Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Chinook
Tucumseh. I am not parading any particular authority, but merely asking you for some expansion of the facts to which you lay claim. If you feel unable to say who these eye-witnesses were, then some unkind folk might think they do not exist. I'm sure that cannot be the case. With all good wishes, as always, JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 6th Nov 2010 at 19:25. Reason: omission
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Funny how you English are so happy talking about the weather!
. while not making the effort to go and see it.
It is not as though some random bad conditions were about the general cloudbase was 1500 foot or so;
the weather of concern was generated by the landmass all the descriptions fit with what was to have been expected at that time of day, at that time of year, with a strong prevailing southerly blowing as I have described often, and has been up there every summer for 16 years for you to familiarise yourselves with.
The Mull is featureless apart from the lighthouse and so if any ground texture is blurred by a layer of thin mist you have a difficult job judging range off it.
The problem the weather presented to them was only if for whatever reason they had to approach closely, in terms of identifying a specific spot and not overshooting it.
And the NHP had been there before and would have been well aware of that hazard of perception and would not have been anywhere so near, closing with it at speed, without some local guidance.
. while not making the effort to go and see it.
It is not as though some random bad conditions were about the general cloudbase was 1500 foot or so;
the weather of concern was generated by the landmass all the descriptions fit with what was to have been expected at that time of day, at that time of year, with a strong prevailing southerly blowing as I have described often, and has been up there every summer for 16 years for you to familiarise yourselves with.
The Mull is featureless apart from the lighthouse and so if any ground texture is blurred by a layer of thin mist you have a difficult job judging range off it.
The problem the weather presented to them was only if for whatever reason they had to approach closely, in terms of identifying a specific spot and not overshooting it.
And the NHP had been there before and would have been well aware of that hazard of perception and would not have been anywhere so near, closing with it at speed, without some local guidance.
John Purdey
But surely the point is that you DO profess to be an absolute authority on this case.
In supporting the Reviewing Officers, you are saying you agree they have proof beyond any doubt whatsoever that the pilots were grossly negligent.
For one so distinguished as yourself to come to that conclusion, it was reasonable of me to assume you have read the Board of Inquiry report from beginning to end.
Or, perhaps you are saying the BoI report and the evidence therein (which you admit you have not read and do not even possess), is of no consequence and there was no need for you to read it? Then some unkind folk may think the verdict was pre-determined to avoid the embarrassment the truth would cause senior officers who knowingly failed in their Duty of Care toward passengers and crew.
But surely the point is that you DO profess to be an absolute authority on this case.
In supporting the Reviewing Officers, you are saying you agree they have proof beyond any doubt whatsoever that the pilots were grossly negligent.
For one so distinguished as yourself to come to that conclusion, it was reasonable of me to assume you have read the Board of Inquiry report from beginning to end.
Or, perhaps you are saying the BoI report and the evidence therein (which you admit you have not read and do not even possess), is of no consequence and there was no need for you to read it? Then some unkind folk may think the verdict was pre-determined to avoid the embarrassment the truth would cause senior officers who knowingly failed in their Duty of Care toward passengers and crew.
tuc, surely any retired Air Officer professing such support for the iniquitous opinions of Wratten and Day must have actually read the BoI report?
Beags
One would think so, but I'm not even sure Wratten and Day read it!
Surely any pilot or aeronautical engineer would recognise the systemic failings and maladministration it describes. And their failure to act upon these failings was yet another failure of Duty of Care.
One would think so, but I'm not even sure Wratten and Day read it!
Surely any pilot or aeronautical engineer would recognise the systemic failings and maladministration it describes. And their failure to act upon these failings was yet another failure of Duty of Care.
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I think the point here is that Lord Philip and the legal Review panel will surely be looking at the legal basis of what the BOI report said and how the evidence therein tallies with 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'. More importantly, I would also hope that, to ensure transparency and thoroughness, the Review will be looking closely what the BOI didn't say and what questions, in the light of recent revelations, the board didn't ask (or weren't allowed to ask?). Rather than pontificating about the weather (futile since no-one knows what the in-flight viz was from the cockpit), maybe we should let the Review get on with that task now?
Officers 'with egg on their hats' would do well to remember that, post the original, flawed BOI, three subsequent legally-based inquiries and reviews have found that the ROs' opinions do not amount to the required weight of evidence and I would humbly advise those officers and their pals to put their collective minds to the thorny problem of what to say should the current review find the same and that the egg has slipped from their hats and onto their faces.
Officers 'with egg on their hats' would do well to remember that, post the original, flawed BOI, three subsequent legally-based inquiries and reviews have found that the ROs' opinions do not amount to the required weight of evidence and I would humbly advise those officers and their pals to put their collective minds to the thorny problem of what to say should the current review find the same and that the egg has slipped from their hats and onto their faces.
flipster...
And so once again the job of military air accident investigation has to be done by members of the civil judiciary because the job was not done properly in the first place. The immediate and understandable wish to reverse the shameful injustice done by very senior officers of the Royal Air Force upon two deceased junior officers must not obscure the very much more shameful demolition of UK Military Airworthiness by very senior officers of the Royal Air Force and the orchestrated dysfunction of investigation into the inevitably fatal consequences of such demolition. Both functions, airworthiness enforcement and military air accident investigation, remain potentially compromised unless and until the MAA and MAAIB are separate and independent, both of the MOD and of each other.
.....the Review will be looking closely what the BOI didn't say and what questions, in the light of recent revelations, the board didn't ask (or weren't allowed to ask?)
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And so once again the job of military air accident investigation has to be done by members of the civil judiciary because the job was not done properly in the first place. The immediate and understandable wish to reverse the shameful injustice done by very senior officers of the Royal Air Force upon two deceased junior officers must not obscure the very much more shameful demolition of UK Military Airworthiness by very senior officers of the Royal Air Force and the orchestrated dysfunction of investigation into the inevitably fatal consequences of such demolition. Both functions, airworthiness enforcement and military air accident investigation, remain potentially compromised unless and until the MAA and MAAIB are separate and independent, both of the MOD and of each other.
I'll admit that this scandal is enough to drive one to drink, baston, but I was stone cold sober so no excuse there if you found it to be incoherent. I can but dig out my old reading and writing course notes I guess and try again. If however you found what I wrote to be incredible or even outrageous then I say reread this thread. Then even you might be drawn inexorably to the drinks cupboard!
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The weather was out of limits for Low Flying....that wasn't low flying, that was grubbing.
John Purdey
You did say:
I have had my say.
The asssumption that the pilots were negligent because they flew into a hill covered in cloud is akin to assuming a body floating face-down in a swimming pool has drowned. But then, you wouldn't make that mistake, would you?
With freshly-reheated good wishes.
MB
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John Purdey(again)
By the way, you were kind enough to offer me the following advice a few weeks ago. Perhaps you should practise what you preach?
By the way, you were kind enough to offer me the following advice a few weeks ago. Perhaps you should practise what you preach?
Meadowbank. I think you might do well to take the hint from so many other contributers, including me, that this whole story should now be allowed to rest until we see the findings of the new Inquiry; do you not agree? With renewed good wishes, John Purdey
If the Chinook WAS totally serviceable and these 2 pilots at the end of a long crew duty day DID make a fatigue-driven mistake and fly into the ground how must the relatives of the pax feel. Does anyone consider their feelings?
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BOAC
You are correct - he should read the BOI in its entirety.
Equally he should also read the evidence of the Duty Exec at Aldergrove (as given to the HOL Committee) in respect of the concern he expressed to Flt Lt Tapper regarding the extended Crew Duty limits he had requested and the probability that those limits would be exceeded. It should be remembered that when they Took Off on that fatal sortie they were already some 10 hours into their Crew Duty Time with 3 sectors still to be flown which would require a refuelling stop at Kinloss later that night.
In his evidence to the HOL Committee the Duty Exec stated that he counselled Flt Lt Tapper that it would not be acceptable for Tapper to call in from somewhere in Scotland seeking permission to nightstop out of Theatre.
The BOI stated that "Detatchment Crews preferred to operate on a "Day On/Day Off rota". In my opinion what the Crews preferred to do is irrelevent. They were in NI to assist the Civil and Military Forces of the Crown in the face of Armed Insurrection. Personal preferences had no part to play in that Duty.
You are correct - he should read the BOI in its entirety.
Equally he should also read the evidence of the Duty Exec at Aldergrove (as given to the HOL Committee) in respect of the concern he expressed to Flt Lt Tapper regarding the extended Crew Duty limits he had requested and the probability that those limits would be exceeded. It should be remembered that when they Took Off on that fatal sortie they were already some 10 hours into their Crew Duty Time with 3 sectors still to be flown which would require a refuelling stop at Kinloss later that night.
In his evidence to the HOL Committee the Duty Exec stated that he counselled Flt Lt Tapper that it would not be acceptable for Tapper to call in from somewhere in Scotland seeking permission to nightstop out of Theatre.
The BOI stated that "Detatchment Crews preferred to operate on a "Day On/Day Off rota". In my opinion what the Crews preferred to do is irrelevent. They were in NI to assist the Civil and Military Forces of the Crown in the face of Armed Insurrection. Personal preferences had no part to play in that Duty.
If the Chinook WAS totally serviceable
As ever it is the information the BoI didn't read, or weren't given, that reveals even more. Minor things like "positively dangerous" and not recommended for Service flying. We'll just have to wait and see if Lord Philip asks ACAS why he ignored these facts. After all, the regulations required him to record his reasoning.
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Caz
re your recent post 7015, I think some added comment on duty hours is needed.
I sat in on the FAI when the OC Aldergrove was being questioned from memory now for a quick reply, these are my recollections and impressions of what was said:
The limit on duty hours applied only to duty within the operational theatre, it being a consideration of the additional stress that the crews may be under in that environment logically, a ferry flight leaving the theatre would surely have been viewed on its merits with particular regard to the crews condition to undertake any such flight;
had the in-theatre limit applied, there would have been an obligation to have consulted the OC and he said that he had not been indeed, he had never previously been asked for such an extension, meaning that the orders had either been ignored (unlikely?) or that the situation had never arisen that a decision to extend duty was required, beyond the scope of of operational assignments that were within the Duty Exec's ability to resolve;
there was an in-depth discussion between the Exec and Flt Lt Tapper in which it seems the argument was won for Tapper's crew to do the sortie on the basis for their having prepared extensively for this sortie (a simple ferry flight?).
This bit is interesting:
<<In his evidence to the HOL Committee the Duty Exec stated that he counselled Flt Lt Tapper that it would not be acceptable for Tapper to call in from somewhere in Scotland seeking permission to nightstop out of Theatre.>>
I seem to recall that ZD576, this most valuable asset, was not scheduled for any activity in-theatre for the most part of the next day so perhaps there was more known at the higher levels of authority regarding the planning for this sortie than has been revealed in any of the inquiries so far. It seems that there would have been the anticipation of a possible overnight stop common sense would have it that regardless of any strict limits on duty hours, to have returned that night would have been pushing the crew too hard let's hope that the lack of tasking for the next day and the undetermined plans for the return were not just because the higher levels of authority had not expected their return to be an issue ...
Hope this completes the picture I suggest that the crew were not being cavalier regarding their duty time but that they were prepared for this sortie and that perhaps they had been tasked to fit in their excursion to the Mull (it made no sense to have gone there as part of a ferry flight in those conditions) the geometry of the planned tracks would not have affected fuel calculations nor schedule whether they had gone Curran to Corran or Mull then going back to 028 to Corran (as I have shown previously). One thing that touching base at the Mull would have achieved in terms of their duty hours is that the operational theatre limit would not have been exceeded by the time that they got there and so the rest of the flight was outside theatre and therefore the rules would not have applied anyway and so the Exec could have OK'd the flight without referring it to the OC Aldergrove they could not have got their feet dry in time outside theatre by going any other route (eg Curran to Corran).
re your recent post 7015, I think some added comment on duty hours is needed.
I sat in on the FAI when the OC Aldergrove was being questioned from memory now for a quick reply, these are my recollections and impressions of what was said:
The limit on duty hours applied only to duty within the operational theatre, it being a consideration of the additional stress that the crews may be under in that environment logically, a ferry flight leaving the theatre would surely have been viewed on its merits with particular regard to the crews condition to undertake any such flight;
had the in-theatre limit applied, there would have been an obligation to have consulted the OC and he said that he had not been indeed, he had never previously been asked for such an extension, meaning that the orders had either been ignored (unlikely?) or that the situation had never arisen that a decision to extend duty was required, beyond the scope of of operational assignments that were within the Duty Exec's ability to resolve;
there was an in-depth discussion between the Exec and Flt Lt Tapper in which it seems the argument was won for Tapper's crew to do the sortie on the basis for their having prepared extensively for this sortie (a simple ferry flight?).
This bit is interesting:
<<In his evidence to the HOL Committee the Duty Exec stated that he counselled Flt Lt Tapper that it would not be acceptable for Tapper to call in from somewhere in Scotland seeking permission to nightstop out of Theatre.>>
I seem to recall that ZD576, this most valuable asset, was not scheduled for any activity in-theatre for the most part of the next day so perhaps there was more known at the higher levels of authority regarding the planning for this sortie than has been revealed in any of the inquiries so far. It seems that there would have been the anticipation of a possible overnight stop common sense would have it that regardless of any strict limits on duty hours, to have returned that night would have been pushing the crew too hard let's hope that the lack of tasking for the next day and the undetermined plans for the return were not just because the higher levels of authority had not expected their return to be an issue ...
Hope this completes the picture I suggest that the crew were not being cavalier regarding their duty time but that they were prepared for this sortie and that perhaps they had been tasked to fit in their excursion to the Mull (it made no sense to have gone there as part of a ferry flight in those conditions) the geometry of the planned tracks would not have affected fuel calculations nor schedule whether they had gone Curran to Corran or Mull then going back to 028 to Corran (as I have shown previously). One thing that touching base at the Mull would have achieved in terms of their duty hours is that the operational theatre limit would not have been exceeded by the time that they got there and so the rest of the flight was outside theatre and therefore the rules would not have applied anyway and so the Exec could have OK'd the flight without referring it to the OC Aldergrove they could not have got their feet dry in time outside theatre by going any other route (eg Curran to Corran).
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