Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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Indeed, Fitter - and JP, having got most of it right with his analysis, missed off para 5 (a) which is:
Others who have aided with the serious allegations, namely Ralph Kohn and his chaps at #5976 et seq.
Others who have aided with the serious allegations, namely Ralph Kohn and his chaps at #5976 et seq.
JP it seems that my reply to your post #5301, ie #5302 (page 266 in Hymns Ancient & Modern, everyone), "by no means answered your post". Well it still stands up for me JP, given that it dates from last July and many cubic metres of H2O have flowed since then:
As BOAC has pointed out, many more of your points seem to have hardened up since then. Congratulations on your prescient forecast, old chap!
JP. Answer to question1: Yes. Answer to other questions; I don't know who knew what or what actions individuals took or didn't take. I am convinced that the reason this aircraft crashed has yet to be determined because the Accident Investigation conducted by the RAF at the time was woeful. That is why there should be a new, objective and fair investigation into every aspect of this tragedy. The main effect to my mind of the BoI/RO's efforts to date has been to obscure the lack of Airworthiness Regulation enforcement by the MOD. We know that since this crash there have been at least two other such tragedies (though I suspect even more) involving lack of airworthiness, accounting for a further 24 needless deaths. It is just possible if the airworthiness shortcomings of the MOD had been exposed by this BoI, those later deaths might have been avoided. I'm sure that this answer is unacceptable to you, like all my others. Too bad.
blimey JP, even with my limited intelligence it's not difficult! He even says he has a web page.
google; Robin Clark Chinook.
or if that's too complicated to do;
ROBIN J CLARK - The Chinook Story
google; Robin Clark Chinook.
or if that's too complicated to do;
ROBIN J CLARK - The Chinook Story
JP
Further to your excellent summary of the facts at #5301, have YOU given any thought to what offences were committed (at your points 1. and 2.) by CA and ACAS; and anyone else who was party to the deliberate decision to ignore Boscombe warnings and advice, and misrepresent the facts in a fabricated CAR/RTS? Given his support of the ROs, one assumes this includes, as you say, CAS. His only defence would be to say his subordinates had withheld the facts from him.
You know my own feelings. Something along the lines of "false representation" (of the facts), failure of "Duty of Care" and "gross negligence" seems appropriate.
Further to your excellent summary of the facts at #5301, have YOU given any thought to what offences were committed (at your points 1. and 2.) by CA and ACAS; and anyone else who was party to the deliberate decision to ignore Boscombe warnings and advice, and misrepresent the facts in a fabricated CAR/RTS? Given his support of the ROs, one assumes this includes, as you say, CAS. His only defence would be to say his subordinates had withheld the facts from him.
You know my own feelings. Something along the lines of "false representation" (of the facts), failure of "Duty of Care" and "gross negligence" seems appropriate.
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Walter's Theory
Walter,
I am sorry about your disappointment since I can certainly agree with the conclusions you make at your 24 March posting, and I think I said that you appeared to have been proved correct re your insistence on the fitment of the CPLS. However, I do not accept your comment that there was "no evidence whatsoever of a control jam or engine control malfunction" - the former is certainly a possibility from the AAIB Report (which I seem to recall I sent you) and the latter formed part of the RTS. I also cannot see why they would have changed waypoints had they been conducting the trial that you postulate.
But in terms of the purpose of this thread none of this seems to me to be relevant anyway. Although I do not see that such a trial could have been missed from the BoI's investigation on the operational side they missed or failed to investigate, or were kept in the dark about, so much else that I have to accept that your theory should not be dismissed any more than mine or indeed pilot error should be - none of us will never know what happened. The point of this thread, with which I believe we both agree, is that the criminal verdict of "Gross Negligence" cannot be justified except on the basis of speculation, and the dangererous failings of that speculation have become ever more obvious as the real facts behind the airworthiness and Introduction to Service of the Chinook Mk2 have emerged - including, it now appears, a failure to even admit/know what the equipment fit was and the potential implications of it being fitted. All of this makes this speculation, even admitted at the start of the SRO's comments, on which the "Gross Negligence" verdict is based ever more unjust and unjustifiable. To quote and support your words the verdict is indeed a "stinking disgrace".
JB
I am sorry about your disappointment since I can certainly agree with the conclusions you make at your 24 March posting, and I think I said that you appeared to have been proved correct re your insistence on the fitment of the CPLS. However, I do not accept your comment that there was "no evidence whatsoever of a control jam or engine control malfunction" - the former is certainly a possibility from the AAIB Report (which I seem to recall I sent you) and the latter formed part of the RTS. I also cannot see why they would have changed waypoints had they been conducting the trial that you postulate.
But in terms of the purpose of this thread none of this seems to me to be relevant anyway. Although I do not see that such a trial could have been missed from the BoI's investigation on the operational side they missed or failed to investigate, or were kept in the dark about, so much else that I have to accept that your theory should not be dismissed any more than mine or indeed pilot error should be - none of us will never know what happened. The point of this thread, with which I believe we both agree, is that the criminal verdict of "Gross Negligence" cannot be justified except on the basis of speculation, and the dangererous failings of that speculation have become ever more obvious as the real facts behind the airworthiness and Introduction to Service of the Chinook Mk2 have emerged - including, it now appears, a failure to even admit/know what the equipment fit was and the potential implications of it being fitted. All of this makes this speculation, even admitted at the start of the SRO's comments, on which the "Gross Negligence" verdict is based ever more unjust and unjustifiable. To quote and support your words the verdict is indeed a "stinking disgrace".
JB
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New Look...
I see some guys already found the earlier draft of my scenario.....I found it easier to edit it on my own office server , and so the current version is at
gneiss.dyndns.info/chinook.htm
it does not need a www , so you may have to copy/paste...or use
this link
The server is not left up 24 hours though , so best tried 9am-9pm UK time..
I arrived at this as the most likely scenario which fits all the known facts.....I do not think there is anything in it which certain AM can dispute.....
I think a dual pronged approach is good , legal challenges and providing ideas such as this are not mutually exclusive , indeed they add to the fight .......
rgds all ..Robin...
gneiss.dyndns.info/chinook.htm
it does not need a www , so you may have to copy/paste...or use
this link
The server is not left up 24 hours though , so best tried 9am-9pm UK time..
I arrived at this as the most likely scenario which fits all the known facts.....I do not think there is anything in it which certain AM can dispute.....
I think a dual pronged approach is good , legal challenges and providing ideas such as this are not mutually exclusive , indeed they add to the fight .......
rgds all ..Robin...
Last edited by Robin Clark; 7th Apr 2010 at 08:23.
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Software effects
Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000105 EndHTML:0000011206 StartFragment:0000002315 EndFragment:0000011170
This correspondence has concentrated on whether the pilots made an error, and on whether the Air Marshals and consequently the Ministers made a different kind of error in condemning the pilots.
I believe the more significant factor is that few people understand software failure behaviour.
(1) All software, like hardware, contains design errors, which can become failures when the software/hardware is run.
(2) When software commits a failure, it is usually impossible to find it by running the software under some "test conditions". One reason for this is that when the software is re-initialised or the equipment switched off and on again, you now have, in effect, as-new software with no evidence of the failure. Those who are not educated in software then say "There you are, no fault". This occurs quite widely (and is probably relevant to Toyota's present problems). Even the senior avionics officer at the CAA a few years ago claimed that the lack of maintenance reports blaming software showed that there was no significant software problem.
(3) There is no in-service built-in test that can identify a fault as caused by software rather than hardware.
(4) Published papers have suggested that, variously, 50% to 80% of software failure modes never recur.
(5) Any software running a safety-related function should therefore not be assumed to be fault free even if the fault cannot be reproduced.
(6) These conditions make it easy for the suppliers of the software to disclaim responsibility, since proof is difficult.
(7) Since few people of senior rank in any organisation understand this, they are easily led to blame other causes for mishaps.
(8) There are ways to compensate for the inevitable software failures, but they mean spending more. (One of those methods is thorough logical and functional analysis, such as is done by Praxis, for example). Standby redundancy may also be needed, as is used in the Space Shuttle guidance, navigation and control computing.
This correspondence has concentrated on whether the pilots made an error, and on whether the Air Marshals and consequently the Ministers made a different kind of error in condemning the pilots.
I believe the more significant factor is that few people understand software failure behaviour.
(1) All software, like hardware, contains design errors, which can become failures when the software/hardware is run.
(2) When software commits a failure, it is usually impossible to find it by running the software under some "test conditions". One reason for this is that when the software is re-initialised or the equipment switched off and on again, you now have, in effect, as-new software with no evidence of the failure. Those who are not educated in software then say "There you are, no fault". This occurs quite widely (and is probably relevant to Toyota's present problems). Even the senior avionics officer at the CAA a few years ago claimed that the lack of maintenance reports blaming software showed that there was no significant software problem.
(3) There is no in-service built-in test that can identify a fault as caused by software rather than hardware.
(4) Published papers have suggested that, variously, 50% to 80% of software failure modes never recur.
(5) Any software running a safety-related function should therefore not be assumed to be fault free even if the fault cannot be reproduced.
(6) These conditions make it easy for the suppliers of the software to disclaim responsibility, since proof is difficult.
(7) Since few people of senior rank in any organisation understand this, they are easily led to blame other causes for mishaps.
(8) There are ways to compensate for the inevitable software failures, but they mean spending more. (One of those methods is thorough logical and functional analysis, such as is done by Praxis, for example). Standby redundancy may also be needed, as is used in the Space Shuttle guidance, navigation and control computing.
engpil:
Well, first may I welcome you and your excellent maiden post, engpil. I must regretfully however take issue with you over the quote above. The action taken by the "Air Marshals", by which I presume you mean the Messrs Wratton and Day, were calculated, deliberate and based on knowledge of the unprecedented RTS of an aircraft type into RAF service while suffering severe technical shortcomings that amounted to it being Grossly Unairworthy. That knowledge was seemingly not shared with the BoI charged to investigate the fatal accident of an aircraft of that type on the Mull of Kintyre in which 29 people died. That they then saw fit to construct a bogus case against the deceased pilots in order to find them Grossly Negligent may be seen in retrospect as an "error" but was at the time a calculated deliberate act that had the effect of obscuring the RTS "irregularities". Ministers of course do not make errors, they are merely badly advised!
.....and on whether the Air Marshals and consequently the Ministers made a different kind of error in condemning the pilots.
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Engpil,
Your post raises a couple of quite relevant questions, and merits a few clarifications.
The clarifications first. It's probably a generalisation to say that all software has faults, though it is fairly likely of any non-trivial system.
Also, safety critical software, in particular that which may lead to loss of life if it fails is incredibly resilient if developed correctly. The current benchmark is less than one failure every billion hours. i.e. over 100 millenia
Obviously things have moved on since the 80's, but even then safety critical software developed with the appropriate tools, methodology and management should have been more than adequate for the purpose.
Having said this all, we need to concern ourselves with the systems in question. I think the team auditing the system had a fair understanding of the issues, and would have been shocked to find the mean time between failures measured more appropriately in minutes rather than millenia.
Back to the questions.
Are the software issues a significant factor?
Yes, clearly, in different ways. Firstly, they do provide a possible cause for the accident which cannot be ruled out for the reasons you suggest.
Secondly, they demonstrate that the aircraft was not airworthy and should not have been released to service. I do not find it credible that anyone can look at the known evidence with an open mind and not see this.
Following on from that, with what was known at the time, was it acceptable to sign the RTS? I personally believe this goes beyond Gross Negligence as it must have been a conscious decision.
Anyway, keep up the good work all. Hopefully someone will remind DC of his promise when the dust settles...
TN
Your post raises a couple of quite relevant questions, and merits a few clarifications.
The clarifications first. It's probably a generalisation to say that all software has faults, though it is fairly likely of any non-trivial system.
Also, safety critical software, in particular that which may lead to loss of life if it fails is incredibly resilient if developed correctly. The current benchmark is less than one failure every billion hours. i.e. over 100 millenia
Obviously things have moved on since the 80's, but even then safety critical software developed with the appropriate tools, methodology and management should have been more than adequate for the purpose.
Having said this all, we need to concern ourselves with the systems in question. I think the team auditing the system had a fair understanding of the issues, and would have been shocked to find the mean time between failures measured more appropriately in minutes rather than millenia.
Back to the questions.
Are the software issues a significant factor?
Yes, clearly, in different ways. Firstly, they do provide a possible cause for the accident which cannot be ruled out for the reasons you suggest.
Secondly, they demonstrate that the aircraft was not airworthy and should not have been released to service. I do not find it credible that anyone can look at the known evidence with an open mind and not see this.
Following on from that, with what was known at the time, was it acceptable to sign the RTS? I personally believe this goes beyond Gross Negligence as it must have been a conscious decision.
Anyway, keep up the good work all. Hopefully someone will remind DC of his promise when the dust settles...
TN
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I personally believe this goes beyond Gross Negligence as it must have been a conscious decision.
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New Look....
My web site at " ROBIN J CLARK - The Chinook Story " ..has now been updated with my suggested chinook scenario.....the photos and maps are not as large as I would like and I'm still working on that.....
...I rather expected lots of flack and PM's ...but it has been very quiet...???
regards all
...I rather expected lots of flack and PM's ...but it has been very quiet...???
regards all
Robin
Thank you for that link. I suppose I don't have a theory about what happened at the time of the crash - my own background draws me to the negligence which occurred from 1991 - May 94. But it is always interesting to read a viewpoint.
If I could just clarify two points. At bullet 3 you say;
It didn't "appear", it was a stated fact in the Release to Service document.
Also, at bullet 5 you say;
I think it would be more accurate to say the kit was (probably) fitted, but was definitely NOT cleared for use. This applies equally to most Comms, EW and Nav. Again, a simple fact based on the RTS.
Both the above are significant evidence of immaturity and premature Release to Service. This links to the points you make about the crew's thoughts about using the Mk2.
Thanks again.
Thank you for that link. I suppose I don't have a theory about what happened at the time of the crash - my own background draws me to the negligence which occurred from 1991 - May 94. But it is always interesting to read a viewpoint.
If I could just clarify two points. At bullet 3 you say;
Some electronic equipment appeared to suffer from electrical interference.......
It didn't "appear", it was a stated fact in the Release to Service document.
Also, at bullet 5 you say;
the a/c was not fitted with approved equipment for this mode of flight
I think it would be more accurate to say the kit was (probably) fitted, but was definitely NOT cleared for use. This applies equally to most Comms, EW and Nav. Again, a simple fact based on the RTS.
Both the above are significant evidence of immaturity and premature Release to Service. This links to the points you make about the crew's thoughts about using the Mk2.
Thanks again.
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Chinook
Robin Clark.
.....Trusting the navigation computer they could not have been aware how close they were to the lighthouse and the high ground , all obscured in the local fog...
Please enlighten us as to why on earth they anywhere near the Mull in Fog.
egards, John Purdey
.....Trusting the navigation computer they could not have been aware how close they were to the lighthouse and the high ground , all obscured in the local fog...
Please enlighten us as to why on earth they anywhere near the Mull in Fog.
egards, John Purdey
Last edited by John Purdey; 4th May 2010 at 05:56. Reason: OTT
Missing the point guys.
key phrase....
Interested to know if you think those who misrepresented and/or hid this fact and falsely declared the regs had been adhered to have anything to answer for. It's a simple question but I won't hold my breath.
key phrase....
NOT cleared for use
Interested to know if you think those who misrepresented and/or hid this fact and falsely declared the regs had been adhered to have anything to answer for. It's a simple question but I won't hold my breath.
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Purdey Baston
When flying at LL in Scotland, you often find youself, VMC below (clear of cloud insight of surface and with a viz of approx 1nm OUTSIDE of the nearby cloud) and flying close to the granite - not only is this allowed by Service Regs but it is expected of you to perform your duties. It is my opinion that the crew were legally flying around Mull in the weather (as described by only relevant witness - Mr Holbrook the sailor) and what is more, to acheive their duty, they had no IFR option because the aircarft and its nav systems did not comly with the airworthiness regs.
However, what no-one will ever know is why the crew could not turn the ac away from the rock face - the air marshalls' theory may be correct, so might Walt's ......but as there is an element of doubt and uncertainty, the AM's judgment cannot be allowed to stand as decreed by AP3207.
Flipster
When flying at LL in Scotland, you often find youself, VMC below (clear of cloud insight of surface and with a viz of approx 1nm OUTSIDE of the nearby cloud) and flying close to the granite - not only is this allowed by Service Regs but it is expected of you to perform your duties. It is my opinion that the crew were legally flying around Mull in the weather (as described by only relevant witness - Mr Holbrook the sailor) and what is more, to acheive their duty, they had no IFR option because the aircarft and its nav systems did not comly with the airworthiness regs.
However, what no-one will ever know is why the crew could not turn the ac away from the rock face - the air marshalls' theory may be correct, so might Walt's ......but as there is an element of doubt and uncertainty, the AM's judgment cannot be allowed to stand as decreed by AP3207.
Flipster