Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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tucumseh
The BOI also stated at para 16e "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
Moreover, at para 32c the BOI stated " in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre." Whilst the Forecast may have precluded a medium level transit over the Highlands, it did not preclude a temporary climb to Safety Altitude at the Mull.
The basis of the finding of Gross Negligence was "the crew of ZD 576 neither maintained Visual Flight Rules nor made a safe transition to Instrument Flight Rules."
The BOI calculated that "it would have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided the ground, whilst remaining on track, from any point beyond the position of the WP change until 4 seconds prior to impact, if the crew had initiated a cyclic climb." The BOI also concluded that "the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
The BOI also stated at para 16e "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
Moreover, at para 32c the BOI stated " in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre." Whilst the Forecast may have precluded a medium level transit over the Highlands, it did not preclude a temporary climb to Safety Altitude at the Mull.
The basis of the finding of Gross Negligence was "the crew of ZD 576 neither maintained Visual Flight Rules nor made a safe transition to Instrument Flight Rules."
The BOI calculated that "it would have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided the ground, whilst remaining on track, from any point beyond the position of the WP change until 4 seconds prior to impact, if the crew had initiated a cyclic climb." The BOI also concluded that "the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."
Last edited by cazatou; 15th May 2009 at 13:16.
Thanks Caz. I'll leave it to pilots to comment on that. Seemed to me there was a degree of contradiction between various statements.
Care to comment on the fact that others had committed gross negligence by abrogating their duty of care? That is something definitely beyond any doubt whatsoever.
Care to comment on the fact that others had committed gross negligence by abrogating their duty of care? That is something definitely beyond any doubt whatsoever.
tucumseh:
cazatou:
Me:
The US$64,000 question for this thread asked at last. The answer; None. Why? Because the Airworthiness Authority that should investigate such abrogation of duty is one and the same as the organisation that presided over such abrogation, that is the MOD. There is of course a QC's investigation into the airworthiness provision for the Nimrod that will report soon. Perhaps then we may know different....
Care to comment on the fact that others had committed gross negligence by abrogating their duty of care? That is something definitely beyond any doubt whatsoever.
That is your opinion - what investigations have taken place in respect of your allegations?
The US$64,000 question for this thread asked at last. The answer; None. Why? Because the Airworthiness Authority that should investigate such abrogation of duty is one and the same as the organisation that presided over such abrogation, that is the MOD. There is of course a QC's investigation into the airworthiness provision for the Nimrod that will report soon. Perhaps then we may know different....
Just a numbered other
Caz
I have to disagree, as the surface temperature was 9 deg C, allowing a climb to the 4 deg C level of about 2500ft. Local SALT was 2800ft.
Have to disagree with that too. The flight was planned for VFR in VMC, all doable below the cloud, just off the coast. Why the aircraft did not turn left along the coast, but continued more or less straight into the Mull, will never be known.
Moreover, at para 32c the BOI stated " in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre." Whilst the Forecast may have precluded a medium level transit over the Highlands, it did not preclude a temporary climb to Safety Altitude at the Mull.
The BOI also stated at para 16e "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
tucumseh
That is your opinion - what investigations have taken place in respect of your allegations?
That is your opinion - what investigations have taken place in respect of your allegations?
Notwithstanding Chug's answer, which is valid, I'd say no investigation is necessary given the relevant 2 Star, 4 Star and a succession of Mins(AF) have been perfectly happy to place their rulings in writing - which for all practical purposes are statements of MoD policy on Airworthiness as it would be a disciplinary offence to disobey their orders. On each occasion they have launched into print, they have had the precise consequences spelt out to them and given the opportunity to retract. They have not.
It remains a simple fact that the Secretary of State, with whom airworthiness responsibility rests, has issued regulations which his senior staffs have stated can be ignored or treated as optional, in the full knowledge of the risks.
It is therefore up to these parties to reconcile their differences, although it's not entirely sure if successive SoS' actually realise these staffs think the regs are a load of waz. As all this is known to the Review, it can only be hoped their report will be robust enough to spell it out to SoS. We'll see.
However, most of these issues HAVE been investigated independently and are the subject of a series of highly critical reports, e.g from PAC, HCDC, NAO, IA. The last, which got right to the very heart of how one goes about complying with JSP553 Ch.5 (maintaining airworthiness in service) was dismissed by the Chinook 2 Star as "of no concern to MoD(PE)". 19 recommendations, none implemented 13 years later. I can't make that any clearer.
So, I am not alleging anything, merely giving readers the benefit of the MoD's own statements. The moment they retract any one of these, I'll let you know. But please don't hold your breath.
Hope this makes my position clear. I do appreciate some of it may have been hard to believe a few years ago, but a succession of damning BoI reports and Coroners' verdicts, saying PRECISELY the same thing, must surely persuade even the most hardened MoD supporter that something is badly wrong.
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Arkroyal
I was quoting the BOI which consisted of a Wg Cdr and a Sqn Ldr who were both experienced Chinook Pilots, and an Engineer Officer experienced on the Chinook. Apart from the Board members the Stn Cdr Odiham (himself a Chinook pilot I believe) also commented prior to the BOI reaching HQ 1Gp. It was the Stn Cdr Odiham who first found negligence in respect of the conduct of the flight. The Stn Cdr Aldergrove commented on only those matters which fell under his juristiction.
The Aircrew members of the BOI were quite specific - the forecast weather would have permitted a climb to Safety Altitude in the vicinity of the Mull. It would not have permitted a medium level transit across the Highlands en route to Fort George.
When, however, the pilots changed the waypoint from A to B they were already too late to conduct a cruise climb to Safety Altitude. They were also too late even to conduct an emergency climb to Safety Altitude.
Trust you are keeping well.
I was quoting the BOI which consisted of a Wg Cdr and a Sqn Ldr who were both experienced Chinook Pilots, and an Engineer Officer experienced on the Chinook. Apart from the Board members the Stn Cdr Odiham (himself a Chinook pilot I believe) also commented prior to the BOI reaching HQ 1Gp. It was the Stn Cdr Odiham who first found negligence in respect of the conduct of the flight. The Stn Cdr Aldergrove commented on only those matters which fell under his juristiction.
The Aircrew members of the BOI were quite specific - the forecast weather would have permitted a climb to Safety Altitude in the vicinity of the Mull. It would not have permitted a medium level transit across the Highlands en route to Fort George.
When, however, the pilots changed the waypoint from A to B they were already too late to conduct a cruise climb to Safety Altitude. They were also too late even to conduct an emergency climb to Safety Altitude.
Trust you are keeping well.
Olive, the art of perpetually asking questions, rejecting the answers but then demanding your questions be answered is an art form developed here by caz and JP to heights that you cannot hope to match. Rather I urge you to read carefully the post above by tucumseh. Therein lies the ultimate answer to the question that underlines this thread, which is "what happened?". That post tells us what happened, a tragedy that the ancient Greeks would have recognised, the descent of a once renowned Flight Safety system into depths that make the latest revelations of MPs greed appear as nothing more than a minor domestic tiff about pocket money. Sooner or later caz will have his investigation, whether he wishes or no. For the sake of avoiding future avoidable accidents let us hope it be sooner.
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Olive Oil
Keep pressing – it would be a rare thing to get a straightforward answer to a specific relevant question on this thread.
Cazatou
<<The BOI calculated that "it would have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided the ground, whilst remaining on track, from any point beyond the position of the WP change until 4 seconds prior to impact, if the crew had initiated a cyclic climb." >>
This is an interesting point – just to be clear, a cyclic climb is just pulling back on the cyclic, isn't it? - no thrust lever? I believe that I have mentioned this some time ago, that the power setting as found may have been consistent with the slowing down as calculated by Boeing – and that, if their problem was misjudging their distance to go to that LZ with the intention of landing, then the power setting may have been at a minimum to hold altitude while the speed washed off in that approach – thus there would have been no excess thrust to climb with. Therefore the BOI calculation was wrong.
In the normally agile Chinook, in this case with heaps of power available (with their payload) provided there was time for both engines to spool up, the worst time to need to pull up in a sudden emergency is when you are coasting with the thrust equal to the weight while your speed washes off – you havn't got that component of thrust that was maintaining your speed by overcoming drag to crank upwards in a cyclic climb – you have to pull up on the thrust lever and await the FADEC and turbine lags – any change to the cyclic in that situation without increasing the thrust must result in a loss of altitude.
Had they not been slowing down in an approach to that LZ – had they been maintaining their high cruise speed – they would indeed have been able to pull up suddenly – rapidly gaining significant height - by a cyclic climb.
So summarising briefly, in a high speed approach, to land nicely you need to know your range to go accurately – at the LZ on the Mull, with no room to overshoot, it would have been critical. If you were somehow misled as to your range by so much that you were still in your low power phase washing your high speed off when you realised the error and needed to pull up you would be stuffed – and they were.
Keep pressing – it would be a rare thing to get a straightforward answer to a specific relevant question on this thread.
Cazatou
<<The BOI calculated that "it would have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided the ground, whilst remaining on track, from any point beyond the position of the WP change until 4 seconds prior to impact, if the crew had initiated a cyclic climb." >>
This is an interesting point – just to be clear, a cyclic climb is just pulling back on the cyclic, isn't it? - no thrust lever? I believe that I have mentioned this some time ago, that the power setting as found may have been consistent with the slowing down as calculated by Boeing – and that, if their problem was misjudging their distance to go to that LZ with the intention of landing, then the power setting may have been at a minimum to hold altitude while the speed washed off in that approach – thus there would have been no excess thrust to climb with. Therefore the BOI calculation was wrong.
In the normally agile Chinook, in this case with heaps of power available (with their payload) provided there was time for both engines to spool up, the worst time to need to pull up in a sudden emergency is when you are coasting with the thrust equal to the weight while your speed washes off – you havn't got that component of thrust that was maintaining your speed by overcoming drag to crank upwards in a cyclic climb – you have to pull up on the thrust lever and await the FADEC and turbine lags – any change to the cyclic in that situation without increasing the thrust must result in a loss of altitude.
Had they not been slowing down in an approach to that LZ – had they been maintaining their high cruise speed – they would indeed have been able to pull up suddenly – rapidly gaining significant height - by a cyclic climb.
So summarising briefly, in a high speed approach, to land nicely you need to know your range to go accurately – at the LZ on the Mull, with no room to overshoot, it would have been critical. If you were somehow misled as to your range by so much that you were still in your low power phase washing your high speed off when you realised the error and needed to pull up you would be stuffed – and they were.
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Red Herring Alert!!
An SF crew was a normal crew who are trained and cleared to do more difficult tasks. If a task is routine, then so are the crew. They couldn't fly at medium level VFR because the cloud was too low. Thats not speculation, thats an answer.
An SF crew was a normal crew who are trained and cleared to do more difficult tasks. If a task is routine, then so are the crew. They couldn't fly at medium level VFR because the cloud was too low. Thats not speculation, thats an answer.
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Caz,
You keep banging on about the fact that the BOI with two experienced Chinook pilots concluded that the "forecast" in the Mull area would have allowed a "safe" climb to SALT. The critical word is "forecast". From your own experience, you know that "forecast" and "actual" often bear little relationship to each other. Like you, the BOI are speculating the "most likely" conditions of the time. Opinion of "actual" conditions vary between those at the lighthouse and Mr Holbrook on his boat. Whether or not the crew could have executed a "safe" climb to SALT is pure speculation.
You keep banging on about the fact that the BOI with two experienced Chinook pilots concluded that the "forecast" in the Mull area would have allowed a "safe" climb to SALT. The critical word is "forecast". From your own experience, you know that "forecast" and "actual" often bear little relationship to each other. Like you, the BOI are speculating the "most likely" conditions of the time. Opinion of "actual" conditions vary between those at the lighthouse and Mr Holbrook on his boat. Whether or not the crew could have executed a "safe" climb to SALT is pure speculation.
Olive
I don't have the answer to your question. However, could I ask what your agenda / gripe is with SF? The reason I ask is that you posed a similar question on the recent Herc thread (now locked). Now it may just be me adding 2 and 2 to get 5 (I am a fully paid up member of SODCAT after all!) but are you trying to infer that the only reason the Chinook (and the Herc for that matter) was at low level was because it was planned and/or flown by an SF crew? If your answer is no could you enlighten me on your agenda / thoughts behind the question?
I don't have the answer to your question. However, could I ask what your agenda / gripe is with SF? The reason I ask is that you posed a similar question on the recent Herc thread (now locked). Now it may just be me adding 2 and 2 to get 5 (I am a fully paid up member of SODCAT after all!) but are you trying to infer that the only reason the Chinook (and the Herc for that matter) was at low level was because it was planned and/or flown by an SF crew? If your answer is no could you enlighten me on your agenda / thoughts behind the question?
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The Mull
dalek,
The term "safe" in the BOI's finding was in respect of the icing clearance - not the visibility/turbulence/down draughts or the prospect of a lightning strike.
It is the contention of some contributors to this thread that icing limitations would have precluded a climb to Safety Altitude - the BOI addressed that specific issue and concluded that such a course of action was feasible and within the published limitations.
The Gentleman in the boat testified on oath to the BOI that his position when he saw the Chinook he was "2NM SW of the Mull and the visibility was 1 NM limited by haze." He subsequently stated to the FAI that when the Chinook came into view he was manouvering around a fishing fleet and he could "see the North Antrim Coast so the visibility was around 5 - 7 miles". You can research for yourself the variation he gave to the House of Lords.
The Yachtsman was referred to as "the lone yachtsman" by the BOI because that was the evidence he gave. At the FAI he referred to "calling to his cabin boy to come and see the helicopter that has been sent to rescue us." At the HOL investigation the "cabin boy" had become an "Adult Male Sailing Companion ".
There are several discrepancies in the evidence that he gave at various stages of the inquiries; regrettably he has not been asked to give a definitive version of events. I do not think it is fitting to discuss them in this forum because of the possible ramifications regarding the fact that the Yachtsman's version of the weather is preferred by campaigners over the observations of the 2 qualified Met Observers stationed at the Mull.
It is, perhaps, fitting to remind you that ZD 576 crashed some 100 metres from two Gentlemen who were searching for WW2 aircraft crash sites. They heard the aircraft and the crash but saw nothing. They were the first to stumble upon that scene of carnage - yet their evidence is discounted by campaigners.
The term "safe" in the BOI's finding was in respect of the icing clearance - not the visibility/turbulence/down draughts or the prospect of a lightning strike.
It is the contention of some contributors to this thread that icing limitations would have precluded a climb to Safety Altitude - the BOI addressed that specific issue and concluded that such a course of action was feasible and within the published limitations.
The Gentleman in the boat testified on oath to the BOI that his position when he saw the Chinook he was "2NM SW of the Mull and the visibility was 1 NM limited by haze." He subsequently stated to the FAI that when the Chinook came into view he was manouvering around a fishing fleet and he could "see the North Antrim Coast so the visibility was around 5 - 7 miles". You can research for yourself the variation he gave to the House of Lords.
The Yachtsman was referred to as "the lone yachtsman" by the BOI because that was the evidence he gave. At the FAI he referred to "calling to his cabin boy to come and see the helicopter that has been sent to rescue us." At the HOL investigation the "cabin boy" had become an "Adult Male Sailing Companion ".
There are several discrepancies in the evidence that he gave at various stages of the inquiries; regrettably he has not been asked to give a definitive version of events. I do not think it is fitting to discuss them in this forum because of the possible ramifications regarding the fact that the Yachtsman's version of the weather is preferred by campaigners over the observations of the 2 qualified Met Observers stationed at the Mull.
It is, perhaps, fitting to remind you that ZD 576 crashed some 100 metres from two Gentlemen who were searching for WW2 aircraft crash sites. They heard the aircraft and the crash but saw nothing. They were the first to stumble upon that scene of carnage - yet their evidence is discounted by campaigners.
Last edited by cazatou; 16th May 2009 at 21:37.
Olive Oil:
Well it was designed to help the thread rather than you personally, Olive. I was trying to point out that asking specific questions without setting them within a dialogue or context rather implies an agenda that you do not wish to share, which is indeed the point of Wrathmonk's post I suspect. We already have those who post here regularly well versed in this tiresome practice, the prospect of yet another does not bode well for a structured dialogue, or is that the point? In short if you have something to say then please say it. In the meantime thank you for your posts but I don't see how they help!
Thanks for your reply but I don't see how it helps.
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Caz,
The Boards conclusions were based on a weather "forecast". What exactly the crew encountered will never be known. With a "forecast" iceing level of around 3000 ft, actual iceing can occur anywhere from the surface to infinity or never.
The Board "speculated", "best guessed", call it what you like.
You and I both know, that what you are forecast to get at a particular time and place and what you "actually" ( that word again) encounter are rarely the same. The only people who knew the conditons at the time and place where a climb (probably?) should have taken place can no longer tell us.
The Boards conclusions were based on a weather "forecast". What exactly the crew encountered will never be known. With a "forecast" iceing level of around 3000 ft, actual iceing can occur anywhere from the surface to infinity or never.
The Board "speculated", "best guessed", call it what you like.
You and I both know, that what you are forecast to get at a particular time and place and what you "actually" ( that word again) encounter are rarely the same. The only people who knew the conditons at the time and place where a climb (probably?) should have taken place can no longer tell us.
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dalek,
It was my eldest son's 14th birthday - but I saw very little of him that evening because, as I walked in the door at the end of a 12 hr day, the phone began to ring. I got to bed at about 0200 and left home again at 0600 so that I could ensure that the programme that I had revised actually happened.
The only reason that I am relating this is that I know what the responses were to the tragedy; and what the reorganisation of a large percentage of the Comms Fleet assets entailed.
There was also, of course, a knock-on effect in respect of other tasks - but I have no specific knowledge of what that entailed.
PS. I never did get re-imbursed for all the phone calls I made that evening!!!
PPS. It is refreshing to see that you admit that you have NO idea what the weather conditions were that evening. The BOI were, of course, lucky enough to have approx a dozen "eye" witnesses as to the actual events that evening - including one who was approx 100 metres from the impact point. In addition, one should never forget that the 2 Lighthouse Keepers were qualified Met Observers - a requirement of the job!!
It was my eldest son's 14th birthday - but I saw very little of him that evening because, as I walked in the door at the end of a 12 hr day, the phone began to ring. I got to bed at about 0200 and left home again at 0600 so that I could ensure that the programme that I had revised actually happened.
The only reason that I am relating this is that I know what the responses were to the tragedy; and what the reorganisation of a large percentage of the Comms Fleet assets entailed.
There was also, of course, a knock-on effect in respect of other tasks - but I have no specific knowledge of what that entailed.
PS. I never did get re-imbursed for all the phone calls I made that evening!!!
PPS. It is refreshing to see that you admit that you have NO idea what the weather conditions were that evening. The BOI were, of course, lucky enough to have approx a dozen "eye" witnesses as to the actual events that evening - including one who was approx 100 metres from the impact point. In addition, one should never forget that the 2 Lighthouse Keepers were qualified Met Observers - a requirement of the job!!
Last edited by cazatou; 16th May 2009 at 19:40.
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dalek
There was remarkable unanimity in the evidence regarding the weather given by the nine eyewitnesses (2 of whom were qualified Met Observers) who were on the Mull at the time of the crash and gave evidence to the BOI. The Yachtsman was not aware of the crash until some hours later. It should be remembered that his evidence to the BOI was that his position, when he saw the Chinook, was 2 NM SW of the Mull and the visibility was "1NM limited by haze".
Mr Ellacott estimated he was no more than "100 yards" from the crash site and he stated "Visibility at this time was only about nine or ten feet maximum."
There was remarkable unanimity in the evidence regarding the weather given by the nine eyewitnesses (2 of whom were qualified Met Observers) who were on the Mull at the time of the crash and gave evidence to the BOI. The Yachtsman was not aware of the crash until some hours later. It should be remembered that his evidence to the BOI was that his position, when he saw the Chinook, was 2 NM SW of the Mull and the visibility was "1NM limited by haze".
Mr Ellacott estimated he was no more than "100 yards" from the crash site and he stated "Visibility at this time was only about nine or ten feet maximum."
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Caz,
Last entry by me on this particular subject. It is becoming, like the breakfast issue, a bit of a red herring.
I accept that within 100 metres of the crash site there were witnesses who were in fog. No met observer qualifications needed for that.
What I don't know, is what the conditions were like, around and just above the aircraft at the optimum pull up point. This would be a considerable distance away from the impact point.
You know just as well as I do that in fog, you can have excellent flying conditions within metres of you.
Last entry by me on this particular subject. It is becoming, like the breakfast issue, a bit of a red herring.
I accept that within 100 metres of the crash site there were witnesses who were in fog. No met observer qualifications needed for that.
What I don't know, is what the conditions were like, around and just above the aircraft at the optimum pull up point. This would be a considerable distance away from the impact point.
You know just as well as I do that in fog, you can have excellent flying conditions within metres of you.
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dalek,
That question has been asked of Caz, JP etc etc and it's a question that simply cannot be answered as there is no one alive who knows the actual answer, plenty of speculation mind you but no definitive answer
That question has been asked of Caz, JP etc etc and it's a question that simply cannot be answered as there is no one alive who knows the actual answer, plenty of speculation mind you but no definitive answer