Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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From Telegraph on line
Blair overruled watchdog on RAF chief's defence job
By Andrew Sparrow, Political Correspondent
(Filed: 26/07/2004)
"Tony Blair personally overruled a decision by a Whitehall anti-sleaze watchdog delaying an RAF air chief marshal from taking a job with a defence company.
In a highly unusual move, the Prime Minister decided it was unfair for the advisory committee on business appointments to make Sir John Day wait a year after leaving his job as head of Strike Command before he could join BAE Systems".
Blair sees this in the public interest.
I assume this is the same gentleman involved in the Chinook scandal?
Blair overruled watchdog on RAF chief's defence job
By Andrew Sparrow, Political Correspondent
(Filed: 26/07/2004)
"Tony Blair personally overruled a decision by a Whitehall anti-sleaze watchdog delaying an RAF air chief marshal from taking a job with a defence company.
In a highly unusual move, the Prime Minister decided it was unfair for the advisory committee on business appointments to make Sir John Day wait a year after leaving his job as head of Strike Command before he could join BAE Systems".
Blair sees this in the public interest.
I assume this is the same gentleman involved in the Chinook scandal?
Avoid imitations
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Walter,
I'm sorry if I offended you; you have obviously put a lot of thought into this. Unfortunately I am not in a position to help you find more evidence. I'm not being obstructive but I'm afraid that my direct contact with the service ended quite some time ago.
I can't help you regarding the existence of a portable DME or any other nav equipment. All I can tell you is that I never heard of portable beacons being used at that time, although I was in theatre not long before the accident. It would not be "less effort to help clear this up" as you seem to think - how would you suggest I help clear this up?
With regard to the Boeing simulation, it was ONLY a simulation and I don't see how it could be held conclusive, despite the Air Marshall's attempts to do so to reinforce their own case.
I don't understand your reference to my "spin" about a conspiracy theory about US Navy Seals, please explain what you mean by that. I have seen no evidence about this subject and I certainly don't subscribe to the fact that this subject might be in any way relevant to the accident.
I don't have any "spin" to give. I just maintain that it was very wrong to attach blame to two dead pilots without the proper and conclusive proof that this normally required. I find it very strange that MOD will not reconsider their stance, but recently less so in light of other decisions made in more recent times.
BTW, I found your cut and paste very hard going and irritating to read.
I'm sorry if I offended you; you have obviously put a lot of thought into this. Unfortunately I am not in a position to help you find more evidence. I'm not being obstructive but I'm afraid that my direct contact with the service ended quite some time ago.
I can't help you regarding the existence of a portable DME or any other nav equipment. All I can tell you is that I never heard of portable beacons being used at that time, although I was in theatre not long before the accident. It would not be "less effort to help clear this up" as you seem to think - how would you suggest I help clear this up?
With regard to the Boeing simulation, it was ONLY a simulation and I don't see how it could be held conclusive, despite the Air Marshall's attempts to do so to reinforce their own case.
I don't understand your reference to my "spin" about a conspiracy theory about US Navy Seals, please explain what you mean by that. I have seen no evidence about this subject and I certainly don't subscribe to the fact that this subject might be in any way relevant to the accident.
I don't have any "spin" to give. I just maintain that it was very wrong to attach blame to two dead pilots without the proper and conclusive proof that this normally required. I find it very strange that MOD will not reconsider their stance, but recently less so in light of other decisions made in more recent times.
BTW, I found your cut and paste very hard going and irritating to read.
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If the entire BAE board gets car-pooled into a single vehicle etc, etc on the eve of a hostile takeover bid by an American company then I'd say it would be the same gentleman!
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On coming back to this thread after some time, I find it getting ever more enmeshed in arcane issues. If anyone wants to overturn the verdict, they have to get away from technical nuances that the general public doesn't understand and get back to basics.
If you ask Bill Wratten why he decided what he did, he will give you a car driving analogy. He will say that if you drive up a motorway in thick fog doing 90mph, you are negligent because you are driving far too fast for the conditions. If a tyre bursts or a car slams on the brakes up ahead, you are done for. And you are done for, not because of the tyre or the car up ahead, but because you are driving dangerously fast for the weather conditions. Ergo, you are negligent.
And that is the nub of BW's argument in the Mull finding. From the reading of the evidence, the RAF hierarchy concluded that the Chinook was going far too fast for the prevailing met conditions. All the hypotheses about engines failing, computers going on the blink etc are seen as a red herring because if the crew had been flying prudently, they would have had time to cope.
As someone who was once responsible for coordinating BoI policy within MoD, I know all about not finding dead aircrew negligent unless there is no doubt. But BW and many others had no doubt that the Chinook pilots were flying far too fast, and therefore too unsafely, for the prevailing conditions.
If you ask Bill Wratten why he decided what he did, he will give you a car driving analogy. He will say that if you drive up a motorway in thick fog doing 90mph, you are negligent because you are driving far too fast for the conditions. If a tyre bursts or a car slams on the brakes up ahead, you are done for. And you are done for, not because of the tyre or the car up ahead, but because you are driving dangerously fast for the weather conditions. Ergo, you are negligent.
And that is the nub of BW's argument in the Mull finding. From the reading of the evidence, the RAF hierarchy concluded that the Chinook was going far too fast for the prevailing met conditions. All the hypotheses about engines failing, computers going on the blink etc are seen as a red herring because if the crew had been flying prudently, they would have had time to cope.
As someone who was once responsible for coordinating BoI policy within MoD, I know all about not finding dead aircrew negligent unless there is no doubt. But BW and many others had no doubt that the Chinook pilots were flying far too fast, and therefore too unsafely, for the prevailing conditions.
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Flatiron
Well said about the technical red herrings BUT the analogy of driving too fast in fog is strange - was has emerged from the inquiries and from inputs to this thread is that they were flying in clear air (excellent visibilty for miles at their altitude) with a clear view of the sea towards a landmass whose ground detail was obscurred by a localised (indeed ground hugging) mist that they were to turn away from (close in - on the shoreline, in fact) and go up the coast at low level.
It was that the turn had not been initiated in time that caused the crash.
Now, I agree that if (at the high speed that they were travelling at) they were relying upon visual judgement alone of their distance off to start this turn then they were indeed negligent - without clear familiar objects or topography to give them spatial awareness they would have to have slowed down considerably to come in so close, and as you said:
<<All the hypotheses about engines failing, computers going on the blink etc are seen as a red herring because if the crew had been flying prudently, they would have had time to cope. >>
The real nub is what made such an experienced crew continue in so close at high speed: given the RAFs obfuscation on the actual flying conditions and the intended route, I doubt very much that at this late stage they will make anything clear and thus it remains for others to try and get to the truth. My view is that, without an on board radar and distrusting the accuracy of the TANS, the logical explanation could be that they were using their TACAN to measure their distance to go to their planned turning point. This is something that someone reading this thread should be able to ascertain for certain one way or the other but, alas, no one has done so to date - do you have the contacts?
You see, if there was a concession allowing use of TACAN (on this regular route in such common conditions) for this one difficult-to-judge turn on an otherwise perfectly reasonable VFR flightplan, then the performance of the TACAN ground equipment should have been considered. I understand the simplistic arguement that under VFR the pilots should not have relied upon navaids for terrain avoidance but common sense suggests that this scenario is a special case if you look at the actual weather conditions and their intended path - one can surely understand that if you have a nice digital readout telling you how far away you are and your visual reference is a grey amorphous blob then the digital readout may have a strong influence on your visual judgement WHETHER YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE RELYING ON IT OR NOT. If the ground equipment was set incorrectly (and this can so easily be done with this equipment) and was reading, say, 1 mile more than was the case then it may have biased their visual judgement. If this sounds incorrect then please consider how often pilots turn to their instruments when momentarily disorientated (there's a whole thread on this subject in another services website that I am sure many pilots reading this thread would be familiar with) - in this case, only disorientated in one dimension but the principal is the same, ie it's hard to judge the distance off that grey mass with the mist moving up the slope, ever changing the texture, just the shoreline clear but nothing of familiar size (lighthouse buildings not visible and seagulls not big enough, etc), you suddenly think you are getting too close so your eyes flit to the TACAN, you calm down and continue looking at that grey mass, the TACAN has told you that you've still got time to make your judgement, perhaps that odd little turn to the right was the left hand pilot nudging the nose over so he can see the shoreline better himself (bear in mind the angle of approach to the Mull).
ZD576s TACAN CU was set on the right channel for Mac - this should have been discussed at least - whether or not there was no line of site to the aerodrome TACAN - whether or not there was a portable (DME only) equipment near the lighthouse for such transits - whatever - this navigation aid should have been discussed fully at the inquiries given the flightplan and the lack of radar, innaccuracy of TANS, and that the CU was set accordingly.
As you would be aware if you look back through the postings, TACAN is a taboo subject in this case.
If the use of a TACAN at the crucial turning point was the usual practice by those flights, even if there was no official relaxation of the rules such that the pilots were still responsible for avoiding terrain visually, then surely the case could not be closed without consideration of the state of the ground equipment. Had this scenario been explored then the concern may have been much more than the reputation of the pilots - for if such ground equipment had been tampered with, then by who, etc..
At the very least, the pilots should not have been blamed after such inadequate inquiries which failed to clearly establish at the very beginning the basics which may have given the many experts and learned gentlemen a flying start at getting to what happened; ie:
the intended flightplan (VFR low level turning close in to the shoreline and going up the coast, never intending to enter the ground hugging mist, never intending to fly over the hill);
the actual weather conditions over the sea where the helo was flying (excellent vis for miles laterally and the sea clearly in view);
that the Mull ahead was clearly visible but its ground detail was obscurred by ground hugging, localised mist and that such conditions are common there.
Add to these basics that the only precision navaid available to ZD576, its TACAN, hardly got a mention - never mind whether it should have been relied upon or not, nor whether the MAC TACAN could have been used or not; it should have been discussed at the inquiries where the right questions could have cleared this matter up.
Well said about the technical red herrings BUT the analogy of driving too fast in fog is strange - was has emerged from the inquiries and from inputs to this thread is that they were flying in clear air (excellent visibilty for miles at their altitude) with a clear view of the sea towards a landmass whose ground detail was obscurred by a localised (indeed ground hugging) mist that they were to turn away from (close in - on the shoreline, in fact) and go up the coast at low level.
It was that the turn had not been initiated in time that caused the crash.
Now, I agree that if (at the high speed that they were travelling at) they were relying upon visual judgement alone of their distance off to start this turn then they were indeed negligent - without clear familiar objects or topography to give them spatial awareness they would have to have slowed down considerably to come in so close, and as you said:
<<All the hypotheses about engines failing, computers going on the blink etc are seen as a red herring because if the crew had been flying prudently, they would have had time to cope. >>
The real nub is what made such an experienced crew continue in so close at high speed: given the RAFs obfuscation on the actual flying conditions and the intended route, I doubt very much that at this late stage they will make anything clear and thus it remains for others to try and get to the truth. My view is that, without an on board radar and distrusting the accuracy of the TANS, the logical explanation could be that they were using their TACAN to measure their distance to go to their planned turning point. This is something that someone reading this thread should be able to ascertain for certain one way or the other but, alas, no one has done so to date - do you have the contacts?
You see, if there was a concession allowing use of TACAN (on this regular route in such common conditions) for this one difficult-to-judge turn on an otherwise perfectly reasonable VFR flightplan, then the performance of the TACAN ground equipment should have been considered. I understand the simplistic arguement that under VFR the pilots should not have relied upon navaids for terrain avoidance but common sense suggests that this scenario is a special case if you look at the actual weather conditions and their intended path - one can surely understand that if you have a nice digital readout telling you how far away you are and your visual reference is a grey amorphous blob then the digital readout may have a strong influence on your visual judgement WHETHER YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO BE RELYING ON IT OR NOT. If the ground equipment was set incorrectly (and this can so easily be done with this equipment) and was reading, say, 1 mile more than was the case then it may have biased their visual judgement. If this sounds incorrect then please consider how often pilots turn to their instruments when momentarily disorientated (there's a whole thread on this subject in another services website that I am sure many pilots reading this thread would be familiar with) - in this case, only disorientated in one dimension but the principal is the same, ie it's hard to judge the distance off that grey mass with the mist moving up the slope, ever changing the texture, just the shoreline clear but nothing of familiar size (lighthouse buildings not visible and seagulls not big enough, etc), you suddenly think you are getting too close so your eyes flit to the TACAN, you calm down and continue looking at that grey mass, the TACAN has told you that you've still got time to make your judgement, perhaps that odd little turn to the right was the left hand pilot nudging the nose over so he can see the shoreline better himself (bear in mind the angle of approach to the Mull).
ZD576s TACAN CU was set on the right channel for Mac - this should have been discussed at least - whether or not there was no line of site to the aerodrome TACAN - whether or not there was a portable (DME only) equipment near the lighthouse for such transits - whatever - this navigation aid should have been discussed fully at the inquiries given the flightplan and the lack of radar, innaccuracy of TANS, and that the CU was set accordingly.
As you would be aware if you look back through the postings, TACAN is a taboo subject in this case.
If the use of a TACAN at the crucial turning point was the usual practice by those flights, even if there was no official relaxation of the rules such that the pilots were still responsible for avoiding terrain visually, then surely the case could not be closed without consideration of the state of the ground equipment. Had this scenario been explored then the concern may have been much more than the reputation of the pilots - for if such ground equipment had been tampered with, then by who, etc..
At the very least, the pilots should not have been blamed after such inadequate inquiries which failed to clearly establish at the very beginning the basics which may have given the many experts and learned gentlemen a flying start at getting to what happened; ie:
the intended flightplan (VFR low level turning close in to the shoreline and going up the coast, never intending to enter the ground hugging mist, never intending to fly over the hill);
the actual weather conditions over the sea where the helo was flying (excellent vis for miles laterally and the sea clearly in view);
that the Mull ahead was clearly visible but its ground detail was obscurred by ground hugging, localised mist and that such conditions are common there.
Add to these basics that the only precision navaid available to ZD576, its TACAN, hardly got a mention - never mind whether it should have been relied upon or not, nor whether the MAC TACAN could have been used or not; it should have been discussed at the inquiries where the right questions could have cleared this matter up.
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New jobs in exchange for what ,exactly ??
From Telegraph on line: Blair overruled watchdog on RAF chief's defence job By Andrew Sparrow, Political Correspondent
(Filed: 26/07/2004)
"Tony Blair personally overruled a decision by a Whitehall anti-sleaze watchdog delaying an RAF air chief marshal from taking a job with a defence company. In a highly unusual move, the Prime Minister decided it was unfair for the advisory committee on business appointments to make Sir John Day wait a year after leaving his job as head of Strike Command before he could join BAE Systems".
So who got Tony Blair to do John Day such a big favour before the recess ? Perhaps someone who wants to see John Day right after he was passed over for Chief of the Air Staff ? For the answer, perhaps we should think who would not want "damaged goods" at the top of the RAF and who would at the same time would want to keep John Day 'on side'.
Perhaps we need look no further than the senior civil servant(s) who would have their fingerprints all over the mess that was the Chinook Mk 2 project and who would have found the verdict of the BoI (imposed by John Day and Bill Wratten) rather convenient.
A shame Tony Blair had time to help cover these tracks while not having time to meet those seeking justice for those unfairly blamed for the accident. There appears to be an interesting parallel with the way John Scarlett, Peter Mandelson and perhaps others who have uncomfortable insight into the 'management of truth' by this government have been set up with new jobs !!
(Filed: 26/07/2004)
"Tony Blair personally overruled a decision by a Whitehall anti-sleaze watchdog delaying an RAF air chief marshal from taking a job with a defence company. In a highly unusual move, the Prime Minister decided it was unfair for the advisory committee on business appointments to make Sir John Day wait a year after leaving his job as head of Strike Command before he could join BAE Systems".
So who got Tony Blair to do John Day such a big favour before the recess ? Perhaps someone who wants to see John Day right after he was passed over for Chief of the Air Staff ? For the answer, perhaps we should think who would not want "damaged goods" at the top of the RAF and who would at the same time would want to keep John Day 'on side'.
Perhaps we need look no further than the senior civil servant(s) who would have their fingerprints all over the mess that was the Chinook Mk 2 project and who would have found the verdict of the BoI (imposed by John Day and Bill Wratten) rather convenient.
A shame Tony Blair had time to help cover these tracks while not having time to meet those seeking justice for those unfairly blamed for the accident. There appears to be an interesting parallel with the way John Scarlett, Peter Mandelson and perhaps others who have uncomfortable insight into the 'management of truth' by this government have been set up with new jobs !!
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CHINOOK
Flatiron.....yes, and do not overlook the fact that the aircraft crashed over a quarter of a mile to the right of its intended track, where the terrain was about 500 feet higher than it was on the intended track. Far too many red herrings. J P.
Just a numbered other
do not overlook the fact that the aircraft crashed over a quarter of a mile to the right of its intended track,
In SH, TANS waypoints simply provided a steering reference. It is not accurate to say that they were necessarily intended to be overflown.
You know nothing, beyond any doubt whatsoever, about this accident!
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JP, Just how much low level VFR flying have you done? I have a few thousand hours on both jets and transports. When I planned a sortie I used to put turning points into whatever computer was available. I neither knew or cared, at the planning stage, whether I woud pass through these turning points. My only intention was to overfly my targets or droping zones and reach my destination. My only other intention was to miss prohibited areas. The low flying booking system gives vast flexibility on route and time? Just how do you know what this crew intended?
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Chinook
Yetti. Well, since you ask, over 4000 hrs, nearly all jet, low level, day and night.
But you specify VFR, and tell us that you 'neither knew nor cared at the planning stage whether you would pass through those turning points' If you played so fast and loose with turning points when IMC, then I'm glad I was not with you! The point surely being that this crew, on a VFR flight plan, flew into IMC conditions (20 yards vis said the lighthouse keeper; no vis at all said the party of hikers.)
As Flatiron rightly said, too many red herrings; and not enough sticking to the known facts.
But you specify VFR, and tell us that you 'neither knew nor cared at the planning stage whether you would pass through those turning points' If you played so fast and loose with turning points when IMC, then I'm glad I was not with you! The point surely being that this crew, on a VFR flight plan, flew into IMC conditions (20 yards vis said the lighthouse keeper; no vis at all said the party of hikers.)
As Flatiron rightly said, too many red herrings; and not enough sticking to the known facts.
Just a numbered other
this crew, on a VFR flight plan, flew into IMC conditions
Was it intentional JP?
My several thousand hours in SH trumps your FJ time. You, Wratten, and Day need to realise how different these environments are!
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CHINOOK
Yeti, In my haste, I fear that my last post to you was misleading. I meant to say, over 4000 hrs first pilot, nearly all low level, day & night, Central Region (including of course that high ground in Scotland) , Northern Region, Southern Region, Middle East and Far East.
Ark Royal. Despite my promise to Brian Dixon on 18 July to stop going on about this matter, your last post deserves a reply, and it is this: we are confusing cause and effect. You say I know nothing about this accident. But we all know there is absolutely no doubt whatever that the crew were at the controls of an aircraft that flew into terrain. They should have followed the rules, and turned away so as not to fly into the cloud/mists or whatever (Iaccept your point that icing conditions precluded a rapid climb). Do you agree?
That they failed to turn away was the negligence. The only question remaining is why they did not turn away. We shall never know, but I have offered the only theory (and of course it is only a theory, and has nothing whatever to do with the negligence already committed), the only theory that makes any sense at all, bearing in mind the very high qulity of the crew, and that is that they were off track by over a quarter of a mile and thus facing much higher ground than they thought.
Regards JP.
Ark Royal. Despite my promise to Brian Dixon on 18 July to stop going on about this matter, your last post deserves a reply, and it is this: we are confusing cause and effect. You say I know nothing about this accident. But we all know there is absolutely no doubt whatever that the crew were at the controls of an aircraft that flew into terrain. They should have followed the rules, and turned away so as not to fly into the cloud/mists or whatever (Iaccept your point that icing conditions precluded a rapid climb). Do you agree?
That they failed to turn away was the negligence. The only question remaining is why they did not turn away. We shall never know, but I have offered the only theory (and of course it is only a theory, and has nothing whatever to do with the negligence already committed), the only theory that makes any sense at all, bearing in mind the very high qulity of the crew, and that is that they were off track by over a quarter of a mile and thus facing much higher ground than they thought.
Regards JP.
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"yetti" makes the point that one always has an IFR option in mind when planning a sortie. The point here is that the crew that flew the sortie DID NOT PLAN IT. Moreover the crucial waypoint of the Lighthouse was entered incorrectly into the TANS.
What we have is a crew who took over the task from another crew and totally ignored the rules on crew duty time, outbriefing and/or nightstopping out of theatre. They also ignored the rules on crew meals (when they took off on the fatal sortie NO crew member had eaten a proper meal for at least 10 hours). To this day nobody knows whether they intended to return to Aldergrove ignoring crew duty limitations or remain outside Theatre overnight without HQNI approval.
How many rules are you allowed to break before it is considered negligence?
What we have is a crew who took over the task from another crew and totally ignored the rules on crew duty time, outbriefing and/or nightstopping out of theatre. They also ignored the rules on crew meals (when they took off on the fatal sortie NO crew member had eaten a proper meal for at least 10 hours). To this day nobody knows whether they intended to return to Aldergrove ignoring crew duty limitations or remain outside Theatre overnight without HQNI approval.
How many rules are you allowed to break before it is considered negligence?
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Bringing back the big picture, Messrs Wratten and Day had to satisfy the requirement of "absolutely no doubt whatsoever", to determine that the crew were negligent. This differs greatly from the mere assumption of negligence proposed by JP and K52.
To use an old worn analogy, if you are driving along a straight road approaching a 90 degree bend and for some reason you fail to turn, are you negligent? What if the steering failed, are you negligent then? What if you suffered a blow out, are you negligent ? What if there was no evidence of any malfunction but several suspicious and incongruous indicators of problems, would anyone be certain beyond any doubt whatsoever that the driver was merely at fault? Are you negligent because you chose to drive down that road?
There are too many uncertainties with this tragedy to categorically establish that the crew were negligent beyond any doubt whatsoever. JP, from your last post you surely have to concede this point in that you also are unsure as to why they did not turn away. This, even though you have your own theory as to why, clearly does not satisfy the unbelievably stringent standard of proof of no doubt whatsoever. That you, or anyone, has no real evidence of why the crew did not turn away is sufficient to have rebutted this stringent burden of proof. At best there is hypothesis and conjecture, but bearing in mind the presumption of innocence and benefit of the doubt, there is no way this judgement should stand.
To use an old worn analogy, if you are driving along a straight road approaching a 90 degree bend and for some reason you fail to turn, are you negligent? What if the steering failed, are you negligent then? What if you suffered a blow out, are you negligent ? What if there was no evidence of any malfunction but several suspicious and incongruous indicators of problems, would anyone be certain beyond any doubt whatsoever that the driver was merely at fault? Are you negligent because you chose to drive down that road?
There are too many uncertainties with this tragedy to categorically establish that the crew were negligent beyond any doubt whatsoever. JP, from your last post you surely have to concede this point in that you also are unsure as to why they did not turn away. This, even though you have your own theory as to why, clearly does not satisfy the unbelievably stringent standard of proof of no doubt whatsoever. That you, or anyone, has no real evidence of why the crew did not turn away is sufficient to have rebutted this stringent burden of proof. At best there is hypothesis and conjecture, but bearing in mind the presumption of innocence and benefit of the doubt, there is no way this judgement should stand.
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uncle peter
I think it is quite clear. The Rules are clearly laid out in Air Staff Instructions.
The Captain (and current Detatchment Commander) decided to ignore the rules for his own convenience. The incoming Detatchment Commander did not object to this decision.
This was the basis for the disaster that occurred.
I think it is quite clear. The Rules are clearly laid out in Air Staff Instructions.
The Captain (and current Detatchment Commander) decided to ignore the rules for his own convenience. The incoming Detatchment Commander did not object to this decision.
This was the basis for the disaster that occurred.
Just a numbered other
The only question remaining is why they did not turn away. We shall never know
Hardly no doubt whatsoever why the crash occurred then, is it?
"yetti" makes the point that one always has an IFR option in mind when planning a sortie
They also ignored the rules on crew meals (when they took off on the fatal sortie NO crew member had eaten a proper meal for at least 10 hours).
We can all come to conclusions various over this, and some of us may be right. JP, K52, that includes you. The point is that those theories must stand the burdon of proof. Clearly they never will, so the finding is not valid.
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CHINOOK
Ark Royal.
I had not realised that we were trying to weigh your log book against mine, I was merely replying to Yeti's quetion of how much low flying I had done. The answer is, quite a lot. Not that it matters.
Do you, or do you not, fly towards hills covered in cloud/fog/mist (please do not argue this one again) unless you are absolutely certain without any doubt whatsoever that you know precisely where you are.?
Do you believe that this crew knew, without any doubt whatsoever, that they knew where they were, ie heading for solid granite?
If so, then why did they press on?
Best wishes John Purdey.
Uncle Peter.
It really does not matter in the slightest WHY the crew pressed on towards those hills; we shall never know why they did so. What is, however, quite clear, is that the aircraft did fly on towards that high ground. That was the Negligence.
My belief is that the crew did so because they thought they were on track, when they were not.
But it is irrevelant; the crew should not have put themselves into such a hazardous position, against all the rules of airmanship and commonsence. Regards. JohnPurdey.
I had not realised that we were trying to weigh your log book against mine, I was merely replying to Yeti's quetion of how much low flying I had done. The answer is, quite a lot. Not that it matters.
Do you, or do you not, fly towards hills covered in cloud/fog/mist (please do not argue this one again) unless you are absolutely certain without any doubt whatsoever that you know precisely where you are.?
Do you believe that this crew knew, without any doubt whatsoever, that they knew where they were, ie heading for solid granite?
If so, then why did they press on?
Best wishes John Purdey.
Uncle Peter.
It really does not matter in the slightest WHY the crew pressed on towards those hills; we shall never know why they did so. What is, however, quite clear, is that the aircraft did fly on towards that high ground. That was the Negligence.
My belief is that the crew did so because they thought they were on track, when they were not.
But it is irrevelant; the crew should not have put themselves into such a hazardous position, against all the rules of airmanship and commonsence. Regards. JohnPurdey.