Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
I'm working on getting the record of what Fox actually said. It's not available yet, but a very nice lady at Hansard is working on it......
airsound
Just noticed that my version of this says it came out at 1218. Actually, it was 2018. Are we on California time?
airsound
Just noticed that my version of this says it came out at 1218. Actually, it was 2018. Are we on California time?
Last edited by airsound; 26th May 2010 at 19:22. Reason: Clocks up the floojy?
OK, here's the Hansard record (and my thanks to them for being really helpful) My bold towards the end
So, not a fully confirmed inquiry, but a reiterated promise.
The MoD is not planning to release a press statement at this stage. There's a surprise, then
airsound
1.43 pm
Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD): I think that we rather enjoyed the leadership speech by the former Foreign Secretary.......
In the time now available to me I shall deal with two issues; I will, perforce, do so rather more briefly than I had intended. The first is an issue from the past. It concerns the crash of a Royal Air Force Chinook helicopter on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994, when all the passengers and all the crew were killed. It was a terrible and tragic event, but with an additional dimension in that the passengers were the civilian and military heads of intelligence in Northern Ireland. The consequence of that event was to prejudice very considerably our efforts at a time in the Province before the Good Friday agreement, when things were by no means easy. The two pilots—Flight Lieutenant Cook and Flight Lieutenant Tapper—were found to have been guilty of negligence. However, it is forcefully argued by many people that the evidence available failed to meet the very high standard necessary before such a finding could be made, under the Royal Air Force’s own regulations.
It is sometimes thought that to seek to reopen this matter is to imply bad faith on the part of the senior officers of the Royal Air Force who were ultimately responsible for the board of inquiry. Let me dissociate myself from that completely and say that I believe that they all acted in good faith. Nevertheless, I believe that an error was made. There have been two external inquiries: a fatal accident inquiry in Scotland under Sheriff Sir Stephen Young—now Sheriff Principal Sir Stephen Young—and a special Select Committee of the House of Lords under the chairmanship of Lord Jauncey, a distinguished former Scottish judge. Both inquiries reached the same conclusion—that the evidence did not justify the verdict. That is why I urge the Defence Secretary to consider, by whatever means appropriate, a review of that decision. Indeed, I have already written to him in those terms, and I sent him a copy of my letter before I came into the Chamber.
Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con): Does my right hon. and learned Friend share my pleasure that the Prime Minister himself, before he became Prime Minister, said:
“the Conservatives believe that the matter cannot rest there. Accordingly, we have committed to undertaking a review”?
Does he agree that such a review has to be independent of the Ministry of Defence for it to carry any weight?
Sir Menzies Campbell: I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend. Over the years he and I, along with many others in both Houses, have sought to persuade the previous Government, and indeed the Government before that, to undertake such a review. On one occasion we met Prime Minister Blair. I very much hope that this Administration will feel compelled to deal with something that many people believe has, inadvertently, caused an injustice that should be put right. If this Chamber is anything, it is surely a place for the redress of grievance.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox): For the sake of clarification, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) is correct to say that in opposition we said there would be an independent review of the evidence, and I can confirm that the Ministry of Defence is already considering the best way to undertake that. We will certainly live up to the promise that we made in opposition.
Sir Menzies Campbell: I am grateful to the Defence Secretary for that intervention, and for his undertaking.
Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD): I think that we rather enjoyed the leadership speech by the former Foreign Secretary.......
In the time now available to me I shall deal with two issues; I will, perforce, do so rather more briefly than I had intended. The first is an issue from the past. It concerns the crash of a Royal Air Force Chinook helicopter on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994, when all the passengers and all the crew were killed. It was a terrible and tragic event, but with an additional dimension in that the passengers were the civilian and military heads of intelligence in Northern Ireland. The consequence of that event was to prejudice very considerably our efforts at a time in the Province before the Good Friday agreement, when things were by no means easy. The two pilots—Flight Lieutenant Cook and Flight Lieutenant Tapper—were found to have been guilty of negligence. However, it is forcefully argued by many people that the evidence available failed to meet the very high standard necessary before such a finding could be made, under the Royal Air Force’s own regulations.
It is sometimes thought that to seek to reopen this matter is to imply bad faith on the part of the senior officers of the Royal Air Force who were ultimately responsible for the board of inquiry. Let me dissociate myself from that completely and say that I believe that they all acted in good faith. Nevertheless, I believe that an error was made. There have been two external inquiries: a fatal accident inquiry in Scotland under Sheriff Sir Stephen Young—now Sheriff Principal Sir Stephen Young—and a special Select Committee of the House of Lords under the chairmanship of Lord Jauncey, a distinguished former Scottish judge. Both inquiries reached the same conclusion—that the evidence did not justify the verdict. That is why I urge the Defence Secretary to consider, by whatever means appropriate, a review of that decision. Indeed, I have already written to him in those terms, and I sent him a copy of my letter before I came into the Chamber.
Mr James Arbuthnot (North East Hampshire) (Con): Does my right hon. and learned Friend share my pleasure that the Prime Minister himself, before he became Prime Minister, said:
“the Conservatives believe that the matter cannot rest there. Accordingly, we have committed to undertaking a review”?
Does he agree that such a review has to be independent of the Ministry of Defence for it to carry any weight?
Sir Menzies Campbell: I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend. Over the years he and I, along with many others in both Houses, have sought to persuade the previous Government, and indeed the Government before that, to undertake such a review. On one occasion we met Prime Minister Blair. I very much hope that this Administration will feel compelled to deal with something that many people believe has, inadvertently, caused an injustice that should be put right. If this Chamber is anything, it is surely a place for the redress of grievance.
The Secretary of State for Defence (Dr Liam Fox): For the sake of clarification, my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) is correct to say that in opposition we said there would be an independent review of the evidence, and I can confirm that the Ministry of Defence is already considering the best way to undertake that. We will certainly live up to the promise that we made in opposition.
Sir Menzies Campbell: I am grateful to the Defence Secretary for that intervention, and for his undertaking.
The MoD is not planning to release a press statement at this stage. There's a surprise, then
airsound
Would vecve and olive accept that they ALL could have been the victims of an unwise and premature RTS of an inadequate aircraft?
No.
What new evidence do you have that would suggest the RTS was in any way compliant or the aircraft sufficiently mature to warrant a claim that it was airworthy?
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An independent inquiry!
On the face of it, great news. Probably the best single announcement in 16 years of campaigning!
Just a reminder if I may: Every single 'independent' review of the 'facts' (as they are) of this case, has found the 'evidence' does not support a finding of negligence against the pilots. There simply is insufficient relevant information!
In total contrast, the mechanical maturity of the HC2 at that time, is now beyond question!
We may now be entering the home straight. What has always hinged on matters of opinion, will now hopefully be assessed on matters of fact!
Let right be done.
(Yet again, I am reminded of the Air New Zealand accident on Mount Eribus)
On the face of it, great news. Probably the best single announcement in 16 years of campaigning!
Just a reminder if I may: Every single 'independent' review of the 'facts' (as they are) of this case, has found the 'evidence' does not support a finding of negligence against the pilots. There simply is insufficient relevant information!
In total contrast, the mechanical maturity of the HC2 at that time, is now beyond question!
We may now be entering the home straight. What has always hinged on matters of opinion, will now hopefully be assessed on matters of fact!
Let right be done.
(Yet again, I am reminded of the Air New Zealand accident on Mount Eribus)
An independent inquiry? The Nimrod Review was 'independent' but was 'assisted' by the MOD. Result being just two relative juniors in the food-chain fed to the wolves and a recommendation to create a Military Aviation Authority. That MAA was to be 'independent' of the MOD, yet a part of it at the same time! I'm afraid that the MOD's definition of 'independent' is somewhat at variance to that in common parlance. I suspect that this 'independent' inquiry will be similarly limited, indeed recommending that W&D's finding be quashed but that any airworthiness lessons have already been learned from H-C and taken care of. I would disagree with that and call for a truly independent inquiry separated entirely from the MOD, ie rather like the MAA should be. Self regulation never works and in aviation it kills!
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No.
And of course my post 6448 should be edited to correctly read: They were a competent crew..... but I was following the style of previous posts using the phrase "could have" to make the point that not everyone here goes along with the various conspiracy theories posted here, especially the one labelled "airworthiness".
And of course my post 6448 should be edited to correctly read: They were a competent crew..... but I was following the style of previous posts using the phrase "could have" to make the point that not everyone here goes along with the various conspiracy theories posted here, especially the one labelled "airworthiness".
If we set the airworthiness issue to one side
"Or, they were a competent crew flying a serviceable aircraft who could have negligently failed to maintain VFR"
What do you think, sounds more factually correct when written in that way
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Seldom
Perhaps you have not read the findings of the Investigating BOI - they were quite specific that the forecast weather would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull. The actual observed weather at the Mull was considerably worse than the forecast weather - yet the aircraft average groundspeed from the radar fix on leaving Belfast CTZ until impact was 158 kts. In this respect you may recall that the AAIB assessment of the aircraft speed at impact was "approx 150 kts" whilst attempting an escape manouvre.
One other interesting point is that if the Chinook did slow down to an IAS of between "60-80 kts" (as described by the Yachtsman) then it would have had to have exceeded Vne at some stage of the transit in order to have achieved the known parameters prior to impact.
Perhaps you have not read the findings of the Investigating BOI - they were quite specific that the forecast weather would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull. The actual observed weather at the Mull was considerably worse than the forecast weather - yet the aircraft average groundspeed from the radar fix on leaving Belfast CTZ until impact was 158 kts. In this respect you may recall that the AAIB assessment of the aircraft speed at impact was "approx 150 kts" whilst attempting an escape manouvre.
One other interesting point is that if the Chinook did slow down to an IAS of between "60-80 kts" (as described by the Yachtsman) then it would have had to have exceeded Vne at some stage of the transit in order to have achieved the known parameters prior to impact.
Perhaps you have not read the findings of the Investigating BOI - they were quite specific that the forecast weather would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull. The actual observed weather at the Mull was considerably worse than the forecast weather - yet the aircraft average groundspeed from the radar fix on leaving Belfast CTZ until impact was 158 kts. In this respect you may recall that the AAIB assessment of the aircraft speed at impact was "approx 150 kts" whilst attempting an escape manouvre.
I imagine that a fair and independent inqury would ask the BoI to reconsider ALL their comments and findings in light of the fact (advised by MoD) that most of the aircraft systems necessary to execute the manoeuvres you mention were NOT CLEARED for use; and that a safety critical system had been declared "positively dangerous". I don't think the BoI members sought or were given this information, but I know at least one of them was informed a couple of years later. By now, of course, all know the truth so I look forward to their comments.
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Seldom
Perhaps you have not read the findings of the Investigating BOI - they were quite specific that the forecast weather would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull. The actual observed weather at the Mull was considerably worse than the forecast weather - yet the aircraft average groundspeed from the radar fix on leaving Belfast CTZ until impact was 158 kts. In this respect you may recall that the AAIB assessment of the aircraft speed at impact was "approx 150 kts" whilst attempting an escape manouvre.
One other interesting point is that if the Chinook did slow down to an IAS of between "60-80 kts" (as described by the Yachtsman) then it would have had to have exceeded Vne at some stage of the transit in order to have achieved the known parameters prior to impact.
Perhaps you have not read the findings of the Investigating BOI - they were quite specific that the forecast weather would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull. The actual observed weather at the Mull was considerably worse than the forecast weather - yet the aircraft average groundspeed from the radar fix on leaving Belfast CTZ until impact was 158 kts. In this respect you may recall that the AAIB assessment of the aircraft speed at impact was "approx 150 kts" whilst attempting an escape manouvre.
One other interesting point is that if the Chinook did slow down to an IAS of between "60-80 kts" (as described by the Yachtsman) then it would have had to have exceeded Vne at some stage of the transit in order to have achieved the known parameters prior to impact.
Actual observed as by whom
Surely the only actual observed that has any meaning in this instance would be that of those on the flight deck 
As has been suggested by others those with no actual experience of SH low level OP's are always going to be very poorly placed when discussing this incident.
Perhaps you have not read the findings of the Investigating BOI
However, assuming there will be a truly independant enquiry in possession of all the facts (suppressed at the time) that have emerged since, a more accurate verdict may be arrived at, and blame properly apportioned.
I am sure the Provost Marshal will take a close interest in the proceedings.
Last edited by Fitter2; 28th May 2010 at 12:45. Reason: dyslexic fingers...
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cazatou (K52)
No doubt opinions such as yours will be presented by those representing the MOD at any future inquiry. In all independent inquiries thus far, their veracity has fallen somewhat short of any recognised standard of proof, never mind the standard quite properly required in these matters!
In other words, matters of 'opinion' are not matters of 'fact'. 'Assumptions' should never be confused with 'evidence'!
cazatou (K52)
Having re-read your post:
I should be very grateful if you would be kind enough to point me in the direction of the evidence specifying a radar fix, linked to an accurate time check, when the aircraft left the Belfast CTZ.
It's just that I can't recall that specifically linked 'evidence'.
Or indeed:
An escape manouvre?? Would that opinion be based on some recording? Or is it simply an assumption? One that (I may be wrong, but) I can't recall "the AAIB" making??
Though I confess one can indeed make a persuasive case when one corrupts the 'facts'!
I'm obliged.
No doubt opinions such as yours will be presented by those representing the MOD at any future inquiry. In all independent inquiries thus far, their veracity has fallen somewhat short of any recognised standard of proof, never mind the standard quite properly required in these matters!
In other words, matters of 'opinion' are not matters of 'fact'. 'Assumptions' should never be confused with 'evidence'!
cazatou (K52)
Having re-read your post:
yet the aircraft average groundspeed from the radar fix on leaving Belfast CTZ
It's just that I can't recall that specifically linked 'evidence'.
Or indeed:
the AAIB assessment of the aircraft speed at impact was "approx 150 kts" whilst attempting an escape manouvre.
Though I confess one can indeed make a persuasive case when one corrupts the 'facts'!
I'm obliged.
Last edited by Tandemrotor; 27th May 2010 at 22:01.
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Tandem Rotor wrote:
<<I should be very grateful if you would be kind enough to point me in the direction of the evidence specifying a radar fix, linked to an accurate time check, when the aircraft left the Belfast CTZ. >>
Well there was another fixed point not so far from the ATC fix that is known accurately (the exact position and the exact time);
due to the lack of confidence at the time in the nav systems with a gps component, they had done what was common practice at the time – they overflew a known feature not long after takeoff and did a fix.
Racal were misleading (in their report) in describing the fix on the waypoint V813 (from memory just now) as the “initialising” or “initialisation” fix;
it was actually the last operator input fix found in the recovered data from the SuperTANS and was not made on the apron at Aldergrove but a couple of miles on their way along the 027 track, and the use of this fix in analysis gave the same result as the ATC fix, dist/time wise;
again, there was some misleading by the ATC witness who described the position as 7 nmiles (all this from memory just now) along the 027 radial from the Belfast VOR – of course this was no where near as anyone has been to Aldergrove could tell you – the apron at Aldergrove is significantly removed from the VOR site – however, they had held 027 mag (at the time) from the apron to the position of waypoint change (near the Mull) and the displacement of the ATC fix did not alter the dist/time calcs significantly.
Yet again a point on this forum illustrates that inadequate analysis by both authorities and interested parties (eg Mull group) leaves understanding of the basics of this crash far short of where it should have been years ago, let alone today.
Further to the analysis aspect, an important deficiency became apparent in the processes of investigation used by the authorities for a politically sensitive crash – that was that civil authorities were overly dependent upon the RAF for information on the aircraft's systems and pertinent operational procedures such that it was apparently easy for the RAF to obfuscate where it wanted equipment and procedures to remain out of the public domain – clearly an interested civil authority needed to have assembled a small team (comprising, say, pilots and civilians with navigation systems backgrounds) prior to an inquiry to better understand the full range of navigation systems available and the evidence with respect to the a/c's navigation, to establish as far as possible what was apparently happening prior to the crash, and to better generate pertinent questions and allow those questions be pressed home in the inquiry – for example, no inquiry could have been regarded as comprehensive without knowledge of the existence and usage of two systems (CPLS and the VHF Homer) capable of aiding local navigation.
That the crash happened in a training area but this was not noticeably emphasised nor considered together with that it was not disclosed that this a/c was fitted with a significant piece of local navigation equipment whose exercise in this area was of obvious merit and whose use analysis predicted must surely be sufficient to justify a new inquiry.
<<I should be very grateful if you would be kind enough to point me in the direction of the evidence specifying a radar fix, linked to an accurate time check, when the aircraft left the Belfast CTZ. >>
Well there was another fixed point not so far from the ATC fix that is known accurately (the exact position and the exact time);
due to the lack of confidence at the time in the nav systems with a gps component, they had done what was common practice at the time – they overflew a known feature not long after takeoff and did a fix.
Racal were misleading (in their report) in describing the fix on the waypoint V813 (from memory just now) as the “initialising” or “initialisation” fix;
it was actually the last operator input fix found in the recovered data from the SuperTANS and was not made on the apron at Aldergrove but a couple of miles on their way along the 027 track, and the use of this fix in analysis gave the same result as the ATC fix, dist/time wise;
again, there was some misleading by the ATC witness who described the position as 7 nmiles (all this from memory just now) along the 027 radial from the Belfast VOR – of course this was no where near as anyone has been to Aldergrove could tell you – the apron at Aldergrove is significantly removed from the VOR site – however, they had held 027 mag (at the time) from the apron to the position of waypoint change (near the Mull) and the displacement of the ATC fix did not alter the dist/time calcs significantly.
Yet again a point on this forum illustrates that inadequate analysis by both authorities and interested parties (eg Mull group) leaves understanding of the basics of this crash far short of where it should have been years ago, let alone today.
Further to the analysis aspect, an important deficiency became apparent in the processes of investigation used by the authorities for a politically sensitive crash – that was that civil authorities were overly dependent upon the RAF for information on the aircraft's systems and pertinent operational procedures such that it was apparently easy for the RAF to obfuscate where it wanted equipment and procedures to remain out of the public domain – clearly an interested civil authority needed to have assembled a small team (comprising, say, pilots and civilians with navigation systems backgrounds) prior to an inquiry to better understand the full range of navigation systems available and the evidence with respect to the a/c's navigation, to establish as far as possible what was apparently happening prior to the crash, and to better generate pertinent questions and allow those questions be pressed home in the inquiry – for example, no inquiry could have been regarded as comprehensive without knowledge of the existence and usage of two systems (CPLS and the VHF Homer) capable of aiding local navigation.
That the crash happened in a training area but this was not noticeably emphasised nor considered together with that it was not disclosed that this a/c was fitted with a significant piece of local navigation equipment whose exercise in this area was of obvious merit and whose use analysis predicted must surely be sufficient to justify a new inquiry.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 28th May 2010 at 09:30. Reason: correction
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Once the Government have decided on the format of this Inquiry (hopefully, carried out by the best legal minds in the country, well removed from the MoD and legally binding), then I suggest that all parties with a valid point of view and worthwhile input should be encouraged to submit their thoughts to the Inquiry.
It may take a while but, with our help, the truth will eventually out and the pilots' names will be cleared.
It may take a while but, with our help, the truth will eventually out and the pilots' names will be cleared.
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Chinook
Posters such as Dalek (5301), Chugalug (5216), and others have in the past alleged that:
1. This Mk of Chinook was put into service when it was not fit for such service.
2. The RAF hierachy (that is to say CAS, CinC, AOC, and their staffs) knew full well that it was not fit to enter service but nevertheless insisted that it be flown.
3. When the Chinook crashed into the Mull, the heirachy decided to blame two innocent pilots in order to conceal their own failings.
4. This view was supported by the Air, Flight Safety, Engineer and Legal Saffs at Group, Command, AFB and MOD levels
Perhaps all those who hold that view will now be prepared to make themselves available to the forthcoming Inquiry, under their real identities of course, and produce their evidence.
I cannot wait. Regards John Purdey
1. This Mk of Chinook was put into service when it was not fit for such service.
2. The RAF hierachy (that is to say CAS, CinC, AOC, and their staffs) knew full well that it was not fit to enter service but nevertheless insisted that it be flown.
3. When the Chinook crashed into the Mull, the heirachy decided to blame two innocent pilots in order to conceal their own failings.
4. This view was supported by the Air, Flight Safety, Engineer and Legal Saffs at Group, Command, AFB and MOD levels
Perhaps all those who hold that view will now be prepared to make themselves available to the forthcoming Inquiry, under their real identities of course, and produce their evidence.
I cannot wait. Regards John Purdey
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Cazatou,
Here we go again. The Mull lighthouse was in fog. No doubt.
The weather approaching the Mull was legal VMC, both on forecast and actual. ( Mr Holbrook, best evidence.). Weather at crash site? Who knows?
A radar fix is agricultural, good to a couple of miles at best. How precise was the timecheck to go with it?
We know the crash position. How precise was the time of impact? I bet you are using that "certified ADR", the TANS again.
Even if you have the precise figures for the above, all you can establish is accurate groundspeed.
You tell us time and time again you are an A1 pilot. Then you must understand that VNE has nothing to do with groundspeed.
Yet again you can only be basing your latest slur on the crew by taking forecast conditions as actual facts. Nobody knows the exact temperature(s), density(s) and wind velocity(s) encountered by the crew during that transit.
Here we go again. The Mull lighthouse was in fog. No doubt.
The weather approaching the Mull was legal VMC, both on forecast and actual. ( Mr Holbrook, best evidence.). Weather at crash site? Who knows?
A radar fix is agricultural, good to a couple of miles at best. How precise was the timecheck to go with it?
We know the crash position. How precise was the time of impact? I bet you are using that "certified ADR", the TANS again.
Even if you have the precise figures for the above, all you can establish is accurate groundspeed.
You tell us time and time again you are an A1 pilot. Then you must understand that VNE has nothing to do with groundspeed.
Yet again you can only be basing your latest slur on the crew by taking forecast conditions as actual facts. Nobody knows the exact temperature(s), density(s) and wind velocity(s) encountered by the crew during that transit.
John Purdey
As I have said before to you,
You will be aware 1. and 2. are now established facts following MoD's (perhaps inadvertent) release of key documents which they had withheld from all previous inquiries. (A serious offence).
On point 3. there is no doubt the RAF hierarchy blamed the pilots. It is also beyond doubt that, if the above documents and facts had been known to the inquiry teams, said senior officers would have faced severe censure, if not legal action. Deliberately misrepresenting the facts and issuing a fabricated CAR and RTS, thereby knowingly endangering aircrew, is a serious offence.
On point 4, I cannot speak for all these departments but, for example, the record shows the MoD(PE) Project Director pleaded with his bosses to take heed of Boscombe's advice that the aircraft should not be declared airworthy. I also understand the formal legal advice was against the gross negligence verdict. If "Flight Safety" or "Engineering" signed up to a decision to ignore Boscombe's "positively dangerous" advice, then I would describe that as criminal. It is far more likely that they were not told; just as the BoI, HofL, HofC, Sheriff and, most importantly, the aircrew, were not.
I say again, so that you are absolutely clear on this point, the documents demonstrating this have been freely released under Freedom of Information by the MoD - they have not been "leaked" in any sense. Many were referred to at every inquiry but, for whatever reason, their significance was not understood or explained. As stated by flipster, many are now eagerly anticipating ensuring this evidence is heard in a proper forum. Some very fine legal minds will now be well aware of the issues resulting in the Haddon-Cave's report, whereas before it was rather assumed MoD met their legal obligations.
Equally, those MoD staffs called to give evidence will now be very hesitant about lying to protect those few responsible for the above; primarily because a significant precedent has been set whereby legal and disciplinary action is being taken against those who ignore their Duty of Care; but also because discussion forums such as this have readily disseminated the available evidence making it more difficult for MoD to dissemble. The argument is essentially that which won the day on both Nimrod and Hercules.
Again, thank you for reminding us of the facts. May we look forward to YOU offering YOUR interpretation of the regulations? That, indeed, would be a pleasure because, so far, you have only rubbished the long experience of individuals here without offering an alternative view on how these senior staffs (CA and ACAS) should have exercised their delegated authority.
Posters such as Dalek (5301), Chugalug (5216), and others have in the past alleged that:
1. This Mk of Chinook was put into service when it was not fit for such service.
2. The RAF hierachy (that is to say CAS, CinC, AOC, and their staffs) knew full well that it was not fit to enter service but nevertheless insisted that it be flown.
3. When the Chinook crashed into the Mull, the heirachy decided to blame two innocent pilots in order to conceal their own failings.
4. This view was supported by the Air, Flight Safety, Engineer and Legal Saffs at Group, Command, AFB and MOD levels
Perhaps all those who hold that view will now be prepared to make themselves available to the forthcoming Inquiry, under their real identities of course, and produce their evidence.
I cannot wait. Regards John Purdey
1. This Mk of Chinook was put into service when it was not fit for such service.
2. The RAF hierachy (that is to say CAS, CinC, AOC, and their staffs) knew full well that it was not fit to enter service but nevertheless insisted that it be flown.
3. When the Chinook crashed into the Mull, the heirachy decided to blame two innocent pilots in order to conceal their own failings.
4. This view was supported by the Air, Flight Safety, Engineer and Legal Saffs at Group, Command, AFB and MOD levels
Perhaps all those who hold that view will now be prepared to make themselves available to the forthcoming Inquiry, under their real identities of course, and produce their evidence.
I cannot wait. Regards John Purdey
As I have said before to you,
You will be aware 1. and 2. are now established facts following MoD's (perhaps inadvertent) release of key documents which they had withheld from all previous inquiries. (A serious offence).
On point 3. there is no doubt the RAF hierarchy blamed the pilots. It is also beyond doubt that, if the above documents and facts had been known to the inquiry teams, said senior officers would have faced severe censure, if not legal action. Deliberately misrepresenting the facts and issuing a fabricated CAR and RTS, thereby knowingly endangering aircrew, is a serious offence.
On point 4, I cannot speak for all these departments but, for example, the record shows the MoD(PE) Project Director pleaded with his bosses to take heed of Boscombe's advice that the aircraft should not be declared airworthy. I also understand the formal legal advice was against the gross negligence verdict. If "Flight Safety" or "Engineering" signed up to a decision to ignore Boscombe's "positively dangerous" advice, then I would describe that as criminal. It is far more likely that they were not told; just as the BoI, HofL, HofC, Sheriff and, most importantly, the aircrew, were not.
I say again, so that you are absolutely clear on this point, the documents demonstrating this have been freely released under Freedom of Information by the MoD - they have not been "leaked" in any sense. Many were referred to at every inquiry but, for whatever reason, their significance was not understood or explained. As stated by flipster, many are now eagerly anticipating ensuring this evidence is heard in a proper forum. Some very fine legal minds will now be well aware of the issues resulting in the Haddon-Cave's report, whereas before it was rather assumed MoD met their legal obligations.
Equally, those MoD staffs called to give evidence will now be very hesitant about lying to protect those few responsible for the above; primarily because a significant precedent has been set whereby legal and disciplinary action is being taken against those who ignore their Duty of Care; but also because discussion forums such as this have readily disseminated the available evidence making it more difficult for MoD to dissemble. The argument is essentially that which won the day on both Nimrod and Hercules.
Again, thank you for reminding us of the facts. May we look forward to YOU offering YOUR interpretation of the regulations? That, indeed, would be a pleasure because, so far, you have only rubbished the long experience of individuals here without offering an alternative view on how these senior staffs (CA and ACAS) should have exercised their delegated authority.
JP,
The haughty disdain with which you hold your position has been obvious in every post you have made here. Many, including myself, are left with the distinct impression that you have much to lose by the steadily mounting evidence that has gathered in favour of overturning the insulting verdict imposed by those supposedly knowledgeable RAF senior officers. And that steadily mounting evidence is now likely to get the proper, full airing it always should have had.
It is absolutely certain that many of "those who hold that view will now be prepared to make themselves available to the forthcoming Inquiry". That is why this thread came in to being, and has continued to exist for so long - because many, many good people feel it is imperative to right a monumental wrong.
How about you JP? Will you make yourself available? Will you be prepared to publicly justify your supercilious position?
The haughty disdain with which you hold your position has been obvious in every post you have made here. Many, including myself, are left with the distinct impression that you have much to lose by the steadily mounting evidence that has gathered in favour of overturning the insulting verdict imposed by those supposedly knowledgeable RAF senior officers. And that steadily mounting evidence is now likely to get the proper, full airing it always should have had.
Perhaps all those who hold that view will now be prepared to make themselves available to the forthcoming Inquiry, under their real identities of course, and produce their evidence.
I cannot wait.
I cannot wait.
How about you JP? Will you make yourself available? Will you be prepared to publicly justify your supercilious position?
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Chinook
Tuc. I hear what you say about the regulations, but that is not what I was discussing. My point deals only with the allegation that the CinC, AOC and staffs decided to blame the pilots in order to conceal their own failings. Please stick to the point.
deeceethree. Invective does not help, please see the above and say whether you agree with that specific allegation.
With kind regards, JP
deeceethree. Invective does not help, please see the above and say whether you agree with that specific allegation.
With kind regards, JP
Invective? You should see me when I am angry ...
Yes, I believe that some or all of them must have done so. That is what a proper inquiry, with all the evidence that can be mustered in one place, will hopefully find out, resulting in the restoration of the reputation of the Chinook crew. And should the guilty parties at various levels of the MoD, RAF and elsewhere have to face censure or whatever for their disgraceful behaviour, hurrah!
..... the CinC, AOC and staffs decided to blame the pilots in order to conceal their own failings.