Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[Fitter2]

You stated that Sqn Ldr Burke

"produced evidence to show that UFCM's and Power Interrupts had taken place on more than one occasion"

Q1. Did he produce any evidence that one or both of these had taken place on this particular flight?

I fear that you have failed to heed the dictum 'it is better to keep ones mouth shut and be thought an idiot than open ones mouth and prove the matter beyond doubt'.

Q2. On those flights that suffered these occurrences - how many fatal and non fatal casualties were there?

It was his considered and expert view that it was only a matter of time before the combination of circumstances would cause an an accident resulting in fatalities. The Mull event MAY be such an incident; due to the lack of recording equipment there is no proof either way.

Q3. How many of these occurrences were classified as Accidents and how many as Incidents?

Heed your own words and read his evidence

Q4 Does "more than one occasion" mean two or twenty or more?

I refer the reader to my previous answer

Q5 Do we not employ Test Pilots precisely because experience shows that "teething troubles" are to be expected with any new type of aircraft?

Ideally yes. Using operational pilots as effectively test pilots on an aircraft prematurely released to service, and over which professional test pilots had expressed concern in the strongest possible terms is a dereliction of duty of those responsible.

[Chugalug2]

Brian Dixon post 1072 (Aug 2004):

ZD576... service history from the point of return to the UK after Mid-Life Update:

8 Apr 94 - Returned from Boeing. Experiences a FADEC problem.

21 Apr 94 - During a transition to hover the helicopter has a torque mismatch of 40%. No engine warning lights illuminate. Number one engine is replaced. (Cause was a faulty torquementer).

26 Apr 94 - Has a problem with engine control levers at the flight idle position. There was no torque indication to either engine and the number one engine ran high. Whole engine replaced again.

3 May 94 - GPS failed to operate.

5 May 94 - GPS failed to operate.

9 May 94 - No GPS feed to RNS252.

10 May 94 - A large spring detached from the collective lever. It was found that the bonding had failed to keep the spring in place. The engineering note stated that there was cause for concern with regards loose atricles within the flying control closet.

17 May 94 - Engine power warning light illuminates three times. Engine temperature also goes beyond its normal level. As a result, part of the FADEC system is returned to the USA for investigation. The engine is stripped and rebuilt.

18 May 94 - Number one ECU PTIT rises (undemanded) to transient 950 degrees C for about 1 second before returning to normal temperature. The ECU is changed.

20 May 94 - During control checks, an unusual vibration was felt when raising the collective. Loose washers and securing nut were found on the CPT assembly. No locking wire was found.

26 May 94- During flight, numerous warning lights illuminate, including the master warning light and a number two engine failure notification. The helicopter makes an emergency diversion to a civilian airport.

31 May 94 - ZD576 delivered to RAF Aldergrove. The IR jammer has a fault. It is replaced.

1 Jun 94 - During flight, there is a problem with the PTIT guage. It is replaced upon landing.

2 Jun 94 - The PTIT guage plays up again and later in the the task it is noticed that there are problems with the RNS 252. However, on return to Aldergrove the faults could not be replicated.

The crash occurs later that day during the second sortie.

This was the history of one aircraft over the two months of its absurdly short life. Sqn Ldr Burke gave evidence to the FAI and HoL that seemed to show it to be par for the course of the Chinook Mk2 then. He didn't give that evidence to the BoI because the RAF didn't want to hear it. It still doesn't.
Bast0n, your post above is both revealing and damning of the RAF attitude to Accident Investigation and Flight Safety in general:

No signs - no evidence - no history of such events with this aircraft - no case...............

There's evidence alright, but none so blind as they who won't see!

[bast0n]

DALEK

Either you are a complete idiot, or you are taking the p*ss.

How very kind.

[Chugalug2]

This BoI did not do the job that it was given, as with the Nimrod BoI. In that case the coroner had to do it instead, finding why the aircraft crashed (it was unairworthy) and what needed to be done to avoid a repetition (ground the others until made airworthy). With this accident the BoI's job was instead done by the FAI and the HoL. The latter in particular did a praiseworthy job IMHO. See if you agree, for much of its report is at:

House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Written Evidence

The House of Lords - Committee to review Chinook ZD 576 crash

House of Lords - Chinook ZD 576 - Report

It does not reflect well upon the BoI or the RO's hence the hostility to it from their apologists, but it is objective and thorough which they were not. I commend it.

baston (2): " Would you support the accident investigation being reopened (under whatever guise that the RAF could manage given caz's list of obstructions) to have that very evidence and those very witnesses presented? "

[Thor Nogson]

Originally Posted by Chugalug2

not quite how you misquoted it Thor.

It wasn't a misquote, it was a selective quote, no words were added or taken away. I shouldn't have added the full stop at the end, that was a mistake on my part.

I was trying to suggest that if the gross negligence verdict is overturned, a lot of the people who have been exploring the other angles, from the ridiculous to the critically important will stop working on those angles. In hindsight I should have just said that rather than trying to be clever with my quoting.

You are preplexed by my suggestion that I would be happy with the verdict being overturned.

Originally Posted by Chugalug2

given that our "quest" is based on the notion that airworthiness provision and enforcement in the UK Military Airfleet by the MOD is utterly compromised.

That is your (and many others) quest , but not mine, or some others, I think. There is clearly enough doubt to quash the original verdict, and that's been my interest in this from the start.

Originally Posted by Chugalug2

JP disputes that, caz ignores it, but you seem to be indifferent to it. Can that be so?

No, I am not indifferent to it, but I feel that I am not well enough informed or qualified to participate in that conversation. If there is a problem, it needs sorting, but is this the right place to do it?

TN

[dalek]

Cazatou,
Answer to Q1. He could not possibly know. He had no access to CVR / ADR data.
He did give us information on events that " could" have been relevant to the accident.
To the rest of your questions, I don't know. But I will think about it.

JP and bast0n,
Caz has at least responded. How about your thoughts? Notice I take all genuine questions seriously. Unlike you JP, I am not arrogant enough to decide what is, and what is not relevant.
Regards

[Chugalug2]

Thor, if a forum of "Professional Pilots" (and of many others of course) is not the place to point up serious shortcomings in UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Enforcement, then where? It was certainly the place to raise it in the "Parliamentary Questions" thread following the Iraq Hercules crash and similarly in the Afghanistan Nimrod thread. So, yes I would say this is very much the place. The entire subject fleet of this thread, the Chinook Mk2, was at the time of the accident unairworthy. That statement is a hostage to fortune I know, and JP will be down on me like a ton of bricks no doubt, but that is my contention. The reason the fleet was thus affected was the UK Military Airworthiness Authority not enforcing its own Regulations. That seems to me to require the attention of Professional Aviators of all persuasions, who simply have to use their own training and experience to decide if that is acceptable if true. It doesn't take a lot of qualification or being informed to do so, just a bit of application. Or is that too much to ask of people?
PS Not having a crack at you personally, but you were kind enough to put your head above the parapet. Good for you!

[cazatou]

Chugalug & dalek

Have you ever picked up a "new" aircraft from the manufacturer?

Well, I did (along with Dick Graham) in the case of the first 2 JP3A's from Short's of Belfast. To put it in context - that was the firm that built the TITANIC. No FRC's or Aircrew Manual and it took some time to find someone who knew how to turn the radio on!! The second time it was a BAe 146 from Woodford which went straight into the Hangar for 2 weeks rectification after arrival at base.

ALL new Aircraft/Types/Marks have teething problems because both air and ground crews are unfamiliar with them. That is precisely why one should treat them with extreme caution until one is familiar with their handling characteristics and quirks. Flying such an aircraft at high speed, at low level, directly at high ground and in poor weather that had been forecast does NOT, in my humble opinion, meet the criteria of "extreme caution". To do so when carrying Passengers is Gross Negligence.

Finally, Chugalug, your post 5159 states that on 2 June 1994 Flt Lt Tapper reported that during the first task of the day there were problems with the RNS 252. However, on return to base the faults could not be replicated.

Given the poor weather, was it really a good idea to rely on the RNS252during the approach to the Mull?

[Cows getting bigger]

Caz, rather a subjective last paragraph. Ordinarily, one would hope that an aircraft is released to service within a set of clearly defined limitations, not a "Be careful chaps, the paint's not quite dry and there may be a few spare nuts, bolts, screws etc rattling around inside the aircraft". It seems to me that ZD576 spent twice as long as your 146 in the hangar having various faults rectified right up to the crash day itself; not exactly a good indication of the serviceability (dare I say airworthiness?) of an aircraft.

Secondly, I would like to think that safety management has moved on a bit since your JP3A run to Shorts. If it hasn't, surely it should have done.

[cazatou]

CGB

Read the bit about the JP3A again.

N0 PILOTS NOTES OR FRC's

Luckily it was a clear day, because there was no way we wanted to try our hand at an instrument approach.

Of course, we could have said NO; but then I don't think you ever met the PCL - did you?

[Chugalug2]

caz:

Chugalug & dalek
Have you ever picked up a "new" aircraft from the manufacturer?

No caz, only a very not well looked after Herc that suffered a bad brake fire at JFK. Lockheed flew it down to their plant in Marietta for repair and eventually I was sent there with a crew to pick it up. As in all such case it wasn't ready, and so we were the subject of true Southern hospitality until it was...but I digress. Probably a similar experience in Belfast. No? Oh well lose some, win some, eh? Along with everyone else of my generation I flew the JP3, and my next employer operated the 146. Both fine aircraft and more than likely yours were airworthy in themselves (though point taken about lack of docs, not clever!). But the Chinook Mk2 was in a different class then. Every one that came out of Boeing was unairworthy, I believe. In particular the FADEC code, DECU connector and the three axis control console (sorry, I know that last bit is not the correct terminology) were all unfit for purpose. I cannot think of any areas other than engine and flying controls more basic to airworthiness. You spoke elsewhere of why we employ test pilots, and I agree this was why. So why, when those same TPs at BD started identifying these basic problems was the type granted its RTS against their protests? BTW don't bother with the no FADEC revisions made thereafter and the code being the same today as it was then. I just don't believe it. If an Airworthiness Authority can go "rogue" as with the Nimrod, as with the Hercules and as I believe with the Chinook Mk2, then it can certainly fix the paperwork to cover its tracks. Serious charge? Yes, I know. Manslaughter is a serious charge, trouble here is the wrong guys took the rap!

[bast0n]

DALEK

I quite thought that you were having a barbeque!

and bast0n,
Caz has at least responded. How about your thoughts? Notice I take all genuine questions seriously. Unlike you JP, I am not arrogant enough to decide what is, and what is not relevant.

Sorry - what is the question that I have avoided? I will certainly answer direct questions - even if accompanied by insults.

Happy days.................

[Thor Nogson]

Originally Posted by Chugalug2

Thor, if a forum of "Professional Pilots" (and of many others of course) is not the place to point up serious shortcomings in UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Enforcement, then where?

Yes, of course it is the place, but I was talking specifically about this thread.
The main aim of which, as I understand it, was to overturn the original and unsupportable verdict of gross negligence.

I wonder if a separate thread pulling together all the issues would be a better place for that, and would be likely to stay more coherent after justice is inevitably done in this case?

I can see your point of view, in that this provides a concrete example of the issues you and others can see, but to a certain degree that is getting lost in the noise of all the other theories, counter theories and point scoring, as is the original aim.

Originally Posted by Chugalug2

PS Not having a crack at you personally, but you were kind enough to put your head above the parapet. Good for you!

I accepted the risks by posting, but I was expecting to be attacked by the opposition, not by friendly fire

I don't think that it is just me that is only seeking justice for the pilots here however, though I stand to be corrected.

Keep up the good work.

TN

[Chugalug2]

Point taken about the blue on blue. As in all such cases unintentional, so sorry fella, if that helps? I honestly believe that the purpose of this thread as you state it is enhanced, not compromised, by emphasising that this fleet was unairworthy when the tragedy happened and that the BoI turned a blind eye to it. Hence the findings by it and the ROs are compromised, hence they are even further from the required standard of "beyond all doubt". The Mull group has appealed to reason, now it appeals to law. The problem is that its adversary, the MOD, is the chief suspect in my view and with tax payer funded resources, so we could be here for another 15 years! Better surely to show how it has flouted its Duty of Care, ignored its own Airworthiness Regulations and been the direct cause of these ever lengthening lists of fallen. It may be important to you that Rick and Jon's honour be restored, and essential to their loved ones and friends. It is important to me, that was my motivation for posting here in the first place, but with due respect to you and to their memory preventing further avoidable Military Air Accidents is even more so. That can only happen if the MOD is "outed" and Airworthiness put into far safer hands, together with Accident Investigation, the other side of the Flight Safety coin, ie to an MAA and MAAIB. We may rage at this injustice but first and foremost we are professionals and know that Aviation is deadly unless everyone involved is scrupulous and responsible. Rick and Jon may well have been. Many of those in the CoC above them were not.

[Tandemrotor]

Have you ever picked up a "new" aircraft from the manufacturer?

Actually, yes. A Chinook, a BO105 dbs4, a B737, and B777. (I have also many hours on the 146 you mention!)

Does that prove something?

Does that somehow make me more qualified than others, or equaly qualified to you in some bizarre way?? Or should we examine your helicopter experience to determine the merit of your arguments???

This debate is deteriorating somewhat n'est pas?

[dalek]

bast0n,
Great BBQ thanks, lamb chops, spicy burgers, haloumi cheese and some great Aussie red.
The "insult" was tongue in cheek, but you were being a little obtuse with the "Burden of Proof" issue. I know you are not an idiot, because you ask too many sensible questions.
Fact. Sqn Ldr Burke gave evidence to the FAI and HOL.
Opinion. (Mine) His evidence was a critical factor in the verdicts arrived at by these bodies.
Fact. Sqn Ldr Burke was a leading Chinook expert and TP, who was assigned to the AAIB and played a major role in the initial investigation.

Questions, (To you and JP), in your opinion
1. Should the RAF have included him in the initial BOI.
2. Should the Reviewing Officers have taken his opinions into consideration when reaching their conclusions.

Do you understand the questions?

[Chugalug2]

bast0n, while you attend to dalek's questions, might I tag mine on the end for you as well? Third time lucky, perhaps?
" Would you support the accident investigation being reopened (under whatever guise that the RAF could manage given caz's list of obstructions) to have that very evidence and those very witnesses presented? "

[bast0n]

DALEK

Yes

Yes

Yes - I understand the question!!

I again state that the airworthiness question is a disgrace - but do not feel that in this case it had much to do with the impact. As has been stated ad nauseam anything COULD have happened in the cockpit in those final minutes but unless there is PROOF that it/they happened we have to go on what is definitely KNOWN - not conjecture.................don't we?

I am going out to lunch now

[dalek]

bast0n,
COULD, PROOF and KNOWN.
Has to apply to the AM's CONJECTURE, just as much as yours or mine.

GROSS NEGLIGENCE is now out of the window.
You have just defined NPD.
Enjoy your lunch

[cazatou]

dalek

You use the word "conjecture". I would use the word "reasoning" and in addition I would add "based on 25 years experience of helicopter operations". Moreover, I would couple that with the duty laid upon Sir John by virtue of his Rank and Appointment at that time.