Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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The BBC states:
Yet MoD state
It might well have been 'available', just as the Encyclopedia Brittanica, War and Peace or Lady Chatterley's Lover were 'available'. But it does not appear to have been made available, i.e. presented to the Inquiry team, so is clearly important additional evidence.
Does anyone trust any 'MoD Statement' these days?
The report (written nine months before the crash by a senior engineering officer at the MoD Aircraft Testing Centre at Boscombe Down) concludes that the release of the Chinook Mk2 into service "cannot be recommended". It calls for a software rewrite, which did not happen.
The report was not included in the report from the original Board of Inquiry.
The report was not included in the report from the original Board of Inquiry.
:"This latest information is from an RAF document; it was available to the Inquiry team and cannot be classed as new evidence."
Does anyone trust any 'MoD Statement' these days?
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Malcolm Rifkind on the Today programme now.
Fairly unequivocal in his view that the RAF was embarrassed into blaming the flight crew and suffers from 'bureaucratic stubbornness' in being able to readdress the new evidence.
Very balanced that it could be technical error or pilot error, however with no specific evidence the two impeccable pilots should not have been blamed.
Fairly unequivocal in his view that the RAF was embarrassed into blaming the flight crew and suffers from 'bureaucratic stubbornness' in being able to readdress the new evidence.
Very balanced that it could be technical error or pilot error, however with no specific evidence the two impeccable pilots should not have been blamed.
MoD claims the aircraft was airworthy.
Where was that stated at the time? The Release to Service (the Master Airworthiness Reference) and the Controller Aircraft Release (the statement by CA to the RAF that the aircraft is airworthy).
The CAR is based on advice from Boscombe (who stated it was NOT airworthy) and subsumed in its entirety in the RTS.
Therefore, there is no audit trail to any advice the aircraft was airworthy, beyond the CAR, which is little more than an early list of what little clearance work had been done by Boscombe but, more importantly, a clear statement of the huge amount of work yet to be commenced. (And pressure from the RAF/Army, suggested in the articles, does not constitute formal advice).
Thus, the focus should be on why these documents were signed in November 1993. As the Boscombe statement was made prior to signature (9 months before the crash), the key questions are;
DHP was a civilian 1 Star. DGA2 an RAF 2 Star. CA a civilian 3 Star. ACAS an RAF 3 Star.
Where was that stated at the time? The Release to Service (the Master Airworthiness Reference) and the Controller Aircraft Release (the statement by CA to the RAF that the aircraft is airworthy).
The CAR is based on advice from Boscombe (who stated it was NOT airworthy) and subsumed in its entirety in the RTS.
Therefore, there is no audit trail to any advice the aircraft was airworthy, beyond the CAR, which is little more than an early list of what little clearance work had been done by Boscombe but, more importantly, a clear statement of the huge amount of work yet to be commenced. (And pressure from the RAF/Army, suggested in the articles, does not constitute formal advice).
Thus, the focus should be on why these documents were signed in November 1993. As the Boscombe statement was made prior to signature (9 months before the crash), the key questions are;
- Was Controller Aircraft informed by his staffs (DHP and DGA2) of Boscombe’s formal position?
- Likewise, was the Assistant Chief of Air Staff informed by CA, or his own staffs?
DHP was a civilian 1 Star. DGA2 an RAF 2 Star. CA a civilian 3 Star. ACAS an RAF 3 Star.
A very positive piece from Sir Malcolm Rifkind just now as part of the lead news item on BBC News 24 just after the 0830 break from BBC1.
The BBC are continuing to present it as their main headline.
It will be interesting to see whether any MoD suit turns up to defend their position during the day.
The BBC are continuing to present it as their main headline.
It will be interesting to see whether any MoD suit turns up to defend their position during the day.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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I had either missed or it had not been made 'public' that S/L Burke's investigation work on behalf of AAIB at RAF Odiham was 'stopped' on orders from a senior officer. Do we have a name?
Beagle - maybe time to have a chat with your 'mate' DC again? You know, 'Happy New Election Year' etc and 'Is that enough' sort of thing? When he has finished cuddling babies, of course
Beagle - maybe time to have a chat with your 'mate' DC again? You know, 'Happy New Election Year' etc and 'Is that enough' sort of thing? When he has finished cuddling babies, of course
Avoid imitations
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As UTP, S/L Burke presumably reported through OC Operations and above him, the Stn Cdr, RAF Odiham.
A very positive piece from Sir Malcolm Rifkind just now as part of the lead news item on BBC News 24 just after the 0830 break from BBC1.
The BBC are continuing to present it as their main headline.
It will be interesting to see whether any MoD suit turns up to defend their position during the day.
Not long now until David Cameron will be able to fulfil the written promise he made in his letter dated Monday 10th July 2006...
The BBC are continuing to present it as their main headline.
It will be interesting to see whether any MoD suit turns up to defend their position during the day.
Not long now until David Cameron will be able to fulfil the written promise he made in his letter dated Monday 10th July 2006...
As I mentioned in my previous letter to you, I do believe that the reputations of the two pilots deserve to be reinstated, as the Lords Select Committee recommended, and in the absence of any overwhelming argument presented to me as Prime Minister that is what I would do.
Yours sincerely
David Cameron
Yours sincerely
David Cameron
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The BoI and Airworthiness
As I have mentioned on this thread several times before, if you do a search on the BoI Report and the Reviewing Officers' Comments for the words "airworthy" or "airworthiness" or even "release to service" you will not find them. There is absolutely no evidence that the BoI either by design/direction or just a plain lack of competence looked at the underlying airworthiness issues at all - there is certainly no confirmation in the BoI report that the aircraft was either airworthy (as is now being claimed by MOD) or even serviceable (as is being claimed by most other people who wish to blame the pilots). I can only suggest that MOD are deliberately misleading us (and themselves?) by saying that these earlier reports were made available to the BoI - if they had been I cannot believe that any responsible and effective BoI would have ignored them.
As further evidence that MOD did not wish the Boscombe Down issues to surface, and certainly did not wish to draw attention to, or provide, any of the critical letters (Software, OC RWTS, 6 June 94 Supt of Engineering) then read the request for legal advice for the MOD Team at the Sherriff's FAI which completely ignores them - being cynical I have to assume that even the MOD's legal team were deliberately not given the full facts either as they would then have had to disclose them to the other side.
Rifkind was right in his comments today - MOD does not need new evidence they just need properly to assess the evidence they have (which to be fair to the BoI now includes documents that they do not seem to have been given or to seek) - as I think was pointed out back in the engineering assessment of the BoI back in 2003!
JB
As further evidence that MOD did not wish the Boscombe Down issues to surface, and certainly did not wish to draw attention to, or provide, any of the critical letters (Software, OC RWTS, 6 June 94 Supt of Engineering) then read the request for legal advice for the MOD Team at the Sherriff's FAI which completely ignores them - being cynical I have to assume that even the MOD's legal team were deliberately not given the full facts either as they would then have had to disclose them to the other side.
Rifkind was right in his comments today - MOD does not need new evidence they just need properly to assess the evidence they have (which to be fair to the BoI now includes documents that they do not seem to have been given or to seek) - as I think was pointed out back in the engineering assessment of the BoI back in 2003!
JB
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The truth (which we knew all along) is a coming out. All this continued "bureaucratic inertia" that the RAF is sticking with is doing is making the senior officers, the RAF as a whole and also the MOD look like a complete bunch of fools that would not be trusted to run a village fete.
I hope and pray that someone in a seat of decision making has a pair of balls (and a concience) and decides that this complete arse of a finding gets removed and a massive apology is made to the families.
If I was in charge heads would have rolled long ago.
I hope and pray that someone in a seat of decision making has a pair of balls (and a concience) and decides that this complete arse of a finding gets removed and a massive apology is made to the families.
If I was in charge heads would have rolled long ago.
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Originally Posted by BEagle
A very positive piece from Sir Malcolm Rifkind just now as part of the lead news item on BBC News 24 just after the 0830 break from BBC1.
The BBC are continuing to present it as their main headline.
It will be interesting to see whether any MoD suit turns up to defend their position during the day.
Not long now until David Cameron will be able to fulfil the written promise he made in his letter dated Monday 10th July 2006...
The BBC are continuing to present it as their main headline.
It will be interesting to see whether any MoD suit turns up to defend their position during the day.
Not long now until David Cameron will be able to fulfil the written promise he made in his letter dated Monday 10th July 2006...
As I mentioned in my previous letter to you, I do believe that the reputations of the two pilots deserve to be reinstated, as the Lords Select Committee recommended, and in the absence of any overwhelming argument presented to me as Prime Minister that is what I would do.
Yours sincerely
David Cameron
Yours sincerely
David Cameron
I see no 'promise' there from David Cameron at all. At present he 'believes'. Whether he will continue to do so should he come to power and be briefed by the MOD we shall have to wait and see.
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KiwiBrit if you see no promise in that letter then try Early Day Motion 651 instead:
If you go to the link you will see that not only did the MP for Witney sign it, he was also one of the sponsors.
That this House urges the Government to ensure that the Ministry of Defence revisits the issue of the Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre on 2nd June 1994; notes that the General Assembly noted the findings of the Fatal Accident Inquiry held in Paisley, the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons and the House of Lords Select Committee, all of which rejected the findings of gross negligence by the RAF Board of Inquiry against flight lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook, and of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee; supports the General Assembly's pastoral concern for all the families affected by the accident; recognises that the Royal Air Force's rules on fatal accidents have subsequently been changed, such that the Chinook pilots would not have been blamed after their deaths; and calls on the Government to overturn the verdict of gross negligence ascribed to the deceased pilots in the 11th year following the accident.
Channel 4 News continues to do its bit.
Fresh doubts over Chinook crash verdict - Channel 4 News
airsound
Fresh doubts over Chinook crash verdict - Channel 4 News
airsound
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This 15-year enigma
Malcolm Rifkind's objective comments on BBC today have set me wondering again.
I am a long retired PPL with UK IR and over 1000hrs and long retired LAE as well. I know nothing about helos and still have much to learn about flying, and this tragedy has puzzled me for years.
I have known the area since boyhood and used to transit it often en route to Glenforsa/Mull. Given its mini-climate and frequent low cloud/mist between Antrim and Kintyre I used to transit at safety altitude and let down on the Macrihanish VOR. (From memory it had TACAN in those days not DME). From there one could eyeball the coast north to Mull, or sometimes not ... the West Scottish coast is unpredictable and unforgiving.
In my time the MAC VOR could not be relied on below about 2000ft when south of Kintyre, because of the large chunk of rock between me and the station.
Perhaps the Chinook had some other nav equipment, if so it does not appear to have worked. Perhaps they were practising for low-level special ops, fair enough but why do so with a full load of personnel?
(1) I wonder why a pilot still less two pilots should be at low level, flying straight at said chunk of rock in typical Kintyre IMC?
(2) I wonder what would happen to a senior civil airworthiness official who overrode the recommendations of engineers and a test pilot and decreed that a civil machine was safe when they said it was not?
I am a long retired PPL with UK IR and over 1000hrs and long retired LAE as well. I know nothing about helos and still have much to learn about flying, and this tragedy has puzzled me for years.
I have known the area since boyhood and used to transit it often en route to Glenforsa/Mull. Given its mini-climate and frequent low cloud/mist between Antrim and Kintyre I used to transit at safety altitude and let down on the Macrihanish VOR. (From memory it had TACAN in those days not DME). From there one could eyeball the coast north to Mull, or sometimes not ... the West Scottish coast is unpredictable and unforgiving.
In my time the MAC VOR could not be relied on below about 2000ft when south of Kintyre, because of the large chunk of rock between me and the station.
Perhaps the Chinook had some other nav equipment, if so it does not appear to have worked. Perhaps they were practising for low-level special ops, fair enough but why do so with a full load of personnel?
(1) I wonder why a pilot still less two pilots should be at low level, flying straight at said chunk of rock in typical Kintyre IMC?
(2) I wonder what would happen to a senior civil airworthiness official who overrode the recommendations of engineers and a test pilot and decreed that a civil machine was safe when they said it was not?
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We are now aware that the HC2 was demonstrably not airworthy - fact. Never mind the limited MTOW, the poor icing clearance and the lack of compliance with the mandated regs, the navigation equipment the crews needed to 'legally' fly IMC had no clearances for use, nor had the nav performance been confirmed by BD (itself indicative of an immature ac/V&V program). That, perhaps, explains why the crew insisted on a HC1, which did have all the clearances? Of course, there weren't any HC1s left!
As Tuc says, the paperwork trail definitively places the onus of airworthiness responsibility on some very senior people indeed. In none of the enquiries - BoI/FAI/PAC nor HoL- has this aspect been explored and neither have the people involved been questioned. That would be interesting but, as I see it now, they don't need to be; the new evidence leads directly to them.
If the MoD had this info, as they admit, then why didn't the Service and MoD legal types advise the AMs to bring it to the attention of all the above legal enquiries? Did they do so? If they did, why did the AMs decline to oblige?
I think we can work out the answer to that one! Perhaps even, the AMs were covering for their own bosses? This could get interesting.
flipster
As Tuc says, the paperwork trail definitively places the onus of airworthiness responsibility on some very senior people indeed. In none of the enquiries - BoI/FAI/PAC nor HoL- has this aspect been explored and neither have the people involved been questioned. That would be interesting but, as I see it now, they don't need to be; the new evidence leads directly to them.
If the MoD had this info, as they admit, then why didn't the Service and MoD legal types advise the AMs to bring it to the attention of all the above legal enquiries? Did they do so? If they did, why did the AMs decline to oblige?
I think we can work out the answer to that one! Perhaps even, the AMs were covering for their own bosses? This could get interesting.
flipster
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The main thrust of many commentators seems to be around the FADEC system. In simple and straightforward terms, could anyone offer an opinion as to why the FADEC system would make a crew fly at such low level rather than flying at or above the Safety Altitude? Not trying to be contentious - genuine query.
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ShyTorque - I'm aware of the chain of command - it was a name (aka a 'moniker') I was after for the origination of the order to 'cease'.
P6 - please read this thread and pick out the important bits - or AT LEAST read the C4 link in post 5866 (yes, you've missed a fair bit coming in at 5869 on the third edition of the thread!!)
SA would have put them into icing conditions for which the a/c was not cleared. SA would have been around 6,000' for the route (from memory)
From that article:
Jon Tapper went further. He knew that the RAF was also concerned about the aircraft's safety and had banned it from flying above a low altitude, on previous advice from Boscombe Down. He asked what he should do in an emergency? Should he break that altitude ban?
The pilot - in the last days of his short life - was told by his superiors, that if he broke the altitude restriction he would be personally responsible for the consequences.
P6 - please read this thread and pick out the important bits - or AT LEAST read the C4 link in post 5866 (yes, you've missed a fair bit coming in at 5869 on the third edition of the thread!!)
SA would have put them into icing conditions for which the a/c was not cleared. SA would have been around 6,000' for the route (from memory)
From that article:
Jon Tapper went further. He knew that the RAF was also concerned about the aircraft's safety and had banned it from flying above a low altitude, on previous advice from Boscombe Down. He asked what he should do in an emergency? Should he break that altitude ban?
The pilot - in the last days of his short life - was told by his superiors, that if he broke the altitude restriction he would be personally responsible for the consequences.
Last edited by BOAC; 4th Jan 2010 at 16:44.
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8-15fromOdium, I agree the early day motion seems clear. However, Cameron seems to be back-tracking somewhat, in that he now talks about what he would do"in the absence of any overwhelming argument presented" - which to me implies that he is open to there being such evidence being presented. He does not seem to be giving a clear-cut promise, as yet.
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(1) I wonder why a pilot still less two pilots should be at low level, flying straight at said chunk of rock in typical Kintyre IMC?