Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Hi BB
The concept of 'gross negligence' of deceased aircrew is a concept which was only possible for military aircrew of that time. To my knowledge it has no parallel in civil accident investigations, and the military have changed their procedures, so such a verdict is not even possible in military proceedings now.
At that time the standard of proof required to be satisfied for such a finding, was that of 'Absolutely no doubt whatsoever'. This standard is some way beyond standards such as 'balance of probability', or even 'beyond reasonable' doubt!
According to the RAF's rules, without there being 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', a finding of negligence cannot be made in circumstances in which the crew are unable to provide their version of events.
Some here believe that is entirely in keeping with the concept of natural justice, and also in the highest traditions of the Royal Air Force, which seeks to offer some protection to those unable to defend themselves from serious allegations.
So, in answer to your question; can the charge of gross negligence be justified?
In view of the above, my position is crystal clear: Though we may all have our own 'opinions', no the charge cannot be justified.
I'm hoping you may feel the same way?
What I was driving at is this: Since, even if what I think took place, actually took place (and I accept we'll never know for sure) would that be enough to justify the very strong 'gross negligence' charge?
At that time the standard of proof required to be satisfied for such a finding, was that of 'Absolutely no doubt whatsoever'. This standard is some way beyond standards such as 'balance of probability', or even 'beyond reasonable' doubt!
According to the RAF's rules, without there being 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', a finding of negligence cannot be made in circumstances in which the crew are unable to provide their version of events.
Some here believe that is entirely in keeping with the concept of natural justice, and also in the highest traditions of the Royal Air Force, which seeks to offer some protection to those unable to defend themselves from serious allegations.
So, in answer to your question; can the charge of gross negligence be justified?
In view of the above, my position is crystal clear: Though we may all have our own 'opinions', no the charge cannot be justified.
I'm hoping you may feel the same way?
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Thanks for taking the time to explain that properly.
I have to say that while my opinion of what happened remains unchanged (and unsubstantiated), I do agree that the 'gross negligence' charge is not appropriate here, as plainly there is always the possibility that they were overtaken by some unknown event.
So, yup. I agree with you.
It seems the Air Force made up their minds on what happened and decided that the possibility of that ''unknown event" was remote enough to be ignored. That's up to them and I offer no comment on it either way.
What I did ask though, was, if their Airships were correct and the a/c was not subject to such an event, (and I agree, how could they know for sure?) would CFITing the Chinook warrant the GN charge?
I'll agree, it's a hypothetical Q. as they don't know for sure what actually took place, but:
Did it? (at the time).
Or did it not?
Thanks for taking the time to explain that properly.
I have to say that while my opinion of what happened remains unchanged (and unsubstantiated), I do agree that the 'gross negligence' charge is not appropriate here, as plainly there is always the possibility that they were overtaken by some unknown event.
So, yup. I agree with you.
It seems the Air Force made up their minds on what happened and decided that the possibility of that ''unknown event" was remote enough to be ignored. That's up to them and I offer no comment on it either way.
What I did ask though, was, if their Airships were correct and the a/c was not subject to such an event, (and I agree, how could they know for sure?) would CFITing the Chinook warrant the GN charge?
I'll agree, it's a hypothetical Q. as they don't know for sure what actually took place, but:
Did it? (at the time).
Or did it not?
Last edited by BarbiesBoyfriend; 17th Jan 2010 at 12:28.
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New Look......
New Look ?
After plotting all the KNOWN FACTS on a large scale contour map of the area , I think it is highly likely that the A/C hit the ground even earlier than supposed.............if they were at around 400 feet asl they would definitely have touched , at 450 feet asl , probably still clipped the ground , and at 500 feet maybe .
It is entirely possible to me that the A/C made contact with the hillside shortly after commencing a left turn and over a half kilometer from the assumed first point of impact.....quite what the effect of this would be , I am unable to predict exactly , but depending if it was the fuselage or a rotor tip that touched , the A/C must have been diverted from its intended path and may have been almost uncontrollable .....
One can hardly imagine what the reaction of the crew may have been in such an event , struggling with a disabled A/C ..
..but they nearly made it..............................the subsquent point of impact some 10-15 seconds later shows they were climbing and turning.......
You will recall the only evidence for a slight turn to the right after selecting waypoint 'B'.......... is the location of the main point of impact............which is slightly to the right of the previous track , and that it represents a 'turn' into wind .... my own calculations make it 2 degrees.......
It is tempting to think they may have flown there directly.......but I would suggest that if you have just wacked the ground you are not too interested in headings.....and there may have been some desperate gyrations before hitting the ground again.........
But how is it they were so far off course......????????....
If we go back to the start of the flight............ the first waypoint recorded (when the system was powered up?) was in a
grass field TWO MILES FROM THE AIRFIELD and over halfway to the town of Antrim.......??????????????????????????.........
Yes really........
.....I find it hard to believe that any NAV aid could be that bad ......but the LAT and LONG are in the report.!!!!!!..................
I bought a handheld GPS myself that summer , a Garmin GPS55 , and I was getting 100 metres accuracy even with Selective Availability still turned on (Selective Availability for civilian use was turned off in the year 2000) but military units were supposed to be ten times better ......
If I were contemplating this journey , and were aware of this error during preflight , my first thought would be disgust , being expected to use such [email protected] then.........I might consider that at least the error was on the SAFE side!!!! .
Having a two mile North/East to South/West error on the box meant you could safely fly to waypoint 'A' and know you were about a mile and a half out to sea as you passed abeam the lighthouse , in case you could not see it in the poor visibility predicted there......
You could head north then to track up the coast and expect to be back in better VMC before reaching Machrihanish , then weave through the mass of small islands and turn right onto 035 to track in towards Corran ...... Waypoint 'B' ...and so on..
But at the crash site the GPS error was in the opposite sense , directing one to fly .........NOT TWO MILES SOUTH AND WEST of
the true location , but 200 METRES NORTH AND EAST of the true location ............
So my interpretation of the facts....... suggests that they flew toward waypoint 'A' without being able to confirm their location visually as they approached , although they could see where the mass of land was , it was cloaked in mist and cloud . The Aldergrove TACAN accuracy is becoming diminished by the distance . Dead Reckoning is unreliable in this case (almost direct tail wind , picking the drift in the wrong direction is NOT GOOD)(would the doppler display give an indication of drift ..????..somebody must know)...
So they are using the superTANS , but with no way to check the accuracy..........there is open sea visible out to port as they get close to the cloud bank....
The 30 second alert of the pending waypoint prompted them to change to waypoint 'B' and they commenced the slight turn left onto north.............they dial up a heading of 035.........then they clip the hillside and all hell breaks loose........
The high point of the cliff they are approaching is at" 58deg. 18.35N 5 deg. 48.00W " ( 58deg.18'21" N 5deg. 48'00"W ) and they
would reach it only 9 or 10 seconds after crossing the shoreline....
The change in the GPS error has brought them over the obscured land , instead of being safely offshore........
I realise that there may no longer be any obvious debris trail after all this time , but it is worth a look . There may be some evidence.......... such as paint streaks on a rock .......gouges etc.
If this scenario is true , then the flight crew....far from being accused of anything.........should be commended for valiant efforts to recover from an impossible situation after being badly let down by their equipment .......................and RACAL and TRIMBLE should be in the dock answering questions..........
..........
Below is a copy of the chart I used , in which the locations of Waypoint change and Waypoint 'A' have been corrected using the apparent GPS error from the last two recorded locations in the superTANS....
After plotting all the KNOWN FACTS on a large scale contour map of the area , I think it is highly likely that the A/C hit the ground even earlier than supposed.............if they were at around 400 feet asl they would definitely have touched , at 450 feet asl , probably still clipped the ground , and at 500 feet maybe .
It is entirely possible to me that the A/C made contact with the hillside shortly after commencing a left turn and over a half kilometer from the assumed first point of impact.....quite what the effect of this would be , I am unable to predict exactly , but depending if it was the fuselage or a rotor tip that touched , the A/C must have been diverted from its intended path and may have been almost uncontrollable .....
One can hardly imagine what the reaction of the crew may have been in such an event , struggling with a disabled A/C ..
..but they nearly made it..............................the subsquent point of impact some 10-15 seconds later shows they were climbing and turning.......
You will recall the only evidence for a slight turn to the right after selecting waypoint 'B'.......... is the location of the main point of impact............which is slightly to the right of the previous track , and that it represents a 'turn' into wind .... my own calculations make it 2 degrees.......
It is tempting to think they may have flown there directly.......but I would suggest that if you have just wacked the ground you are not too interested in headings.....and there may have been some desperate gyrations before hitting the ground again.........
But how is it they were so far off course......????????....
If we go back to the start of the flight............ the first waypoint recorded (when the system was powered up?) was in a
grass field TWO MILES FROM THE AIRFIELD and over halfway to the town of Antrim.......??????????????????????????.........
Yes really........
.....I find it hard to believe that any NAV aid could be that bad ......but the LAT and LONG are in the report.!!!!!!..................
I bought a handheld GPS myself that summer , a Garmin GPS55 , and I was getting 100 metres accuracy even with Selective Availability still turned on (Selective Availability for civilian use was turned off in the year 2000) but military units were supposed to be ten times better ......
If I were contemplating this journey , and were aware of this error during preflight , my first thought would be disgust , being expected to use such [email protected] then.........I might consider that at least the error was on the SAFE side!!!! .
Having a two mile North/East to South/West error on the box meant you could safely fly to waypoint 'A' and know you were about a mile and a half out to sea as you passed abeam the lighthouse , in case you could not see it in the poor visibility predicted there......
You could head north then to track up the coast and expect to be back in better VMC before reaching Machrihanish , then weave through the mass of small islands and turn right onto 035 to track in towards Corran ...... Waypoint 'B' ...and so on..
But at the crash site the GPS error was in the opposite sense , directing one to fly .........NOT TWO MILES SOUTH AND WEST of
the true location , but 200 METRES NORTH AND EAST of the true location ............
So my interpretation of the facts....... suggests that they flew toward waypoint 'A' without being able to confirm their location visually as they approached , although they could see where the mass of land was , it was cloaked in mist and cloud . The Aldergrove TACAN accuracy is becoming diminished by the distance . Dead Reckoning is unreliable in this case (almost direct tail wind , picking the drift in the wrong direction is NOT GOOD)(would the doppler display give an indication of drift ..????..somebody must know)...
So they are using the superTANS , but with no way to check the accuracy..........there is open sea visible out to port as they get close to the cloud bank....
The 30 second alert of the pending waypoint prompted them to change to waypoint 'B' and they commenced the slight turn left onto north.............they dial up a heading of 035.........then they clip the hillside and all hell breaks loose........
The high point of the cliff they are approaching is at" 58deg. 18.35N 5 deg. 48.00W " ( 58deg.18'21" N 5deg. 48'00"W ) and they
would reach it only 9 or 10 seconds after crossing the shoreline....
The change in the GPS error has brought them over the obscured land , instead of being safely offshore........
I realise that there may no longer be any obvious debris trail after all this time , but it is worth a look . There may be some evidence.......... such as paint streaks on a rock .......gouges etc.
If this scenario is true , then the flight crew....far from being accused of anything.........should be commended for valiant efforts to recover from an impossible situation after being badly let down by their equipment .......................and RACAL and TRIMBLE should be in the dock answering questions..........
..........
Below is a copy of the chart I used , in which the locations of Waypoint change and Waypoint 'A' have been corrected using the apparent GPS error from the last two recorded locations in the superTANS....
Last edited by Robin Clark; 17th Jan 2010 at 20:23. Reason: minor text changes
Robin Clark
No comment on the above, as I'm no navigator. However, thought you might be interested in this, from the (fabricated) CA Release and RTS, current at time of accident;
Lack of understanding constitutes a Human Factors hazard - in the same way the master caution warning relating to FADEC was not understood. In isolation they may, eventually, become understood and be deemed aceptable, but the cumulative effect at this time was, I believe, an unnacceptable risk.
Interestingly, at a time when the RAF were opertating a mixed fleet (Mk1 and Mk2) there was no equivalent GPS/RNS252 warnings for Mk1. Is it any wonder that Flt Lt Tapper thought it necessary to visit Racal in a vain attempt to work out how GPS/RNS252 worked and behaved? That shows a dedication completely missing in those who were meant to ensure he had a mature aircraft.
Is it not also an indication that the so-called "Mk2 conversion course" was highly premature? 4 months later the crew were still so uncertain of the aircraft maturity they asked for a Mk1?
No comment on the above, as I'm no navigator. However, thought you might be interested in this, from the (fabricated) CA Release and RTS, current at time of accident;
1. GPS has not yet been declared operational by the US DoD and therefore accuracy is not guaranteed to any level. Even when GPS is declared operational, accuracy of GPS could degrade substantially without any indications to the crew. For this reason SPS GPS should not be used as the sole navigation aid.
2. In addition to (1) above, the GPS is highly susceptible to jamming of which the only crew indication is loss of GPS. The "Err" (Error) figure displayed (on the RNS252), which has conventionally been taken as a measure of GPS performance is MEANINGLESS and so no indication of GPS accuracy is available to the user. The GPS suffers from an average 2 second processing delay on the displayed GPS position.
Call me pedantic, but "Err" must mean something, even if it is "This system is so bloody immature only a complete prat would release it to Service before we understand how it works and can train the aircrew". Which is effectively what Boscombe said, only more forcefully. Lack of understanding constitutes a Human Factors hazard - in the same way the master caution warning relating to FADEC was not understood. In isolation they may, eventually, become understood and be deemed aceptable, but the cumulative effect at this time was, I believe, an unnacceptable risk.
Interestingly, at a time when the RAF were opertating a mixed fleet (Mk1 and Mk2) there was no equivalent GPS/RNS252 warnings for Mk1. Is it any wonder that Flt Lt Tapper thought it necessary to visit Racal in a vain attempt to work out how GPS/RNS252 worked and behaved? That shows a dedication completely missing in those who were meant to ensure he had a mature aircraft.
Is it not also an indication that the so-called "Mk2 conversion course" was highly premature? 4 months later the crew were still so uncertain of the aircraft maturity they asked for a Mk1?
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Thor Nogson. Your 6132 ..... "This thread, and to a certain degree the campaign as a whole, absolutely require contributors with a contrary viewpoint in order to survive."
Well, at least that was honest. But many Pruners did not wish to play the game because their opinions were ignored, or the authors were insulted. JP
Well, at least that was honest. But many Pruners did not wish to play the game because their opinions were ignored, or the authors were insulted. JP
Are you suggesting that my other points, or those of other posters are dishonest?
Or is it that the honesty was the only redeeming feature of the post?
Kind regards,
TN
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Robin Clark
The initial position entered into the kit and the first waypoint do not have to be in the same place.
If the aircraft intended to lift off say, from the centre of the airfield, but exit via the light airfield, then having it as Waypoint A is quite reasonable.
By itself, it gives no indication as to how good the TANS was at that point.
Perhaps my definition of Waypoint and yours are different.
And yes, I have seen precision aids, such as Supertans and HINS (GPS/IN) give errors of 2miles and over without any fault indications.
Not only that, subsequent investigation of complete and undamaged equipment on the ground has failed to reproduce any fault.
The initial position entered into the kit and the first waypoint do not have to be in the same place.
If the aircraft intended to lift off say, from the centre of the airfield, but exit via the light airfield, then having it as Waypoint A is quite reasonable.
By itself, it gives no indication as to how good the TANS was at that point.
Perhaps my definition of Waypoint and yours are different.
And yes, I have seen precision aids, such as Supertans and HINS (GPS/IN) give errors of 2miles and over without any fault indications.
Not only that, subsequent investigation of complete and undamaged equipment on the ground has failed to reproduce any fault.
Last edited by dalek; 21st Jan 2010 at 12:27.
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Mull Of Kintyre Review
I wrote the following letter to the Daily Telegraph on Sunday. It seems that they have ignored it as they have done in the past with letters from us 'Three Fellows'. As the Editor will not gives us a chance to reply, I felt it should be shared with the readers of this thread. I wrote as follows:
MULL OF KINTYRE REVIEW
Five Air Chief Marshals indicated (DT 14 January – Chinook accident review) they would welcome the opportunity to, quote: “… explain precisely why it (the verdict) cannot be overturned by recourse to a hypothesis for which there is no evidence and which is revealed as wholly implausible when tested against known facts”, unquote.
We welcome the Air Chief Marshals having a chance to make their points to Ministers as part of a new Inquiry provided that all available evidence is heard this time. That would, of course, include previously withheld evidence about MoD's failure to implement airworthiness regulations; the same failings highlighted last year by the Haddon-Cave report.
The unanswered questions are, why were the pilots charged with Gross Negligence based upon pure supposition with no actual facts by the two senior reviewing officers, who overturned the RAF’s own Board of Inquiry that could not apportion blame; and why was the aircraft released to Service whilst still not fully Airworthy.
We look forward with interest to hearing those responsible explain their actions.
Captain Ralph Kohn, Captain Ron Macdonald and Captain Richard KJ Hadlow
Compiler and co-authors of the Macdonald Report (April 2000 & January 2010 Addendum 4)
The Macdonald Report 2000 with Addendum 4 (2010) may be found on
http://www.scribd.com/share/upload/20816348/2ecf7hocouvm9wc81ngw
MULL OF KINTYRE REVIEW
Five Air Chief Marshals indicated (DT 14 January – Chinook accident review) they would welcome the opportunity to, quote: “… explain precisely why it (the verdict) cannot be overturned by recourse to a hypothesis for which there is no evidence and which is revealed as wholly implausible when tested against known facts”, unquote.
We welcome the Air Chief Marshals having a chance to make their points to Ministers as part of a new Inquiry provided that all available evidence is heard this time. That would, of course, include previously withheld evidence about MoD's failure to implement airworthiness regulations; the same failings highlighted last year by the Haddon-Cave report.
The unanswered questions are, why were the pilots charged with Gross Negligence based upon pure supposition with no actual facts by the two senior reviewing officers, who overturned the RAF’s own Board of Inquiry that could not apportion blame; and why was the aircraft released to Service whilst still not fully Airworthy.
We look forward with interest to hearing those responsible explain their actions.
Captain Ralph Kohn, Captain Ron Macdonald and Captain Richard KJ Hadlow
Compiler and co-authors of the Macdonald Report (April 2000 & January 2010 Addendum 4)
The Macdonald Report 2000 with Addendum 4 (2010) may be found on
http://www.scribd.com/share/upload/20816348/2ecf7hocouvm9wc81ngw
Last edited by Ralph Kohn; 19th Jan 2010 at 18:35.
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Mull of Kintyre review - posted at 15:08
Attention Moderator :
Please correct a typo in the second sentence, first line, 5th word has should read have. It should read:
... Sunday. It seems that they have ignored it as they have done in the past.
with my apologies
Thank you
Ralph Kohn
Edit: No apologies necessary Ralph. I have made the change. PPP
Please correct a typo in the second sentence, first line, 5th word has should read have. It should read:
... Sunday. It seems that they have ignored it as they have done in the past.
with my apologies
Thank you
Ralph Kohn
Edit: No apologies necessary Ralph. I have made the change. PPP
Ralph, first a belated but warm welcome to the thread and indeed the forum. I think that we both shared the experience of having been on the payroll of Bilbao House, a delightful experience I hope you agree. The moderation on the Military Forum is exceedingly light (well usually anyway!). You can edit your own posts merely by logging in and going to the post where you will find an edit button alongside the reply one. The post appears in the same box in which you composed it and can be altered as you see fit. You can also, if you wish, put a brief explanation for the edit in a box for that purpose and save the result back to the thread. It will then have an added note to the effect that you have edited it and when you did so.
You bring new authority and experience both to this thread and the supposed quality press. The fact that at least part of the latter spurns your offerings is a comment on them and their sense of fair play. All correspondents are theoretically equal before their eyes, but Air Marshals more so than others it would seem. Not here though!
Again, welcome Sir, I look forward to reading many more of your posts.
You bring new authority and experience both to this thread and the supposed quality press. The fact that at least part of the latter spurns your offerings is a comment on them and their sense of fair play. All correspondents are theoretically equal before their eyes, but Air Marshals more so than others it would seem. Not here though!
Again, welcome Sir, I look forward to reading many more of your posts.
Yes I think you are right Fitter. I've no idea when I posted that, who it was to and in response to what, as there is no post number or link. I guess that's the idea though, so I'll take your advice as well as that of the "Troll Sticky". Cheers!
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Mull of Kintyre Review
Thank you Chugalug 2
I regret to see that some seem upset by your helpful words to me on how to correct typos, such as the one that slipped into my last post captioned Mull of Kintyre Review. I have to get used to posting memos in this new and strange on-line environment for me and I obviously need to be more careful with my one fingered typing and near-octogenarian editing.
We “Three Fellows” consider it unfair to see two deceased pilots accused with Gross Negligence in the circumstances surrounding the accident. However, further research has now brought to light a number of Airworthiness factors regarding the state of the new converted from Mark 1, termed HC2 at initial certification, which are of import and that indicate that the pilots were given an immature aircraft to operate.
The Macdonald report Appendix 4 – Airworthiness (2010) covers our findings in a letter sent to MoD last December. It was not acknowledged, let alone answered. You and others may find it interesting. Please refer to my previous posting on the matter for the link.
We hope that our contribution will help to right a situation we consider to be wrong, that is, we do not find that deceased pilots should be accused as they have been, against the RAF’s own Regulations of No Doubt Whatsoever among other reasons. Indeed, they may have been given the wrong tool to work with which, I suggest, may point the finger in other directions regarding negligence.
Please accept that we are looking for the truth and nothing more. No one really knows what happened. On that basis alone, the verdict of gross negligence should be overturned.
Ralph Kohn
I regret to see that some seem upset by your helpful words to me on how to correct typos, such as the one that slipped into my last post captioned Mull of Kintyre Review. I have to get used to posting memos in this new and strange on-line environment for me and I obviously need to be more careful with my one fingered typing and near-octogenarian editing.
We “Three Fellows” consider it unfair to see two deceased pilots accused with Gross Negligence in the circumstances surrounding the accident. However, further research has now brought to light a number of Airworthiness factors regarding the state of the new converted from Mark 1, termed HC2 at initial certification, which are of import and that indicate that the pilots were given an immature aircraft to operate.
The Macdonald report Appendix 4 – Airworthiness (2010) covers our findings in a letter sent to MoD last December. It was not acknowledged, let alone answered. You and others may find it interesting. Please refer to my previous posting on the matter for the link.
We hope that our contribution will help to right a situation we consider to be wrong, that is, we do not find that deceased pilots should be accused as they have been, against the RAF’s own Regulations of No Doubt Whatsoever among other reasons. Indeed, they may have been given the wrong tool to work with which, I suggest, may point the finger in other directions regarding negligence.
Please accept that we are looking for the truth and nothing more. No one really knows what happened. On that basis alone, the verdict of gross negligence should be overturned.
Ralph Kohn
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Now come on guys. If you cannot debate without snide and ridiculous comments please stay away. This thread in particular has NO space for anything other than proper respect and common sense. Simple!
Ralph, may I say how pleasant it is to read your properly constructed English prose. Regrettably, many contributors to this website are either bordering on the illiterate, or are just bone idle. Basic spelling mistakes, apostrophic abuse and grammatical 'howlers' frequently plague this site.
However, it is your neo-octogenerian enthusiasm and tenacity for which the Mull group should feel most grateful. As a quinquagenarian, I am greatly relieved to note that, if 60 is the new 40, then 80 is merely the new 50!
I am appalled that your post received a rude and intemperate response. But since you've faced idiots in the past, I know that this will not have put you and your fellow Fellows off the path of justice.
So many Airships seem to have become embroiled in the recent tails-over-bottoms exercise that methinks they do protest too much....
However, it is your neo-octogenerian enthusiasm and tenacity for which the Mull group should feel most grateful. As a quinquagenarian, I am greatly relieved to note that, if 60 is the new 40, then 80 is merely the new 50!
I am appalled that your post received a rude and intemperate response. But since you've faced idiots in the past, I know that this will not have put you and your fellow Fellows off the path of justice.
So many Airships seem to have become embroiled in the recent tails-over-bottoms exercise that methinks they do protest too much....
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Mull of Kintyre Review
Ralph,
Thank you for your erudite comments.
If anyone reading this thread still has the slightest belief in the validity of their Airships' finding of Gross Negligence, I can only refer them to your Macdonald Report. (Link on post 6160.)
Utterly brilliant in the scope of its coverage and the depth of the analysis by you and your "Three Fellows". Justice surely cannot now be delayed much longer.
Vertico
Thank you for your erudite comments.
If anyone reading this thread still has the slightest belief in the validity of their Airships' finding of Gross Negligence, I can only refer them to your Macdonald Report. (Link on post 6160.)
Utterly brilliant in the scope of its coverage and the depth of the analysis by you and your "Three Fellows". Justice surely cannot now be delayed much longer.
Vertico
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Hi everyone,
Very good to see Ralph Kohn here on PPRuNe and making very valuable contributions to this thread. The ‘Three Fellows’ have consistently supported our view and have brought great credibility, insight and integrity to the cause. Welcome, Ralph, I hope that you, and your good lady, are well.
The only difference of opinion I, and the Campaign Group, have with the Three Fellows is that I don’t believe that the five knights should be granted an audience with ministers. The reasons are quite simple – the information that these so called honourable gentlemen wish to defend is the sole evidence upon which they base their verdict of gross negligence. If they are so confident that they have refused to move from their opinion for over fifteen years, why the need, now, to stand up and defend what they, and others, have written?
The Campaign Group is willing to hand every document over and let an independent Judge make a decision based upon the evidence placed before them (including the damning evidence from Boscombe Down), and accept the findings of the Judge, whether it be in our favour, or not. We are sufficiently confident in our own evidence and documentary collection to be able to do this. Why, not so the five knights? Do they have so little confidence in their own documentation? Do they now finally realise that it is clear to all that they have finally been rumbled?
May I remind the honourable gentlemen that their so called ‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’ evidence has already been scrutinised at a time where two Air Marshals had the opportunity to be questioned on, and defend, their opinions, and that evidence was found wanting.
My question to the five knights is this – if you are so confident in your verdict, let it be examined without the need to plead its case. In addition, I challenge you to release the full Boscombe Down documentation in relation to the Chinook HC2 trials. The existence has finally been acknowledged, so put it in the public domain. Or does that seriously undermine your flimsy case further?
I also realise that time has moved on since the Tornado discussion. If anyone would still like to see the words of the Station Commander, please let me know and I’ll post them here.
Finally, I am pleased to let you, the MoD and the five knights know that we haven’t finished just yet! Keep those tin hats on and letters to the editors ready chaps!
My best, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook
Very good to see Ralph Kohn here on PPRuNe and making very valuable contributions to this thread. The ‘Three Fellows’ have consistently supported our view and have brought great credibility, insight and integrity to the cause. Welcome, Ralph, I hope that you, and your good lady, are well.
The only difference of opinion I, and the Campaign Group, have with the Three Fellows is that I don’t believe that the five knights should be granted an audience with ministers. The reasons are quite simple – the information that these so called honourable gentlemen wish to defend is the sole evidence upon which they base their verdict of gross negligence. If they are so confident that they have refused to move from their opinion for over fifteen years, why the need, now, to stand up and defend what they, and others, have written?
The Campaign Group is willing to hand every document over and let an independent Judge make a decision based upon the evidence placed before them (including the damning evidence from Boscombe Down), and accept the findings of the Judge, whether it be in our favour, or not. We are sufficiently confident in our own evidence and documentary collection to be able to do this. Why, not so the five knights? Do they have so little confidence in their own documentation? Do they now finally realise that it is clear to all that they have finally been rumbled?
May I remind the honourable gentlemen that their so called ‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’ evidence has already been scrutinised at a time where two Air Marshals had the opportunity to be questioned on, and defend, their opinions, and that evidence was found wanting.
My question to the five knights is this – if you are so confident in your verdict, let it be examined without the need to plead its case. In addition, I challenge you to release the full Boscombe Down documentation in relation to the Chinook HC2 trials. The existence has finally been acknowledged, so put it in the public domain. Or does that seriously undermine your flimsy case further?
I also realise that time has moved on since the Tornado discussion. If anyone would still like to see the words of the Station Commander, please let me know and I’ll post them here.
Finally, I am pleased to let you, the MoD and the five knights know that we haven’t finished just yet! Keep those tin hats on and letters to the editors ready chaps!
My best, as always.
Brian
“Justice has no expiry date” – John Cook
Last edited by Brian Dixon; 21st Jan 2010 at 16:03. Reason: Lost count of the number of knights!
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This accident MAY have been aircrew error, MAY have been a design fault and MAY have been the first victim of what we will someday come to call the Kintyre Triangle.
There is not, never was and (I predict) never will now be revealed enough evidence to convict the crew, the company or the Kintyre Triangle of clearly and conclusively having caused this accident.
In the absence of such conclusive proof, it is a fundamental of British justice to make no finding of guilt
But therein lies the system's dilemma. Having found the crew guilty 'because there wasnt enough evidence to nail anybody else', if that 'verdict' is overturned then the one possible scapegoat who can never be charged again (bearing in mind double jeapordy) is the scapegoat the system first pegged out for the tigers to devour.
So we will never know
I doubt we will ever see a widely accepted conclusion on this one. But perhaps the legacy of those who died on board - and those on the Board when they die too - will be that we re-learn the lesson about thinking ESPECIALLY CAREFULLY before passing judgement on those, tragically, not present to defend themselves.
There is not, never was and (I predict) never will now be revealed enough evidence to convict the crew, the company or the Kintyre Triangle of clearly and conclusively having caused this accident.
In the absence of such conclusive proof, it is a fundamental of British justice to make no finding of guilt
But therein lies the system's dilemma. Having found the crew guilty 'because there wasnt enough evidence to nail anybody else', if that 'verdict' is overturned then the one possible scapegoat who can never be charged again (bearing in mind double jeapordy) is the scapegoat the system first pegged out for the tigers to devour.
So we will never know
I doubt we will ever see a widely accepted conclusion on this one. But perhaps the legacy of those who died on board - and those on the Board when they die too - will be that we re-learn the lesson about thinking ESPECIALLY CAREFULLY before passing judgement on those, tragically, not present to defend themselves.
It is interesting to note the various causal factors, direct or indirect, that were available to the BoI and Reviewing officers. These include;
Try as I may, I cannot find any evidence that these causal factors were properly investigated; and the RO’s most certainly didn’t want to go there as they, along with CAS’s staffs, were party to the failures in the first place.
Very clearly, evidence supporting all three existed, for example, the negligence in releasing the aircraft to service against a fabricated CA Release and Release to Service. Also, the related failure to demonstrate in the Master Airworthiness Reference that installed equipment performance had been properly assessed and established (pre-requisite to determining Limitations) and, of course, the failure to provide proper FRCs (Instructions) and training. There is more, but all trails lead back to the Release process being hasty, ill-considered and premature.
- Human Factors (Non-Aircrew) (Negligence) – The breach of Duty to take due and reasonable care in carrying out their task.
- Unsatisfactory Equipment - Equipment not satisfying the needs of the User
- Organisational Fault - Failure to provide adequate training, instructions, materiel or manpower
Try as I may, I cannot find any evidence that these causal factors were properly investigated; and the RO’s most certainly didn’t want to go there as they, along with CAS’s staffs, were party to the failures in the first place.
Very clearly, evidence supporting all three existed, for example, the negligence in releasing the aircraft to service against a fabricated CA Release and Release to Service. Also, the related failure to demonstrate in the Master Airworthiness Reference that installed equipment performance had been properly assessed and established (pre-requisite to determining Limitations) and, of course, the failure to provide proper FRCs (Instructions) and training. There is more, but all trails lead back to the Release process being hasty, ill-considered and premature.
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tucumseh,
This is what it's about - no case has to be proved, or to be represented. No new evidence needs to be sought to overturn this 'finding'. We are where we are because the MOD has been able to ring fence itself and not be held to account. Well, the World has moved on - if this 'case' was put in front of a Judge and 12 true men - we all know what the outcome would be.
Then the process of identifying those individuals who were, themselves, negligent - re the above - can commence.
S4G
the negligence in releasing the aircraft to service against a fabricated CA Release and Release to Service. Also, the related failure to demonstrate in the Master Airworthiness Reference that installed equipment performance had been properly assessed and established (pre-requisite to determining Limitations) and, of course, the failure to provide proper FRCs (Instructions) and training. There is more, but all trails lead back to the Release process being hasty, ill-considered and premature.
Then the process of identifying those individuals who were, themselves, negligent - re the above - can commence.
S4G
Last edited by Sand4Gold; 21st Jan 2010 at 11:23. Reason: Amplification.
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Yes to a Judge
Thank you again Chugalug2, also Beagle, Vertico and Brian Dixon for your welcoming words following my recent arrival on this thread of the Military Aircrew forum. They were most appreciated by one who values civilised debate and exchanges of thoughts, where all are given the opportunity to speak sensibly on a given subject, be it pro or con; and without unnecessary animosity or snide comments, in the absence of logical arguments.
I totally agree with Brian about preferring to see the ACMs’ views aired before a Judge and not just having them talking to Ministers on their own as in the past, where we too can offer our findings on the matter; particularly on the Airworthiness aspects of the HC2 introduction. We would welcome the opportunity to participate in any such re-run of the inquiry.
My last unpublished letter to the Telegraph tried to indicate that all the evidence we have recently uncovered with the help of our researchers, should be aired; quote:
“… provided that all available evidence is heard this time. That would, of course, include previously withheld evidence about MoD's failure to implement airworthiness regulations; the same failings highlighted last year by the Haddon-Cave report.” unquote.
I should have spelt it out more clearly. So it is probably better that it was only aired on PPRuNe for the moment, thus giving me a chance to redraft my next letter to the Media in clearer terms when the time comes, indicating that we want to present our side of the Airworthiness story for consideration, at the same time the knights have their day.
Ralph Kohn
I totally agree with Brian about preferring to see the ACMs’ views aired before a Judge and not just having them talking to Ministers on their own as in the past, where we too can offer our findings on the matter; particularly on the Airworthiness aspects of the HC2 introduction. We would welcome the opportunity to participate in any such re-run of the inquiry.
My last unpublished letter to the Telegraph tried to indicate that all the evidence we have recently uncovered with the help of our researchers, should be aired; quote:
“… provided that all available evidence is heard this time. That would, of course, include previously withheld evidence about MoD's failure to implement airworthiness regulations; the same failings highlighted last year by the Haddon-Cave report.” unquote.
I should have spelt it out more clearly. So it is probably better that it was only aired on PPRuNe for the moment, thus giving me a chance to redraft my next letter to the Media in clearer terms when the time comes, indicating that we want to present our side of the Airworthiness story for consideration, at the same time the knights have their day.
Ralph Kohn