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Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

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Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

Old 6th Jan 2010, 19:41
  #5861 (permalink)  
 
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Those, like me, who see the Mull Tragedy as the cause celebre of the fight to get a truly independent MAA should draw encouragement from this pathetic letter from the Chief of the Air Staff. This aircraft was Grossly Unairworthy because of, not despite, the machinations of the UK Military Airworthiness Authority, AKA The Ministry of Defence. Whether 29 lives were lost wholly or partly because of that we don't know and is beside the point. The Airworthiness Authority has never admitted that the RTS was illegal, ie in direct confliction with its own Regulations. Well it wouldn't would it? The Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry never found that the aircraft, together with the entire Mk2 fleet, was unairworthy. Well it wouldn't would it? That is the scandal that the CAS is trying to obscure, that Airworthiness Provision and Accident Investigation under his command was, is and will remain dysfunctional until there is established a truly independent MAA, that includes full RTS authority, and a truly independent MAAIB. The fudge outlined by the SoS in response to the Nimrod Review, and the Review itself for that matter, is a turkey and will not fly. In resisting the very measured and reasonable calls by Brian and his campaign over the years to simply have W & D's wretched "finding" struck off to be replaced with "Cause not Positively Determined" their Airships have shone a light into a scandal that will rock the MOD. The CAS is merely trying to delay the inevitable. He will not even manage that.
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 19:51
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CAS hasn't the power to change the decision, he is a relative "tea boy" in the decision making chain, way too much politics involved now for a military officer to officially change anything. That said, he could tell us all what he really thinks and help correct a terrible wrong.

Go back to making the tea Air Marshal, in my view you are not worthy of your rank.

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Old 6th Jan 2010, 21:04
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Brian

bast0n,
there is only one verdict that would sum up this whole tragedy sufficiently:
Cause not positively determined.
Hummm - I think that there are one or two pointers as to what happened. It was by all accounts a serviceable if not technically airworthy aircraft was it not?

And did it fly itself into the ground...........?

Gosh - this goes round and round.....................
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 21:51
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I hesitate to rekindle your 'circles', Baston, but what of post 5931 - did that aircraft fly itself into the ground, perchance? Was the crash possibly caused by pilot error?
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Old 6th Jan 2010, 22:08
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A very difficult question, but would a new verdict of any level that did not completely exonerate the crew be acceptable to the Campaign leaders.
I'm not a campaign leader, but...

In my opinion "Cause not known" is the only sensible, fair, logical and correct verdict, as per other accident reports where the cause is not known.
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 07:34
  #5866 (permalink)  
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Sqn Ldr Burke (RAF Rtd) was pretty forthright this am on BBC radio 4 with his opinion of the CAS's 'letter'. Basically, he had the balls to say that in his opinion 'the CAS was wrong'. We need a few more of him. I'd still be interested to know where the 'stop order' for him at Odiham/AAIB originated
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 08:00
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Baston would you care to answer BOACs post about the Tornado that speared in? Or should we confront Dalton with it direct?

Nothing quite like double standards in High Office..
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 08:04
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BOAC

but what of post 5931 - did that aircraft fly itself into the ground, perchance? Was the crash possibly caused by pilot error?
Error of judgement perchance...............?

Dalton is not doing very well is he.......
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 08:06
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“not technically airworthy aircraft”


If you are so indifferent to safety, what airworthiness components would you be happy for MoD to ignore?
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 08:10
  #5870 (permalink)  
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Originally Posted by Baston
Error of judgement perchance
- a chink of daylight?
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 09:13
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Chinook

I thought I heard Sqn Ldr Burke on the radio this morning at 0730 or so saying that if the crew had turned 12 degrees to port, then they would have flown along the coast (I am willing to accept that I have not quoted him precisely). I was itching for the interview to ask "Why then did they not do so?" but he failed to press this obvious point. JP
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 09:20
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S/L Burke, never one to mince his words would almost certainly have answered "I don't know".

Now if only a couple of senior folk at the heart of all this had been able to grasp that quite simplistic notion.
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 09:41
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Best Summary Yet

I am coming late to the detail of this thread and this may have been aired before.

There is a very good summary of the accident, the various enquiries and investigations and a postulation of the cause, in a book called "Chinook Crash" by Steuart Campbell.

I realise that the views of both the supporters and opponents of the official line are probably too polarised now but, nonetheless, I found the book extremely well written and objectively presented. I have recommeded it to many people who have asked me about the accident and my copy has been loaned out more times than I care to remember.
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 09:58
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As a PPL with no helicopter or military experience perhaps I shouldn't be asking a question on this thread but I find most flying incidents have some relevance to general flying. The question I'm struggling with is as follows. Is the implication that the Chinook was cruising along and may have entered misty conditions which took the crew by surprise or off course so they went for a correction in heading and/or power setting which the allegedly faulty software couldn't cope with? I hope this isn't too naive and I'm not suggesting any fault on the part of the crew but why otherwise would the software be relevant to the crash?
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 10:17
  #5875 (permalink)  
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VG - don't 'struggle'!

The software is not definitively 'relevant' to this crash. The questionable suitability of an apparently 'unairworthy' aircraft is.

The truth is no-one knows for sure what happened (probably the root message in this whole series of threads) - it is all guesswork, claimed as 'deduction'. It would be of benefit to you to absorb all the messages here if you have time.

For others - I gather a MkI was 'not available' on request. Two questions please:

1) What handicap would a MkI have introduced for the detail?
2) I begin to wonder if there is a possibility that someone was just trying to 'show off' the 'new' MkII by sticking all those important and most unfortunate folk on it?
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 10:51
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Speculation and Guilt

For once I can agree with something that JP has said - why indeed having made the waypoint change and taken the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse (WP1) off the system did they not turn - even MOD has confirmed in writing that a waypoint change would normally be coincident with a course change. So, did they deliberately continue to fly towards the Mull (which they certainly knew was there), did something distract them (comment from Stn Cdr Odiham in his remarks about accepted Release to Service problems such as false engine fail warnings) or did they lose control of one of the engines or even suffer a control restriction (both problems with this very aircraft over the previous few days). JP doesn't know, I certainly don't know, I am pretty sure Robert would have said that he doesn't know and even, wait for it, the two senior reviewing officers don't know!

I remind you of what ACM Wratten said:

1. Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact. What does emerge from the Inquiry however, is that there is no evidence whatever of any combination of possible minor problems, or of any major difficulty, which would have so taxed the skills of the crew that they had no option other than to keep flying towards high ground at speed at low level in deteriorating conditions of cloud and visibility. From this I am reluctantly drawn to the conclusion that the operating pilots could and would have avoided this accident had they followed a different course of action from the one they chose to pursue. What they should have done and what they were trained to do is succinctly described by the AOC. Why they therefore elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know. What we do know however, and what the two pilots would also have known, is that of all the hazards inherent, in aviation, hitting the ground without intending or expecting to carries the lowest likelihood of survival and consequently the risk of this occurring must be avoided at ail costs. This was the pre-eminent responsibility of the two pilots and there is not even a hint of any circumstances which would have been beyond their professional skills to accommodate, or which would have justified them taking the risk of proceeding as they did. Lamentably, all the evidence points towards them having ignored one of the most basic tenets of airmanship, which is never to attempt to fly visually below safety altitude unless the weather conditions are unambiguously suitable for operating under Visual Flight Rules.

2. I therefore agree with the AOC's summary, in particular that the actions of the two pilots were the direct cause of this crash. I also conclude that this amounted to gross negligence.


Everything after the sentence I have outlined in bold is based on speculative opinions not facts - something that the HofL Select Committee (with I suggest somewhat more eminent legal quailifications than CAS) did not accept when the senior reviewing officers were able to make their case to them at length. Speculation is not compatible with Gross Negligence and, as CAS has conveniently ignored, was not allowed by the RAF's own rules of the time. As Malcolm Rifkind (another eminent legal brain) pointed out this non fact supported verdict (effectively a finding of manslaughter) based on an incomplete investigation by the BOI and opinions and speculative decisions by senior officers in the Command Chain, and with no possibility for the dead pilots (or their families) to defend themselves would not stand up in any Court in the land.

Someone asked if the families would now accept a verdict of pilot error - presumably a "balance of probabilities - pilot error" rather than NPD. I can't speak for the families, but I wouldn't now that we know just how much of the "available" (good word that - saves the word "new" coming into the equation) evidence was either not seen or not considered by the BoI. Incidentally this same evidence was not, if the MOD's own request of October 1995 for legal opinion is correct, made available to the MOD's legal team for the FAI either - funny that - like the question on why they did not change course I could only speculate - but I won't!

JB
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 12:21
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Another letter supporting the CAS in the Telegraph today (sorry can't find a link) from ACM's Graydon(CAS at the time) and Alcock (Chief Engineer at the time) so no self interest there then.

Seems very weak.

"In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.

This conclusion stems from evidence which is absoloutely clear to the open minded."

Then:

"Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself if there was the slightest possibility that a technical fault might have been responsible?"

Because that same RAF should not have allowed an unairworthy aeroplane to be used in the first place.

If their leadership was as weak as their arguments in this letter I am not surprised that the safety regulation of the RAF has got into the state it has.
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 12:31
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Originally Posted by pulse1
Another letter supporting the CAS in the Telegraph today (sorry can't find a link)
Here it is. (Scroll down about a third of a screen).

Chinook crash revisited
SIR – The current chief of the air staff has made his views clear (Letters, January 6) following your leading article on the Chinook crash (January 5). That successive CASs have reached the same conclusion after independent and exhaustive reviews, as have ministers, civil servants and senior military aircrew, can hardly be called stubborn; “consistent” might be a more balanced term.

You suggest we may be “trying to hide something”. Could something have been hidden for all these years when leaks from Government departments are a daily occurrence?

As for the so-called new evidence reported by the BBC, in comprehensive responses to reports and submissions by a House of Lords committee, the House of Commons defence committee and Mull of Kintyre campaigners, the RAF – through the MoD – has explained precisely why the finding of gross negligence was unavoidable. It remains so and can only be set aside if the facts are ignored.

Documents dated July 2002 and December 2008 address all issues raised in the campaigners’ various endeavours (including, of course, the Fadec computer system), and painstakingly explain why they are all irrelevant. In a nutshell, had the pilots not knowingly contravened the strict regulations that govern flight at low level, they could not possibly have crashed on the Mull of Kintyre as they did.

This conclusion stems from evidence which is absolutely clear to the open-minded. One can hardly imagine such doughty politicians as George Robertson and John Reid, just two examples, having the wool pulled over their eyes.

Why would the Royal Air Force wish to blame itself for this accident if there was the slightest possibility that technical fault might have been responsible?

You suggest that “institutionalised resistance” might be involved. For institutional resistance read consistent objectivity. Our duty was to acknowledge our failing and try to ensure that it never happened again.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Graydon
Chief of the Air Staff 1992-97
Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Alcock
Chief Engineer, RAF, 1991-96
London SW1
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Old 7th Jan 2010, 12:57
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Maybe someone needs to write the following:

Re Dalton 6 Jan and Graydon 7 Jan

Sir, how many other RAF 'CFIT' accidents, with or without objective evidence, have resulted in an RAF verdict of Gross Negligence? In particular, how did the RAF form a different conclusion to that of both the 1990 Shackelton and 1994 Tornado (ZG708) crashes where evidence of an equal or, in the case of ZG708, far stronger nature did not result in a finding of Gross Negligence?

I have the honour to be

Blah Blah Blah

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Old 7th Jan 2010, 13:05
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Graydon Letter

I must have missed something somewhere - how did the RAF blame itself? I believe it accused, and without any defence, found guilty of Gross Negligence, two relatively junior pilots - a verdict based on opinion and speculation. This is not, I suggest, a case of the RAF blaming itself - it is a case of the RAF diverting the blame from itself. If the BoI or even the review process had properly looked at the reasons why a technical or airworthiness issue might have come about and obtained satisfactory answers then maybe Graydon and Alcock's letter might be credible - however as we now know those answers would almost certainly have been far from satisfactory, particularly as far as the RAF bringing the Mk2 into service was concerned. As it is I am more than "gobsmacked" that as Chief Engineer Alcock thought the BoI had done anything like a thorough investigation, and that he should support Graydon's letter. I am even more "gobsmacked" at the inconsistency of RAF senior management thinking and the dispensing of justice between the Chinook verdict where there was no ADR/CVR and that on Tornado crash in Glen Ogle when the ADR/CVR showed exactly what happened.

JB
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