Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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For Tandemrotor. I just re-read some of the earlier items in this series of exchanges, and you seem to say that the mis-plotting of the waypoint, which I mentioned, falls into the garbage category. Are you really trying to tell us that? If so, then I think you should check up on a few uncontested facts before you engage. Best wishes. John Purdey.
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John Purdey
You are quite correct that this discussion can become clouded by whether one is talking about the outcome of the HOL Select Committee inquiry (the legal side) or what occurred during the flight and/or why it happened. I am now not so sure from your recent post whether or not you agree that the Select Committee opinion is correct i.e. that a gross negligence verdict is inappropriate.
Whatever, you have advanced a theory of what happened and why, and you maintain this is fact; I disagree with this, as do others, and therefore feel it necessary to challenge the basis of your argument. (I don’t disagree it might be correct, although I think it highly unlikely, but I can’t agree it is fact).
Stay with me while I review some history. The HOL Select Committee reported their findings. In response to the report, the Government commissioned a detailed report from Boeing to follow up the various points raised and to rerun a number of simulations. This report was the basis of the MOD/Government official response which was subsequently debated in the Lords. As part of that report (Enclosure 4 of the Boeing documents) a detailed analysis of the probable flight profile was produced using the best evidence available (note the word probable - much of the so-called evidence is best-guess). Part of that analysis showed a flight path deviation to the right of track following waypoint change; this was interpreted by Boeing in para 4.3 of the document as a deliberate heading change to the right. Now this analysis is based on the best estimates from the various position data and assumes, like you have, that the aircraft was under full control of the crew at the time. I agree that this is not fact either, but is probably a more likely flightpath scenario than one with no track deviation from before waypoint change to impact. It is no worse a theory than a straight track profile.
So, if you maintain the crew deliberately planned to fly over the lighthouse in IMC at low level on track, knowing the terrain clearance, why did they knowingly turn right towards higher ground? Doesn’t make sense to me.
[A qualifier - I have not had a chance to check the position calculations made by Boeing since I am not privy to the various reports by the nav equipment manufacturers. I know that there are errors in other parts of the report and these have led to incorrect statements and conclusions in the MOD response.]
Regards, TAC
As to the comment by TheAeroCo, many thanks, but what makes you think that they turned right?
Whatever, you have advanced a theory of what happened and why, and you maintain this is fact; I disagree with this, as do others, and therefore feel it necessary to challenge the basis of your argument. (I don’t disagree it might be correct, although I think it highly unlikely, but I can’t agree it is fact).
Stay with me while I review some history. The HOL Select Committee reported their findings. In response to the report, the Government commissioned a detailed report from Boeing to follow up the various points raised and to rerun a number of simulations. This report was the basis of the MOD/Government official response which was subsequently debated in the Lords. As part of that report (Enclosure 4 of the Boeing documents) a detailed analysis of the probable flight profile was produced using the best evidence available (note the word probable - much of the so-called evidence is best-guess). Part of that analysis showed a flight path deviation to the right of track following waypoint change; this was interpreted by Boeing in para 4.3 of the document as a deliberate heading change to the right. Now this analysis is based on the best estimates from the various position data and assumes, like you have, that the aircraft was under full control of the crew at the time. I agree that this is not fact either, but is probably a more likely flightpath scenario than one with no track deviation from before waypoint change to impact. It is no worse a theory than a straight track profile.
So, if you maintain the crew deliberately planned to fly over the lighthouse in IMC at low level on track, knowing the terrain clearance, why did they knowingly turn right towards higher ground? Doesn’t make sense to me.
[A qualifier - I have not had a chance to check the position calculations made by Boeing since I am not privy to the various reports by the nav equipment manufacturers. I know that there are errors in other parts of the report and these have led to incorrect statements and conclusions in the MOD response.]
Regards, TAC
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JP,
You said that "No-one has rebutted what I am saying, which is that the crew were not where they thought they were".
You appear to have a selective memory.
I rebutted it on 10th Jan and Arkroyal also did on 21st Jan. You didn't answer either of us with regard to how you KNOW what THEY (the crew) were thinking.
NONE of us knows what the crew were thinking. I have never actually heard of an accident report where the investigations proved what those involved were thinking. The only way such evidence can be provided is from the mouths of crew survivors.
Your argument is based on your own subjectivity. These continued appearances to insist that you KNOW what caused the accident make me suspicious as to your motive.
Your theory MAY be valid, as MAY other theories, such as the well-documented previous evidence of FADEC problems and control pallet detachment problems. Then again, your theory may be totally invalid. We don't know and it will never be known.
What happened was certainly unusual but without 100% conclusive evidence it should have been "cause unknown".
You have missed the point of the campaign.
You said that "No-one has rebutted what I am saying, which is that the crew were not where they thought they were".
You appear to have a selective memory.
I rebutted it on 10th Jan and Arkroyal also did on 21st Jan. You didn't answer either of us with regard to how you KNOW what THEY (the crew) were thinking.
NONE of us knows what the crew were thinking. I have never actually heard of an accident report where the investigations proved what those involved were thinking. The only way such evidence can be provided is from the mouths of crew survivors.
Your argument is based on your own subjectivity. These continued appearances to insist that you KNOW what caused the accident make me suspicious as to your motive.
Your theory MAY be valid, as MAY other theories, such as the well-documented previous evidence of FADEC problems and control pallet detachment problems. Then again, your theory may be totally invalid. We don't know and it will never be known.
What happened was certainly unusual but without 100% conclusive evidence it should have been "cause unknown".
You have missed the point of the campaign.
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CHINOOK
For TheAerosco. Many thanks for your objective contribution (there aren't too many in that category in these exchanges!). I agree; the right turn makes no sense at all, but one wonders how reliable was the Boeing simulation. As you say, some parts of their report were later found to be less than accurate. Regards. John.
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But wasn't some of the original Boeing simulation used to establish fact , and these facts later undermined by anomalies in the simulation? I may have missed the point on this, so please feel free to correct me.
Also, sorry to disappoint you Mr Purdey. I don't have any answers or new revalations for you regarding the unanswered call from ZD576 - just more questions.
1. Why was it not responded to, despite the fact that all equipment appeared to be in working order?
2. If the call was heard, but not understood, why no clarification call from ATC?
3. Why no second call from the Chinook?
As I say, no answers. Nor am I pointing fingers at anyone. I can offer my own theory as to what may have gone on, but that is all it would be - a theory. If you want it, I'd be happy to post it, but I'm not sure how useful it would be.
My regards, as always
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Also, sorry to disappoint you Mr Purdey. I don't have any answers or new revalations for you regarding the unanswered call from ZD576 - just more questions.
1. Why was it not responded to, despite the fact that all equipment appeared to be in working order?
2. If the call was heard, but not understood, why no clarification call from ATC?
3. Why no second call from the Chinook?
As I say, no answers. Nor am I pointing fingers at anyone. I can offer my own theory as to what may have gone on, but that is all it would be - a theory. If you want it, I'd be happy to post it, but I'm not sure how useful it would be.
My regards, as always
Brian
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John Purdey
Just to clarify, the Boeing analysis I was referring to was not part of the simulation, rather it was a seperate exercise to establish a possible flightpath which fitted with the data obtained from the nav boxes etc. There's a bit more to this which I'll jot down in a day or two when I have more time.
Brian Dixon
I agree - the simulation results were used by the MOD to try to validate their arguments - but it really did no such thing; it just establised a possible scenario; it could never establish fact.
Regards, TAC
Just to clarify, the Boeing analysis I was referring to was not part of the simulation, rather it was a seperate exercise to establish a possible flightpath which fitted with the data obtained from the nav boxes etc. There's a bit more to this which I'll jot down in a day or two when I have more time.
Brian Dixon
I agree - the simulation results were used by the MOD to try to validate their arguments - but it really did no such thing; it just establised a possible scenario; it could never establish fact.
Regards, TAC
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John Purdey
You seem to place a lot of weight on a miss plotted waypoint. My recollection, not good I have to say, is that the only map/chart available to the BoI was the one that was left with the Duty Supervisor on 72 Sqn. This, quite obviously, was not the chart used by the crew of ZD576 during the sortie. I think it fair to assume that this would have been a map made up as a quick copy to show the bare bones of the sortie either with the sole intention of leaving it or even as a ‘quick look’ at early planning which was handy to leave behind as a rough guide should the worse happen.
I have been reluctant to reply to this issue because, as TandamRotor and Pulse1 have already said, the thought that the crew would plan to fly so close to such terrain (with correct waypoint plotting) whilst IMC is ridiculous.
Assuming you have an aircrew background I can only wonder why you wish to put forward such trivial arguments.
You seem to place a lot of weight on a miss plotted waypoint. My recollection, not good I have to say, is that the only map/chart available to the BoI was the one that was left with the Duty Supervisor on 72 Sqn. This, quite obviously, was not the chart used by the crew of ZD576 during the sortie. I think it fair to assume that this would have been a map made up as a quick copy to show the bare bones of the sortie either with the sole intention of leaving it or even as a ‘quick look’ at early planning which was handy to leave behind as a rough guide should the worse happen.
I have been reluctant to reply to this issue because, as TandamRotor and Pulse1 have already said, the thought that the crew would plan to fly so close to such terrain (with correct waypoint plotting) whilst IMC is ridiculous.
Assuming you have an aircrew background I can only wonder why you wish to put forward such trivial arguments.
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Radar fix
I recently emailed Geoff Hoon regarding apparent inaccuracies in the MOD response to the HOL Select Committee. I believed that the initial fix used by Boeing to calculate average groundspeed was inaccurate and that this had implications for conclusions drawn further on in the report (see post 554). Essentially, I thought the initial fix was purely an r/t position report at zone boundary, so did not give an accurate fix to start with, and that Boeing in any case had used a figure of 7nm instead of 9nm from the VOR (which was the figure suggested in a previous inquiry).
I have today received a reply from the MOD which indicates a radar fix might have been available. This is an extarct from the letter:-
' I have rechecked the evidence given by the Air Traffic Controller who was on duty at Belfast International Airport just before the tragic accident, and this states that, at 1747 hrs, the aircraft reported at the Zone Boundary and advised changing to an en-route frequency. Also that (at the time) "the helicopter was observed on radar to be approximately 7nm out on the 027 degree radial from the Belfast VOR". - It follows therefore, that your revised average ground speed of the aircraft is incorrect.'
Questions - does anyone know which report this evidence is quoted in and should/would the radar have been recorded? If the radar was recorded, why are there no tapes available?
Regards, TAC
I have today received a reply from the MOD which indicates a radar fix might have been available. This is an extarct from the letter:-
' I have rechecked the evidence given by the Air Traffic Controller who was on duty at Belfast International Airport just before the tragic accident, and this states that, at 1747 hrs, the aircraft reported at the Zone Boundary and advised changing to an en-route frequency. Also that (at the time) "the helicopter was observed on radar to be approximately 7nm out on the 027 degree radial from the Belfast VOR". - It follows therefore, that your revised average ground speed of the aircraft is incorrect.'
Questions - does anyone know which report this evidence is quoted in and should/would the radar have been recorded? If the radar was recorded, why are there no tapes available?
Regards, TAC
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CHINOOK
Latest posts noted with interest, and yes, I think it would be helpful to know more about the R/T TX. What did the TX say?
For M134, I do not see how the fact that the a/c crashed more than a quarter of a mile right of track can be called trivial. It has always seemed to me to be absolutely central to this whole tradgedy, and I do not think enough has been made of it by MOD or anyone else, but of course you are entitled to you own view. Regards. John
For M134, I do not see how the fact that the a/c crashed more than a quarter of a mile right of track can be called trivial. It has always seemed to me to be absolutely central to this whole tradgedy, and I do not think enough has been made of it by MOD or anyone else, but of course you are entitled to you own view. Regards. John
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AerosCo,
I'm currently looking at all things Rx / Tx. An initial line of enquiry has been sent to MoD and I hope to progress this issue further. Once I have more information, I'll let everyone know. However, it may take a while.
Again, my apologies for not having any answers to hand.
9 Years ago today.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I'm currently looking at all things Rx / Tx. An initial line of enquiry has been sent to MoD and I hope to progress this issue further. Once I have more information, I'll let everyone know. However, it may take a while.
Again, my apologies for not having any answers to hand.
9 Years ago today.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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JP
You keep mentioning the fact that that they were 1/4 mile right of track and that the ground was 500' higher here than where they thought they were. I, like Pulse1, would like to know if you seriously believe that the crew made a concious decision to only climb to clear the ground in front of them and not the ground 1/4 mile to the right of them. I would quite happily wager my mortgage on the fact that if I asked every military pilot in the Air Force, would you be happy to do this, they would to a man say no, even in my aircraft with 4 IRUs, 2 GPS and a Mission Computer to mix the whole lot together, giving me an error of 6 Yds, I would not fly under those conditions. You quite rightly state that time and time again crews have sadly made blatant errors in time of stress and perhaps this crew did in fact formulate this as a reasonable plan of action, despite the fact that sitting here in the cold light of day, it would seem a foolhardy and reckless thing to do. However, and here is the central theme again, where is your proof of this? We do not have to prove what happened to quash the verdict, the RAF does have to prove, without any doubt, that the crew made this exact decision that you have talked about.
You keep mentioning the fact that that they were 1/4 mile right of track and that the ground was 500' higher here than where they thought they were. I, like Pulse1, would like to know if you seriously believe that the crew made a concious decision to only climb to clear the ground in front of them and not the ground 1/4 mile to the right of them. I would quite happily wager my mortgage on the fact that if I asked every military pilot in the Air Force, would you be happy to do this, they would to a man say no, even in my aircraft with 4 IRUs, 2 GPS and a Mission Computer to mix the whole lot together, giving me an error of 6 Yds, I would not fly under those conditions. You quite rightly state that time and time again crews have sadly made blatant errors in time of stress and perhaps this crew did in fact formulate this as a reasonable plan of action, despite the fact that sitting here in the cold light of day, it would seem a foolhardy and reckless thing to do. However, and here is the central theme again, where is your proof of this? We do not have to prove what happened to quash the verdict, the RAF does have to prove, without any doubt, that the crew made this exact decision that you have talked about.
Banggearo,
There is another point raised by JP's theory which seems to make his accusations even more serious.
If they were deliberately climbing in IMC to avoid ground, presumably the only option then would be to continue to MSA. It has already been clearly established that this was totally unacceptable in this aircraft due to icing limitations.
So, if he is right, they would have to have deliberately chosen to continue the flight illegally and unsafely until they could achieve ATC or navaid help to descend again or find a suitable break in the clouds.
All this when they had the safe option to continue VMC over water towards their next waypoint.
Now I know several miltary pilots who confess to having climbed into icing conditions in unsuitable aircraft, one who later wrote about it in Flight Safety Bulletin was lucky to survive it, so it is not impossible that they did so.
But how anyone can determine, on the few facts, that they did so "with absolutely no doubt whatsoever" is totally beyond me.
I just hope that, before year 10 is up, this matter will be resolved to the satisfaction of all the families, whose dignity and resolve throughout has earned them the utmost respect.
There is another point raised by JP's theory which seems to make his accusations even more serious.
If they were deliberately climbing in IMC to avoid ground, presumably the only option then would be to continue to MSA. It has already been clearly established that this was totally unacceptable in this aircraft due to icing limitations.
So, if he is right, they would have to have deliberately chosen to continue the flight illegally and unsafely until they could achieve ATC or navaid help to descend again or find a suitable break in the clouds.
All this when they had the safe option to continue VMC over water towards their next waypoint.
Now I know several miltary pilots who confess to having climbed into icing conditions in unsuitable aircraft, one who later wrote about it in Flight Safety Bulletin was lucky to survive it, so it is not impossible that they did so.
But how anyone can determine, on the few facts, that they did so "with absolutely no doubt whatsoever" is totally beyond me.
I just hope that, before year 10 is up, this matter will be resolved to the satisfaction of all the families, whose dignity and resolve throughout has earned them the utmost respect.
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CHINOOK
Tandemrotor, I wholeheartedly agree with you. What an unutterably sad business the whole tragedy was.
Banggearo, I don't like it any more than you do, but I have always believed that THE CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE, ie they thought they were faced with a hill about 300 or so feet high. as they pressed on in IMC.
So tell us this, do you really think they DID KNOW where they were, ie that they knew that they were heading towards terrain 800 ft plus high, in IMC, at low level and at a goodly forward speed? That seems to me to be quite out of the question, but I would be interested to hear your defense of it.
It has to be one thing or the other; either they knew where they were or they did not know, and I prefer to believe that they were a qurater of a mile to starboard of where they believed themselves to be. No other explanation fits the facts.
Pulse1. I'm afraid I have seen too much military aviation, and its accidents, to think that even so splendid a crew might not have made such a grave misjudgement. Very sad though it is. John PUrdey.
Banggearo, I don't like it any more than you do, but I have always believed that THE CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE, ie they thought they were faced with a hill about 300 or so feet high. as they pressed on in IMC.
So tell us this, do you really think they DID KNOW where they were, ie that they knew that they were heading towards terrain 800 ft plus high, in IMC, at low level and at a goodly forward speed? That seems to me to be quite out of the question, but I would be interested to hear your defense of it.
It has to be one thing or the other; either they knew where they were or they did not know, and I prefer to believe that they were a qurater of a mile to starboard of where they believed themselves to be. No other explanation fits the facts.
Pulse1. I'm afraid I have seen too much military aviation, and its accidents, to think that even so splendid a crew might not have made such a grave misjudgement. Very sad though it is. John PUrdey.
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John Purdey wrote:
Indeed, but that is only one small and frankly irrelevant part of the debate. An equally important question is whether or not the aircraft was under control at the time of the accident. During the House of Lords Select Committee Hearings, Tony Cable, who investigated the crash for the AAIB, was asked:
"So you were not able to exclude the possibility of a control jam, and do I understand that you were not able to exclude the possibility of some engine malfunction, of which you found no trace?"
(Mr Cable) No; that is correct. As I said, it is not possible to prove serviceability effectively.
Let me just emphasise the point again:
That's pretty conclusive isn't it Mr Purdey?
It has to be one thing or the other; either they knew where they were or they did not know
"So you were not able to exclude the possibility of a control jam, and do I understand that you were not able to exclude the possibility of some engine malfunction, of which you found no trace?"
(Mr Cable) No; that is correct. As I said, it is not possible to prove serviceability effectively.
Let me just emphasise the point again:
AAIB: "....it is not possible to prove serviceability effectively"
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CHINOOK
Chocks wayhay. We have been all over this far too many times before. But just once more: if the crew knew that they were heading for the 800 ft high ground, as you seem to say, then you have also to believe that the flying controls locked simultaneously in all three dimensions, the power controls also locked and at the same time the R/T failed, leaving the crew helpless to do anything about their predicament as they headed towards the hill in IMC, and of course leaving no witness marks of any kind to be found by the crash investigators If you wish to believe that, then of course you are free to do so.
I really see no point in continuing this discussion, and anyway I am off to sunnier climes for a while. Regards and good luck to all our readers. John Purdey.
I really see no point in continuing this discussion, and anyway I am off to sunnier climes for a while. Regards and good luck to all our readers. John Purdey.
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John Purdey:
"We have been all over this far too many times before"
I agree, but you started it .... (this time)
"if the crew knew that they were heading for the 800 ft high ground, as you seem to say"
I didn't say that
"then you have also to believe that the flying controls locked simultaneously in all three dimensions, the power controls also locked and at the same time the R/T failed, leaving the crew helpless to do anything about their predicament as they headed towards the hill in IMC, and of course leaving no witness marks of any kind to be found by the crash investigators "
What utter rubbish, I don't have to believe that, or anything like it. I don't have to believe in anything other than the facts . The AAIB can't say that a malfunction didn't cause the crash - that's good enough for me. I'm surprised it's not good enough for you.
"I really see no point in continuing this discussion, and anyway I am off to sunnier climes for a while"
This is becoming a familiar pattern - come in and dredge up the old argument, lose the ensuing debate, then disappear for a while.
Rest assured that Brian, myself, and everyone else will still be here on your return.
"We have been all over this far too many times before"
I agree, but you started it .... (this time)
"if the crew knew that they were heading for the 800 ft high ground, as you seem to say"
I didn't say that
"then you have also to believe that the flying controls locked simultaneously in all three dimensions, the power controls also locked and at the same time the R/T failed, leaving the crew helpless to do anything about their predicament as they headed towards the hill in IMC, and of course leaving no witness marks of any kind to be found by the crash investigators "
What utter rubbish, I don't have to believe that, or anything like it. I don't have to believe in anything other than the facts . The AAIB can't say that a malfunction didn't cause the crash - that's good enough for me. I'm surprised it's not good enough for you.
"I really see no point in continuing this discussion, and anyway I am off to sunnier climes for a while"
This is becoming a familiar pattern - come in and dredge up the old argument, lose the ensuing debate, then disappear for a while.
Rest assured that Brian, myself, and everyone else will still be here on your return.
Just a numbered other
Back from hols to find that the closed mind of JP is back in circulation!
You can repeat this as often as you like, but it will still be your theory and not fact.
Miss-plotting the light house is irrelevant. In VFR flight, the TANS is a tool to help you find the waypoint, which you will then see. Any suggestion that the crew intended to use TANS to fly in IMC within 500ft and 500 metres of cumulo-granite is frankly absurd.
It is a possible explanation, however, and must be weighed as evidence. Unfortunately for your theory, in order to find the pilots guilty of Gross Negligence, that evidence must prove BEYOND ANY DOUBT WHATSOEVER that that is what happened.
There is not, nor ever will be, such evidence. Therefore the crew MUST be given the benefit of considerable doubt.
Remember that the rules of evidence were expressly in place to protect dead men from kangaroo courts.
Banggaero's post of 2/6 1607 says it all.
THE CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE, ie they thought they were faced with a hill about 300 or so feet high. as they pressed on in IMC.
Miss-plotting the light house is irrelevant. In VFR flight, the TANS is a tool to help you find the waypoint, which you will then see. Any suggestion that the crew intended to use TANS to fly in IMC within 500ft and 500 metres of cumulo-granite is frankly absurd.
It is a possible explanation, however, and must be weighed as evidence. Unfortunately for your theory, in order to find the pilots guilty of Gross Negligence, that evidence must prove BEYOND ANY DOUBT WHATSOEVER that that is what happened.
There is not, nor ever will be, such evidence. Therefore the crew MUST be given the benefit of considerable doubt.
Remember that the rules of evidence were expressly in place to protect dead men from kangaroo courts.
Banggaero's post of 2/6 1607 says it all.
Judging by the interference effects which nearby Plod radios have when induced by the feeder cable to my kitchen TV, if any of the passengers in the back of the accident Chinook had been using a radio telephone handset, could there have been a significantly harmful effect on the FADEC, TANS or avionic systems?
Was TETRA active back in those days?
Was TETRA active back in those days?
Last edited by BEagle; 15th Jun 2003 at 02:44.