Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Lightbob said
<<Are you suggesting that the passengers on the flight were opposed to the peace process that was eventually hammered out?>>
Yes, but this is my conjecture only based on information in the public domain (such as newspapers at the time, a published book, etc).
What I have gathered over time is the following:
1. That the consensus within that group was that a military solution was possible (ie. The IRA terrorism could be fought and won against);
2. They had a major campaign in plan that would have considerably weakened the IRA had it been successfully carried out and consequently would have weakened the IRA’s bargaining position (generally and particularly in the upcoming peace process).
Point (1) above would have needed the will, cooperation, and support of the British institutions which Airey Neave, some years earlier, had questioned immediately before his assassination (he had gone so far as to name proposed new heads for MI5 & MI6 to improve matters). It is of note that specific technical evidence that survived suggested that the bomb that killed Airey Neave was at least in part American. I will not spend time here conjecturing on possible American agendas wrt NI but suggest reading some of the late Enoch Powell's opinions on the subject.
From discussions with people on both “sides”, my feeling is that the result of the crash was profound and opened the way for the American sponsored peace plan with the IRA ceasefire that followed so soon after the crash. Casual comments from others and my intuition suggest to me that one particular aspect of the peace process that this team would never have accepted was the involvement of the IRA whilst still being armed.
Your phrase “…the peace process that was eventually hammered out” – try getting a good deal without your champions present. The integrity of a corner (stone?) of the British nation is being weakened with the peace process as is.
<<Are you suggesting that the passengers on the flight were opposed to the peace process that was eventually hammered out?>>
Yes, but this is my conjecture only based on information in the public domain (such as newspapers at the time, a published book, etc).
What I have gathered over time is the following:
1. That the consensus within that group was that a military solution was possible (ie. The IRA terrorism could be fought and won against);
2. They had a major campaign in plan that would have considerably weakened the IRA had it been successfully carried out and consequently would have weakened the IRA’s bargaining position (generally and particularly in the upcoming peace process).
Point (1) above would have needed the will, cooperation, and support of the British institutions which Airey Neave, some years earlier, had questioned immediately before his assassination (he had gone so far as to name proposed new heads for MI5 & MI6 to improve matters). It is of note that specific technical evidence that survived suggested that the bomb that killed Airey Neave was at least in part American. I will not spend time here conjecturing on possible American agendas wrt NI but suggest reading some of the late Enoch Powell's opinions on the subject.
From discussions with people on both “sides”, my feeling is that the result of the crash was profound and opened the way for the American sponsored peace plan with the IRA ceasefire that followed so soon after the crash. Casual comments from others and my intuition suggest to me that one particular aspect of the peace process that this team would never have accepted was the involvement of the IRA whilst still being armed.
Your phrase “…the peace process that was eventually hammered out” – try getting a good deal without your champions present. The integrity of a corner (stone?) of the British nation is being weakened with the peace process as is.
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I cannot answer for the civilian or the police members of the team. Those in the military would have had a role to advise the senior military staff in NI on options based on the intelligence sources that they would have had access to. Those senior military could then advise the politicians etc etc. My point is that those who died in the crash, Majs and Lt Cols would have been on a 2 year tour (probably due posting to another theatre) and not have had the influence to block a particular governement policy. Very few junior to middle ranking officers have that influence in UK.
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This team as a whole was the one at the coal face, with irreplaceable qualities and experience - the loss was severe. Even the popular press at the time questioned why so important a team was all on one helicopter.
In terms of influence on govt policy, who can block it?
The point is that they could have objected strongly and been a great embarrassment to the govt, they knowing what was and was not possible better than the politicians - and their counsel during negotiations would have been invaluable (to one side at least).
And points 1 & 2 still stand.
Thus I find it strange that sabotage was so lightly dismissed so early by the authorities.
There may well have been no skulduggery on any parties part in this tragedy, but it appears to me that fear of contemplating such is blocking people's minds to objectively determining what actually happened - all I am asking on this thread is that anyone with particular knowledge of this flight confirm the usual flight plan and contingencies and clear up the actual navigation practice in such conditions - and help explain some anomalies (eg the incomplete sequence of radio calls, for example). I am surprised that such basic considerations were not the starting point in the inquiries - the vigour put into distractions and the appalling obfuscation at the inquiries only suggests that there may be something the govt or RAF does not want made public.
Let me put my perspective as simply as I can:
The best analysis I have seen on the flight suggests that the a/c was basically flying straight and level at a high cruise speed, showing no signs of control problems until a vigorous evasive manoeuvre was executed shortly before impact, and controls were as expected to have got the a/c to the attitude that it was in at impact – ie the a/c was under control.
Seems to me that they were closer than they thought and thus navigation should have been the primary issue.
So, after 9 years of exhaustive debate on everything else, let us spend a short time on navigation and put it to bed:
Let us determine, from those who would know, what exactly was the intended path of this flight.
In regard to the frequently occurring localised mist on the Mull, was there any special practice to allow routine flights to continue at low level in close proximity to the Mull?
Were there any special conditions (eg security concerns) that would allow such routine flights to change their status and modify their flight plans (eg go in real close to the headland to mask approach, using such and such prearranged procedure and equipment)? And who would make the decision to apply them.
Let us ask for the complete radio recordings, or a statement from the airspace controller involved explaining the unanswered call, or if it was answered but the recordings withheld let us ask why so and what was said (eg was anything said that could have caused the a/c to something non routine).
That’s it – all it would take to close this aspect. Just to finish off, here is my theory as to what happened:
The intention was to approach the Mull at low level and close in turn up (at waypoint A as referred to in the inquiries) the coast towards Macrihanish (as was common practice for these flights).
They were in control at waypoint A or they would not have been bothering to update their enroute nav (TANS) with a distant waypoint.
Under the prevailing conditions of a ground hugging mist obscuring detail on the Mull, waypoint A was already too close in to safely rely on the Mk1 eyeball for distance off the Mull for starting a safe turn at their high closing speed – and don’t forget that this crew had little faith in the accuracy of the TANS anyway – and yet they carried on.
The only thing that such an experienced and responsible crew would have trusted in to go in so close in such conditions was the good old reliable and accurate TACAN – being just about ahead of them, the Distance Measuring (DME) function would have been an ideal countdown for their turn (don’t forget, they were in clear air until the last moment – it was the judgement of distance off the misty Mull that was the problem – VFR was OK so long as they stayed clear of the localised mist – what a ****** to have to consider IMC for just this one point on the route! – how many times would flight crews on this “milk run” have debated this point?).
ZD576’s TACAN CU was set to ch 107 (Macrihanish DME). They were not supposed to be landing at the aerodrome and had the TANS for en route nav.
Now, readers, what do you think they had that set for?
And it is very, very easy to alter the internal delay in the DME on the ground to give a false reading of, say, 1 mile.
Never mind the detractors, what was the practice on these runs according to the other pilots who made them?
In terms of influence on govt policy, who can block it?
The point is that they could have objected strongly and been a great embarrassment to the govt, they knowing what was and was not possible better than the politicians - and their counsel during negotiations would have been invaluable (to one side at least).
And points 1 & 2 still stand.
Thus I find it strange that sabotage was so lightly dismissed so early by the authorities.
There may well have been no skulduggery on any parties part in this tragedy, but it appears to me that fear of contemplating such is blocking people's minds to objectively determining what actually happened - all I am asking on this thread is that anyone with particular knowledge of this flight confirm the usual flight plan and contingencies and clear up the actual navigation practice in such conditions - and help explain some anomalies (eg the incomplete sequence of radio calls, for example). I am surprised that such basic considerations were not the starting point in the inquiries - the vigour put into distractions and the appalling obfuscation at the inquiries only suggests that there may be something the govt or RAF does not want made public.
Let me put my perspective as simply as I can:
The best analysis I have seen on the flight suggests that the a/c was basically flying straight and level at a high cruise speed, showing no signs of control problems until a vigorous evasive manoeuvre was executed shortly before impact, and controls were as expected to have got the a/c to the attitude that it was in at impact – ie the a/c was under control.
Seems to me that they were closer than they thought and thus navigation should have been the primary issue.
So, after 9 years of exhaustive debate on everything else, let us spend a short time on navigation and put it to bed:
Let us determine, from those who would know, what exactly was the intended path of this flight.
In regard to the frequently occurring localised mist on the Mull, was there any special practice to allow routine flights to continue at low level in close proximity to the Mull?
Were there any special conditions (eg security concerns) that would allow such routine flights to change their status and modify their flight plans (eg go in real close to the headland to mask approach, using such and such prearranged procedure and equipment)? And who would make the decision to apply them.
Let us ask for the complete radio recordings, or a statement from the airspace controller involved explaining the unanswered call, or if it was answered but the recordings withheld let us ask why so and what was said (eg was anything said that could have caused the a/c to something non routine).
That’s it – all it would take to close this aspect. Just to finish off, here is my theory as to what happened:
The intention was to approach the Mull at low level and close in turn up (at waypoint A as referred to in the inquiries) the coast towards Macrihanish (as was common practice for these flights).
They were in control at waypoint A or they would not have been bothering to update their enroute nav (TANS) with a distant waypoint.
Under the prevailing conditions of a ground hugging mist obscuring detail on the Mull, waypoint A was already too close in to safely rely on the Mk1 eyeball for distance off the Mull for starting a safe turn at their high closing speed – and don’t forget that this crew had little faith in the accuracy of the TANS anyway – and yet they carried on.
The only thing that such an experienced and responsible crew would have trusted in to go in so close in such conditions was the good old reliable and accurate TACAN – being just about ahead of them, the Distance Measuring (DME) function would have been an ideal countdown for their turn (don’t forget, they were in clear air until the last moment – it was the judgement of distance off the misty Mull that was the problem – VFR was OK so long as they stayed clear of the localised mist – what a ****** to have to consider IMC for just this one point on the route! – how many times would flight crews on this “milk run” have debated this point?).
ZD576’s TACAN CU was set to ch 107 (Macrihanish DME). They were not supposed to be landing at the aerodrome and had the TANS for en route nav.
Now, readers, what do you think they had that set for?
And it is very, very easy to alter the internal delay in the DME on the ground to give a false reading of, say, 1 mile.
Never mind the detractors, what was the practice on these runs according to the other pilots who made them?
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kilo 52
Yes and although maybe not on this site, hopefully someone who does visit here could get motivated and make contact.
The same goes for any aircrew that flew this route - after all I believe that it was regular in terms of the low level approach and close in turn (eg when we were standing halfway between the lighthouse and the crash site,the lighthousekeeper told me, when a helo passed unseen but close overhead in near identical conditions, "...they do that all the time...") - anyone who visits this site and could draw their attention to this debate would be doing their bit.
Yes and although maybe not on this site, hopefully someone who does visit here could get motivated and make contact.
The same goes for any aircrew that flew this route - after all I believe that it was regular in terms of the low level approach and close in turn (eg when we were standing halfway between the lighthouse and the crash site,the lighthousekeeper told me, when a helo passed unseen but close overhead in near identical conditions, "...they do that all the time...") - anyone who visits this site and could draw their attention to this debate would be doing their bit.
Avoid imitations
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Something to bear in mind re radio calls. The crew were under NO obligation to make radio calls and would have not expected ATC instructions of any sort. In the military the general principle in any event on such flights is to fly round everything and speak to who ever can give the best service, probably expecting just a flight information service at best.
They were flying at low level on an operational flight (it is politically incorrect to call the NI situation at that time a civil war) and had no option to climb into the prevailing icing conditions because of the limitations of this unserviceable airframe / uncleared type which was grounded the previous day by the MOD test pilots responsible for giving the aircraft a Release to Service. The Boscombe Down test pilots refused to fly the Mk 2 airframe in their charge 10 minutes up the road to RAF Odiham for servicing. Draw your own conclusions....
They were flying at low level on an operational flight (it is politically incorrect to call the NI situation at that time a civil war) and had no option to climb into the prevailing icing conditions because of the limitations of this unserviceable airframe / uncleared type which was grounded the previous day by the MOD test pilots responsible for giving the aircraft a Release to Service. The Boscombe Down test pilots refused to fly the Mk 2 airframe in their charge 10 minutes up the road to RAF Odiham for servicing. Draw your own conclusions....
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ST,
A driver on the Aldergrove-Carnlough-Kintyre flightpath got quite a shock when he saw a Chinook coming straight at him near Parkgate at more or less hedge top height. Around the same time up on the north coast near Portrush another Chinook on a different flightpath skimmed a low ridge. John Spellar's reply to William Ross that there was only one Chinook in flight has yet to be corrected and the identity and role of the Portrush Chinook have yet to be established.
In light of your comments about the state of the Mk2 Chinooks on June 1 you must have been surprised that the ZD576 Mk2 was flown over to Northern Ireland on May 31, the first MK2 to be based at Aldergrove. If I remember correctly this helicopter had just been upgraded in the US a few weeks earlier. JATOC claimed that on May 31 he had recommended the use of two Pumas for the transit but this was changed on June 1 to one Chinook.
A driver on the Aldergrove-Carnlough-Kintyre flightpath got quite a shock when he saw a Chinook coming straight at him near Parkgate at more or less hedge top height. Around the same time up on the north coast near Portrush another Chinook on a different flightpath skimmed a low ridge. John Spellar's reply to William Ross that there was only one Chinook in flight has yet to be corrected and the identity and role of the Portrush Chinook have yet to be established.
In light of your comments about the state of the Mk2 Chinooks on June 1 you must have been surprised that the ZD576 Mk2 was flown over to Northern Ireland on May 31, the first MK2 to be based at Aldergrove. If I remember correctly this helicopter had just been upgraded in the US a few weeks earlier. JATOC claimed that on May 31 he had recommended the use of two Pumas for the transit but this was changed on June 1 to one Chinook.
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Ben,
Two Pumas would have made infinitely more sense, especially in view of the importance of the pax.
I still firmly believe that someone above station level was trying to make a political statement by ordering this very important flight in this particular aircraft. The statement was probably supposed to show that the Mk2 was perfectly safe in spite of what was being said by the people that flew them, including Boscombe Down's test pilots.
It went tragically wrong and in an attempt to put a lid on this dreadful management mistake, the crew got the blame.
Two Pumas would have made infinitely more sense, especially in view of the importance of the pax.
I still firmly believe that someone above station level was trying to make a political statement by ordering this very important flight in this particular aircraft. The statement was probably supposed to show that the Mk2 was perfectly safe in spite of what was being said by the people that flew them, including Boscombe Down's test pilots.
It went tragically wrong and in an attempt to put a lid on this dreadful management mistake, the crew got the blame.
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Ben,
No, I can't explain it, but the RAF might still have archived authorisation sheets, detailing who was flying where on that day. It's probably a vain hope after all this time. Although I know that used auth. sheets were retained by all squadrons, I can't remember how long for and I'm not sure if the data is in the public domain, if you know what I mean.
But I'm not sure what the relevance of another aircraft would be.
No, I can't explain it, but the RAF might still have archived authorisation sheets, detailing who was flying where on that day. It's probably a vain hope after all this time. Although I know that used auth. sheets were retained by all squadrons, I can't remember how long for and I'm not sure if the data is in the public domain, if you know what I mean.
But I'm not sure what the relevance of another aircraft would be.
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Ben,
It may well be that your witness saw a Helicopter at that time and place but what type of Helicopter is a matter of speculation.
It is not unknown for "eyewitnesses" to convince themselves that what they saw was "the one" involved in the particular incident.
ps welcome back
W K
"The root cause of this accident is that the crew while operating in poor weather and close to high ground flew the aircraft into the ground." OC RAF ODIHAM
"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre" BOI para16e
Oh - incidentally
I always understood that the Boscombe Pilots DID NOT refuse to fly the Chinook but that pre - planned maintenance was brought forward whilst awaiting further data to arrive to enable icing trials to be carried out.
It may well be that your witness saw a Helicopter at that time and place but what type of Helicopter is a matter of speculation.
It is not unknown for "eyewitnesses" to convince themselves that what they saw was "the one" involved in the particular incident.
ps welcome back
W K
"The root cause of this accident is that the crew while operating in poor weather and close to high ground flew the aircraft into the ground." OC RAF ODIHAM
"The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre" BOI para16e
Oh - incidentally
I always understood that the Boscombe Pilots DID NOT refuse to fly the Chinook but that pre - planned maintenance was brought forward whilst awaiting further data to arrive to enable icing trials to be carried out.
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ST
Wrt your posting 12 April:
BUT the a/c DID make a call – surely you are not saying that the ground controller could be so ambivalent about responding? This matter should be examined fully as I explained earlier.
Secondly, you rightly say that there was no option to climb, etc BUT this is not the point – I believe that there was a regular flight plan (for the typical milk run) for this bit whereby a close in approach was made to the Mull and thence up the coast (this was also suggested by one of the witnesses at one of the inquiries) and therefore it was not an unusual situation for such an aircraft to be in (coming in close and turning up the coast at low level) – let us be clear about this, they were not being constrained by limitations on that particular aircraft to stay low – it was their intention. It was not that they had left insufficient time to climb over the Mull – they were late making a small left turn. They were intending to go in close before the turn – they just went too close.
. It may well have been that, due to operational considerations, they were to come in particularly close; that is as the pax were such a potential target that the a/c should use the terrain to mask its approach. Way back when I originally made this assumption, I had suggested that they may have used DME for judging the close in turning point but repeatedly got the simplistic reply that it was not an operational flight and therefore would not deviate from the flying regs (VFR vs IMC) and therefore would not rely on DME (in this case a function of the TACAN) when at low level flying visual; I am thankful, therefore, to you for your comment that it was, effectively, an operational flight.
Again I call for pilots who did this run to come forward and clear up this issue of what was the practice – if you know someone, lean on them!
Wrt your posting 12 April:
BUT the a/c DID make a call – surely you are not saying that the ground controller could be so ambivalent about responding? This matter should be examined fully as I explained earlier.
Secondly, you rightly say that there was no option to climb, etc BUT this is not the point – I believe that there was a regular flight plan (for the typical milk run) for this bit whereby a close in approach was made to the Mull and thence up the coast (this was also suggested by one of the witnesses at one of the inquiries) and therefore it was not an unusual situation for such an aircraft to be in (coming in close and turning up the coast at low level) – let us be clear about this, they were not being constrained by limitations on that particular aircraft to stay low – it was their intention. It was not that they had left insufficient time to climb over the Mull – they were late making a small left turn. They were intending to go in close before the turn – they just went too close.
. It may well have been that, due to operational considerations, they were to come in particularly close; that is as the pax were such a potential target that the a/c should use the terrain to mask its approach. Way back when I originally made this assumption, I had suggested that they may have used DME for judging the close in turning point but repeatedly got the simplistic reply that it was not an operational flight and therefore would not deviate from the flying regs (VFR vs IMC) and therefore would not rely on DME (in this case a function of the TACAN) when at low level flying visual; I am thankful, therefore, to you for your comment that it was, effectively, an operational flight.
Again I call for pilots who did this run to come forward and clear up this issue of what was the practice – if you know someone, lean on them!
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Kilo52,
The helicopter seen near Portrush had twin rotors and a patchwork quilt type camouflage. Surely that's a Chinook. The patches appeared to be about 3 to 4 feet in size. Sorry I can't give you the colours but I'm colour blind. I think I'd probably recognize the pattern if I saw it.
The helicopter seen near Portrush had twin rotors and a patchwork quilt type camouflage. Surely that's a Chinook. The patches appeared to be about 3 to 4 feet in size. Sorry I can't give you the colours but I'm colour blind. I think I'd probably recognize the pattern if I saw it.
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Ben,
Crews flying at low level under VFR are not obliged to make radio calls to ATC unless requiring to penetrate controlled airspace. I did not intend to infer that they should not have made such a call, or that it was imperative that it was answered. What I hoped to make clear was that it was probably not a major surprise at the time for no reply to be received to a routine call made from low level. Comms at low level are often sporadic due to terrain masking. An aircraft in distress would certainly make a call, but during an inadvertant entry into IMC (if this did in fact happen) a call would no doubt be made at the appropriate time, in order to obtain a radar service or whatever assistance was required by the Captain. The immediate priority and a pilot's gut instinct would normally be to climb as rapidly as possible and / or turn away from relevant obstructions. It is possible the crew had a problem, there were two pieces of evidence to suggest this, namely the transponder setting, which had been changed to include a "7" (7700=Mayday) and the co-pilot's intercom, which was found in the emergency position, as if the normal system had failed. It is possible that a lack of intercom at a critical time was a factor, but this will never be known.
The last person to see the aircraft in flight was the yachtsman, who said that the aircraft was flying slowly enough for him to think it might be involved in a SAR, as if searching the surface of the sea. What none of us can understand is how the aircraft went from low speed in VMC to very high speed, in a climb, towards high ground, probably then in IMC. It makes absolutely NO sense for a crew to normally do this, normally speed is converted to height.
However, an engine runaway up would require the pilot's full attention and very rapid intervention. To contain the rotor RPM within structural limits, a great deal of collective pitch needs to be applied without a second's delay. This WOULD result in a rapid acceleration. A pilot's initial reaction would be to try to keep the aircraft in VMC, especially so in this case, without an icing clearance, but in marginal VMC conditions that could prove impossible.
I am NOT saying I believe this occurred, no-one ever has, but it is just as likely a scenario as any other supposition. It is known for FADEC problems to occur in flight (not only on this aircraft type) and subsequently leave no evidence once electrical power has been removed from the aircraft. I understand some engine runaways had already occurred on the MK2 and one aircraft in the USA had been severely damaged on the ground. It is now known that MOD were suing Boeing because the FADEC software was of dubious integrity. To complicate the issue, it had been written in an obsolescent programming language, which made changes extremely difficult. This latter fact was not revealed by MOD until well after the BOI (and well after the crew had been deemed Grossly Negligent).
K52,
My recollection is that during the HOL inquiry, Sqn Ldr Bob Burke, the RAF Odiham UTP, stated that he was detailed to bring the aircraft back to Odiham for maintenance because at that time no-one at Boscombe was prepared to fly the type again, even for 10 minutes to Odiham, until uncertainties about the engine software were resolved.
I have NO wish to re-convene the BOI. There is no need, in my opinion. That isn't why this thread is here.
The RAF's Board of Inquiry found that there was not sufficient evidence to determine the cause. The original findings (verdict) of the BOI, as convened by the RAF, consisted of Chinook pilots and other very experienced Support Helicopter pilots, were not accepted and overturned by two officers higher up the chain of command. Without firm evidence and without further investigation, the pilots were deemed to be Grossly Negligent.
This was against the RAF's normal procedure, as the officers concerned had perished in the accident and could not defend themselves against the allegation.
One of those two officers, when asked to explain his reason for disregarding the findings of the BOI, arrogantly retorted that the President of the BOI (who was a Wing Commander Chinook pilot of some 19 years service and well experienced in the NI theatre) was "a relatively inexperienced pilot and officer" or words to that effect. One can only wonder why he was promoted at all in that case (actually I know Wg Cdr Pulford of old, in no way could he be described as such, he was well respected and undoubtedly still is).
I have seen, read or heard nothing to change my original viewpoint that this crew, or any other, should not have been found guilty of manslaughter in the absence of actual EVIDENCE to prove it.
I remain convinced that this sorry affair was motivated by a political desire to divert attention away from the flawed decision to put this suspect type of aircraft into service BEFORE it was proved airworthy, as required by the normal RAF and MOD prodedure. Who made that decision has never been revealed.
Any amount of supposition, theorising or pontificating cannot compensate for lack of EVIDENCE. I think Brian Dixon will confirm that he placed the thread not so much to determine the cause but to fight against the unjust placing of the blame.
No apology offered for reiterating this yet again.
Crews flying at low level under VFR are not obliged to make radio calls to ATC unless requiring to penetrate controlled airspace. I did not intend to infer that they should not have made such a call, or that it was imperative that it was answered. What I hoped to make clear was that it was probably not a major surprise at the time for no reply to be received to a routine call made from low level. Comms at low level are often sporadic due to terrain masking. An aircraft in distress would certainly make a call, but during an inadvertant entry into IMC (if this did in fact happen) a call would no doubt be made at the appropriate time, in order to obtain a radar service or whatever assistance was required by the Captain. The immediate priority and a pilot's gut instinct would normally be to climb as rapidly as possible and / or turn away from relevant obstructions. It is possible the crew had a problem, there were two pieces of evidence to suggest this, namely the transponder setting, which had been changed to include a "7" (7700=Mayday) and the co-pilot's intercom, which was found in the emergency position, as if the normal system had failed. It is possible that a lack of intercom at a critical time was a factor, but this will never be known.
The last person to see the aircraft in flight was the yachtsman, who said that the aircraft was flying slowly enough for him to think it might be involved in a SAR, as if searching the surface of the sea. What none of us can understand is how the aircraft went from low speed in VMC to very high speed, in a climb, towards high ground, probably then in IMC. It makes absolutely NO sense for a crew to normally do this, normally speed is converted to height.
However, an engine runaway up would require the pilot's full attention and very rapid intervention. To contain the rotor RPM within structural limits, a great deal of collective pitch needs to be applied without a second's delay. This WOULD result in a rapid acceleration. A pilot's initial reaction would be to try to keep the aircraft in VMC, especially so in this case, without an icing clearance, but in marginal VMC conditions that could prove impossible.
I am NOT saying I believe this occurred, no-one ever has, but it is just as likely a scenario as any other supposition. It is known for FADEC problems to occur in flight (not only on this aircraft type) and subsequently leave no evidence once electrical power has been removed from the aircraft. I understand some engine runaways had already occurred on the MK2 and one aircraft in the USA had been severely damaged on the ground. It is now known that MOD were suing Boeing because the FADEC software was of dubious integrity. To complicate the issue, it had been written in an obsolescent programming language, which made changes extremely difficult. This latter fact was not revealed by MOD until well after the BOI (and well after the crew had been deemed Grossly Negligent).
K52,
My recollection is that during the HOL inquiry, Sqn Ldr Bob Burke, the RAF Odiham UTP, stated that he was detailed to bring the aircraft back to Odiham for maintenance because at that time no-one at Boscombe was prepared to fly the type again, even for 10 minutes to Odiham, until uncertainties about the engine software were resolved.
I have NO wish to re-convene the BOI. There is no need, in my opinion. That isn't why this thread is here.
The RAF's Board of Inquiry found that there was not sufficient evidence to determine the cause. The original findings (verdict) of the BOI, as convened by the RAF, consisted of Chinook pilots and other very experienced Support Helicopter pilots, were not accepted and overturned by two officers higher up the chain of command. Without firm evidence and without further investigation, the pilots were deemed to be Grossly Negligent.
This was against the RAF's normal procedure, as the officers concerned had perished in the accident and could not defend themselves against the allegation.
One of those two officers, when asked to explain his reason for disregarding the findings of the BOI, arrogantly retorted that the President of the BOI (who was a Wing Commander Chinook pilot of some 19 years service and well experienced in the NI theatre) was "a relatively inexperienced pilot and officer" or words to that effect. One can only wonder why he was promoted at all in that case (actually I know Wg Cdr Pulford of old, in no way could he be described as such, he was well respected and undoubtedly still is).
I have seen, read or heard nothing to change my original viewpoint that this crew, or any other, should not have been found guilty of manslaughter in the absence of actual EVIDENCE to prove it.
I remain convinced that this sorry affair was motivated by a political desire to divert attention away from the flawed decision to put this suspect type of aircraft into service BEFORE it was proved airworthy, as required by the normal RAF and MOD prodedure. Who made that decision has never been revealed.
Any amount of supposition, theorising or pontificating cannot compensate for lack of EVIDENCE. I think Brian Dixon will confirm that he placed the thread not so much to determine the cause but to fight against the unjust placing of the blame.
No apology offered for reiterating this yet again.
Last edited by ShyTorque; 13th Apr 2004 at 20:43.
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The BOI found that the forecast weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre.
When the aircraft was last seen in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre it was not being flown in accordance with IFR. The aircraft crashed at high speed whilst the crew attempted to fly VFR in unsuitable conditions which had been forecast.
It is difficult to conceive of any verdict other than that arrived at by the AOC.
The BOI found that the forecast weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre.
When the aircraft was last seen in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre it was not being flown in accordance with IFR. The aircraft crashed at high speed whilst the crew attempted to fly VFR in unsuitable conditions which had been forecast.
It is difficult to conceive of any verdict other than that arrived at by the AOC.
"When the aircraft was last seen in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre it was not being flown in accordance with IFR."
That might have been the opinion formed as a result of comments made by an inexpert witness. It is NOT sufficient proof for the verdict passed by Wratten and Day.
That might have been the opinion formed as a result of comments made by an inexpert witness. It is NOT sufficient proof for the verdict passed by Wratten and Day.
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"When the aircraft was last seen in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre it was not being flown in accordance with IFR".
By definition, if the aircraft could be seen, it would have been clear of cloud and in sight of the surface. That is all that is required for a helicopter, even by civilian rules. Military rules are even less stringent. RAF aircraft have been flown for years in similar weather conditions. I spent 3 years on my first tour in a theatre where a 100' cloudbase and 500m visibility was deemed acceptable for day VFR ops.
The aircraft was unsuitable for IFR. The crew knew this and so did the higher authority that mandated the flight to be flown in a MK2. The crew asked to use a MK1 that was IFR capable. They didn't get one.
I can only conclude that this was an accident caused by bad management, if ever there was one. Unfortunately that same management was allowed to protect itself by allocating ALL blame elswhere.
K52, You and I will never agree. You are prepared to accept that a crew should be found guilty of manslaughter despite the lack of conclusive evidence. I am not.
By definition, if the aircraft could be seen, it would have been clear of cloud and in sight of the surface. That is all that is required for a helicopter, even by civilian rules. Military rules are even less stringent. RAF aircraft have been flown for years in similar weather conditions. I spent 3 years on my first tour in a theatre where a 100' cloudbase and 500m visibility was deemed acceptable for day VFR ops.
The aircraft was unsuitable for IFR. The crew knew this and so did the higher authority that mandated the flight to be flown in a MK2. The crew asked to use a MK1 that was IFR capable. They didn't get one.
I can only conclude that this was an accident caused by bad management, if ever there was one. Unfortunately that same management was allowed to protect itself by allocating ALL blame elswhere.
K52, You and I will never agree. You are prepared to accept that a crew should be found guilty of manslaughter despite the lack of conclusive evidence. I am not.
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Apparently there were two Chinooks based at Aldergrove on a staggered 6 week rotation. The ZD576 was the first Mk2 to be based in NI and it was flown in on May 31 two days before the crash. I've been told that the 1991-1994 tasking records were destroyed about three weeks before Christmas 2000 which funnily enough more or less coincides with my report of the Portrush Chinook on PPrune.
Mrs Bellchambers in a letter dated 19 September 2002 claimed that one of the two Mk1s based at Aldergrove was returned to RAF Odiham on May 31. She also reported that the remaining Mk1 was 'not in service on 2 June 1994'. The ZD576, a Mk2 with single-tone dark green camouflage, was definitely not the Chinook seen near Portrush. 'There were no Mk1 Chinooks (which have a "patchwork camouflage") or any other RAF Chinooks flying in Northern Ireland on 2 June'.
If the Portrush Chinook with its military camouflage wasn't an RAF Chinook who might it have belonged to? Why wasn't the remaining Mk1 at Aldergrove used?
Apparently there were two Chinooks based at Aldergrove on a staggered 6 week rotation. The ZD576 was the first Mk2 to be based in NI and it was flown in on May 31 two days before the crash. I've been told that the 1991-1994 tasking records were destroyed about three weeks before Christmas 2000 which funnily enough more or less coincides with my report of the Portrush Chinook on PPrune.
Mrs Bellchambers in a letter dated 19 September 2002 claimed that one of the two Mk1s based at Aldergrove was returned to RAF Odiham on May 31. She also reported that the remaining Mk1 was 'not in service on 2 June 1994'. The ZD576, a Mk2 with single-tone dark green camouflage, was definitely not the Chinook seen near Portrush. 'There were no Mk1 Chinooks (which have a "patchwork camouflage") or any other RAF Chinooks flying in Northern Ireland on 2 June'.
If the Portrush Chinook with its military camouflage wasn't an RAF Chinook who might it have belonged to? Why wasn't the remaining Mk1 at Aldergrove used?
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Ben,
I can't help you in respect of other aircraft that were flying at the time. If the official authorisation sheet records have been destroyed, then it will never be known unless a pilot with the record of the flight in his personal logbook comes forward.
I understand there were no serviceable Mk1s available at the time. I think this was declared in the evidence given to the HOL inquiry.
Shame the pax weren't just moved to a civvy flight, or any other with an IFR capability. The fact that it wasn't says something of the mentality of those ordering the flight. No "loss of face" allowed and all that.
I think it was Mr Day who stated that as far as he was concerned the gross negligence was committed before the flight took off. That is something I could agree with but at least some of the responsibility for what happened that sad day was almost certainly not the crew's.
Something that was never really examined is why the flight was allowed by the duty supervisor at Aldergrove, in view of the weather, limitations of the type and unserviceability of this aircraft.
The biggest mistake the crew made was taking off. They were put in an unenviable situation by severe management pressure but in my opinion they were just trying to get the job done, as ordered. That the senior management took a big step backwards when the flight safety chain broke while they were pulling at least one end, is appalling.
I can't help you in respect of other aircraft that were flying at the time. If the official authorisation sheet records have been destroyed, then it will never be known unless a pilot with the record of the flight in his personal logbook comes forward.
I understand there were no serviceable Mk1s available at the time. I think this was declared in the evidence given to the HOL inquiry.
Shame the pax weren't just moved to a civvy flight, or any other with an IFR capability. The fact that it wasn't says something of the mentality of those ordering the flight. No "loss of face" allowed and all that.
I think it was Mr Day who stated that as far as he was concerned the gross negligence was committed before the flight took off. That is something I could agree with but at least some of the responsibility for what happened that sad day was almost certainly not the crew's.
Something that was never really examined is why the flight was allowed by the duty supervisor at Aldergrove, in view of the weather, limitations of the type and unserviceability of this aircraft.
The biggest mistake the crew made was taking off. They were put in an unenviable situation by severe management pressure but in my opinion they were just trying to get the job done, as ordered. That the senior management took a big step backwards when the flight safety chain broke while they were pulling at least one end, is appalling.
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Apart from some cloud on top of the Mull was the weather not quite reasonable? Near Portrush the sky was a little darker than usual following some heavy early afternoon rain but visiblity seemed quite good. The Chinook ZD576 should have been able to veer a few degrees to port as it approached the lighthouse and continue flying at the same height.
I was reminded of the Kintyre crash when I read www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/3/1/223707] and this brief passage from the Guarino report:
"Velji Do, Croatia, 2:58 Pm.:
Everyone in this tiny collection of stone huts at the base of Sveti Ivan hears a plane go directly overhead in the clouds, then power its engines mightily for one instant.
Aboard the plane, the klaxon of its ground-proximity warning device suddenly blares, jolting Captain Davis. He immediately jerks the plane upward and to the left.
The two to three seconds of warning are far too little. The plane’s left wingtip touches ground, spinning it directly into the rocky hillside, making an earth-shaking explosion. There is the crackling hiss of a huge fireball as the plane and its large load of fuel burn. Then a dead silence in the mist."
Apart from some cloud on top of the Mull was the weather not quite reasonable? Near Portrush the sky was a little darker than usual following some heavy early afternoon rain but visiblity seemed quite good. The Chinook ZD576 should have been able to veer a few degrees to port as it approached the lighthouse and continue flying at the same height.
I was reminded of the Kintyre crash when I read www.newsmax.com/articles/?a=1999/3/1/223707] and this brief passage from the Guarino report:
"Velji Do, Croatia, 2:58 Pm.:
Everyone in this tiny collection of stone huts at the base of Sveti Ivan hears a plane go directly overhead in the clouds, then power its engines mightily for one instant.
Aboard the plane, the klaxon of its ground-proximity warning device suddenly blares, jolting Captain Davis. He immediately jerks the plane upward and to the left.
The two to three seconds of warning are far too little. The plane’s left wingtip touches ground, spinning it directly into the rocky hillside, making an earth-shaking explosion. There is the crackling hiss of a huge fireball as the plane and its large load of fuel burn. Then a dead silence in the mist."
Last edited by Ben Leice; 16th Apr 2004 at 09:50.
