Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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JP,
As Brian says surely, now that you are admitting that as, your words Sir and not mine "there are only two possibilities as regards the forward view from the cockpit" then the fact that there are, again as YOU state two possibilities here surely the criteria of "there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever" is simply not satisfied.
Or are you now telling us that despite your obvious and freely stated uncertainty, unless of course you are now going to change tack and state for us clearly and categorically what they did see, that in spite of your confusion the verdict of "there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever" is right and proper.
As Brian says surely, now that you are admitting that as, your words Sir and not mine "there are only two possibilities as regards the forward view from the cockpit" then the fact that there are, again as YOU state two possibilities here surely the criteria of "there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever" is simply not satisfied.
Or are you now telling us that despite your obvious and freely stated uncertainty, unless of course you are now going to change tack and state for us clearly and categorically what they did see, that in spite of your confusion the verdict of "there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever" is right and proper.
seldom,
I think you need to go back a couple of years to understand why you cannot resolve your differences with JP in the way you are trying to.
JP has stated publicly that he agrees with Wratten that the Chinook crew were being grossly negligent BEFORE they entered IMC, ie. at waypoint change. Wratten and JP believe that they were going too fast approaching the cloud covered hills of the Mull.
We know that the crash site was obscured by cloud. Do we know, with no doubt whatsoever, how much of the high ground was obscured? No!
Do we know, with no doubt whatsoever, that they were going too fast? No!
To maintain his position, JP should provide evidence which removes ANY doubt on both of those questions.
I think you need to go back a couple of years to understand why you cannot resolve your differences with JP in the way you are trying to.
JP has stated publicly that he agrees with Wratten that the Chinook crew were being grossly negligent BEFORE they entered IMC, ie. at waypoint change. Wratten and JP believe that they were going too fast approaching the cloud covered hills of the Mull.
We know that the crash site was obscured by cloud. Do we know, with no doubt whatsoever, how much of the high ground was obscured? No!
Do we know, with no doubt whatsoever, that they were going too fast? No!
To maintain his position, JP should provide evidence which removes ANY doubt on both of those questions.
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Pulse,
In one guise or another I have been in the thick of this thread for quite a few years now and fully understand JP's mindset. The problem for me is that on every occasion I ask him a direct question he slips and slides and simply refuses to answer and I fully expect more of the same.
He freely admits that there are at least 2 possibilities with regards to the weather but if you ask him which one is correct he cannot answer because again he does not actually know, something he has already freely admitted.
I have asked him directly if the fact that the weather at the waypoint, on the subsequent leg and at the crash site is not actually known then surely that casts enough doubt on the verdict in this case but he again refuses to reply.
His assertion, as you point out is that the crews gross negligence was committed at the waypoint turn but if he cannot even tell us what the weather was at that point how on earth can he reach that conclusion.
There is doubt about the weather, which he himself has admitted, which in turn means the very exact conditions of the verdict have not been met and it should be overturned and justice will then be done.
In one guise or another I have been in the thick of this thread for quite a few years now and fully understand JP's mindset. The problem for me is that on every occasion I ask him a direct question he slips and slides and simply refuses to answer and I fully expect more of the same.
He freely admits that there are at least 2 possibilities with regards to the weather but if you ask him which one is correct he cannot answer because again he does not actually know, something he has already freely admitted.
I have asked him directly if the fact that the weather at the waypoint, on the subsequent leg and at the crash site is not actually known then surely that casts enough doubt on the verdict in this case but he again refuses to reply.
His assertion, as you point out is that the crews gross negligence was committed at the waypoint turn but if he cannot even tell us what the weather was at that point how on earth can he reach that conclusion.
There is doubt about the weather, which he himself has admitted, which in turn means the very exact conditions of the verdict have not been met and it should be overturned and justice will then be done.
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JP,
The only deja vu here is that you Sir, are yet again unwilling to answer the very simple question I have asked, so I will ask it again.
If you are uncertain of the weather at the turning point, the inbound leg and at the point of impact how then can the verdict of no doubt what so ever be correct?
The only deja vu here is that you Sir, are yet again unwilling to answer the very simple question I have asked, so I will ask it again.
If you are uncertain of the weather at the turning point, the inbound leg and at the point of impact how then can the verdict of no doubt what so ever be correct?
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The weather again – a factor we can have reasonable certainty about.
You can go up there yourself and get familiar with the local weather phenomena on the Mull at this time of year (much of what passes as summer) – and then consider eye witness reports that were in a position to know (as opposed to people standing in the cloud).
Why not take a trip up there for the anniversary?
First check the long range weather forecast to make sure you are going to experience the common southerly wind on the Mull.
Visit the crash site in the morning while it is clear: see the green triangle landing area (if you walk to the edge with your GPS you can see just how close in way point A was);
notice that a moderate turn to the north gives a wide path between the masts and the high ground in case of wave off.
Get a bunch of you together and charter a boat (fishing trip like) for the afternoon until, say, 7pm – have a GPS with you or make sure the boat has a nice daylight viewing radar that you can gather around so you can have a little competition for judging how far you are off the coast at. say, 1, ˝, and Ľ miles off.
Hang around the position where the way point was changed in the SuperTANS – get a feel for how close in it was.
Now wait for the day to cool down and have your cameras ready – as the afternoon goes to early evening, you should start to notice a fine haze developing on the lower slopes running up along the slope – you can still see the “ground” but the effect is subtle – small detail and texture is lost such that even in this state it becomes hard to judge distance accurately unless you can see a familiar object (eg light house) clearly.
As time goes by, the layer of ground hugging mist starts lower and thickens further up the slope until it merges with the developing orographic cloud.
Note that in your boat you are in the clear even very close in – but keep chugging back to the position of way point change – keep up the range guessing game.
On a typical summer evening with a southerly blowing this is a very common local condition – but how do we know this was as it was at the time of the crash with reasonable certainty? - who were the witnesses?
WITNESSES:
The Procurator Fiscal was the man who called the FAI; he is a local and attended the crash site as soon as was possible and spent much time there that evening with a critical eye; he described to me that there were sufficient gaps in the mist, when you walked just below the crash site so that you were out of the solid orographic cloud, that bright sunlight got through and you could see that the mist was a layer following the slope; he asked that the attending helicopter, when it was landing at the crash site, land further down as it was disturbing evidence with its wash.
There were two helicopters I know of that were operating on and around the Mull for much of that day: one pilot described the mist to me as that it was very much on the land as opposed to out at sea at all – when on the shoreline, it was clear for miles out to sea but clag on the land; the other pilot of interest, who flew the attending Sea King, was not called to the BOI.
There were several fishing vessels in the area of interest – the Chief Inspector, a local, who was in charge of the crash site told me that it was often the case and that most of them were probably Irish – they would have had local knowledge of the usual conditions and should have been able to comment on the conditions on that particular day; as far as I know, none were asked but much has been made of the account of the amateur yachtsman who had to sail around this little fleet – he described it as being clear up to the coast and up to the base of the light house wall.
.
So I am saying that if you are at the position of way point change, in the conditions that seem with reasonable certainty to have been prevailing that day, whether at sea level in your boat or at say 500ft (but below the base of the orographic cloud) you would be in the clear.
However, it would be very difficult to judge your range off the coast visually, especially approaching at speed.
This bit should be of relevance to what JP has been on about:
However close in they were at the position of way point change (and this was very close), they would not have been breaking VFR as nothing would have been coming out of the mist, it being right on the landmass – on the see and be seen principal, whatever their speed, it was clear in all directions apart from that of the landmass and no other a/c would have been coming from that direction – also for completion, they could legitimately be actually under the orographic cloud (about 800ft at the time) as nothing should have been descending through it.
I hope that the perspective I have presented here will stop the slur that pilots of their calibre would have been bumbling about in IMC so close to the landmass.
.
Going back to the boat trip – at about 6pm at the position of way point change look towards the coast and do the range game – imagine if your GPS or Radar or some other device was telling you that you were ˝ mile further out than you were – even standing in the open on the deck at slow speed with all the time in the world, would you be able to disagree confidently with that? - imagine at 140ish kts looking through perspex concentrating on an instrument.
But you would know that you were close such that with any kind of emergency you would surely do anything to avoid heading that way at speed or without climbing urgently – how many controls would have to have jambed to have prevented emergency evasive action of some kind? - and that let them initiate a suitable emergency manoeuvre at the last moment before impact presumably as they entered the mist?
At the position of way point change they turned right (onto 035 mag).
Boeing's analysis (dist/time calcs) had it that they very much continued straight in to the crash area after this turn and this was reinforced by the AAIB report on the accuracy of the Doppler part of the navigation system (they had not been weaving about as the accuracy of the Doppler as determined was dependent upon a steady heading).
I have made the case in previous posts that this turn was deliberate (HP's HSI setting).
Rather than powering up to get over the low hill that is the Mull, they had started to slow down (Boeing – airspeed down 20ish but masked by increase in tail wind component as they crossed the shoreline) and the matched state of the engines' powers suggests that this was a controlled state.
With the HP's baro alt set for landing at the elevation of that “green triangle” landing area that way point A was the obvious inner marker for and that a RADALT warning was at min consistent with an imminent landing in marginal conditions and that the landing area had been used before by Chinooks (the Procurator Fiscal thought they must have been going to land there – Flt Lt Tapper had done so himself on previous occassions) it would be reasonably to contemplate that they had an intention to land or closely pass there – for whatever reason.
.
However, back to standing on that boat at the position of way point change – you must ask yourselves the question “would I turn here at their speed towards that mess without some accurate point reference?” - I think not.
They had discarded way point A from the SuperTANS at this position – it was still ahead and would have been invaluable – so what the hell were they referring to?
.
Doing this trip and exercise for yourselves would not take much time nor money and you would get a feel for the circumstances that cannot be got by reading – at the very least, it is a nice area to visit and you can pay your respects at the memorial.
Compare this suggested boat exercise with the flight arranged for those involved in one of the inquiries when the weather was clear – which would have been more relevant?
If you are rich you could also do this exercise in a light a/c in the same conditions as I have described as prevalent at the time – don't forget a camera for our benefit!
You can go up there yourself and get familiar with the local weather phenomena on the Mull at this time of year (much of what passes as summer) – and then consider eye witness reports that were in a position to know (as opposed to people standing in the cloud).
Why not take a trip up there for the anniversary?
First check the long range weather forecast to make sure you are going to experience the common southerly wind on the Mull.
Visit the crash site in the morning while it is clear: see the green triangle landing area (if you walk to the edge with your GPS you can see just how close in way point A was);
notice that a moderate turn to the north gives a wide path between the masts and the high ground in case of wave off.
Get a bunch of you together and charter a boat (fishing trip like) for the afternoon until, say, 7pm – have a GPS with you or make sure the boat has a nice daylight viewing radar that you can gather around so you can have a little competition for judging how far you are off the coast at. say, 1, ˝, and Ľ miles off.
Hang around the position where the way point was changed in the SuperTANS – get a feel for how close in it was.
Now wait for the day to cool down and have your cameras ready – as the afternoon goes to early evening, you should start to notice a fine haze developing on the lower slopes running up along the slope – you can still see the “ground” but the effect is subtle – small detail and texture is lost such that even in this state it becomes hard to judge distance accurately unless you can see a familiar object (eg light house) clearly.
As time goes by, the layer of ground hugging mist starts lower and thickens further up the slope until it merges with the developing orographic cloud.
Note that in your boat you are in the clear even very close in – but keep chugging back to the position of way point change – keep up the range guessing game.
On a typical summer evening with a southerly blowing this is a very common local condition – but how do we know this was as it was at the time of the crash with reasonable certainty? - who were the witnesses?
WITNESSES:
The Procurator Fiscal was the man who called the FAI; he is a local and attended the crash site as soon as was possible and spent much time there that evening with a critical eye; he described to me that there were sufficient gaps in the mist, when you walked just below the crash site so that you were out of the solid orographic cloud, that bright sunlight got through and you could see that the mist was a layer following the slope; he asked that the attending helicopter, when it was landing at the crash site, land further down as it was disturbing evidence with its wash.
There were two helicopters I know of that were operating on and around the Mull for much of that day: one pilot described the mist to me as that it was very much on the land as opposed to out at sea at all – when on the shoreline, it was clear for miles out to sea but clag on the land; the other pilot of interest, who flew the attending Sea King, was not called to the BOI.
There were several fishing vessels in the area of interest – the Chief Inspector, a local, who was in charge of the crash site told me that it was often the case and that most of them were probably Irish – they would have had local knowledge of the usual conditions and should have been able to comment on the conditions on that particular day; as far as I know, none were asked but much has been made of the account of the amateur yachtsman who had to sail around this little fleet – he described it as being clear up to the coast and up to the base of the light house wall.
.
So I am saying that if you are at the position of way point change, in the conditions that seem with reasonable certainty to have been prevailing that day, whether at sea level in your boat or at say 500ft (but below the base of the orographic cloud) you would be in the clear.
However, it would be very difficult to judge your range off the coast visually, especially approaching at speed.
This bit should be of relevance to what JP has been on about:
However close in they were at the position of way point change (and this was very close), they would not have been breaking VFR as nothing would have been coming out of the mist, it being right on the landmass – on the see and be seen principal, whatever their speed, it was clear in all directions apart from that of the landmass and no other a/c would have been coming from that direction – also for completion, they could legitimately be actually under the orographic cloud (about 800ft at the time) as nothing should have been descending through it.
I hope that the perspective I have presented here will stop the slur that pilots of their calibre would have been bumbling about in IMC so close to the landmass.
.
Going back to the boat trip – at about 6pm at the position of way point change look towards the coast and do the range game – imagine if your GPS or Radar or some other device was telling you that you were ˝ mile further out than you were – even standing in the open on the deck at slow speed with all the time in the world, would you be able to disagree confidently with that? - imagine at 140ish kts looking through perspex concentrating on an instrument.
But you would know that you were close such that with any kind of emergency you would surely do anything to avoid heading that way at speed or without climbing urgently – how many controls would have to have jambed to have prevented emergency evasive action of some kind? - and that let them initiate a suitable emergency manoeuvre at the last moment before impact presumably as they entered the mist?
At the position of way point change they turned right (onto 035 mag).
Boeing's analysis (dist/time calcs) had it that they very much continued straight in to the crash area after this turn and this was reinforced by the AAIB report on the accuracy of the Doppler part of the navigation system (they had not been weaving about as the accuracy of the Doppler as determined was dependent upon a steady heading).
I have made the case in previous posts that this turn was deliberate (HP's HSI setting).
Rather than powering up to get over the low hill that is the Mull, they had started to slow down (Boeing – airspeed down 20ish but masked by increase in tail wind component as they crossed the shoreline) and the matched state of the engines' powers suggests that this was a controlled state.
With the HP's baro alt set for landing at the elevation of that “green triangle” landing area that way point A was the obvious inner marker for and that a RADALT warning was at min consistent with an imminent landing in marginal conditions and that the landing area had been used before by Chinooks (the Procurator Fiscal thought they must have been going to land there – Flt Lt Tapper had done so himself on previous occassions) it would be reasonably to contemplate that they had an intention to land or closely pass there – for whatever reason.
.
However, back to standing on that boat at the position of way point change – you must ask yourselves the question “would I turn here at their speed towards that mess without some accurate point reference?” - I think not.
They had discarded way point A from the SuperTANS at this position – it was still ahead and would have been invaluable – so what the hell were they referring to?
.
Doing this trip and exercise for yourselves would not take much time nor money and you would get a feel for the circumstances that cannot be got by reading – at the very least, it is a nice area to visit and you can pay your respects at the memorial.
Compare this suggested boat exercise with the flight arranged for those involved in one of the inquiries when the weather was clear – which would have been more relevant?
If you are rich you could also do this exercise in a light a/c in the same conditions as I have described as prevalent at the time – don't forget a camera for our benefit!
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Walter
The information from the PRC112 is displayed on a small display on the lower right section of the left hand seat pilots instrument panel, he gives a running commentary to the right hand (handling) pilot who can then remain eyes out.
The information from the PRC112 is displayed on a small display on the lower right section of the left hand seat pilots instrument panel, he gives a running commentary to the right hand (handling) pilot who can then remain eyes out.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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In Memorium
Flt Lt JONATHAN P.TAPPER.
Flt Lt RICHARD D.COOK.
MALM GRAHAM W.FORBES.
Sgt KEVIN A.HARDIE.
Asst Chief Constable: BRIAN FITZSIMONS.
Det Chief Superintendant: DESMOND CONROY.
Det Chief Superintendant: MAURICE REILLY.
Det Superintendant: PHILLIP DAVIDSON.
Det Superintendant: ROBERT FOSTER.
Det Superintendant: BILLY GWILLIAM.
Det Superintendant: IAN PHOENIX.
Det Chief Inspector: DENIS BUNTING.
Det Inspector: STEPHEN DAVIDSON.
Det Inspector: KEVIN MAGEE.
JOHN DEVERILL.
Col. CHRISTOPHER BILES. OBE.
Lt Col. RICHARD GREGORY-SMITH.
Lt Col. JOHN TOBIAS.
Lt Col. GEORGE WILLIAMS.
Maj CHRISTOPHER J.DOCHERTY.
Maj ANTHONY HORNBY.
Maj GARY SPARKS.
Maj RICHARD ALLEN.
Maj ROY PUGH.
ANNE JAMES.
MARTIN DALTON.
JOHN HAYNES.
MICHAEL MALTBY.
STEPHEN RICKARD.
RIP
14 years ago today.
Not forgotten.
Flt Lt JONATHAN P.TAPPER.
Flt Lt RICHARD D.COOK.
MALM GRAHAM W.FORBES.
Sgt KEVIN A.HARDIE.
Asst Chief Constable: BRIAN FITZSIMONS.
Det Chief Superintendant: DESMOND CONROY.
Det Chief Superintendant: MAURICE REILLY.
Det Superintendant: PHILLIP DAVIDSON.
Det Superintendant: ROBERT FOSTER.
Det Superintendant: BILLY GWILLIAM.
Det Superintendant: IAN PHOENIX.
Det Chief Inspector: DENIS BUNTING.
Det Inspector: STEPHEN DAVIDSON.
Det Inspector: KEVIN MAGEE.
JOHN DEVERILL.
Col. CHRISTOPHER BILES. OBE.
Lt Col. RICHARD GREGORY-SMITH.
Lt Col. JOHN TOBIAS.
Lt Col. GEORGE WILLIAMS.
Maj CHRISTOPHER J.DOCHERTY.
Maj ANTHONY HORNBY.
Maj GARY SPARKS.
Maj RICHARD ALLEN.
Maj ROY PUGH.
ANNE JAMES.
MARTIN DALTON.
JOHN HAYNES.
MICHAEL MALTBY.
STEPHEN RICKARD.
RIP
14 years ago today.
Not forgotten.
RIP
14 years ago today.
Not forgotten.
14 years ago today.
Not forgotten.
We will remember them.
Chug
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Walter Kennedy
Re your Post 3511 - compare your assertions with post 3516 from Tandemrotor.
20 years to the day before this tragedy I was instructing on the Refresher Flying Sqn at RAF Leeming - at least I would have been except we did not do any flying that day BECAUSE WE WERE TOO BUSY ENGAGED IN SNOW CLEARANCE.
The United Kingdom does not have a climate - IT HAS WEATHER!!
Re your Post 3511 - compare your assertions with post 3516 from Tandemrotor.
20 years to the day before this tragedy I was instructing on the Refresher Flying Sqn at RAF Leeming - at least I would have been except we did not do any flying that day BECAUSE WE WERE TOO BUSY ENGAGED IN SNOW CLEARANCE.
The United Kingdom does not have a climate - IT HAS WEATHER!!
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cazatou
You could have asked TR what was wind strength/dir and time of day of his flight – but you still wouldn't get it – the local weather on the Mull at the time of the crash was as expected given the forecast (with some local knowledge) as per the witnesses in the positions to know.
Are you saying that they were in IMC that close in or that they were in the clear but it was beyond their ability to do anything to avoid the low hill? - either way, you are not giving them much credit.
Why is it that you will not consider the case that the hazard was seen but because of the clag on it judgment of range to it was difficult?
Is it because this would infer that they could have easily avoided it unless they had a business to approach it closely?
You could have asked TR what was wind strength/dir and time of day of his flight – but you still wouldn't get it – the local weather on the Mull at the time of the crash was as expected given the forecast (with some local knowledge) as per the witnesses in the positions to know.
Are you saying that they were in IMC that close in or that they were in the clear but it was beyond their ability to do anything to avoid the low hill? - either way, you are not giving them much credit.
Why is it that you will not consider the case that the hazard was seen but because of the clag on it judgment of range to it was difficult?
Is it because this would infer that they could have easily avoided it unless they had a business to approach it closely?
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Having grown up on the Isle of Arran, and
a. Having handed over to the crew on that fatefull mission.
b. Understanding the weather in the area in side out.
c. Being on a chinook sqn at the time the mk2 was being brought into service.
d. Knowing the a/c servicability on arrival in theatre.
e. knowing what a prc112 is!!
I can only agree with Brian..
that no-one alive can say with absolute certainty what could be seen from the cockpit on that fateful day. Furthermore, no-one can say what discussions took place between the crew, what instruments were fiddled with, whether they intended to land somewhere else, whether there was a problem with the aircraft or anything else, for that matter.
You have offered two broad possibilities, and I have no problem with that. They are just that - possibilities.
What someone needs to discover - and I don't mind who, is what exactly took place on that flight. Only then can we all agree that the evidence supports a verdict with a burden of proof of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Nothing less will do.
Therefore, at this precise moment in time the only right and proper verdict should be cause not positively determined
and finally: I commend Brians post in Memorium.
We will not forget
bum, last time ever I bite or post here!
a. Having handed over to the crew on that fatefull mission.
b. Understanding the weather in the area in side out.
c. Being on a chinook sqn at the time the mk2 was being brought into service.
d. Knowing the a/c servicability on arrival in theatre.
e. knowing what a prc112 is!!
I can only agree with Brian..
that no-one alive can say with absolute certainty what could be seen from the cockpit on that fateful day. Furthermore, no-one can say what discussions took place between the crew, what instruments were fiddled with, whether they intended to land somewhere else, whether there was a problem with the aircraft or anything else, for that matter.
You have offered two broad possibilities, and I have no problem with that. They are just that - possibilities.
What someone needs to discover - and I don't mind who, is what exactly took place on that flight. Only then can we all agree that the evidence supports a verdict with a burden of proof of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
Nothing less will do.
Therefore, at this precise moment in time the only right and proper verdict should be cause not positively determined
and finally: I commend Brians post in Memorium.
We will not forget
bum, last time ever I bite or post here!
Last edited by Winch-control; 4th Jun 2008 at 15:55.
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Seven months ago - 6 Dec 07 - BBC Scotland posted a somewhat premature headline ‘Browne re-examines Chinook crash’. However, as we all know, nothing of note has materialized.
I was intrigued by a sentence BD posted earlier this year:
Clearly, 7 months later, the MOD has failed to realise the importance of the evidence presented to them. In any other ‘judicial’ review, this new information would have helped to accelerate the removal of the unsubstantiated Gross Negligence finding against Jon and Rich.
I struggle to see why the evidence submitted cannot now be placed on this Forum to be discussed? Surely we are way passed compromising this review by doing so.
AA
I was intrigued by a sentence BD posted earlier this year:
I think the only positive at the moment is that we haven't been given a 'No'. I'm sure we will have an answer as soon as the MoD realise the importance of the evidence presented to them.
I struggle to see why the evidence submitted cannot now be placed on this Forum to be discussed? Surely we are way passed compromising this review by doing so.
AA
Last edited by Sand4Gold; 6th Jun 2008 at 12:20.
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One of the innumerable who believe the finding against Flt Lts Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook was unjustified has sent us a photo he happened to have of ZD576 when it was a Mk1, before the mid-life update which included the Fadec. Thank you to Robin Crorie for the photo. And thanks to Brian Dixon (and PPRuNe) for doing so much to keep the campaign going.
http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/...if-unique.html
http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/...if-unique.html
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I hope this doesn't sound churlish, and thanks to Tony Collins and Robin Crorie, but the often used picture of Flt Lt Rick Cook, shows him standing in front of an 18 Sqn aircraft, 'BL', which I think is also ZD576 as a Mk 1.
Perhaps someone could confirm?
Perhaps someone could confirm?
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Ancient Aviator,
you make a very valid point, and draw attention to the fact that the MoD have had this latest report for 7 months. I share your frustration about the length of time it is taking, but the Campaign gave its word to Mr Browne that the document would not be released until he makes his decision. We stand by that commitment (despite me being the one that moans the loudest!).
I am aware that Mr Browne has had a gentle 'prod' to ask him to reach that conclusion in the near future. Rest assured, we will let everyone know what is going on as soon as we hear anything from the MoD.
Tony,
welcome to the thread, and thanks for your continued support and for all the work you do as well.
Tandemrotor,
I'm embarassed to say that I had never noticed before, but having just looked at a magnified version of the photo, I can confirm that it is, indeed, ZD576. Ironic
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
you make a very valid point, and draw attention to the fact that the MoD have had this latest report for 7 months. I share your frustration about the length of time it is taking, but the Campaign gave its word to Mr Browne that the document would not be released until he makes his decision. We stand by that commitment (despite me being the one that moans the loudest!).
I am aware that Mr Browne has had a gentle 'prod' to ask him to reach that conclusion in the near future. Rest assured, we will let everyone know what is going on as soon as we hear anything from the MoD.
Tony,
welcome to the thread, and thanks for your continued support and for all the work you do as well.
Tandemrotor,
I'm embarassed to say that I had never noticed before, but having just looked at a magnified version of the photo, I can confirm that it is, indeed, ZD576. Ironic
Regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Brian,
My recollection is that the MOD were given the report on 15 January 2008. Mr Browne has had it for 5 months by my reckoning. Somewhat less than the 2 years the campaign took to prepare it.
Regards
AC
My recollection is that the MOD were given the report on 15 January 2008. Mr Browne has had it for 5 months by my reckoning. Somewhat less than the 2 years the campaign took to prepare it.
Regards
AC
A really irritating PPRuNer
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And that's a fair point, AC.
That's why we are not pushing Mr Browne too hard. It's a fair sized document which contains a lot of information. Time will be needed to look at everything we have presented.
The 'gentle prod' was just to test the water to see if anyone was close to reaching a decision. We welcome proper examination of our submission by those we are asking to make the decisions.
Frustrating from my point of view, but also acceptable timescales as far as the evidence is concerned.
That said, I would welcome a decision in the near future!
Welcome to the thread, by the way.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
That's why we are not pushing Mr Browne too hard. It's a fair sized document which contains a lot of information. Time will be needed to look at everything we have presented.
The 'gentle prod' was just to test the water to see if anyone was close to reaching a decision. We welcome proper examination of our submission by those we are asking to make the decisions.
Frustrating from my point of view, but also acceptable timescales as far as the evidence is concerned.
That said, I would welcome a decision in the near future!
Welcome to the thread, by the way.
Kind regards,
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook