Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
FJJP - absolutely correct.
A shame that neither Wratten nor Day can understand such a blindingly obvious summary. Or perhaps they find it convenient not to?
A shame that neither Wratten nor Day can understand such a blindingly obvious summary. Or perhaps they find it convenient not to?
Just a numbered other
FJJP
Well put, and shouting excused.
Do you get it now, Walter. The low flying is and must be entirely Mk 1 eyeball. Waypoints plugged in to TANS are just for convenience, there is no requirement ir even INTENTION to actually overfly them. (TACAN is never a primary aid at low level, it just isn't reliable enough around hills, but you'd probably put in a local freq as a back up).
I'd have planned exactly the same trip, and turned up the coast. Why they didn't WILL NEVER BE KNOWN.
If the BoI had been reviewed by officers with some understanding of SH flying we wouldn't be here now ten years on trying to knock some sense into some very thick heads. They'd have agreed with their President.
Well put, and shouting excused.
Do you get it now, Walter. The low flying is and must be entirely Mk 1 eyeball. Waypoints plugged in to TANS are just for convenience, there is no requirement ir even INTENTION to actually overfly them. (TACAN is never a primary aid at low level, it just isn't reliable enough around hills, but you'd probably put in a local freq as a back up).
I'd have planned exactly the same trip, and turned up the coast. Why they didn't WILL NEVER BE KNOWN.
If the BoI had been reviewed by officers with some understanding of SH flying we wouldn't be here now ten years on trying to knock some sense into some very thick heads. They'd have agreed with their President.
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FJJP
Thank you for your confirmation of the common met conditions.
With all due respect to your experience in flying VFR in the region, this flight was not just recognising and giving a wide berth to the Mull – it was going in very, very close and turning up practically on the coastline. Given that their approach was very much “end on” to the Mull, there were no other features on either side to aid perception – just that amorphous grey lump ahead.
My point is that to military helicopters on that route, this would have been an all too common situation.
If there was an operational situation (eg carrying the security team that was such a potential target) whereby it was preferable to mask ones approach to the mainland by approaching directly the high ground (at low level) and turning in close hugging the ground, as it were, then you may want to consider ways of achieving this safely as, in my humble opinion, it would be very difficult to judge the starting point of such a turn which would have taken some significant room given their high speed and weight. Judging purely visually may result in a turn too soon to achieve the objective of getting in close – or too late which would have catastrophic consequences (it would have been too late once the coast was crossed or the mist was entered to do anything other than what was in fact done – an up and left evasive manoeuvre which has always suggested control at this final point). This latter point, to me, suggests that endless discussions about (unprovable) control problems has been “muddying the waters” – at least until the details of the flight plan have been clarified and this surely has improved through recent contributions from several ppruners, wouldn’t you all agree?
If you are really frustrated by people discussing this aspect, may I respectfully suggest that you can constructively close it off by assisting with bringing this line of inquiry to closure by using any contacts you may have to get input from military helicopter pilots who have done THIS flight?
Thank you for your confirmation of the common met conditions.
With all due respect to your experience in flying VFR in the region, this flight was not just recognising and giving a wide berth to the Mull – it was going in very, very close and turning up practically on the coastline. Given that their approach was very much “end on” to the Mull, there were no other features on either side to aid perception – just that amorphous grey lump ahead.
My point is that to military helicopters on that route, this would have been an all too common situation.
If there was an operational situation (eg carrying the security team that was such a potential target) whereby it was preferable to mask ones approach to the mainland by approaching directly the high ground (at low level) and turning in close hugging the ground, as it were, then you may want to consider ways of achieving this safely as, in my humble opinion, it would be very difficult to judge the starting point of such a turn which would have taken some significant room given their high speed and weight. Judging purely visually may result in a turn too soon to achieve the objective of getting in close – or too late which would have catastrophic consequences (it would have been too late once the coast was crossed or the mist was entered to do anything other than what was in fact done – an up and left evasive manoeuvre which has always suggested control at this final point). This latter point, to me, suggests that endless discussions about (unprovable) control problems has been “muddying the waters” – at least until the details of the flight plan have been clarified and this surely has improved through recent contributions from several ppruners, wouldn’t you all agree?
If you are really frustrated by people discussing this aspect, may I respectfully suggest that you can constructively close it off by assisting with bringing this line of inquiry to closure by using any contacts you may have to get input from military helicopter pilots who have done THIS flight?
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Walter, sorry, you missed the fundimental point I was making - MK1 EYEBALL is the be-all and end-all of low flying. Don't even think of introducing ground terrorist threats as a consideration of route. It just is not a factor. Emotive words like hugging the coast = terrain masking, which would be appropriate if there was a high threat. There is just no case to believe that there were any bad guys sitting around the Mull on the off-chance of having a go at a passing helio. My low flying experience in the UK, European and N American environment is extensive, spread over 38 years.
As for the 'perception' case, there is a thing called situational awareness. You don't reveal you experience in your profile, therefore it is difficult to judge whether or not you have the experience of flying in marginal conditions - believe me when I tell you that the senses sharpen up very rapidly and there is a high 'pucker' factor. That crew would have been well aware of their proximity to the hard place. Apart from everything else, they would have been well aware of the local geography, and would have had a mental picture of the shape and position of the Mull relative to the aircraft.
Also, forget any arguments about turning circles, speeds, performance et al; I used to fly round the Mull at 300 KIAS. OK, I'm used to flying at that speed and know what the performance of the aircraft is at that speed. Flying a Chipmunk at 90 KIAS frightens me f*artless, because I can stand it on its wingtip at 50 feet and do half a dozen tight turns in 30 secs. Each pilot knows his aircraft and its capabilities.
Oh, and by the way, my son is a Chinook pilot. 'Nuff said?
As for the 'perception' case, there is a thing called situational awareness. You don't reveal you experience in your profile, therefore it is difficult to judge whether or not you have the experience of flying in marginal conditions - believe me when I tell you that the senses sharpen up very rapidly and there is a high 'pucker' factor. That crew would have been well aware of their proximity to the hard place. Apart from everything else, they would have been well aware of the local geography, and would have had a mental picture of the shape and position of the Mull relative to the aircraft.
Also, forget any arguments about turning circles, speeds, performance et al; I used to fly round the Mull at 300 KIAS. OK, I'm used to flying at that speed and know what the performance of the aircraft is at that speed. Flying a Chipmunk at 90 KIAS frightens me f*artless, because I can stand it on its wingtip at 50 feet and do half a dozen tight turns in 30 secs. Each pilot knows his aircraft and its capabilities.
Oh, and by the way, my son is a Chinook pilot. 'Nuff said?
Last edited by FJJP; 4th May 2004 at 19:52.
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FJJP.........way to go fella!! With you 200% on this. Navigation aids are useless at low altitude.....MK1 eyeball is the only way to go. I got caught during an Ireland tour in Gazelles where I had to climb to safety altitude and shout "help". I agree with you more experienced chaps that we will never know why the skipper didnt make different choices, if indeed he was able to make a decision or the decision had been made for him.
I am an ex QHI Gazelle/Scout.
I am an ex QHI Gazelle/Scout.
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This latter point, to me, suggests that endless discussions about (unprovable) control problems has been “muddying the waters”
"Where there is no fault found that does not mean that there was not a fault present. In this case I found it probable that on the engineering side as far as I could see there was not a fault highly relevant to the accident, but I certainly could not dismiss that possibility"
In the absence of qualified witnesses, flight data recorder information or other hard information, and where there are other possible explanations with equal credibility to the obvious one of "pilot error", surely it is unfair and unjust to place the blame on deceased aircrew?
All the other debates about what others did and what the crew of ZD576 might have done, about possible radio calls and navaids, simulations and speculations are irrelevant. Jon and Rick have been dead nearly ten years, surely they and their families deserve justice by now.
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FJJP
Thank you for your detailed response which I believe deserves a considered reply.
Firstly, if you son is a Chinook pilot then this may make it easier for you to help with that last point I made in my last posting – “…to get input from military helicopter pilots who have done THIS flight.”
With regard to that fundamental point of the Mk1 eyeball, I have tried to convey my concerns that in a common situation on a regular flight path there may have been some special arrangement to ease the pilots’ workload and reduce the risk inherent in a purely visual approach in these circumstances – whilst I recognise that reliance on the eye only was “legal” and that dependence upon a radio navaid would not be. I would have thought that you have enough flying experience to agree with me that judging ones distance of, say, an isolated cloud is an exercise that may convince you of the problem of approaching the Mull visually at their speed in those circumstances.
On that tragic day, the crew had passed a point already rather too close for visual under the prevailing conditions having had the time to change their route navigation waypoint – which would rather suggest that they were in control at that point.
Between that point and just before impact, work by a Mr Mitchel of the Boeing company suggests that the a/c had no time to have deviated significantly from its path to have got where it got to (ie. No dramatic turns, slowing, climbs/dives, etc) which suggests that they were basically just carrying on – although others would have it that there was an a/c malfunction that did either of the following:
1. rendered the a/c uncontrollable somehow (whilst leaving it stable and leaving no trace and no call to this effect from the pilots in the 10+secs they had – although this last point seems to have been covered by the lack of recording of the last communication from the ground to the air);
2. sufficiently distracted the pilots that they did not do anything but carry on towards the high ground (your words are so relevant here “…situational awareness... believe me when I tell you that the senses sharpen up very rapidly and there is a high 'pucker' factor. That crew would have been well aware of their proximity to the hard place.”) – in all those arguments about the FADEC etc would there have been no control available to them to avoid that worst case of carrying straight on? – think about it.
Just before impact, the attitude of the a/c and the control positions were entirely consistent with their having SEEN just how close that they had got (eg the shoreline passing underneath or mist flitting past the screen, perhaps) and reacted with an evasive manoeuvre (they very nearly made it, too) – suggesting that they had control at this point too. The hypothesis that a control malfunction occurred for just such a short time at such a critical point, without throwing the a/c off its trajectory or axis in any significant way, and then cleared itself is not credible.
Something had misled them to get so close.
I suppose a brief summary of why I am pushing the nav issue is in order:
Upon hearing of the crash, I immediately suspected sabotage because of who was on board and their plans for a new “offensive” against terrorism in NI. While expecting all possible types of sabotage to be thoroughly investigated by the authorities, I merely wanted to bring their attention to the possibility of the tampering with ground equipment (of the system that I thought would have been used) so that such equipment could have been investigated before evidence was disturbed, say, before a maintenance visit).
I am satisfied by the FAI alone that there was a no evidence of explosion or impact from another object, etc and so the more usual types of sabotage I accept probably did not happen.
The question of navigation, however, seems to have been avoided like the plague in the inquiries – even the actual intended route was not made clear – rather hidden by obfuscation – coming out only in incidental snippets by witnesses and subsequent discussions.
I would like the nav issue to be brought to closure one way or the other – for me this would require a statement from the flight responsible for ferrying such personnel on this route to the effect that the practice in closing with the Mull was:
Purely up to the pilots as per VFR;
Used such and such a navaid in these special circumstances;
Other
And that would do it for me – it is the continued avoidance of this issue that perplexes me – perhaps some of you reading this thread have the connections to apply pressure to achieve this?
As regards you comment “Don't even think of introducing ground terrorist threats as a consideration of route. It just is not a factor. Emotive words like hugging the coast = terrain masking, which would be appropriate if there was a high threat. There is just no case to believe that there were any bad guys sitting around the Mull on the off-chance of having a go at a passing helio (sic)..” well, I rather think that is naïve and the threat would have been more organised but the motive and who may have done it is a big issue in its own right and inappropriate for this thread –although I am happy to send by private message if you are interested.
All that I hope to achieve in this thread is to get experienced people to see this perspective and help bring this line of enquiry to closure – and not just shoot down the arguments with generalisations and simplistic arguments about rules.
Let me make this very clear – I believe that these pilots were NOT to blame and that their names must be cleared; but it should be by way of getting to the full picture of what happened – and not by petty legal arguments.
Every possibility of sabotage should have been thoroughly considered in view of who was on board and this one line of thought I have endeavoured to express here is one that could be cleared up from constructive input by military aircrew visiting this site.
Thank you for your detailed response which I believe deserves a considered reply.
Firstly, if you son is a Chinook pilot then this may make it easier for you to help with that last point I made in my last posting – “…to get input from military helicopter pilots who have done THIS flight.”
With regard to that fundamental point of the Mk1 eyeball, I have tried to convey my concerns that in a common situation on a regular flight path there may have been some special arrangement to ease the pilots’ workload and reduce the risk inherent in a purely visual approach in these circumstances – whilst I recognise that reliance on the eye only was “legal” and that dependence upon a radio navaid would not be. I would have thought that you have enough flying experience to agree with me that judging ones distance of, say, an isolated cloud is an exercise that may convince you of the problem of approaching the Mull visually at their speed in those circumstances.
On that tragic day, the crew had passed a point already rather too close for visual under the prevailing conditions having had the time to change their route navigation waypoint – which would rather suggest that they were in control at that point.
Between that point and just before impact, work by a Mr Mitchel of the Boeing company suggests that the a/c had no time to have deviated significantly from its path to have got where it got to (ie. No dramatic turns, slowing, climbs/dives, etc) which suggests that they were basically just carrying on – although others would have it that there was an a/c malfunction that did either of the following:
1. rendered the a/c uncontrollable somehow (whilst leaving it stable and leaving no trace and no call to this effect from the pilots in the 10+secs they had – although this last point seems to have been covered by the lack of recording of the last communication from the ground to the air);
2. sufficiently distracted the pilots that they did not do anything but carry on towards the high ground (your words are so relevant here “…situational awareness... believe me when I tell you that the senses sharpen up very rapidly and there is a high 'pucker' factor. That crew would have been well aware of their proximity to the hard place.”) – in all those arguments about the FADEC etc would there have been no control available to them to avoid that worst case of carrying straight on? – think about it.
Just before impact, the attitude of the a/c and the control positions were entirely consistent with their having SEEN just how close that they had got (eg the shoreline passing underneath or mist flitting past the screen, perhaps) and reacted with an evasive manoeuvre (they very nearly made it, too) – suggesting that they had control at this point too. The hypothesis that a control malfunction occurred for just such a short time at such a critical point, without throwing the a/c off its trajectory or axis in any significant way, and then cleared itself is not credible.
Something had misled them to get so close.
I suppose a brief summary of why I am pushing the nav issue is in order:
Upon hearing of the crash, I immediately suspected sabotage because of who was on board and their plans for a new “offensive” against terrorism in NI. While expecting all possible types of sabotage to be thoroughly investigated by the authorities, I merely wanted to bring their attention to the possibility of the tampering with ground equipment (of the system that I thought would have been used) so that such equipment could have been investigated before evidence was disturbed, say, before a maintenance visit).
I am satisfied by the FAI alone that there was a no evidence of explosion or impact from another object, etc and so the more usual types of sabotage I accept probably did not happen.
The question of navigation, however, seems to have been avoided like the plague in the inquiries – even the actual intended route was not made clear – rather hidden by obfuscation – coming out only in incidental snippets by witnesses and subsequent discussions.
I would like the nav issue to be brought to closure one way or the other – for me this would require a statement from the flight responsible for ferrying such personnel on this route to the effect that the practice in closing with the Mull was:
Purely up to the pilots as per VFR;
Used such and such a navaid in these special circumstances;
Other
And that would do it for me – it is the continued avoidance of this issue that perplexes me – perhaps some of you reading this thread have the connections to apply pressure to achieve this?
As regards you comment “Don't even think of introducing ground terrorist threats as a consideration of route. It just is not a factor. Emotive words like hugging the coast = terrain masking, which would be appropriate if there was a high threat. There is just no case to believe that there were any bad guys sitting around the Mull on the off-chance of having a go at a passing helio (sic)..” well, I rather think that is naïve and the threat would have been more organised but the motive and who may have done it is a big issue in its own right and inappropriate for this thread –although I am happy to send by private message if you are interested.
All that I hope to achieve in this thread is to get experienced people to see this perspective and help bring this line of enquiry to closure – and not just shoot down the arguments with generalisations and simplistic arguments about rules.
Let me make this very clear – I believe that these pilots were NOT to blame and that their names must be cleared; but it should be by way of getting to the full picture of what happened – and not by petty legal arguments.
Every possibility of sabotage should have been thoroughly considered in view of who was on board and this one line of thought I have endeavoured to express here is one that could be cleared up from constructive input by military aircrew visiting this site.
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Walter K - You make a number of points and make a number of assumptions that I will address. I do not intend to get drawn into any discussion concerning terrorism, sabotage or intelligence - I think that those subjects are inappropriate for an open forum, and believe that they are not involved.
It is for my son or any other Chinook pilot to decide for themselves whether or not to input opinion to this forum. I discuss it with him occasionally, but the decicision to post is entirely his - I would not presume to influence him one way or the other.
You appear to have the belief that regular flight paths are established and have
I am at a loss to understand the significance of this statement. It matters not that you have flown a particular route a hundred times - the same rules of airmanship [and self preservation] applies each time. There are no 'special arrangements to ease pilot workload'. Workload is not reduced by familiarity with a particular route. The ac still has to be flown, with checks to be done, navigation to be carried out [whether visual or electronic] and the ac systems to be tended. Legality is a smokescreen. Weatherwise, you can be legal as hell and still crash the ac through mishandling of the ac or its systems. VFR outside CAS, there is no 'legal'requirement whatsoever to become involved with radio aids.
I know of no pilot who would approach a rock filled cloud without due caution - they would not be trying to judge ANY distance from cloud visually. They knew where they were, could see that the Mull was cloud covered and would have adjusted their intentions accordingly, say, by turning early. Except the ac didn't turn.
Another fact of which you are probably not aware [and have no reason to be] is that the typical time from the onset of an unusual ac malfunction to the pilot physically reacting to it can be as long as 10 SECONDS. This came from an AAIB psychologist who helped me with an unrelated Board of Inquiry. It goes like this - first the pilot has to become aware that there is a problem. Then he has to figure out what the problem is. Then he has to work out what is causing the problem and then react by doing something with the ac and/or ac systems to recify or amelierate the effects of the problem. This is where flight sims come into their own. By repeatedly practicing emergencies and failures, pilot reaction becomes almost instinctive, shaving valuable seconds off the recognition/decision-making process; seconds saved = lives saved.
And knowing roughly where they were, just how likely do you think it is that a highly experienced crew continued on a straight line to make contact with land? I don't think so. [More especially since CRM was in the forefront of the flight safety world at the time]. Furthermore, a crew typically prioritises their attention to tasks according to the prevailing circumstances. A million miles visibility and not an aircraft within a hundred miles = crew chatting about the local barmaid. Marginal visibility with rock-filled clouds about = crew take a special interest in navigation and a plan of action to avoid IMC. Mr Boeing stated the blindingly obvious - OF COURSE THEY JUST CARRIED STRAIGHT ON - how the hell else would they have hit the ground. I note that he did not offer any alternative explanation as to why, other than to suggest the the crew had thumbs up b*ms and mind in neutral. But then, Boeing are unlikely to commit commercial and financial suicide by admitting that there is a possible problem with one of their products.
You hit the nail on the head with:
That's the whole point in nearly 1000 posts on the THIRD forum devoted to the subject.
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PILOTS HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE AIRCRAFT FOR A CRITICAL PERIOD AS THEY APPROACHED THE MULL OF KINTYRE.
And you state that it is just not credible that control of the aircraft could have been frozen at a critical time. Oh really? Have you ever had a rudder freeze on you at high level, where you had to fly below the zero degree isotherm to allow the ice to thaw out? - I have. Have you ever had the situation where the autopilot would not disengage on the instinctive cutout? - I have. Have you ever experienced an ac major system failure not covered by the checklists? - I have. So if I agree with you it is statistically exceptionally unlikely that there was a loss of control of the ac at a critical time - can you guarantee that that 'exceptionally unlikely' = 100%? I suggest not.
So, we're finally back where the thread started:
NOBODY CAN GUARANTEE 100% THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS PILOT ERROR.
QED - the findings of those 2 fine, upstanding Air Ranking Officers was flawed, and the findings should be quashed. But then, having experienced both of these men, hell will freeze over before their arrogance allows them to admit they were wrong.
It is for my son or any other Chinook pilot to decide for themselves whether or not to input opinion to this forum. I discuss it with him occasionally, but the decicision to post is entirely his - I would not presume to influence him one way or the other.
You appear to have the belief that regular flight paths are established and have
special arrangements to ease pilot workload and reduce the risk inherent in a purely visual approach in these circumstances – whilst I recognise that reliance on the eye only was “legal” and that dependence upon a radio navaid would not be
I know of no pilot who would approach a rock filled cloud without due caution - they would not be trying to judge ANY distance from cloud visually. They knew where they were, could see that the Mull was cloud covered and would have adjusted their intentions accordingly, say, by turning early. Except the ac didn't turn.
Another fact of which you are probably not aware [and have no reason to be] is that the typical time from the onset of an unusual ac malfunction to the pilot physically reacting to it can be as long as 10 SECONDS. This came from an AAIB psychologist who helped me with an unrelated Board of Inquiry. It goes like this - first the pilot has to become aware that there is a problem. Then he has to figure out what the problem is. Then he has to work out what is causing the problem and then react by doing something with the ac and/or ac systems to recify or amelierate the effects of the problem. This is where flight sims come into their own. By repeatedly practicing emergencies and failures, pilot reaction becomes almost instinctive, shaving valuable seconds off the recognition/decision-making process; seconds saved = lives saved.
And knowing roughly where they were, just how likely do you think it is that a highly experienced crew continued on a straight line to make contact with land? I don't think so. [More especially since CRM was in the forefront of the flight safety world at the time]. Furthermore, a crew typically prioritises their attention to tasks according to the prevailing circumstances. A million miles visibility and not an aircraft within a hundred miles = crew chatting about the local barmaid. Marginal visibility with rock-filled clouds about = crew take a special interest in navigation and a plan of action to avoid IMC. Mr Boeing stated the blindingly obvious - OF COURSE THEY JUST CARRIED STRAIGHT ON - how the hell else would they have hit the ground. I note that he did not offer any alternative explanation as to why, other than to suggest the the crew had thumbs up b*ms and mind in neutral. But then, Boeing are unlikely to commit commercial and financial suicide by admitting that there is a possible problem with one of their products.
You hit the nail on the head with:
- in all those arguments about the FADEC etc would there have been no control available to them to avoid that worst case of carrying straight on? – think about it.
IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PILOTS HAD NO CONTROL OVER THE AIRCRAFT FOR A CRITICAL PERIOD AS THEY APPROACHED THE MULL OF KINTYRE.
And you state that it is just not credible that control of the aircraft could have been frozen at a critical time. Oh really? Have you ever had a rudder freeze on you at high level, where you had to fly below the zero degree isotherm to allow the ice to thaw out? - I have. Have you ever had the situation where the autopilot would not disengage on the instinctive cutout? - I have. Have you ever experienced an ac major system failure not covered by the checklists? - I have. So if I agree with you it is statistically exceptionally unlikely that there was a loss of control of the ac at a critical time - can you guarantee that that 'exceptionally unlikely' = 100%? I suggest not.
So, we're finally back where the thread started:
NOBODY CAN GUARANTEE 100% THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS PILOT ERROR.
QED - the findings of those 2 fine, upstanding Air Ranking Officers was flawed, and the findings should be quashed. But then, having experienced both of these men, hell will freeze over before their arrogance allows them to admit they were wrong.
Just a numbered other
FJJP:
Brilliant post.
If only our two Air ranking friends had such clarity of thought.
Walter. Listen to FJJP. There was no thought in the crew's minds of terrorist threat. Just none.
They would NEVER rely on electronic aids to fly without sight of the ground or water. If they had, then they would have indeed been negligent.
I too heard Tony Cable's words in the HoL. Their Lordships heard them and took note.
Every enquiry into the verdict since this tragedy has found against it.
Brilliant post.
If only our two Air ranking friends had such clarity of thought.
Walter. Listen to FJJP. There was no thought in the crew's minds of terrorist threat. Just none.
They would NEVER rely on electronic aids to fly without sight of the ground or water. If they had, then they would have indeed been negligent.
I too heard Tony Cable's words in the HoL. Their Lordships heard them and took note.
Every enquiry into the verdict since this tragedy has found against it.
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Arkroyal
The BOI specifically state " The icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow." You obviously know something that the Chinook qualified Aircrew and Engineer on the BOI were not aware of?
Walter Kennedy
How do you justify the assertion that this was a "milk run"? If that was the case then there would have been a standard Flight Plan. What the BOI were presented with was a photocopy of a map prepared by the Captain of the 2nd crew who had planned the trip on the assumption that crew duty considerations would require the utilisation of both Detatchment crews to complete the days tasking.
-------------------
The BOI concluded that the crew "selected an inappropriate rate of Climb to safely overfly the Mull" Later in their deliberations they concluded that Flt Lt Tapper " made an error of judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull"
In my own opinion (and one that is emphasised throughout the entire RAF); if you find yourself IMC at low level there is only one option - which is a max rate climb on a safe heading to Safety Altitude. Continuing to fly towards the Mull would not be my idea of "a safe heading"
The BOI further concluded that it was likely that the Captain "made an error of judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull"
OC RAF Odiham stated that " the root cause of this accident was that the crew, while operating in poor weather and close to high ground, flew the aircraft into the ground."
It was the AOC who grasped the nettle and stated-
" This sortie was planned to be a low level daytime passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules. Yet when the aircraft crashed it was flying at high speed, well below safety height in cloud in direct contravention of the rules for flight under VFR or IFR."
Now just read those last three paragraphs again.
The BOI specifically state " The icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow." You obviously know something that the Chinook qualified Aircrew and Engineer on the BOI were not aware of?
Walter Kennedy
How do you justify the assertion that this was a "milk run"? If that was the case then there would have been a standard Flight Plan. What the BOI were presented with was a photocopy of a map prepared by the Captain of the 2nd crew who had planned the trip on the assumption that crew duty considerations would require the utilisation of both Detatchment crews to complete the days tasking.
-------------------
The BOI concluded that the crew "selected an inappropriate rate of Climb to safely overfly the Mull" Later in their deliberations they concluded that Flt Lt Tapper " made an error of judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull"
In my own opinion (and one that is emphasised throughout the entire RAF); if you find yourself IMC at low level there is only one option - which is a max rate climb on a safe heading to Safety Altitude. Continuing to fly towards the Mull would not be my idea of "a safe heading"
The BOI further concluded that it was likely that the Captain "made an error of judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull"
OC RAF Odiham stated that " the root cause of this accident was that the crew, while operating in poor weather and close to high ground, flew the aircraft into the ground."
It was the AOC who grasped the nettle and stated-
" This sortie was planned to be a low level daytime passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules. Yet when the aircraft crashed it was flying at high speed, well below safety height in cloud in direct contravention of the rules for flight under VFR or IFR."
Now just read those last three paragraphs again.
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K52 - I'm no-one here would disagree that in the event of inadvertant entry to IMC then a climb to safety alt as you describe is the only option. Indeed, some of the evidence (notably relating to engine speed) indicates that this might be exactly what the crew of ZD576 were trying to do. Can you prove otherwise?
As to your other points:
The key word here is likely. Again few would dismiss this as a possibility, but where's the evidence?
OC RAF Odiham was no more in the cockpit that day than you or I, so how on earth can he know for sure?
These are the facts, however there's nothing in that sentence (or the evidence) that proves conclusively, beyond doubt, that the crew were the only cause of the crash.
I say again - there is no evidence to support the conclusion of negligence.
As to your other points:
The BOI further concluded that it was likely that the Captain "made an error of judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull"
OC RAF Odiham stated that " the root cause of this accident was that the crew, while operating in poor weather and close to high ground, flew the aircraft into the ground."
" This sortie was planned to be a low level daytime passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules. Yet when the aircraft crashed it was flying at high speed, well below safety height in cloud in direct contravention of the rules for flight under VFR or IFR."
I say again - there is no evidence to support the conclusion of negligence.
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F D &H
AAIIB could not find any reason for the aircraft flying into the Mull based on the evidence they accumulated from the wreckage site. The evidence from eye witnesses before the crash gave no indication of any problem. There was no Distress call or any indication of any attempt to indicate Distress made by the crew. No distress call was received despite world wide satellite coverage of the international distress frequency
What you are postulating is a massive control failure for which there is no evidence whatsoever. Unless you wish to include AAIB in your conspiracy?
AAIIB could not find any reason for the aircraft flying into the Mull based on the evidence they accumulated from the wreckage site. The evidence from eye witnesses before the crash gave no indication of any problem. There was no Distress call or any indication of any attempt to indicate Distress made by the crew. No distress call was received despite world wide satellite coverage of the international distress frequency
What you are postulating is a massive control failure for which there is no evidence whatsoever. Unless you wish to include AAIB in your conspiracy?
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Ark Royal
“There was no thought in the crew's minds of terrorist threat. Just none.”
Well, after what happened to Airey Neave (very much of the same attitude as that team) someone should have considered a threat from our “friends” – you know, the ones who when challenged about being on the crash site before our services said that they were “…looking for our stuff”. But I agree with FJJP on this, as he says:
“I do not intend to get drawn into any discussion concerning terrorism, sabotage or intelligence - I think that those subjects are inappropriate for an open forum”
– I agree that this thread should be kept to what happened to the flight – but that causes of the crash that could only result from sabotage should not be dismissed off hand – we need to establish what happened and this can lead to other debate elsewhere. For me, the real investigation into what went on only starts with the determination of what happened to the Chinook.
“They would NEVER rely on electronic aids to fly without sight of the ground or water. If they had, then they would have indeed been negligent.”
But they were flying in clear air with the sea and the Mull visible – it was how they were judging the distance off the Mull before starting their turn that I wish to get clarified.
kilo52
“How do you justify the assertion that this was a "milk run"? If that were the case then there would have been a standard Flight Plan. What the BOI were presented with was a photocopy of a map prepared by the Captain of the 2nd crew who had planned the trip on the assumption that crew duty considerations would require the utilisation of both Detatchment crews to complete the days tasking.”
Certainly, I believe that the approach to the Mull and the close in turn to run up the coast was part of a regular flight plan and it is the details for this portion of such a regular flight plan that would be of great interest to many of us. What did the 2nd crew’s map show? – a low level turn up the coast or a climb over? I have said before that at the point that they had changed the waypoint in the TANS – which suggests that they were in control and under no duress at that point – they were already rather too close to make a smooth climb over without perturbing their cruise speed and so I believe that it was their intention to turn up the coast (a common practice). The arguments that they had selected an inappropriate rate of climb etc because they had found themselves in poor visibility are odd – the mist was very close to the ground, forming as the air rose over the Mull (localised on the hazard), and so it would have been too late by then – turning too late was the problem, as I see it.
I recall the question of crew duty hours at the FAI – the OC of Aldergrove (if I recall correctly) stated that they would have been over the ten (?) hours allowed for the NI theatre if going all the way to Ft George and stated that no request for extension was asked. However, they would have been within their hours to get to, say, Macrihanish. I do not know if a short break of a couple of hours would have allowed a continuation later. This, together with the golf equipment, rather suggests that they were going up the coast – I have heard that stopovers on that golf course had been done before.
FJJP
“It is for my son or any other Chinook pilot to decide for themselves whether or not to input opinion to this forum. I discuss it with him occasionally, but the decicision to post is entirely his - I would not presume to influence him one way or the other.” Well, I just suggested that you (or anyone else who had contacts with relevantly experienced aircrew) in effect directed your energies outward to help bring this issue to closure as opposed to getting frustrated arguing here with what limited information we have as I recall that you expressed frustration with this debate.
“Mr Boeing stated the blindingly obvious - OF COURSE THEY JUST CARRIED STRAIGHT ON - …… But then, Boeing are unlikely to commit commercial and financial suicide by admitting that there is a possible problem with one of their products.”
I anticipated this perfectly rational reaction to the quoting of any conclusions by Boeing – but I referred to the analysis by a Mr Mitchel of the Boeing company who in great detail works out the dynamics of the flight from the available data – I highly recommend all interested in this debate to download it – it is also the only written reference that I have come across which raises the question of the TACAN CU being set for ch107 (and this document only came out in 2002, as I recall).
If you have sufficient time and motivation you can follow the calculations through yourself – I found them to be quite reasonable.
The point that I was drawing from this Boeing work is that the a/c had not had time to deviate from its path significantly – it was already at the top end of its cruise speed and would not have been able to get to where it did if it had deviated as there was no reserve of speed to recover to the path on time.
And those comments about control problems (eg “ …rudder freeze”) etc….
It is surely the case that an inherently unstable beast like a helicopter is exercising its controls continuously even to maintain its straight and level flight? – I do not know if an autopilot was involved, though.
All I ask is that we all put or efforts into closing off one aspect that we CAN close off – and that is what was the flight plan and what was the practice for safely executing that close in turn to the Mull in those prevailing conditions.
“There was no thought in the crew's minds of terrorist threat. Just none.”
Well, after what happened to Airey Neave (very much of the same attitude as that team) someone should have considered a threat from our “friends” – you know, the ones who when challenged about being on the crash site before our services said that they were “…looking for our stuff”. But I agree with FJJP on this, as he says:
“I do not intend to get drawn into any discussion concerning terrorism, sabotage or intelligence - I think that those subjects are inappropriate for an open forum”
– I agree that this thread should be kept to what happened to the flight – but that causes of the crash that could only result from sabotage should not be dismissed off hand – we need to establish what happened and this can lead to other debate elsewhere. For me, the real investigation into what went on only starts with the determination of what happened to the Chinook.
“They would NEVER rely on electronic aids to fly without sight of the ground or water. If they had, then they would have indeed been negligent.”
But they were flying in clear air with the sea and the Mull visible – it was how they were judging the distance off the Mull before starting their turn that I wish to get clarified.
kilo52
“How do you justify the assertion that this was a "milk run"? If that were the case then there would have been a standard Flight Plan. What the BOI were presented with was a photocopy of a map prepared by the Captain of the 2nd crew who had planned the trip on the assumption that crew duty considerations would require the utilisation of both Detatchment crews to complete the days tasking.”
Certainly, I believe that the approach to the Mull and the close in turn to run up the coast was part of a regular flight plan and it is the details for this portion of such a regular flight plan that would be of great interest to many of us. What did the 2nd crew’s map show? – a low level turn up the coast or a climb over? I have said before that at the point that they had changed the waypoint in the TANS – which suggests that they were in control and under no duress at that point – they were already rather too close to make a smooth climb over without perturbing their cruise speed and so I believe that it was their intention to turn up the coast (a common practice). The arguments that they had selected an inappropriate rate of climb etc because they had found themselves in poor visibility are odd – the mist was very close to the ground, forming as the air rose over the Mull (localised on the hazard), and so it would have been too late by then – turning too late was the problem, as I see it.
I recall the question of crew duty hours at the FAI – the OC of Aldergrove (if I recall correctly) stated that they would have been over the ten (?) hours allowed for the NI theatre if going all the way to Ft George and stated that no request for extension was asked. However, they would have been within their hours to get to, say, Macrihanish. I do not know if a short break of a couple of hours would have allowed a continuation later. This, together with the golf equipment, rather suggests that they were going up the coast – I have heard that stopovers on that golf course had been done before.
FJJP
“It is for my son or any other Chinook pilot to decide for themselves whether or not to input opinion to this forum. I discuss it with him occasionally, but the decicision to post is entirely his - I would not presume to influence him one way or the other.” Well, I just suggested that you (or anyone else who had contacts with relevantly experienced aircrew) in effect directed your energies outward to help bring this issue to closure as opposed to getting frustrated arguing here with what limited information we have as I recall that you expressed frustration with this debate.
“Mr Boeing stated the blindingly obvious - OF COURSE THEY JUST CARRIED STRAIGHT ON - …… But then, Boeing are unlikely to commit commercial and financial suicide by admitting that there is a possible problem with one of their products.”
I anticipated this perfectly rational reaction to the quoting of any conclusions by Boeing – but I referred to the analysis by a Mr Mitchel of the Boeing company who in great detail works out the dynamics of the flight from the available data – I highly recommend all interested in this debate to download it – it is also the only written reference that I have come across which raises the question of the TACAN CU being set for ch107 (and this document only came out in 2002, as I recall).
If you have sufficient time and motivation you can follow the calculations through yourself – I found them to be quite reasonable.
The point that I was drawing from this Boeing work is that the a/c had not had time to deviate from its path significantly – it was already at the top end of its cruise speed and would not have been able to get to where it did if it had deviated as there was no reserve of speed to recover to the path on time.
And those comments about control problems (eg “ …rudder freeze”) etc….
It is surely the case that an inherently unstable beast like a helicopter is exercising its controls continuously even to maintain its straight and level flight? – I do not know if an autopilot was involved, though.
All I ask is that we all put or efforts into closing off one aspect that we CAN close off – and that is what was the flight plan and what was the practice for safely executing that close in turn to the Mull in those prevailing conditions.
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walter kennedy
The question of crew duty time is, I believe, central to the issue. A "stopover" for a rest would not have solved the problem - it would have exacerbated it. Crew Duty time accummulates from the moment the crew assembles for the Task. It can be extended under clearly defined rules and one extension had already been requested and approved for this task.
What we have is the Captain of this aircraft facing a one sided interview with his Station Commander for breaking the strict rules on Crew Duty and/or nightstopping outside Theatre without the approval of HQ NI. His only option was to complete the task in the least possible time.
The question of crew duty time is, I believe, central to the issue. A "stopover" for a rest would not have solved the problem - it would have exacerbated it. Crew Duty time accummulates from the moment the crew assembles for the Task. It can be extended under clearly defined rules and one extension had already been requested and approved for this task.
What we have is the Captain of this aircraft facing a one sided interview with his Station Commander for breaking the strict rules on Crew Duty and/or nightstopping outside Theatre without the approval of HQ NI. His only option was to complete the task in the least possible time.
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psyclic
A valid point
The crew duty problem was, however, of his own making. Utilising both crews on that day would have obviated the crew duty problem and enabled the crew who were to perform the task to monitor the weather and adjust their flight plan if necessary.
A valid point
The crew duty problem was, however, of his own making. Utilising both crews on that day would have obviated the crew duty problem and enabled the crew who were to perform the task to monitor the weather and adjust their flight plan if necessary.
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K52 - You appear to think that the AAIB ruled out technical issues, however this is emphatically not the case. Please read again the following quotation from the AAIB:
As to your second point, regarding a conspiracy, I am at a loss - what conspiracy?
"Where there is no fault found that does not mean that there was not a fault present. In this case I found it probable that on the engineering side as far as I could see there was not a fault highly relevant to the accident, but I certainly could not dismiss that possibility"
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Hi everyone,
I have to admit to not seeing this, but it was sent to me by Mike Tapper. Article written by James Goffin from The Sun, dated 5 May.
Squadron Banned from Memorial
The Ministry of Defence was last night accused of being "vindicative and disgraceful" in banning an RAF squadron from attending a memorial service for four colleagues killed in action.
Four RAF crew and 25 anti-terrorism experts died in June 1994 when their Chinook helicopter crashed on the Mull of Kintyre.
Families and friends are holding a memorial service to mark the 10th anniversary of the tragedy, but Mike Tapper, whose son Flight Lt Jonathan Tapper was one of the two pilots killed in the crash, says his son's colleagues have been banned from attending the service.
"I have had calls from RAF Odiham, where Jonathan's colleagues are based, and they have been told that no one from No 7 Squadron will be attending the service," said Mr Tapper, who lives at Burnham Market.
"It is a basic tenet of the armed services that they honour their dead. I think it is part of the culture of the MoD under this Secretary of State that things like this happen. It is very upsetting for us and for Jonathan's colleagues."
The circumstances surrounding the crash have been contentious since a 1995 RAF board of inquiry ignored its own initial findings and found Flight Lt Tapper and co-pilot Flight Lt Rick Cook guilty of gross negligence.
A subsequent civil inquiry by Paisley Sheriff Sir Stephen Young and three parliamentary inquiries have all called for that verdict to be overturned, but the Government has refused to budge.
Mr Tapper said: "The MoD claims the memorial service is being used as a campaigning tool, but it is about remembering the 29 people that died.
"It seems that an unworthy coalition of middle-ranking officials has made a knee-jerk reaction."
Last night, former Conservative defence minister James Arbuthnot called on the MoD to explain its actions.
"I was minister at the time of the board of inquiry and defended the report in the House of Commons, but I now feel I have no choice but to speak out against it. Every piece of evidence has shown that it is wrong," he said.
"If it is true that the squadron is not being allowed to go, it is an extremely shameful thing to do. That they may not even be able to remember their friends that were killed in the service of their country is vindictive and disgraceful. These were two pilots at the top of their game."
A spokeswoman for the MoD last night said plans for the memorial service had yet to be confirmed, but would not deny that service personnel at RAF Odiham had been told they could not attend.
"I do not want to get into what has or hasn't been said. We have been told that the details have not yet been finalised, and it is something being run by the families rather than a military affair," she said. "If the squadron wanted to go and all the relatives are OK with that, we would not object."
A private ceremony will be conducted at Odiham on June 2 by the base padre for service personnel.
End
I would certainly hope that individuals are given the freedom of choice over such a sensitive issue. May I point out, again, that these memorials are nothing to do with the campaign. We may be organising a few of them, but we have enough compassion and dignity to separate the two issues. I find it deeply offensive that the MoD try to score such cheap points over this issue.
Anyone with an interest is welcome to attend - irrespective of your opinion of what happened. Let us just meet, to pay our respects to 29 individuals who made the ultimate sacrifice for their country.
My best to you all, as always.
Brian
(No usual quote - to try to prove a point to the MoD)
I have to admit to not seeing this, but it was sent to me by Mike Tapper. Article written by James Goffin from The Sun, dated 5 May.
Squadron Banned from Memorial
The Ministry of Defence was last night accused of being "vindicative and disgraceful" in banning an RAF squadron from attending a memorial service for four colleagues killed in action.
Four RAF crew and 25 anti-terrorism experts died in June 1994 when their Chinook helicopter crashed on the Mull of Kintyre.
Families and friends are holding a memorial service to mark the 10th anniversary of the tragedy, but Mike Tapper, whose son Flight Lt Jonathan Tapper was one of the two pilots killed in the crash, says his son's colleagues have been banned from attending the service.
"I have had calls from RAF Odiham, where Jonathan's colleagues are based, and they have been told that no one from No 7 Squadron will be attending the service," said Mr Tapper, who lives at Burnham Market.
"It is a basic tenet of the armed services that they honour their dead. I think it is part of the culture of the MoD under this Secretary of State that things like this happen. It is very upsetting for us and for Jonathan's colleagues."
The circumstances surrounding the crash have been contentious since a 1995 RAF board of inquiry ignored its own initial findings and found Flight Lt Tapper and co-pilot Flight Lt Rick Cook guilty of gross negligence.
A subsequent civil inquiry by Paisley Sheriff Sir Stephen Young and three parliamentary inquiries have all called for that verdict to be overturned, but the Government has refused to budge.
Mr Tapper said: "The MoD claims the memorial service is being used as a campaigning tool, but it is about remembering the 29 people that died.
"It seems that an unworthy coalition of middle-ranking officials has made a knee-jerk reaction."
Last night, former Conservative defence minister James Arbuthnot called on the MoD to explain its actions.
"I was minister at the time of the board of inquiry and defended the report in the House of Commons, but I now feel I have no choice but to speak out against it. Every piece of evidence has shown that it is wrong," he said.
"If it is true that the squadron is not being allowed to go, it is an extremely shameful thing to do. That they may not even be able to remember their friends that were killed in the service of their country is vindictive and disgraceful. These were two pilots at the top of their game."
A spokeswoman for the MoD last night said plans for the memorial service had yet to be confirmed, but would not deny that service personnel at RAF Odiham had been told they could not attend.
"I do not want to get into what has or hasn't been said. We have been told that the details have not yet been finalised, and it is something being run by the families rather than a military affair," she said. "If the squadron wanted to go and all the relatives are OK with that, we would not object."
A private ceremony will be conducted at Odiham on June 2 by the base padre for service personnel.
End
I would certainly hope that individuals are given the freedom of choice over such a sensitive issue. May I point out, again, that these memorials are nothing to do with the campaign. We may be organising a few of them, but we have enough compassion and dignity to separate the two issues. I find it deeply offensive that the MoD try to score such cheap points over this issue.
Anyone with an interest is welcome to attend - irrespective of your opinion of what happened. Let us just meet, to pay our respects to 29 individuals who made the ultimate sacrifice for their country.
My best to you all, as always.
Brian
(No usual quote - to try to prove a point to the MoD)