Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)

[walter kennedy]

BOAC
It's not much of a journey for you - I've been there a few times since I moved to Oz - if you can't make the effort then what can I say?
I suggest you do your plotting better - waypoint A is not the light house.
As I said in a previous post, it is difficult at first to grasp the scale of the area in question - you have to put some time and effort in.
The coords put in the STANS as waypoint A were 55:18:30 and 05:48:00 - nice and easy to remember and close enough to do the job - only 60 metres before the "threshold" - practical navigation - when I used to move my charter boat from Chichester Harbour to Langstone Hbr at night before fitting a radar it was sometimes very foggy, I could use the Decca Lat & Long without referring to the chart every minute as I had memorised the track (obviously to rounded figures).
When you say wpt A was "imprecise", I wonder if you have done much prac nav - why would you plot in extra digits that would be meaningless in regard to the accuracy of the SuperTANS? 60 MTS IS BUGGER ALL.
Do you want me to supply the coords of the corners of the area so you can look at it in Google Earth? Just use the ruler function and go north 60m - there is a green bit of the area I have given you before.
And yes it would be good to hear from someone who has landed there.

[BOAC]

Walter - several points arise from that post. I trust you will not start quoting Hotspur to me and then 'fade away'?

1) I have absolutely NO intention (or need) to 'visit' the Mull to investigate your claims. Google earth is fine for me at the moment.

2) It seems that in all your 'weaving' of this story, you have even confused yourself. I am begiining to hear echoes of ?Churchill's? comments about a battle of wits. Your referred post #3935 states:

7 waypoints had been entered into the STANS route:
H N 54.47.70 W 006.36.00 spudfield
A N55.18.50 W 005.48.00
B N 56.43.00 W 005.14.00 turning point, no specific feature
C N 57.35.02 W 004.04.45 100yd swim to Ft George
D N 57.32.42 W 004.02.92 about middle of Inverness Aerodrome

You are now saying that was wrong? Anything else you want to correct?

3) I am not aware of thinking that the lighthouse was WPT A - I did in fact obfuscate the issue in "ANYTHING north of Wpt A AND the lighthouse which is where Wpt A is" - I meant north of the lighthouse (your 'original' WPT) - my mistake- I had what I THOUGHT were the WPT A coords at the time.

4) Are you now saying that the evidence presented CONFIRMS that Wpt A was in fact as you have just stated and not as you previously 'confirmed'?

5) Are you also telling me that the 'latest' coords are NOW in fact 60m south of the LDZ of which you speak?

6) "I wonder if you have done much prac nav" - good to see you have a sense of humour

7) "why would you plot in extra digits that would be meaningless in regard to the accuracy of the SuperTANS? 60 MTS IS BUGGER ALL." - over to you then to explain the remaining coords in STANS. I have never conducted low level VFR nav using a GPS based nav system, but had I had the facility I would probably have entered a 'ball park' waypoint on the Mull which (the Mull/lighthouse) I would visually acquire. It may well be that (whatever the ACTUAL WPT A coords were) the only 'fix' available to the planner was that LDZ (if it existed?)

7) "Do you want me to supply the coords of the corners of the area so you can look at it in Google Earth?" - well, no thanks, assuming we can take your LATEST coords to be it and not another 'error'.

I am confused as to how you think they were using TANS - a reported change of waypoint off the coast would suggest a change from WPT A to B, so how do you explain this 'track' of 035 towards a WPT (A) which has just been bypassed? They would surely not STILL be navigating on WPT 'H' (home?) at this stage?

I note your 'advice' to other readers that I am not "doing the background work" and trust you will apologise for furnishing the incorrect information to me in this 'background work'? Anything else you need to change?

[dalek]

Waypoints

Remind me again. Why are the exact positions of the entered Waypoints so important? Were there any suspected "Gross errors"?

[cazatou]

dalek

Re your post 4821

If you have to ask such basic questions you merely show your ignorance of the matters in question.

Re your post 4816

RWTS did NOT state that the Aircraft was unairworthy - RWTS's decision not to authorise further trials flying was made against a background of several engine control system malfunctions that had occurred on the ground during start up checks. These had not, at that point, been explained to Boscombe Down's satisfaction by the aircraft or engine Design Authority. The necessary clarification was completed and accepted by Boscombe Down on 24 October 1994. Test flying was resumed without any changes to the aircraft FADEC system, or any additional operating limitations.

To pre-empt your next inane gambit - the forecast +4 degree isotherm in the area of the Mull that evening was at 3500ft which would have allowed the pilots to have climbed to minimum safe altitude of 2400 ft over the Mull.

[dalek]

Manners Please

Ignorant or not an answer would be nice. Walt or BOAC, can you help.
My question on crew change, leading to the CDT debate turned out not to be so dumb.
As a former instructor who has done a manufacturers TANs course, I may (I repeat May), be able to hazard an opinion at the crews intentions.

[cazatou]

BOAC

Your Post #4795

"It is not thought they were in fog at waypoint change"

What BOI did you read then?

The Investigating Board thought that the aircraft WAS in cloud and NOT flying VFR when they made the waypoint change.

Of course, if the Pilots had checked the waypoints on the map (which they had not prepared) they would have noticed that the Mull waypoint was not the Lighthouse, but the HLS some 280 metres to the SE of the Lighthouse. Thus they were closer to the high ground than they may have anticipated. In addition, a small inaccuracy between the GPS position and true position meant the aircrafts heading was taking it further towards the higher ground to the east of the lighthouse.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Originally Posted by cazatou

BOAC

Your Post #4795

"It is not thought they were in fog at waypoint change"

What BOI did you read then?

The Investigating Board thought that the aircraft WAS in cloud and NOT flying VFR when they made the waypoint change but they have no definitive proof that was actually the case.

Of course, if the Pilots had checked the waypoints on the map (which they had not prepared), and bear in mind there is not a shred of conclusive evidence to suggest they did not they would have noticed that the Mull waypoint was not the Lighthouse, but the HLS some 280 metres to the SE of the Lighthouse. Thus they were closer to the high ground than they may have anticipated. In addition, a small inaccuracy between the GPS position and true position meant the aircrafts heading was taking it further towards the higher ground to the east of the lighthouse but this is just pure supposition as no one actually knows what really happened that fateful day, certainly not with the required degree of certainty that this verdict requires.

Poor old Caz will not see this but it's not too difficult to put an alternative spin on his assertions as basically thats all they are, assertions

[BOAC]

Dalek - the effort in trying to sort out the waypoint confusion is to try and find out if there is any merit in WK's theory. So far no luck. Cazatou has retired hurt and is now resorting to insults. (OOPs - I see he's back!) I see you are reasonably qualified to tell me whether it would be feasible and normal practice for a SH crew to make an IMC approach (at fairly high speed) to a STANS waypoint on a hilly headland? Seems unlikely to me, but both Caz and WK seem to think they were 'in fog' and hurtling willy-nilly towards this waypoint (and my question on WPT change remains unanswered until WK awakes). That I would consider not only gross negligence but totally improbable! Have we seen, by the way, any substantive agreement from SH crews about 'frequent' use of this LDZ?

The 'SA' red herring is exactly that, as we both know, since 2400' would not have got them far on the way to INS having 'pulled up', and neither would 3500', so an 'abort' to SA would be endex for the task. (No sick humour intended).

Caz - the whole argument on this thread is about the findings of the BoI. My comment you quote relates to what normal, sane people would think. Have you ever flown IMC towards a WPT on a hilly outcrop? Tell me how you would plan to let down?

The Investigating Board thought that the aircraft WAS in cloud and NOT flying VFR when they made the waypoint change.

- this to me discredits the whole finding. Why would they make a WPT change if IMC? Which WPT was then selected? Can you confirm WK's waypoint was in fact wrong? Can you elaborate on your 'RAF Pilot' experience? AH! So many questions.

[tucumseh]

Caz

RWTS did NOT state that the Aircraft was unairworthy - RWTS's decision not to authorise further trials flying was made against a background of several engine control system malfunctions that had occurred on the ground during start up checks. These had not, at that point, been explained to Boscombe Down's satisfaction by the aircraft or engine Design Authority. The necessary clarification was completed and accepted by Boscombe Down on 24 October 1994. Test flying was resumed without any changes to the aircraft FADEC system, or any additional operating limitations.

Sorry Caz, this is seemingly contradicted by the MoD.



On 7th March 1994 during one of the specified FADEC checks on the ground, the engine (sic) of an HC Mk2 flamed out. Trials at A&AEE were halted while the failure was investigated. The failure was not due to a software fault and flying resumed on 20th April.

However, in the period up to 2nd June 1994 there were a number of incidents involving AIRBORNE HC Mk2 of which approximately 5 (five) were due to FADEC malfunction whilst operating in normal mode. There had also been incidents on the ground.

The postponement of the trials at this time was an expediency within the proper exercise of airworthiness considerations by A&AEE and was not seen as a refusal by individual test pilots to fly the Chinook HC Mk2.


I understand a certain senior officer described A&AEE’s actions as “quite incredible”. Others, more knowledgeable in the application of airworthiness regulations, would call it right and proper.

[walter kennedy]

BOAC
re your post #4820 accusing me of making an error with the waypoint A coords:
I did caution you in post #4813 of 14th Jun thus:
<<If you just want to play with Google earth, you can put the cursor on the lat/long of the points of interest (don't forget to be careful about converting arcsecs into dec minutes and vice versa where required) and put a marker there which will stay on your computers presentation of Google Earth (so it's worth doing) - impact point, pos of wpt change, etc - see how it lines up. >>


BUT you still got them mixed up, didn't you? The original post you quoted (#3935 6Jan09 page 197 of this thread) had waypoints with decimal minutes of arc as opposed to arcseconds in Google Earth - .50' = 30” so
55:18:30” is the same position as 55:18.50'
fifty five degrees, 18 minutes and 30 seconds is equivalent
to fifty five degrees, 18 decimal five minutes.
No offence on this one, many get confused, you just need to practice on this case – I had hoped many more would have done so years ago – once we are all familiar in our minds with the geometry we can discuss the track issues – people are often shy of grasping the nav nettle as it is easy to make howlers and few want the embarrassment.
I did make a confusing error in post 4813 of 14th June – I had put in an extra zero (trying not to wear reading glasses when on computer) – I had meant the detailed 1 in 25 thou – not the 1 in 250 thou scale that no doubt rang a bell with you.
To save further delay and confusion, here are 4 points as corners in format that you put in Google Earth for that LZ:
55: 18: 34.00” 05: 48: 03.00”
55: 18: 32.00” 05: 48: 03.80”
55: 18: 33.60” 05: 48: 01.50”
55: 18: 32,30” 05: 48: 01.60”
I also suggest you put markers at the other points of interest, such as waypoint change and initial impact, if you use the ruler function to measure wpt change to impact and close the ruler without clearing the result you are left with a useful track line that remains whatever aspect you view the aerial pix from - well worth juggling around to get a feel - and, while this line is still there, do the flight simulator option: chug along at about 150kts to get a feel for how quickly the ground rises as you pass the LZ area - you would want to be sure of your actual closing range that close in if the ground detail was as fuzzy as in the pix..
If you go to a site called “Marinas” you can get a free download of a screensaver that is an excellent view of the area from light house to the LZ from about the elevation of the light house just off the coast – just look at the site with keyword “Mull” and there will be a few to look through, the one I mean should be obvious – it is high res so when you view it you can zoom in – worth a look.


You wrote: <<I am confused as to how you think they were using TANS - a reported change of waypoint off the coast would suggest a change from WPT A to B, so how do you explain this 'track' of 035 towards a WPT (A) which has just been bypassed? They would surely not STILL be navigating on WPT 'H' (home?) at this stage?>>
Even those most hostile to my views would surely acknowledge that I have made a lot of effort to explain the track, hdg changes etc in many detailed posts over many years – once again I am tempted to ask you to read the posts – very briefly here now, so that recent readers may grasp the basic idea and then hopefully go back over past detailed posts:
For starters, all compass references to magnetic north (at the time of the crash);
Aldergrove to the position of waypoint change – they had departed on 027 VOR radial (as they had declared they would to ATC) and had held 027 accurately (Boeing analysis) – if you stick to 027 (mag at the time) you go right to waypoint A from Aldergrove VOR);
they then dumped waypoint A from the SuperTANS and turned right (Boeing) - it was still ahead and useful when they dumped it – waypoint B was of no use to them where they dumped it as the track to it would have been over higher ground than that which they eventually struck (they would have had to have selected B several miles earlier to have allowed a simple change of track to it to keep them clear) ;
the track from waypoint change to the position of first impact was straight until last second evasive manoeuvre (Boeing) and this track was 035;
035 was the course selector setting as found on the handling pilot's Horiz Situation Indicator – it is also the obvious best line to the LZ;
they had started to slow down in air speed (Boeing analysis) with engine power matched but increased tailwind as they approached and crossed the shoreline masked this maintaining the ground speed;
RADALT warning set appropriately for imminent landing in marginal conditions and HP's baro alt set for landing at elevation of that LZ.
I have always held the view that this crew in particular would not have trusted the SuperTANS to be accurate and believe that their actions could be best explained by their having referred to some other radio nav reference that they believed intrinsically accurate and that was supposed to be at the LZ and so dumped waypoint A when it became apparent that there was a significant conflict between the two. I have suggested a candidate equipment that was fitted to several HC2 Chinooks a few months later – had the ground equipment (handheld) been ½ mile or so up the hill (rather than on the LZ) then the early turn and too fast/too close approach is explained – don't forget, they may not have been intending to fully land, perhaps just a close pass/turn over the LZ to demonstrate the usefulness of the equipment for pinpoint local nav (as it is so often used for).

[Tandemrotor]

If I may be of assistance:

The Oxford English Dictionary definition of 'thought', in this context goes something like this:

an idea or mental picture, imagined and contemplated

As in cazatou's (K52's) quote:

The Investigating Board 'THOUGHT' that the aircraft WAS in cloud and NOT flying VFR when they made the waypoint change.

ie: An idea 'imagined' or 'contemplated'.

I can't fault their imagination, as long as it is left at only that.

HTH

[BOAC]

WK - thank you for clearing the confusion over the waypoints. Your 2 'statements of what WPT A 'WERE' had an air of authority about them but differed in format - why the change in a supposedly authoritative statement? Do I therefore, assume at least one of them is not taken from official findings? Which one? I still await my requested link to the detailed report to save my trawling this thread. SO, yes, I can see the supposed LDZ to which you refer.

So, you maintain that you, like CAZ, assume that they homed (at high speed) to this 'beacon' in IMC in that terrain? That, in my opinion, is not 'gross negligence' but suicidal - mind you I am not familiar with SF/SH techniques, hence my question to TR. It seems very odd that they should 'dump' WPT A when, as you say, "it was still ahead and useful when they dumped it – waypoint B was of no use to them where they dumped it". I can see no logical explanation for this than the fact that they knew where they were at WPT change and were going to fly around the coast visually, but that something interfered with the plan. To assume otherwise requires a huge leap of fantasy from both the BoI and you two. I cannot imagine any pilot of at least average ability flying (rapidly) towards rising ground IMC below SA, homing beacon or not. Why do you assume this is what they did? Is YOUR assumption 'beyond reasonable doubt?

Is there any official evidence as to the planned route? I assume I can see the 'intent' - which is how I would have flown it, but what from the 'planner' involved? I think I recall seeing the G Glen planned? I would assume this would be a 'bread and butter' route for a NI crew.

I also meant to ask before but forgot - what is the 'prac nav' you mentioned?

TR, since you are 'passing through', any comments on both this LDZ on the Mull and the IMC approach technique assumed?

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

BOAC,

During my 3 Puma tours I can only recall one inadvertent entry into IMC, there may have been another but I can only recall one, it was in Co Fermanagh at night with the Sqn QHI and it happened within 30 seconds of getting airborne.

SOP in the Puma and I suspect for all other SH types was on spotting/encountering bad weather to slow down and for the Puma put the wheels down. You continued to slow down until you could either spot a way through/round the weather in front or make a decision to turn away or around.

Going IMC was an absolute last resort and because of the unique characteristics of a rotary aircraft it was very easy to avoid.

The thing that has always troubled me with this incident is why the were still going so fast. You would have to ask Jayteeto, or Shy or one of the other SH pilots who post in here to describe the profile flown at the point if inadvertent entry into IMC, I am not 100% certain I ever recall a cruise climb as such I think it was way more pronounced than that but I defer to the pilot fraternity for that one.

[cazatou]

BOAC

PLEASE get your "facts" right.

Walter will confirm that I do not, and never have, acceded to his theory regarding the circumstances surrounding the crash.

If Walter is correct then I accede to the notion that the crew were not negligent. The correct finding would have been Recklessness.

[BOAC]

Thank you SFFP.

Caz - you are correct -my apologies for 'lumping you in', but you do think they continued towards high ground in IMC, and that beyond reasonable doubt this was simply negligence as I read you.

[Tandemrotor]

Hi BOAC

If your question regarding the LDZ on the Mull, and IMC approach techniques refers to something WK has posted, I have to tell you he has been on my Ignore List for some very considerable time now. I have no plans to change that. Life is too short, and this case too important.

IMHO there is not a chance that this accident was caused by any kind of approach to any landing site.

SFFP

I think many of us would accept that crew are more susceptible to inadvertent entry in to IMC over the sea than over land. This in and of itself, would not necessarily constitute negligence.

Your point about their high speed, bordering on it's maximum speed, at impact, is very well made. It is not recognisable as any kind of Chinook technique. As was mentioned by one of the reviewing officers on the basis of conversations he had had with a number of experienced Chinook pilots.

[BOAC]

Thank you TR - para 3 noted. Just for my interest, was there EVER any technique to approach sites IMC as suggested by the 'ignored'?

[Tandemrotor]

Not in my time on SF (which pre-dated the accident) Nor revealed in general conversations with the crew of ZD576. It is possible others may know different?

I am of course aware of GPS based, IMC approaches to 'pre-recced' sites in other types of operations.

[cazatou]

BOAC

No - not beyond "reasonable doubt" but beyond any doubt whatsoever.

If I may quote from the words of Lord Glenarthur in the House of Lords debate on 5 November 2002. His Lordship had spent 5 years in the Army flying helicopters and 6 years with British Airways Helicopters. He had spent 10 years as Chairman of the British Helicopter Advisory Board and had also been Chairman of the European Helicopter Association. He had, in addition, for several years been Chairman of the International Federation of Helicopter Associations. He is a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, was on the Council of the Air League, and is a Liveryman of the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators.

"When we talk about military aircraft, it is important always to remember that we are concerned with disciplined Services, where rules are to be obeyed unless there is a very good operational reason for doing otherwise. By no stretch of the imagination can I, or very many others to whom I have spoken, conceive of any reason for flying a large helicopter, with or without passengers, at speed and at low level into doubtful visual meteorological conditions, probably breaching them, and entering cloud while approaching land from the sea, below Minimum Safe Altitude. It is, frankly, incredible; it exhibits a lack of attention to the concept of airmanship which is, or should be, dinned into the minds of all Military and Civil pilots throughout their flying careers."

I would agree with every word of that quotation (although I may have been a bit more blunt than his Lordship - if only for Shy Torque's edification).

[BOAC]

Assuming, iaw your 'directives', that is a complete quote from Glenarthur, I would argue it is a strong argument AGAINST the crew having deliberately done just that? I am, however, not familiar with his position on the accident.

It is, frankly, incredible; would you like to borrow TandemRotor's dictionary?