Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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dalek
Re your post 7901.
It seems evident that you are not familiar with the BOI. Flt Lts Tapper and Cook planned to do all the flying task that day - which is why they were flying the fateful sortie having already been On Duty for more than 9 hrs. The other crew had the RN Exchange Pilot (with limited experience of the Chinook) crewed with an RAF Navigator.
Re your post 7901.
It seems evident that you are not familiar with the BOI. Flt Lts Tapper and Cook planned to do all the flying task that day - which is why they were flying the fateful sortie having already been On Duty for more than 9 hrs. The other crew had the RN Exchange Pilot (with limited experience of the Chinook) crewed with an RAF Navigator.
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Quite right Caz.
It is sixteen years since I saw the BOI. I had to sign it out in the Adj's Office and read it there and then. I have never seen it since.
What I do remember is that I never saw any concerns over crew duty or crewing by the Board or Reviewing Officers. I accept I may have missed / forgotten something. If so I stand corrected.
I have read recently the findings of the HOL committee and the FAI. Again I find no concerns over Crew Composition or CDT.
If all of the above bodies have failed to find CDT or Crew Comp an issue, why do you continue to raise them?
It is sixteen years since I saw the BOI. I had to sign it out in the Adj's Office and read it there and then. I have never seen it since.
What I do remember is that I never saw any concerns over crew duty or crewing by the Board or Reviewing Officers. I accept I may have missed / forgotten something. If so I stand corrected.
I have read recently the findings of the HOL committee and the FAI. Again I find no concerns over Crew Composition or CDT.
If all of the above bodies have failed to find CDT or Crew Comp an issue, why do you continue to raise them?
Last edited by dalek; 19th Jun 2011 at 10:11.
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dalek
<<Equipment fitted does not mean equipment used.>>
My analysis predicted the use of such kit before I had it confirmed that it was fitted (from several sources now, Tuc); the mentioning of routine NAVEXs was to remind you all that it would not be unusual to stick an exercise into such a flight; I sat in the FAI for a time and the question of duty time most certainly did come up (when CO Aldergrove being questioned); Flt Lt Tapper did do some persuading (Stangroom? - apologies can't look it up just now) where he stated something like his crew had trained/planned "extensively" for it - further, a witness at one of the other inquiries referred to it as a training flight only to blurt out that all flights could have an element of training when surprise was expressed that any training would be undertaken with such passengers on board; it was an ideal location and conditions were ideal to demonstrate CPLS utility; there were personnel stationed at Mac at the time who were well versed with PRC112 handsets and so would be ideal to help out with demo; of course, someone higher up would have to have put it together and we wait eagerly for that person to come forward or otherwise be identified.
SFFP
The proof is the interpretation of the available data which I could not get smaller than an 80+ page report and supporting illustrating video lasting 50+ minutes - if you go through my posts you may see how several particular points are justified - otherwise you may have to wait for the public release of the report (after inquiry has finished).
<<Equipment fitted does not mean equipment used.>>
My analysis predicted the use of such kit before I had it confirmed that it was fitted (from several sources now, Tuc); the mentioning of routine NAVEXs was to remind you all that it would not be unusual to stick an exercise into such a flight; I sat in the FAI for a time and the question of duty time most certainly did come up (when CO Aldergrove being questioned); Flt Lt Tapper did do some persuading (Stangroom? - apologies can't look it up just now) where he stated something like his crew had trained/planned "extensively" for it - further, a witness at one of the other inquiries referred to it as a training flight only to blurt out that all flights could have an element of training when surprise was expressed that any training would be undertaken with such passengers on board; it was an ideal location and conditions were ideal to demonstrate CPLS utility; there were personnel stationed at Mac at the time who were well versed with PRC112 handsets and so would be ideal to help out with demo; of course, someone higher up would have to have put it together and we wait eagerly for that person to come forward or otherwise be identified.
SFFP
The proof is the interpretation of the available data which I could not get smaller than an 80+ page report and supporting illustrating video lasting 50+ minutes - if you go through my posts you may see how several particular points are justified - otherwise you may have to wait for the public release of the report (after inquiry has finished).
Walter
Quite right to mention training.
The available evidence shows the status of the aircraft clearance was for training and familiarisation only (which is a formal programme phase, before operational use commences; although there can be overlap). In late May 1994 ACAS had sought to extend this, whereby aircrew were not permitted to rely on any Nav or Comms in the aircraft. Not that aircrew were told this.
This is what makes the question of flying pax so relevant. The regs don’t actually say not to do this, because they rather assume no-one in their right mind would have broken quite so many regulations to get to a point where a Mk2 was at Aldergrove.
Note this is a different issue from that of flying all VIP pax in one aircraft. Had the clearance permitted this, or if they’d used a Mk1, I’d still say it was somewhat risky, but that is just my opinion.
Quite right to mention training.
The available evidence shows the status of the aircraft clearance was for training and familiarisation only (which is a formal programme phase, before operational use commences; although there can be overlap). In late May 1994 ACAS had sought to extend this, whereby aircrew were not permitted to rely on any Nav or Comms in the aircraft. Not that aircrew were told this.
This is what makes the question of flying pax so relevant. The regs don’t actually say not to do this, because they rather assume no-one in their right mind would have broken quite so many regulations to get to a point where a Mk2 was at Aldergrove.
Note this is a different issue from that of flying all VIP pax in one aircraft. Had the clearance permitted this, or if they’d used a Mk1, I’d still say it was somewhat risky, but that is just my opinion.
SFFP:
Could I please make that three of us perplexed and curious as to your motives caz? JP's have become clearer as the thread has progressed, but yours remain an enigma. Given that you were a Group Flight Safety Staff Officer, and a Senior one at that, in the period following the accident and publication of the AOC's and AOC-in-C's Finding, you would have been privy to the ensuing staffing and directives. As such you could shine much light onto this tragedy and its aftermath. I do not expect you to fall foul of the OSA, but the pre-occupation of many of us here is to prevent such a tragedy recurring, ie the very Raison d'Étre of your then job. Or was it? I only ask because all we get from you is speculation on pilot performance, whether it be due to supposed malnutrition or Duty Hours pressure. Now I see that CRM has been thrown into the ring, everything indeed other than the tangible Gross Unairworthiness of the aircraft itself. The BoI didn't want to go there. Wratten and Day didn't want to go there. The MOD don't want to go there. Neither it seems do you. Why is that caz? Are you more concerned with Reputation than with Safety and if so, whose? Any response would be welcome if only to set our minds at rest.
Originally Posted by dalek
Quite right Caz.
If all of the above bodies have failed to find CDT or Crew Comp an issue, why do you continue to raise them?
Quite right Caz.
If all of the above bodies have failed to find CDT or Crew Comp an issue, why do you continue to raise them?
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SFFP
The proof is the interpretation of the available data which I could not get smaller than an 80+ page report and supporting illustrating video lasting 50+ minutes - if you go through my posts you may see how several particular points are justified - otherwise you may have to wait for the public release of the report (after inquiry has finished).
The proof is the interpretation of the available data which I could not get smaller than an 80+ page report and supporting illustrating video lasting 50+ minutes - if you go through my posts you may see how several particular points are justified - otherwise you may have to wait for the public release of the report (after inquiry has finished).
Surely after all these years of you contributing in here someone must have come forward with the smoking gun that proves you correct, surely
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Like the evidence that the a/c was not airworthy? (Despite the enormous number of people pushing that line.) What fault have they discovered?
At least I have had a result (and that took so many years) - I would have thought that uncovering a location equipment fit that had not been considered at any of the preceding inquiries was of some merit.
I have explained how the use of that equipment could have caused the crash, consistent with all the known data - and yet the very existence of it has been covered up for so many years - surely enough to discredit the verdict against the pilots.
If you are capable and willing you yourself can reconstruct the last leg of this flight from the available data which constitutes evidence that there was a deliberate approach to a particular point on the Mull - which has not been acknowledged at any previous inquiry and which now should lead to questioning of anyone who would have had involvement with the planning of any activity beyond the declared ferry flight.
At least I have had a result (and that took so many years) - I would have thought that uncovering a location equipment fit that had not been considered at any of the preceding inquiries was of some merit.
I have explained how the use of that equipment could have caused the crash, consistent with all the known data - and yet the very existence of it has been covered up for so many years - surely enough to discredit the verdict against the pilots.
If you are capable and willing you yourself can reconstruct the last leg of this flight from the available data which constitutes evidence that there was a deliberate approach to a particular point on the Mull - which has not been acknowledged at any previous inquiry and which now should lead to questioning of anyone who would have had involvement with the planning of any activity beyond the declared ferry flight.
Walter
having taken you off the ignore list to examine the posts replied to by others, may I point out that the most common gross error in scientific research is to start with a premise and select only those facts which support the theory, ignoring those which do not agree. This is unfortunately a perfect description of your regular postings.
Together with the fact that there is absolutely no evidence of the presence of the 'Navy SEAL', and that for a deliberate attempt to be made to sabotage the peace process would have required cooperation of sufficient people that the 'smoking gun' would have emerged long ago, it is obvious to all why you are a lone voice crying in the wilderness.
As to airworthiness, the paper trail that has emerged is conclusive proof that the proper release to service was circumvented (and demonstrably illegally so). Whether an UCFM caused the crash is unprovable (due to the lack of fitment of a data recorder or CVR), and it is clear the true cause of the crash will never be conclusively proved.
having taken you off the ignore list to examine the posts replied to by others, may I point out that the most common gross error in scientific research is to start with a premise and select only those facts which support the theory, ignoring those which do not agree. This is unfortunately a perfect description of your regular postings.
Together with the fact that there is absolutely no evidence of the presence of the 'Navy SEAL', and that for a deliberate attempt to be made to sabotage the peace process would have required cooperation of sufficient people that the 'smoking gun' would have emerged long ago, it is obvious to all why you are a lone voice crying in the wilderness.
As to airworthiness, the paper trail that has emerged is conclusive proof that the proper release to service was circumvented (and demonstrably illegally so). Whether an UCFM caused the crash is unprovable (due to the lack of fitment of a data recorder or CVR), and it is clear the true cause of the crash will never be conclusively proved.
Last edited by Fitter2; 20th Jun 2011 at 18:20. Reason: speeling
Good post, F2. You know and I know though that Walter will not concede the point, but that is a comment on him and well worth your making it, for others will come to their own conclusions.
He will at least respond though, and in that respect at least follows the etiquette of the Forum, ie he answers points put to him. Meanwhile I await a response from caz. Previous experience does not bode well, for his modus operandi is to make points himself but to disregard those put to him. Again, if he sticks to that it is a comment on him, but I live in hope!
He will at least respond though, and in that respect at least follows the etiquette of the Forum, ie he answers points put to him. Meanwhile I await a response from caz. Previous experience does not bode well, for his modus operandi is to make points himself but to disregard those put to him. Again, if he sticks to that it is a comment on him, but I live in hope!
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I suspect that in Caz,s case it will once again be the fault of the French Internet .........hang on as I am currently in France and am able to post it can't be Internet problems, perhaps it's the answer to the question which is causing him so much trouble 
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fitter2
<<.. select only those facts which support the theory, ignoring those which do not agree.>>
Can you give any which do not support it?
<<... deliberate attempt to be made to sabotage the peace process ...>>
Shows how much you read and understand my posts – this crash expedited the peace process, the team on board not being exactly enthusiastic about it.
Stick your head back in the sand.
<<.. select only those facts which support the theory, ignoring those which do not agree.>>
Can you give any which do not support it?
<<... deliberate attempt to be made to sabotage the peace process ...>>
Shows how much you read and understand my posts – this crash expedited the peace process, the team on board not being exactly enthusiastic about it.
Stick your head back in the sand.
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Like the evidence that the a/c was not airworthy? (Despite the enormous number of people pushing that line.) What fault have they discovered?
But the most significant fault in the context of achieving an overturn of the verdict is the Organisational Fault, as explained many times and ignored by those to whom it is an inconvenient fact. That was a contributory factor open to the Board of Inquiry (AP3207). If you want to place sole blame on anyone, it rather follows you must eliminate the possibility of any other factor; especially when the legal test is so high (beyond any doubt whatsoever). The RAF Chief Engineer and ACAS were sitting on a 373 page report in which every page spells out Organisational Fault, with page 1 listing Chinook losses attributed solely to systemic airworthiness failings. That single sentence should have been sufficient to cast doubt. Presumably the act of sitting on it and withholding it from those ultimately affected most, constitutes "elimination" in their book. Cover up, more like. At the very least there should have been mention of such a report with a reasoned explanation why it didn't apply. But there could be no such reason, so they (the RAF Establishment) had a choice. Do the honourable thing or blame the pilots.
I would be very surprised indeed if Lord Philip does not dwell at length on this report (CHART) and, hopefully, the underlying reasons behind the serious Organisational Faults it outlines. Not least, the fact that, like Haddon-Cave's report of 2009, it contains not a single word that came as any surprise; the majority having been notified in January 1988 following AMSO policies of the previous year that were having a so obviously detrimental effect on In Service aircraft. So serious is this issue, I can see it warranting further action, separate from the basic issue of clearing the pilots; both by Lord Philip and politicians.
Walter, you ask what has been discovered. That is not the point. It is what has been known all along but withheld that is the key issue here.
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Clues. CPLS or TANS
I have not seen a shred of evidence to show that CPLS was even switched on the day of the crash.
The RACAL report has the SUPERTANS working to a high spec until it was "Powered Down" some 32 secs before impact. The power switch was found by Mr Cable to be in the Off Position at impact.
Some contend that impact knocked the switch to off. I have used several varieties of TANS and find this to be unlikely. If switched On the massive G of impact would certainly dislodge the switch but it is designed to fall back to its original position.
Can I be certain of this? Of course not. Crashes do strange things.
But a combination of the 32 Sec Powerdown and the Switch in the Off Position suggest Switch Off by the crew at 32 Secs to impact.
But the RACAL analysis says the crew had just completed the (three?) button pushes to do a Manual Waypoint change. Why use the kit then switch it off?
I have never been a Chinook operator but I can think of experiences on other
aircraft which would force me to ditch a good accurate piece of Navigation equipment.
Tornado (80's version). Double Generator Failure Drill.
You have a couple of minutes before the engines accelerate to oblivion. The more load you shed, the longer you get to deal with the emergency.
C130. Mains AC failure. Not as critical as on the Tornado, but all non essentials are switched off. If you are VFR then TANS is not essential.
So crew distracted by a critical drill? Who knows, but at least the availabable evidence points to the possibility.
The RACAL report has the SUPERTANS working to a high spec until it was "Powered Down" some 32 secs before impact. The power switch was found by Mr Cable to be in the Off Position at impact.
Some contend that impact knocked the switch to off. I have used several varieties of TANS and find this to be unlikely. If switched On the massive G of impact would certainly dislodge the switch but it is designed to fall back to its original position.
Can I be certain of this? Of course not. Crashes do strange things.
But a combination of the 32 Sec Powerdown and the Switch in the Off Position suggest Switch Off by the crew at 32 Secs to impact.
But the RACAL analysis says the crew had just completed the (three?) button pushes to do a Manual Waypoint change. Why use the kit then switch it off?
I have never been a Chinook operator but I can think of experiences on other
aircraft which would force me to ditch a good accurate piece of Navigation equipment.
Tornado (80's version). Double Generator Failure Drill.
You have a couple of minutes before the engines accelerate to oblivion. The more load you shed, the longer you get to deal with the emergency.
C130. Mains AC failure. Not as critical as on the Tornado, but all non essentials are switched off. If you are VFR then TANS is not essential.
So crew distracted by a critical drill? Who knows, but at least the availabable evidence points to the possibility.
Last edited by dalek; 22nd Jun 2011 at 11:55.
As always, Walter's contributions to this thread are valuable, though not necessarily in ways that he would wish. His taunt:
is so pathetic as to attract ridicule, but tuc instead ignores the massive misunderstanding inherent in it and uses it to make a very fundamental point. The RAF's BoI rules at the time required that no deceased person be found negligent, let alone grossly so, without no doubt whatsoever. Despite W&D's absurd suppositions instead of proof, for many years it was not revealed that the RAF itself was in possession of reports that gross organisational faults existed in the general provision of airworthiness, and in particular these had led to gross airworthiness failings in the Chinook, of all marks, at the time of the crash. We now know of CHART as did the RAF then. Thus it acted in contradiction of its own rules. There was doubt, enormous doubt, and in victimising the pilots it sought to bury that doubt.
The more time that passes, the more the burden of shame increases. In not choosing to unilaterally do the honourable thing, by disowning the AM's finding and restoring the reputations of two experienced professional Junior Officers, the Royal Air Force mires its proud record. So be it. If it no longer knows right from wrong others do, and will not rest until this shame is expunged.
Let Right Be Done!
Like the evidence that the a/c was not airworthy? (Despite the enormous number of people pushing that line.) What fault have they discovered?
The more time that passes, the more the burden of shame increases. In not choosing to unilaterally do the honourable thing, by disowning the AM's finding and restoring the reputations of two experienced professional Junior Officers, the Royal Air Force mires its proud record. So be it. If it no longer knows right from wrong others do, and will not rest until this shame is expunged.
Let Right Be Done!
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dalek
Where did 32 seconds come from?
Further, did anyone answer Tucumse's query as to whether the STANS carried on processing even when switched off? - if not, the data suggests that it was not switched off before impact or the switch was movwed by persons unknown on the ground soon after the crash (as smoke marks suggest).
Chug
What is your problem with someone thinking along a different line? If airworthiness had to wait for the paper trail to be correct and complete it is doubtful if you would have anything in the air - true? So airworthiness is something that you could blame for anything going wrong - as there is no evidence of a/c fault, this is a futile exercise - but it keeps you busy.
Where did 32 seconds come from?
Further, did anyone answer Tucumse's query as to whether the STANS carried on processing even when switched off? - if not, the data suggests that it was not switched off before impact or the switch was movwed by persons unknown on the ground soon after the crash (as smoke marks suggest).
Chug
What is your problem with someone thinking along a different line? If airworthiness had to wait for the paper trail to be correct and complete it is doubtful if you would have anything in the air - true? So airworthiness is something that you could blame for anything going wrong - as there is no evidence of a/c fault, this is a futile exercise - but it keeps you busy.
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If airworthiness had to wait for the paper trail to be correct and complete it is doubtful if you would have anything in the air - true? So airworthiness is something that you could blame for anything going wrong - as there is no evidence of a/c fault, this is a futile exercise - but it keeps you busy.
Walter:
OK Walter, that's a Red Card for you! You know full well that the "Smoke Marks", ie sooting, suggested (as stated by Mr Cable, AAIB Inspector) quite the opposite, that the switch was selected to, and gated at, OFF prior to the crash. It is only you that suggests that the switch was ON at impact but switched OFF by your angst ridden Seal before fire spread to that region of the wreckage!
As to the paper trail/airworthiness stuff, I honestly don't know what you mean, I really don't! The aircraft was unairworthy because the HC2 had crap code in the FADEC, a flying control system with a history of UFCM's, and not a single avionics system available for anything other than "switch on" use only, rather than an absence of paper. There was paper work all right, in the guise of a Release to Service signed by the Controller Aircraft and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. I mean, that must mean its kosher, mustn't it? Or must it? It wasn't lack of paper that was the problem Walter, rather that what paper there was lied like a cheap Changi watch!
or the switch was moved by persons unknown on the ground soon after the crash (as smoke marks suggest).
As to the paper trail/airworthiness stuff, I honestly don't know what you mean, I really don't! The aircraft was unairworthy because the HC2 had crap code in the FADEC, a flying control system with a history of UFCM's, and not a single avionics system available for anything other than "switch on" use only, rather than an absence of paper. There was paper work all right, in the guise of a Release to Service signed by the Controller Aircraft and the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff. I mean, that must mean its kosher, mustn't it? Or must it? It wasn't lack of paper that was the problem Walter, rather that what paper there was lied like a cheap Changi watch!
