.
US Navy SEALS were stationed at Macrihanish at the time (and were amongst the first at the crash scene) – they are equipped with personal communication sets that can operate in DME transponder mode exactly as portable/transportable DMEs used by many NATO countries; HC2s (as was ZD576) were fitted with equivalent avionics to CH47-Ds in respect of communicating with such ground side equipment (an RAF Chinook picked up a SAS team in Iraq recently using this system – it is a NATO standard). Despite adamant protests by contributors to this thread that no such systems are used for local navigation, radio hams (if that is the correct description) state in their literature that temporary beacons are often used, particularly by military helicopters (there are highly technical amateurs out there with very sophisticated equipment whose hobby it is to monitor military aircraft and to identify beacons – amazing, eh?). And doesn’t common sense tell you how handy such would be on that regular crossing in those all too common, indeed prevailing, conditions?

If that seems far fetched, look at the follow up: if the powers that be had decided to end the operations of that team in such a manner it would not have been much good if only part of the team had been on board (of course they WERE all on board this one aircraft) or if their precious information could have been used by another such team – well the latter point was taken care of by using the US personnel for several days to help collect the confidential documents – with the known sympathies towards the IRA of some elements of the US establishment, they could then suddenly utter a cry and say “What have we done? – we must assume all the plans and assets have been compromised – we have no choice but to go along with the American brokered truce and peace process!”.
Britain’s war on terror was lost that day.

NOTES
7760 etc – while this is in the range of codes for several countries meaning use of a ground transponder, I have no access to UK military codes and no one on this thread has been forthcoming. Further, at an inquiry this code (7760) was described as “meaningless” and that the settings were disturbed in the crash or the pilots were halfway through changing them (I have argued my view in detail in past postings that these scenarios were unlikely). However, radar recordings showing the squawk code did exist (even someone on this thread admitted seeing it but commented that it could not have been significant or he would have noted it) – one would have thought that the squawk code set and as seen on the radar earlier in the flight should have been stated in the inquiries as a starting point especially as the issue was brought up several times in direct questions. I am endeavoring to get a witness to clarify this at the moment but it is hard from here – someone on this thread could have made this easy. If it turns out that 7760 was set prior to the last part of the flight, then at the very least the inquiries were misled and this alone should be grounds for a fresh look at the crash.
walter kennedy is offline  
Old 18th Nov 2004, 07:55
  #1291 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: New Zealand
Posts: 254
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Having followed this discussion almost since its inception, the following appears to contain a major discrepancy between what is good for an RAF BOI, and the recent findings of an Army Board investigating the unfortunate deaths of six Royal Military Police soldiers, murdered by a mob in Iraq.

The account is on-line at:-

Families call for inquest into Redcap deaths.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main...ixnewstop.html

Quotes published state:-
“But the board, led by Col Mike Hickson, found that it "could not categorically state" that more ammunition or better communications would have saved the Redcaps' lives.
Mr Hoon said in a written statement to the House of Commons that the board had "made a rigorous, objective and exhaustive" inquiry. The families, who spent more than an hour at the Ministry of Defence meeting Mr Hoon and hearing the inquiry results described his attitude as "generous".
Mike Aston, Mrs Aston's husband, said it was "a very thorough report, a very honest report". He said: "It does point a lot of criticism at the Army from which they admit they have lessons to learn and I for one am very grateful."

Queen's Regulations disbar boards from finding blame , but Sgt Hamilton-Jewell's brother, Tony, said: "Nobody has apportioned blame because it was the system that let these lads down."”

Is it possible that some ‘brass’ may have been found wanting in this instance, and it was simply convenient to find nobody was to blame, or is this too cynical?
HectorusRex is offline  
Old 18th Nov 2004, 11:14
  #1292 (permalink)  
invertron
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
IMC ???

I fully and absolutely concur your feelings with regards to blame. The aircrew CANNOT be negligent unless you are absolutely certain what happened and as a Curent and operational member of Her Majesty's finest aviators I would back those guys up till the end....

However, Why did they fly into the hillside?
Did they see the hill side? Why didnt they see it? If they were VMC then they would have clearly seen the ground and been able to avoid it. If they were not VMC then they MUST (r) MUST climb to above the safety altitude.

Notwithstanding that, it seems certain that the guys were doing what they were trained to do and if that is the case then the training is incorrect and therefore they CANNOT be negligent...the system is.
 
Old 18th Nov 2004, 14:56
  #1293 (permalink)  
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Invertron,
thank you for your response, and to emphasise the point, may I answer your questions:

Why did they fly into the hillside? - No-one knows with absolute certainty.

Did they see the hillside? - No one knows with absolute certainty (although why else make the waypoint change?).

Why didn't they see it? - No one knows if they did or didn't (with absolute certainty).

If they were VMC they would have been able to avoid the ground - so why didn't they then? (Unanswerable question)

If they were not VMC they should have climbed above the safety altitude - so why didn't they then? (Again, an unanswerable question).

As you correctly point out, it may well have been that the training was insufficient. It may have been that the pilots were, in fact, negligent. It may be that an helicopter with a dubious service history should not have been flying in the first place.

There are just too many unknowns or possibles surrounding this tragedy to allow the slur of negligence to stand against two deceased pilots, according to the RAF's own rules in place at the time.

I'm grateful for your opinion that the negligence slur cannot be justified. May I respectfully ask that you bring this injustice to the attention of your flying colleagues, in the hope that those of you currently perforiming the role, see how two of your former colleagues are being treated.

My best to you, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Last edited by Brian Dixon; 18th Nov 2004 at 15:45.
Brian Dixon is offline  
Old 18th Nov 2004, 17:33
  #1294 (permalink)  
John Purdey
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
Invertron.
Please see the recent book 'Chinook Crash', which explains why the crew did not realise that they were so far to the right of their intended track, and thus why they were faced with terrain that was about 1000 feet higher than they were expecting.
With all good wishes, as always, to all contributers.
 
Old 18th Nov 2004, 18:18
  #1295 (permalink)  
A really irritating PPRuNer
Thread Starter
 
Join Date: Jun 2000
Location: Just popping my head back up above the parapet
Posts: 903
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Hi Mr Purdey,
Hope you are well.

You forgot to mention that the book is based on speculation and supposition, and therefore doesn't offer any factual evidence to support the author's conclusion, let alone the negligence verdict.

It may, of course, be what actually happened. But we will never know with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, will we?

My best, as always.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Last edited by Brian Dixon; 18th Nov 2004 at 18:28.
Brian Dixon is offline  
Old 18th Nov 2004, 20:14
  #1296 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
invertron
They could see the landmass (it was visible from the NI coast at he time) but it was covered in localized (indeed ground hugging) mist which obscured ground detail – this would have affected their ability to judge their distance off visually to any degree of accuracy. Further, the cloud base met the hills and so perspective could not have been had by watching the top – and their very much “end on” approach did not give any laterally displaced topographical features for perspective either. These conditions are very common at the Mull owing to the prevailing wind pushing moist air up the slope.
However, this said, the rules for helicopters still allowed them to be visual at their level in these conditions (clear all around except for ahead with the sea below clearly visible) provided there was clear air ahead enough for them to have slowed down if need be so as to remain in clear air. Although waypoint A was very close in, had they started their turn at the geographical location of waypoint A they would have turned in the clear and not have broken any rules. However, this crew in particular had no confidence in the accuracy of the SuperTans system as fitted in HC2s (Doppler is combined with GPS unlike the earlier system as fitted to MK1 Chinooks, which can result in degraded performance over water) and therefore continuing past waypoint A (as given by the SuperTANS) may not indicate control problems but may simply be that they were going to start their turn judged on something else (looking for a familiar feature or using some other method – as ZD576 did not have radar, a suggestion is DME).
It would indeed have been unwise to continue at their speed with nothing else to go on but their visual judgment of their distance off that amorphous grey mass and I do not believe that such an experienced and professional crew would have; while they would not have been allowed by the rules to rely on anything else but visual judgment for terrain avoidance, a nice digital readout telling them they still had, say, ½ a mile to go would have put a strong bias on what they thought they were seeing – remember, if you are unsure of your visual reference (like temporary disorientation) the reaction is to check the instruments – if they had nothing else to go on, they would have turned if they could (and they demonstrated that they had control in the last moments by starting an evasive turn). If the DME had been altered/moved to give a wrong reading it would have been hard to pick this up by judging the distance to the mist (try judging your entry into a cloud bank to better than ½ a mile). As they got too close the shoreline would have been seen to pass under them, they would have entered the mist, and the RADALT alarm would have gone off all about the same time – which coincides with their last desperate evasive maneuver.
ZD576s TACAN CU was set to ch 107, the Macrihanish TACAN, but as there would not have been LOS at their level on the last part of the flight they may not have been able to get a DME reading from it. However, the MK2 avionics would have allowed ZD576 to use portable/transportable DMEs had there been one at a convenient spot. This system also gives an approximate (+/- 4deg) bearing to such DMEs – and ZD576 did make a small turn RIGHT at waypoint A which could be consistent with heading towards such a beacon located behind the lighthouse (the helipad?) presumably to turn at a given range from it.
walter kennedy is offline  
Old 19th Nov 2004, 11:34
  #1297 (permalink)  
Just a numbered other
 
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Earth
Age: 72
Posts: 1,169
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
fish

invertron

Nice to see some fresh thinking in the thread. You say:

If they were not VMC then they MUST (r) MUST climb to above the safety altitude.
But there was a problem with even that. The Mk2 Chinook's pitiful 'icing' clearance was +4 degC. The information available to the crew would indicate that level to be about 2500ft, well below the SALT. They simply did not have the option to climb.

You are quite right, we will never know what happened to the degree of certainty required to find negligence as the cause.

Sorry Walter, but you are talking tosh. I've flown VFR in some very marginal conditions, and have never had difficulty in judgement of distane, and closure rates in misty conditions. One thig I would NEVER have done is to rey on DME for it.

JP

Please see the recent book 'Chinook Crash', which explains why the crew did not realise that they were so far to the right of their intended track,
It doesn't. It gives the author's opinion, (which may be accurate, who knows?) not fact beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Arkroyal is offline  
Old 19th Nov 2004, 14:24
  #1298 (permalink)  
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
 
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
We have come a long way from Thread No 1 and indeed a long way (88 pages) on Thread 3.

Once again we seem to be going in circles over 'why' and 'how' and 'if' and we are going AWAY from the point of this whole thing which is that whether one conjectures that they were negligent or that they had some serious malfunction with the Chinook, it STILL remains that no-one, least of all the BoI, have ANY conclusive proof which enables a finding of negligence by the crew. That surely is the crux of the matter, and it is really of little interest, in trying to get the verdict overturned, whether there were 'Seals' with some arcane device, or whether they were squawking this or that or reading a particular DME - we will in all probability never know. Let's concentrate on getting the people who CAN do something about it to do it?

Perhaps Brian can post the address again so that those who have not yet written in to ask for a review of the findings can do so?
BOAC is offline  
Old 19th Nov 2004, 15:44
  #1299 (permalink)  
invertron
Guest
 
Posts: n/a
At Last

At last, someone talking with a bit of sense rather than a duty to their comrades.

Ark, you have hit the nail on the suede (although, despite the pitiful icing clearance there still remains the problem of Captaincy, authorisation to consider).

We may never know what happend and because we cannot be certain then they aircrew cannot be held accountable despite the fact that they were IMC below their safety altitude.


http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/2084.html
 
Old 20th Nov 2004, 15:33
  #1300 (permalink)  
Just a numbered other
 
Join Date: Feb 2000
Location: Earth
Age: 72
Posts: 1,169
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
fish

despite the fact that they were IMC below their safety altitude
We should be careful with statements like this. Even this is not an established fact. Sure, they impacted the mull in cloud, but just before, they were visible to the Yachtsman, as was the light house.

You are right, we will never know what happened to the degree required to aportion blame.
(although, despite the pitiful icing clearance there still remains the problem of Captaincy, authorisation to consider).
Could you expand on that? I'm not quite getting your point.
Arkroyal is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.