Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
over land when they selected the waypoint change
-re RadAlt. Before criticising the indicator(s) settings or opining about contributory factors, perhaps the Board should have asked why it was carrying both defects and faults, and was set up wrongly such that it almost certainly misbehaved above 800’ range. Having referenced a report that said a setting (AGC Clamp) was 15dB out and stated that there was no information available to e.g. Odiham (never mind Aldergrove – did they have 2nd line test equipment?) on what the tolerance was, perhaps they would have been wise to investigate why. Perhaps they would have discovered that the tolerance was actually +/- 1dB. If I can read this from notes that pre-date the crash by 12 years, then there is something radically wrong with the MoD process designed to maintain and disseminate that information – and teach people how to implement it. The same notes show that in 1985 the general problem was still ongoing but the contractor was not under contract to rectify it. (Precisely the root problem identified by Haddon-Cave). Not by coincidence is this the very period when AMSO are on record as commencing a campaign of slashing airworthiness-related spending, without any regard whatsoever for impact, culminating in the infamous 1991 ruling that no safety-related tasks shall be conducted.
We know why MoD doesn’t want to go there. Too many stars implicated. But the evidence exists and this time I hope it is heard.
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Caz,
Quite happy to accept possibly rather than almost certainly.
Other definitions of possibly are perhaps or maybe.
Falls a bit short of the proof reqired for "no doubt whatsoever."
My last entry.
"remind me again, where was the negligence at that point."
Quite happy to accept possibly rather than almost certainly.
Other definitions of possibly are perhaps or maybe.
Falls a bit short of the proof reqired for "no doubt whatsoever."
My last entry.
"remind me again, where was the negligence at that point."
Last edited by dalek; 15th Aug 2010 at 16:57.
caz:
OK, this is getting weird! In over 6700 posts this has never been suggested before AFAIK. No, caz, they were not. Of course your case would be greatly advanced if they were because such a scenario would put them much closer at WP change to the crash site and to the cloud and mist that surrounded it, but they were not. They were out over the sea, where the only eye witness has them VMC and with the shoreline of the Mull visible.
We have also been told by the BBC that:
No they did not, well not to my knowledge anyway. Such a statement would belie belief, given what we now know about the state of the Chinook HC2 at RTS.
So what is going on here? Are we rewriting history a la the USSR? I hope that none of this hogwash is being put to his Lordship, or are these examples of "new evidence" that the MOD does approve of?
Moreover, were they not over land when they selected the waypoint change?
We have also been told by the BBC that:
The Ministry of Defence said the helicopter was airworthy.
So what is going on here? Are we rewriting history a la the USSR? I hope that none of this hogwash is being put to his Lordship, or are these examples of "new evidence" that the MOD does approve of?
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Air Member for Supply and Organisation. Actually I think the 'post' was created after the Chinook crash?
EDIT: Actually I am wrong! Who was AMSO at the time?
EDIT: Actually I am wrong! Who was AMSO at the time?
Last edited by BOAC; 17th Aug 2010 at 07:30.
AMSO
SFFP
Air Council Posts and members_P
(BOAC - you are thinking of AML - same people, same policies).
In 1991/2 AMSO took over the centralised MoD(PE) activities associated with maintaining airworthiness, including the Secretariat which was part of D/Military Aircraft Projects. This Secretariat is where much of the audit trail we discuss was retained and maintained. It was ditched and, following complaints from those charged with the task, whose signatures actually appeared on the papers, AMSO chopped the HQ Mods Committees (whose Chairpersons were the lynchpin of maintaining airworthiness, representing the vast experience that had been built up and controlling and maintaining much of the corporate knowledge).
This provocative (and life-threatening) act was accompanied by a threat to sack civilian personnel who complained about (a) airworthiness being compromised and (b) AMSO’s policy to waste hundreds of millions each year. Ultimately, (a) and (b) were exposed by a Director Internal Audit (MoD’s own auditors) report in June 1996, but by then the damage had been done. DIA recommended correcting many of these damaging changes in recommendations that Haddon-Cave mirrored 15 years later. Neither MoD(PE) or the new AML took action and the same mistakes are being made today. And the gaps (risks) created in those 6 years have never been mitigated.
For example, the Radio Mods Committee, responsible for all electronics (but not the FADEC DECUs in Chinook, otherwise they wouldn’t have been approved!) last sat in June 1993. By scrapping these committees, AMSO ensured PUS’s (the Chief Accounting Officer) mandated policy of Independent Scrutiny could not be met. Henceforth, there was no oversight – precisely the criticism levelled at MoD by the Public Accounts Committee on Chinook HC Mk3. This may sound bureaucratic, but it was the HQMCs who ensured provision was made to, for example, update Safety Cases properly – again, the thrust of the Haddon-Cave report.
I’m deliberately painting a picture of the years immediately before Mull. The same AMSO decisions were responsible for most of the airworthiness failings heard (but not understood) by the BoI. Tech Pubs outdated and incorrect. Incorrect training. Numerous faults and defects. Even the criticism of air and ground crews who didn’t report faults properly can be linked to AMSO’s actions, because it became policy in 1991 not to investigate faults – apathy set in and Engineering Authorities were told not to waste their time submitting 760s as nothing would be done. Even when they did submit them, they were "sentenced" by junior admin clerks, whom AMSO permitted to make technical decisions (which were almost always "no further action" because it "saved" money). However, records show the problems were emerging in the mid-80s – the example I mentioned was there being no contract in 1985 to investigate the known faults and defect in the RadAlt.
Back to Haddon-Cave. He implied these problems only started when the RAF's Chief Engineer post was disestablished in about 1998; in doing so implying the CE could have prevented the problems. Well, the evidence shows all this happened when the RAF had a CE. So, instead of writing to the press along with CAS and other stars denigrating deceased aircrew, perhaps he'd care to explain just what he was doing between 1991 and 1996 when all this was happening right under his nose. And I'm sure past AMSOs, say from 1985-on, will happily give their version. Myself and colleagues of the day will be interested to hear their reasoning for ignoring JSP553.
Hope this helps.
Air Council Posts and members_P
Post established by splitting the duties of the Air Member of Supply and Research - 14 Jan 1935. Post appointed to Air Staff - 14 Jan 1935. Post renamed Air Member for Logistics - 1 Sep 1994.
In 1991/2 AMSO took over the centralised MoD(PE) activities associated with maintaining airworthiness, including the Secretariat which was part of D/Military Aircraft Projects. This Secretariat is where much of the audit trail we discuss was retained and maintained. It was ditched and, following complaints from those charged with the task, whose signatures actually appeared on the papers, AMSO chopped the HQ Mods Committees (whose Chairpersons were the lynchpin of maintaining airworthiness, representing the vast experience that had been built up and controlling and maintaining much of the corporate knowledge).
This provocative (and life-threatening) act was accompanied by a threat to sack civilian personnel who complained about (a) airworthiness being compromised and (b) AMSO’s policy to waste hundreds of millions each year. Ultimately, (a) and (b) were exposed by a Director Internal Audit (MoD’s own auditors) report in June 1996, but by then the damage had been done. DIA recommended correcting many of these damaging changes in recommendations that Haddon-Cave mirrored 15 years later. Neither MoD(PE) or the new AML took action and the same mistakes are being made today. And the gaps (risks) created in those 6 years have never been mitigated.
For example, the Radio Mods Committee, responsible for all electronics (but not the FADEC DECUs in Chinook, otherwise they wouldn’t have been approved!) last sat in June 1993. By scrapping these committees, AMSO ensured PUS’s (the Chief Accounting Officer) mandated policy of Independent Scrutiny could not be met. Henceforth, there was no oversight – precisely the criticism levelled at MoD by the Public Accounts Committee on Chinook HC Mk3. This may sound bureaucratic, but it was the HQMCs who ensured provision was made to, for example, update Safety Cases properly – again, the thrust of the Haddon-Cave report.
I’m deliberately painting a picture of the years immediately before Mull. The same AMSO decisions were responsible for most of the airworthiness failings heard (but not understood) by the BoI. Tech Pubs outdated and incorrect. Incorrect training. Numerous faults and defects. Even the criticism of air and ground crews who didn’t report faults properly can be linked to AMSO’s actions, because it became policy in 1991 not to investigate faults – apathy set in and Engineering Authorities were told not to waste their time submitting 760s as nothing would be done. Even when they did submit them, they were "sentenced" by junior admin clerks, whom AMSO permitted to make technical decisions (which were almost always "no further action" because it "saved" money). However, records show the problems were emerging in the mid-80s – the example I mentioned was there being no contract in 1985 to investigate the known faults and defect in the RadAlt.
Back to Haddon-Cave. He implied these problems only started when the RAF's Chief Engineer post was disestablished in about 1998; in doing so implying the CE could have prevented the problems. Well, the evidence shows all this happened when the RAF had a CE. So, instead of writing to the press along with CAS and other stars denigrating deceased aircrew, perhaps he'd care to explain just what he was doing between 1991 and 1996 when all this was happening right under his nose. And I'm sure past AMSOs, say from 1985-on, will happily give their version. Myself and colleagues of the day will be interested to hear their reasoning for ignoring JSP553.
Hope this helps.
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Tuc,
Many thanks for that explanation
BOAC,
I think not only in 1994 but anyone prior to that who was party to this shameful erosion of safety standards should be holding their head in their hands.
It would though give a chap a good reason to fight tooth and nail for the verdict in this case to be upheld.
Many thanks for that explanation
BOAC,
I think not only in 1994 but anyone prior to that who was party to this shameful erosion of safety standards should be holding their head in their hands.
It would though give a chap a good reason to fight tooth and nail for the verdict in this case to be upheld.
SFFP:
I think that we can all agree that tuc has done that for you in spades, SFFP. Turned out to be an excellent question to have asked as the very informative reply from tuc sets the whole corrupt rotten edifice that is the MOD into perspective, and the cost in blood and treasure that it has meant. Thank you as ever tuc for this necessary lesson into the real world of Air Marshals.
....with regards to AMSO, can you fill in the blanks for me
Ah, you always know you’ve hit a nerve because MoD and their hangers-on respond with lies and attempts to change the subject. Sometimes they go quiet but, after all, it is the holiday season and D/Air Staffs may not be able to brief them on the latest party line.
As I’ve mentioned before, MoD are nervous over the airworthiness issue. So much so, they have attempted to re-write history and now claim ACAS did not issue a Release to Service in November 1993; that the only Release was issued by Controller Aircraft.
In fact, they now claim there was no such thing as a Release to Service in November 1993; it only came into being in 1996 when it replaced the Controller Aircraft Release.
Just to clarify matters.
1. The regulations of the day are clear. ACAS was required to issue an RTS.
2. ACAS issued an RTS, dated November 1993.
3. MoD are lying.
All that is simple fact. But why would one MoD Department risk lying so blatantly, when another has happily supplied the said documents? There is only one reason for lying; to hide the truth. What is that truth that is making them so nervous?
A breach of the airworthiness regulations that makes Haddon-Cave’s report look like a minor misdemeanour.
Who are they protecting by telling such lies? Well, that can only be those who signed the Releases. But, as MoD have named Controller Aircraft (a serious faux pas in itself) in a letter, stating he was solely responsible, then that narrows it down to one person who is being protected.
ACAS.
To which I’d add – and those who have supported him by writing to the press (and, indeed, pprune) denigrating the pilots and perpetuating these lies. Now, all we need is for Lord Philip to ask the same questions.
As I’ve mentioned before, MoD are nervous over the airworthiness issue. So much so, they have attempted to re-write history and now claim ACAS did not issue a Release to Service in November 1993; that the only Release was issued by Controller Aircraft.
In fact, they now claim there was no such thing as a Release to Service in November 1993; it only came into being in 1996 when it replaced the Controller Aircraft Release.
Just to clarify matters.
1. The regulations of the day are clear. ACAS was required to issue an RTS.
2. ACAS issued an RTS, dated November 1993.
3. MoD are lying.
All that is simple fact. But why would one MoD Department risk lying so blatantly, when another has happily supplied the said documents? There is only one reason for lying; to hide the truth. What is that truth that is making them so nervous?
A breach of the airworthiness regulations that makes Haddon-Cave’s report look like a minor misdemeanour.
Who are they protecting by telling such lies? Well, that can only be those who signed the Releases. But, as MoD have named Controller Aircraft (a serious faux pas in itself) in a letter, stating he was solely responsible, then that narrows it down to one person who is being protected.
ACAS.
To which I’d add – and those who have supported him by writing to the press (and, indeed, pprune) denigrating the pilots and perpetuating these lies. Now, all we need is for Lord Philip to ask the same questions.
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Bring it on!
Just to answer an earlier point:
A very uncomfortable 1.187 seconds indeed, which the 2 pilots probably spent wondering what an earth had gone wrong with the aircraft that had prevented them from completing the slight turn to the left that they had intended about 30 secs before.
Although a staunch supporter of this campaign, I have no difficulty in accepting that the aircraft was IMC when it crashed, but I do have difficulty in accepting the logic of cazatou, JP et al pointing to this fact as positive evidence that the crew was negligently flying there - that is simply illogical.
The crash could equally have happened in unlimited visibility if whatever unserviceability that caused the accident still occurred, but some here seem fixated on the idea that impact in IMC equals negligence by pilots. Nonsense!
Just to answer an earlier point:
The Pilots would, therefore, have had only a maximum of 1.187 seconds visual warning of impact to assimilate the danger and react.
Although a staunch supporter of this campaign, I have no difficulty in accepting that the aircraft was IMC when it crashed, but I do have difficulty in accepting the logic of cazatou, JP et al pointing to this fact as positive evidence that the crew was negligently flying there - that is simply illogical.
The crash could equally have happened in unlimited visibility if whatever unserviceability that caused the accident still occurred, but some here seem fixated on the idea that impact in IMC equals negligence by pilots. Nonsense!
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It looks as if a local paper, the Argyll News is 'on side'. Some 'familiar' names popping up.............................................. 
A good read.
A good read.
Last edited by BOAC; 22nd Aug 2010 at 12:54.
BOAC:
and likely to become ever more familiar!
indeed, but perhaps better if the accident date had not variously been quoted as 1994, 1995 and 2010. Infected no doubt by the infamous BoB virus changing the date of that on the MOD site and hi-lighted on another thread.
Seriously it is good to see the 4th estate coming on side. Indeed it would seem that all are, with the conspicuous absence of course of the MOD who retain the rights of Judge Jury and Executioner unto themselves. Someone has to break their vice like grip on disclosing the real facts. With any luck they already are....
Some 'familiar' names popping up
A good read.
Seriously it is good to see the 4th estate coming on side. Indeed it would seem that all are, with the conspicuous absence of course of the MOD who retain the rights of Judge Jury and Executioner unto themselves. Someone has to break their vice like grip on disclosing the real facts. With any luck they already are....
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Meadowbank
I must have missed something along the way! What unserviceability are you referring to that "caused the accident"?
I thought that the jury was still out on what caused the crash. Could even have been pilot error he said in hushed tones....................
The crash could equally have happened in unlimited visibility if whatever unserviceability that caused the accident still occurred
I thought that the jury was still out on what caused the crash. Could even have been pilot error he said in hushed tones....................
Can anyone who knows, give a `timeline` from when the accident was first reported ,by whom to whom, in order, up the `monkey-puzzle tree`.I was at Lossie that day and I`m interested to know when the MRT were alerted.
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Baston,
You are right and I believe that most independent observers would agree with you that pilot error was a possibility. But I think the important word in meadowbank's post was "if" - that is, a technical falfunction was also, almost certainly, possible - especially given the design state of the aircraft. We should remember that
'no evidence of failure does not mean evidence of no failure'
(as any accident investigator will confirm).
Sadly, however, we will never truly know what happened between take-off and WP change or WP change and impact.
Either way, therefore, a mountain of doubt exists, so the Day/Wratten 'verdict' is simply untenable in law (civil or military) - as I'm very sure Lord Phillip will discover.
Furthermore, the more I discover about the attainment of the military RTS of this machine, the more I am convinced that any negligence or dereliction of duty occured in late 1993, in the higher-level corridors of Main Bldg, High Wycombe and possibly MoD PE.
I ask you; how would you feel, as a commander (with responsibility for your crew and passengers) if you were routinely tasked to fly an aircraft that Boscombe Down had described as 'positively dangerous', which had not undergone full EMC testing and had a troubled recent history of flight-control, engine and navigation system problems, where most of the latter two had no clearances for in-flight or IMC use anyway?
The FACT that the HC2 did in no way meet the regulatory requirements to attain airworthiness is in black and white - this is can be proven with no doubt whatsoever. Whether Lord Phillip dares to go there is another matter of course.
Sycamore
I think you will find some timing details in the BoI main report, including a passing reference to 'difficulties' between the Strathclyde Police and the MRT about primacy over the crash site (clarification of which is a lesson that is oft repeated at Flight Safety Officers' and Post-Crash Incient Commanders' courses). Unfortunately, I don't have a copy of the BoI report with me at the moment, so perhaps someone could oblige and send sycamore a copy? However, most details will be included in the BoI's vast amount of supporting files and records - which after a number of FOI requests, the MoD claim to have lost!!! Does anyone really believe that?
flipster
ps I agree that it was a refreshingly lucid, accurate and thought-provoking article in the Argyll paper - well done!
You are right and I believe that most independent observers would agree with you that pilot error was a possibility. But I think the important word in meadowbank's post was "if" - that is, a technical falfunction was also, almost certainly, possible - especially given the design state of the aircraft. We should remember that
'no evidence of failure does not mean evidence of no failure'
(as any accident investigator will confirm).
Sadly, however, we will never truly know what happened between take-off and WP change or WP change and impact.
Either way, therefore, a mountain of doubt exists, so the Day/Wratten 'verdict' is simply untenable in law (civil or military) - as I'm very sure Lord Phillip will discover.
Furthermore, the more I discover about the attainment of the military RTS of this machine, the more I am convinced that any negligence or dereliction of duty occured in late 1993, in the higher-level corridors of Main Bldg, High Wycombe and possibly MoD PE.
I ask you; how would you feel, as a commander (with responsibility for your crew and passengers) if you were routinely tasked to fly an aircraft that Boscombe Down had described as 'positively dangerous', which had not undergone full EMC testing and had a troubled recent history of flight-control, engine and navigation system problems, where most of the latter two had no clearances for in-flight or IMC use anyway?
The FACT that the HC2 did in no way meet the regulatory requirements to attain airworthiness is in black and white - this is can be proven with no doubt whatsoever. Whether Lord Phillip dares to go there is another matter of course.
Sycamore
I think you will find some timing details in the BoI main report, including a passing reference to 'difficulties' between the Strathclyde Police and the MRT about primacy over the crash site (clarification of which is a lesson that is oft repeated at Flight Safety Officers' and Post-Crash Incient Commanders' courses). Unfortunately, I don't have a copy of the BoI report with me at the moment, so perhaps someone could oblige and send sycamore a copy? However, most details will be included in the BoI's vast amount of supporting files and records - which after a number of FOI requests, the MoD claim to have lost!!! Does anyone really believe that?
flipster
ps I agree that it was a refreshingly lucid, accurate and thought-provoking article in the Argyll paper - well done!
Last edited by flipster; 23rd Aug 2010 at 09:42.
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baston
I agree that the accident could have been caused by human error but we cannot rule out any of several different possible failures that would have led to the aircraft flying into the granite-stuffed hill rather than in its intended direction. Therefore there is doubt regarding the cause of the accident and it would have been unreasonable to find the two dead pilots grossly negligent "beyond reasonable doubt" let alone "beyond any doubt whatsoever".
Although the MoD will say that the evidence is not new, much evidence regarding the less-than-airworthy state of the HCMk2 has come to light since Day & Wratten reached their now infamous unfounded conclusion and this travesty must be righted, then the circumstances surrounding the entry into service of this aircraft should be investigated.
I must have missed something along the way! What unserviceability are you referring to that "caused the accident"?
I thought that the jury was still out on what caused the crash. Could even have been pilot error he said in hushed tones....................
I thought that the jury was still out on what caused the crash. Could even have been pilot error he said in hushed tones....................
Although the MoD will say that the evidence is not new, much evidence regarding the less-than-airworthy state of the HCMk2 has come to light since Day & Wratten reached their now infamous unfounded conclusion and this travesty must be righted, then the circumstances surrounding the entry into service of this aircraft should be investigated.
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Chinook
Meadowbank. We have been here before of course, but for the benefit of new readers, perhaps someone out there could tell us whether or not the Mk2s are now airworthy. If they are not, then why are they flying? And if they are now airworthy then just what steps were taken, by whom, and on what date, directly post the Mull crash, to raise their status? Regards JP
Last edited by John Purdey; 23rd Aug 2010 at 15:21. Reason: Omission
