Nimrod MRA.4
Dervish
Hear! Hear!
There are too many people "wishing upon a star" on what might have been; the same type of rose bespectacled variety as those that dream on about TSR2 for many years to come.
I, for one, was glad when MRA4 was canx'd as, from what I heard within Air Cmd and DE&S, it had all the trappings of being another "widow maker"...
...quite simply, as others have put, we had not learned the lessons from earlier losses.
Chug
The only problem I can find with your argument is could anyone ever be truly independent? If you use an organisation it will have to be paid for - that way it can be corrupted. If it is provided for free then it can be corrupted between Govt Depts and politicing. If done for free, as a charity organisation then it probably won't be run as well as it should (unless it's a Trust and then they'll take home £70k a year and a free Vulcan T-Shirt
). So I would welcome your view on how to make it truly independant?
B Word
Hear! Hear!
There are too many people "wishing upon a star" on what might have been; the same type of rose bespectacled variety as those that dream on about TSR2 for many years to come.
I, for one, was glad when MRA4 was canx'd as, from what I heard within Air Cmd and DE&S, it had all the trappings of being another "widow maker"...
...quite simply, as others have put, we had not learned the lessons from earlier losses.
Chug
The only problem I can find with your argument is could anyone ever be truly independent? If you use an organisation it will have to be paid for - that way it can be corrupted. If it is provided for free then it can be corrupted between Govt Depts and politicing. If done for free, as a charity organisation then it probably won't be run as well as it should (unless it's a Trust and then they'll take home £70k a year and a free Vulcan T-Shirt
). So I would welcome your view on how to make it truly independant?B Word
B Word, I could waffle on with no end of blather, but in truth the only answer I can give is that I don't know. What I do know is that having Regulator, Operator, and Accident Investigator as one and the same is a recipe for disaster! You are right of course that the money has to be found, as it has to be for Civil Aviation. In that case:
Obviously in the case of Military Aviation that formula would be a direct contradiction, and Government funding would be needed. The only thing that occurs is that would at least be an improvement on MOD funding and hence control. Cleverer heads than mine must square that circle.
Speaking of the CAA, it also occurs that an MAA sistered with its civil counterpart, and an MAAIB likewise sistered with the AAIB could give access to professional regulating and investigating at a stroke. I doubt if either civilian organisation would welcome being involved with such a can of worms but this is truly national crisis and needs a national solution.
The first step in solving such a crisis is to recognise that it exists. That has to come from military aviation professionals, be they air or ground, military or civilian.
Too much time has been wasted by the turning of blind eyes. Lord Kitchener said it all, Your Country Needs You!
The UK Government requires that the CAA’s costs are met entirely from its charges on those whom it regulates. Unlike many other countries, there is no direct Government funding of the CAA’s work.
Speaking of the CAA, it also occurs that an MAA sistered with its civil counterpart, and an MAAIB likewise sistered with the AAIB could give access to professional regulating and investigating at a stroke. I doubt if either civilian organisation would welcome being involved with such a can of worms but this is truly national crisis and needs a national solution.
The first step in solving such a crisis is to recognise that it exists. That has to come from military aviation professionals, be they air or ground, military or civilian.
Too much time has been wasted by the turning of blind eyes. Lord Kitchener said it all, Your Country Needs You!
Chug
I think the CAA is a bad model to base it upon. As a Govt quango it comes with lots of issues, but as the civil airlines pays it an awful lot of money, the airlines get an awful lot of say on safety, regulation and airspace in this country. If you compare the number of G-reg civil aircraft to commercial aircraft you can see how this is skewed - surely safety, regulation and airspace should be dictated by the majority? Not in the CAA's case.
Looking at some of the smaller civil organisations that oversee airworthiness on behalf of the CAA - namely the British Gliding Assoc, Light Aircraft Assoc and the British Microlight Aircraft Assoc - you will see that true independent audit is not achieved either.
So is the MAA any worse? I don't know, but I doubt it...
I think the CAA is a bad model to base it upon. As a Govt quango it comes with lots of issues, but as the civil airlines pays it an awful lot of money, the airlines get an awful lot of say on safety, regulation and airspace in this country. If you compare the number of G-reg civil aircraft to commercial aircraft you can see how this is skewed - surely safety, regulation and airspace should be dictated by the majority? Not in the CAA's case.
Looking at some of the smaller civil organisations that oversee airworthiness on behalf of the CAA - namely the British Gliding Assoc, Light Aircraft Assoc and the British Microlight Aircraft Assoc - you will see that true independent audit is not achieved either.
So is the MAA any worse? I don't know, but I doubt it...
Last edited by The B Word; 11th Jun 2012 at 21:36.
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Have been reading all the failings in this and the one thing that comes to mind is a lack of a bulletproof contract so everyone knew what was expected and BAe would have been tied to producing an airworthy project or would have paid the price for not delivering what was required.
A friend that was involved in the failed Nimrod AWAC told me one of the major failings was an open contract and a major problem was the software would not fit on the computer hard drive so a fortune was sent compressing the data to fit, where the simple expedience of upgrading the computers and fitting larger drives would have solved the majority of the problems, but as there was no fixed costings involved there was no incentive for BAe to solve the problem. Whether that is correct or not, it would seem to be about right for the way the MOD goes about things.
The MR 4 also had problems when fitting computer designed wings on what were hand built airframes, the first set fitted, but the rest were way out, couple that with adding an engine that wasn't supposedly designed to operate down long intake ducts and you are then having to throw money at it. They would have probably been cheaper to build new fuselages to match the wings.
A friend that was involved in the failed Nimrod AWAC told me one of the major failings was an open contract and a major problem was the software would not fit on the computer hard drive so a fortune was sent compressing the data to fit, where the simple expedience of upgrading the computers and fitting larger drives would have solved the majority of the problems, but as there was no fixed costings involved there was no incentive for BAe to solve the problem. Whether that is correct or not, it would seem to be about right for the way the MOD goes about things.
The MR 4 also had problems when fitting computer designed wings on what were hand built airframes, the first set fitted, but the rest were way out, couple that with adding an engine that wasn't supposedly designed to operate down long intake ducts and you are then having to throw money at it. They would have probably been cheaper to build new fuselages to match the wings.
Last edited by NutLoose; 11th Jun 2012 at 22:13.
BWord, I'm not presenting the CAA, or for that matter any other organisation, as a model for the MAA. "My" MAA will be flawed, criticized, bureaucratic, etc, just as any other is. What it will not do, I earnestly hope, is to set about suborning its very own Airworthiness Regulations and then signimg them off as having been complied with. What it will not do, I earnestly hope, is to rid itself off its qualified and experienced engineers who cannot be thus suborned, and replace them with inexperienced and unqualified administrators and then giving them Airworthiness Authority, so that they may do the suborning required of them.
That is what the military airworthiness authority aka the MOD did, along with letting the Regulations whither on the vine, unamended, unpublished, and unlamented.
The Military Airworthiness Authority, that does not understand airworthiness, and has no real authority, cannot reverse all that as presently constituted. It has to be independent of the MOD that wrought all this damage, and seen to be so. After that it will be a daunting task to pick up the pieces of this massive slow motion train crash and slowly repair it. No doubt many interim special exemptions will have to be authorised to keep our military aircraft flying, but the sooner we start the sooner the task can be accomplished, and the sooner that airworthiness related accidents and deaths may be avoided. That is the purpose of an Airworthiness Authority, Civil or Military. High time it happened!
That is what the military airworthiness authority aka the MOD did, along with letting the Regulations whither on the vine, unamended, unpublished, and unlamented.
The Military Airworthiness Authority, that does not understand airworthiness, and has no real authority, cannot reverse all that as presently constituted. It has to be independent of the MOD that wrought all this damage, and seen to be so. After that it will be a daunting task to pick up the pieces of this massive slow motion train crash and slowly repair it. No doubt many interim special exemptions will have to be authorised to keep our military aircraft flying, but the sooner we start the sooner the task can be accomplished, and the sooner that airworthiness related accidents and deaths may be avoided. That is the purpose of an Airworthiness Authority, Civil or Military. High time it happened!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 12th Jun 2012 at 07:03.
Nutloose
You are absolutely correct. And it will come as no surprise there are mandated regulations which require such a milestone in a contract. You don’t let a £1Bn contract with a single payment. You have milestones. These milestones must be relevant and achievable. In aircraft programmes they are based on Configuration Milestones, primarily Design Reviews; which in turn are tied to the development of the Safety Case.
However, it would be wrong to have, for example, issuing the Release to Service as a milestone, as that is controlled by the MoD. There is nothing to stop the MoD agreeing all preceding milestones and then refusing to issue an RTS – which is effectively what happened with MRA4. A typical final milestone, or at least a late one tied to a large payment, is achieving Transfer to PDS, when the design comes Under Ministry Control. There is a comprehensive checklist laid down in the mandated Def Stan. If anyone involved in the support or operation of the aircraft (or equipment) studied this list, you’d be quite confident the product was (a) built to spec (b) fully supportable and (c) safe. There are variations on this theme, but the basic concept is sound.
Now the reality. Under the RAF Chief Engineer, PDS was rundown from 1991-onwards. As that is the process which maintains the Build Standard and Safety Case, and the latter MUST be based on a maintained former, the risk was obvious, predicted, notified and ignored. As there was to be no (Full) PDS, then the mandated regulation to achieve Transfer to PDS became meaningless. That is a significant reason why the Nimrod IPT had to let the ill-fated MR2 Safety Case task criticised by Haddon-Cave – because the Chief Engineer’s organisation (AMSO) had decreed them a waste of time and the MR2 work had lapsed. As an airworthy MR2 was a mandatory pre-requisite to a viable MRA4 programme, then it is (and was) obvious to even the most casual observer that the MRA4 programme was fatally compromised by the decision to ignore safety and, quite clearly, should never have passed scrutiny.
Ah, Scrutiny. The Chief Engineer’s immediate subordinate (DGSM) decreed that a sackable offence in December 1992, which explains almost all waste mentioned on here. In effect, the Nimrod IPT was playing catchy up when they let the Safety Case task. The fact they mismanaged it is another story, caused by lack of experience as few had been taught how to do it, due to the work being cancelled 10 years before. Let’s face it, if you’re told it is a sackable offence to do something, most tend to steer clear of it even if they know the work must be done. The real issue is why they had to let it in the first case – it should already have existed, without break, since the Nimrod was first contracted in the 60s. Yes, I know “Safety Cases” were only mandated in the early 90s, but in practice the work has always been done in industry.
Latterly, any attempt by an experienced programme manager to insert all this in a contract has been thwarted, with the clause being cancelled or waived by non-engineers as they see it as a waste of time. They don’t necessarily make a conscious decision that safety is a waste of time (although some do), but that is the effect because they have simply not been trained before acquiring the authority to waive safety, and are not required to be competent. Unscrupulous companies don’t say anything. The better companies actually complain, but are told to wind it in. Today, if you mentioned the above to 95% of staff in DE&S they’d completely topple. And no-one in the MAA is going to mention it, because they are not independent, most are light blue, and we see in the press and Ministerial announcements the influence those retired RAF officers still carry. You will never hear the MAA acknowledge any of the above. If they don’t, then how can they truly understand the scale and scope of their task?
Back to MRA4. The obvious question is – Who was meant to exercise “management oversight” of the above? Answer, for most of the MRA4 programme, is the MoD(PE)/DPA 2 Star, Director General Air Systems 2. What was his formal position on the above? That’s simple. Any programme manager seeking to implement these mandated regulations was subject to disciplinary action. This was issued in writing on at least 3 occasions. I have the letters. He was fully supported by his 4 Star, the Chief of Defence Procurement (who gets his airworthiness delegation direct from Secretary of State). Again, if the MAA would acknowledge these simple facts, they’d be far nearer a solution. But they waltz round it as to do so is a career killer. (Which is presumably far worse than an aircrew killer).
As ever, it isn’t the lack of process or procedure that went wrong, it is the implementation. MoD’s way round this? They cancelled the mandated Def Stan (above), so today there is nowhere to learn this stuff, yet it is as fundamental to an aspiring programme manager as being able to see is to a pilot. This is what allows the MAA to reinvent so many wheels, because the old wheels have been thrown away and staffs aren’t told they ever existed.
Have been reading all the failings in this and the one thing that comes to mind is a lack of a bulletproof contract so everyone knew what was expected and BAe would have been tied to producing an airworthy project or would have paid the price for not delivering what was required.
However, it would be wrong to have, for example, issuing the Release to Service as a milestone, as that is controlled by the MoD. There is nothing to stop the MoD agreeing all preceding milestones and then refusing to issue an RTS – which is effectively what happened with MRA4. A typical final milestone, or at least a late one tied to a large payment, is achieving Transfer to PDS, when the design comes Under Ministry Control. There is a comprehensive checklist laid down in the mandated Def Stan. If anyone involved in the support or operation of the aircraft (or equipment) studied this list, you’d be quite confident the product was (a) built to spec (b) fully supportable and (c) safe. There are variations on this theme, but the basic concept is sound.
Now the reality. Under the RAF Chief Engineer, PDS was rundown from 1991-onwards. As that is the process which maintains the Build Standard and Safety Case, and the latter MUST be based on a maintained former, the risk was obvious, predicted, notified and ignored. As there was to be no (Full) PDS, then the mandated regulation to achieve Transfer to PDS became meaningless. That is a significant reason why the Nimrod IPT had to let the ill-fated MR2 Safety Case task criticised by Haddon-Cave – because the Chief Engineer’s organisation (AMSO) had decreed them a waste of time and the MR2 work had lapsed. As an airworthy MR2 was a mandatory pre-requisite to a viable MRA4 programme, then it is (and was) obvious to even the most casual observer that the MRA4 programme was fatally compromised by the decision to ignore safety and, quite clearly, should never have passed scrutiny.
Ah, Scrutiny. The Chief Engineer’s immediate subordinate (DGSM) decreed that a sackable offence in December 1992, which explains almost all waste mentioned on here. In effect, the Nimrod IPT was playing catchy up when they let the Safety Case task. The fact they mismanaged it is another story, caused by lack of experience as few had been taught how to do it, due to the work being cancelled 10 years before. Let’s face it, if you’re told it is a sackable offence to do something, most tend to steer clear of it even if they know the work must be done. The real issue is why they had to let it in the first case – it should already have existed, without break, since the Nimrod was first contracted in the 60s. Yes, I know “Safety Cases” were only mandated in the early 90s, but in practice the work has always been done in industry.
Latterly, any attempt by an experienced programme manager to insert all this in a contract has been thwarted, with the clause being cancelled or waived by non-engineers as they see it as a waste of time. They don’t necessarily make a conscious decision that safety is a waste of time (although some do), but that is the effect because they have simply not been trained before acquiring the authority to waive safety, and are not required to be competent. Unscrupulous companies don’t say anything. The better companies actually complain, but are told to wind it in. Today, if you mentioned the above to 95% of staff in DE&S they’d completely topple. And no-one in the MAA is going to mention it, because they are not independent, most are light blue, and we see in the press and Ministerial announcements the influence those retired RAF officers still carry. You will never hear the MAA acknowledge any of the above. If they don’t, then how can they truly understand the scale and scope of their task?
Back to MRA4. The obvious question is – Who was meant to exercise “management oversight” of the above? Answer, for most of the MRA4 programme, is the MoD(PE)/DPA 2 Star, Director General Air Systems 2. What was his formal position on the above? That’s simple. Any programme manager seeking to implement these mandated regulations was subject to disciplinary action. This was issued in writing on at least 3 occasions. I have the letters. He was fully supported by his 4 Star, the Chief of Defence Procurement (who gets his airworthiness delegation direct from Secretary of State). Again, if the MAA would acknowledge these simple facts, they’d be far nearer a solution. But they waltz round it as to do so is a career killer. (Which is presumably far worse than an aircrew killer).
As ever, it isn’t the lack of process or procedure that went wrong, it is the implementation. MoD’s way round this? They cancelled the mandated Def Stan (above), so today there is nowhere to learn this stuff, yet it is as fundamental to an aspiring programme manager as being able to see is to a pilot. This is what allows the MAA to reinvent so many wheels, because the old wheels have been thrown away and staffs aren’t told they ever existed.
If I may, I'd also mention the balls that is Earned Value Management. This was introduced in MoD just over decade ago in lieu of proper, measurable milestones. Yet another "new" management solution to a non-existant problem (if the regs were implemented correctly). The "flagship" (multi-Billion) programme, against all prevailing advice, based the contract payments on EVM. Suffice to say, the company met all it's EVM obligations, but at the expense of delivering anything the MoD could actually use. The ISD has come and gone, some years ago, with nothing to show. The effect has been all over the press for years (and on full view on Wootton Bassett High Street) but no-one has ever said a thing. It is waste like this that, if corrected, renders any perceived cost of an independent MAA irrelevant.
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This is a classic from Nick Harvey;
If it is not that difficult, why did it take 20 years to deliver nothing?
And, given that timescale, I assume by “relatively short notice” he means in excess of 20 years!
And finally, since no-one has been brought to book over this screw up, in fact the major players have been rewarded with gongs and promotions; may we assume he is content that Nimrod MRA4 represents an acceptable acquisition benchmark?
The capabilities that Nimrod would have provided, if it had successfully been brought into service, would have been very sophisticated. What the Air Vice-Marshal was saying, and what I meant when I said we could get back into this quickly if we needed to, was that getting some surveillance equipment of adequate calibre to perform the basic function into an aircraft with sufficient endurance to patrol the space we need to cover, is not in and of itself a phenomenally difficult challenge. If, at relatively short notice, we thought that we needed to get back into having a dedicated capability we could put something together or buy something off the shelf pretty quickly.
If it is not that difficult, why did it take 20 years to deliver nothing?
And, given that timescale, I assume by “relatively short notice” he means in excess of 20 years!
And finally, since no-one has been brought to book over this screw up, in fact the major players have been rewarded with gongs and promotions; may we assume he is content that Nimrod MRA4 represents an acceptable acquisition benchmark?
Seedcorn capability until 2020, and possibly beyond, realistic, or just good words to placate the committee....?
Do the seedcorn guys know they are on 8 year postings?
The whole point of seedcorn was taking UK people, who already possessed maritime experience and skills, and preserving those skills in flying (or flying related) posts with the help of another nation.
When does it just become nothing more than a large (one way) exchange programme, with someone joining the RAF, doing a tour on C-17s, then getting exchange on P-8s as their next tour, with no previous maritime experience?
Also, why are rearcrew officers part of the seedcorn package, when there is no longer a WSO trade, so any future UK MPA fleet cannot possibly be manned with rearcrew officers unless that trade is re-instated? Is it just a case of there are some rearcrew MPA officers that need jobs to do, and the seedcorn is one way of gainfully employing them?
Tuc - maybe he meant "relatively short" in terms of geological timescales!?
Do the seedcorn guys know they are on 8 year postings?
The whole point of seedcorn was taking UK people, who already possessed maritime experience and skills, and preserving those skills in flying (or flying related) posts with the help of another nation.
When does it just become nothing more than a large (one way) exchange programme, with someone joining the RAF, doing a tour on C-17s, then getting exchange on P-8s as their next tour, with no previous maritime experience?
Also, why are rearcrew officers part of the seedcorn package, when there is no longer a WSO trade, so any future UK MPA fleet cannot possibly be manned with rearcrew officers unless that trade is re-instated? Is it just a case of there are some rearcrew MPA officers that need jobs to do, and the seedcorn is one way of gainfully employing them?
Tuc - maybe he meant "relatively short" in terms of geological timescales!?
Last edited by Biggus; 20th Jun 2012 at 18:40.
Whither wide area airborne ASW capability gap?
The HOC report seems to imply that our capability gap in wide-area airborne ASW, a critical role of the MRA4, has been surreptitiously abandoned leaving a much more digestible capability gap in (surface?) surveillance which will be quicker, cheaper and easier to fill.
Am I missing something here?
Am I missing something here?
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Biggus.
No, there will continue to be a trickle flow of NCA who are commissioned to provide a management/crew leader structure in all current fleets as required.
A future maritime fleet would commission from within trade rearcrew operators at a similar annual trickle rate, I would suggest.
There are still several hundred WSOs employed in the RAF, some of us under the age of 40 - shock/horror!
No, there will continue to be a trickle flow of NCA who are commissioned to provide a management/crew leader structure in all current fleets as required.
A future maritime fleet would commission from within trade rearcrew operators at a similar annual trickle rate, I would suggest.
There are still several hundred WSOs employed in the RAF, some of us under the age of 40 - shock/horror!
Last edited by Scuttled; 21st Jun 2012 at 00:30.
Scuttled,
I don't want to get into a pi**ing contest, but would offer the following comments, observations and questions.
First of all we don't even know if we will get back into the manned aircraft game in the maritime role, let alone with what type of aircraft and crew size/compliment, etc. If we do, the AVM implied the decision certainly won't be made before 2015, more likely 2020, then there is the acquisition time etc. I think it fair to say nothing would be flying operationally before 2020 (if the decision was made in 2015) at the earliest, probably later (if the decision was made in 2020). The aircraft would then be expected to have a life of at least 25 years, meaning the fleet needs to be manned until at least 2045, probably longer.
I know there are still several hundred WSOs left in the RAF, some under 40. How many of them have maritime experience, and how many are currently not gainfully employed? I also believe that WSOs have been recruited exclusively under SSC terms for at least the last 5 years, maybe longer. Unless the RAF elects to offer PCs to some of these WSOs on SSCs (purely on the basis that a decision likely to be made in 2020 may create a need for them) then how many will still be around in 2020, let alone 2045. This only leaves your ever shrinking pool of serving to 55 WSOs to draw from, again, doesn't the RAF currently have other plans for them? Any WSO expected to be in service until 2045 has to be 22 or younger today, unless the RAF increases retirement age to 60. With WSO recruiting off the high street complete, there is no longer anyone coming in at the bottom.
So, for long term officer aircrew manning of any future maritime fleet, which won't stand up before 2020 at the earliest, the only options available are to re-instigate a trade, or internal commissioning from WSOp as you suggest. While we have no idea of size of fleet, or crew compliment, I would suggest that more than a trickle flow of NCA commissioning would be required, at least in the early days of the fleet when it first tries to stand up.
As to why we sent WSOs on seedcorn, apart from finding them something to do, and the fact that only they have recent expertise in certain roles, its no doubt because other nations wouldn't allow us to put NCA in certain seats on the aircraft.....
Another thing, why would the RAF need officer aircrew in the back end of any future MPA, good quality NCA should be capable of doing the job (which isn't meant to imply that all our NCA aren't good quality!!)....
I don't want to get into a pi**ing contest, but would offer the following comments, observations and questions.
First of all we don't even know if we will get back into the manned aircraft game in the maritime role, let alone with what type of aircraft and crew size/compliment, etc. If we do, the AVM implied the decision certainly won't be made before 2015, more likely 2020, then there is the acquisition time etc. I think it fair to say nothing would be flying operationally before 2020 (if the decision was made in 2015) at the earliest, probably later (if the decision was made in 2020). The aircraft would then be expected to have a life of at least 25 years, meaning the fleet needs to be manned until at least 2045, probably longer.
I know there are still several hundred WSOs left in the RAF, some under 40. How many of them have maritime experience, and how many are currently not gainfully employed? I also believe that WSOs have been recruited exclusively under SSC terms for at least the last 5 years, maybe longer. Unless the RAF elects to offer PCs to some of these WSOs on SSCs (purely on the basis that a decision likely to be made in 2020 may create a need for them) then how many will still be around in 2020, let alone 2045. This only leaves your ever shrinking pool of serving to 55 WSOs to draw from, again, doesn't the RAF currently have other plans for them? Any WSO expected to be in service until 2045 has to be 22 or younger today, unless the RAF increases retirement age to 60. With WSO recruiting off the high street complete, there is no longer anyone coming in at the bottom.
So, for long term officer aircrew manning of any future maritime fleet, which won't stand up before 2020 at the earliest, the only options available are to re-instigate a trade, or internal commissioning from WSOp as you suggest. While we have no idea of size of fleet, or crew compliment, I would suggest that more than a trickle flow of NCA commissioning would be required, at least in the early days of the fleet when it first tries to stand up.
As to why we sent WSOs on seedcorn, apart from finding them something to do, and the fact that only they have recent expertise in certain roles, its no doubt because other nations wouldn't allow us to put NCA in certain seats on the aircraft.....
Another thing, why would the RAF need officer aircrew in the back end of any future MPA, good quality NCA should be capable of doing the job (which isn't meant to imply that all our NCA aren't good quality!!)....
Last edited by Biggus; 21st Jun 2012 at 08:18.
FOD - yes you are missing something, but unless you know about it I'm not going to tell you what.
The HoC didn't ask the right questions, but I refer to their complaint that the MoD only ever answers the question asked not the question implied. The Select Committee would do well to forget Nimrod and start looking forward and thus framing their questions properly.
(I assume the HoC Select Committee are all DV'd?)
The HoC didn't ask the right questions, but I refer to their complaint that the MoD only ever answers the question asked not the question implied. The Select Committee would do well to forget Nimrod and start looking forward and thus framing their questions properly.
(I assume the HoC Select Committee are all DV'd?)
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The timescales of getting any form of LR MPA back into service militates against the RAF retaining any form of crews in a "seedcorn" role. The RN have not abandoned ASW and are continuing to train ASW Observers and aircrewmen. It should be from here that any re-introduced capability is grown and operated. If and when a funding line is established (presumably post SDSR 2015 or 2020), the RN can start feeding Merlin crews into the USN programme in readiness for the introduction into service of a UK P8. In terms of economies of scale it would be ridiculous to have 2 Services operating ASW assets.
Last edited by Pheasant; 21st Jun 2012 at 08:39.
Pheasant,
Sounds like a cunning plan to me...
Many (most?) countries which have MPA have them operated by their navy, there is a certain inescapable logic to it.
Many years ago I met an acoustics operator off a Dutch P-3 whose previous tour had been in the sound room (or whatever the naval types call it) of an SSK. That kind of cross experience is priceless, but in their fleet was commonplace, and is something any future UK MPA could only achieve to any great extent if it was operated by the RN.....and that's from a crab!
Sounds like a cunning plan to me...
Many (most?) countries which have MPA have them operated by their navy, there is a certain inescapable logic to it.
Many years ago I met an acoustics operator off a Dutch P-3 whose previous tour had been in the sound room (or whatever the naval types call it) of an SSK. That kind of cross experience is priceless, but in their fleet was commonplace, and is something any future UK MPA could only achieve to any great extent if it was operated by the RN.....and that's from a crab!
Last edited by Biggus; 21st Jun 2012 at 08:55.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Biggus, quite. On one operation that you will be familiar with we had a number of submariners on board. They were foisted on us and not invited and OC OSS was furious when he found out but . . .
We observed a particular manoevre by our target followed by a particular acoustic event which then ceased and the target manoeuvre ceased too.
Our passengers told us exactly what we had heard, what the target did about it, and why it had happened. As you say, priceless.
We observed a particular manoevre by our target followed by a particular acoustic event which then ceased and the target manoeuvre ceased too.
Our passengers told us exactly what we had heard, what the target did about it, and why it had happened. As you say, priceless.
"Many (most?) countries which have MPA have them operated by their navy, there is a certain inescapable logic to it."
That will be, from memory, not including, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Spain, Portugal.
The big exception is of course the US Navy - where unfortunately, a career as a professional MPA operator isn't possible as a "full career" is necessary for promotion and they don't have a Spec aircrew type of scheme. For example one USN Exchange Officer went from Kinloss to a carrier as a deck landing officer - that doesn't exactly strike me as inescapable logic.
That will be, from memory, not including, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Spain, Portugal.
The big exception is of course the US Navy - where unfortunately, a career as a professional MPA operator isn't possible as a "full career" is necessary for promotion and they don't have a Spec aircrew type of scheme. For example one USN Exchange Officer went from Kinloss to a carrier as a deck landing officer - that doesn't exactly strike me as inescapable logic.
N L H,
I believe the air forces of Australia and New Zealand, and possibly Canada were historically modeled on the RAF, hence no doubt the reason they operate MPA.
I said many (with most followed by a question mark) countries have navies which operate MPA, using your "from memory" approach, I could quote, in addition to the USN:
JMSDF - a mere 80 odd P-3s which no doubt exceeds the combined MPA fleets of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Spain, and Portugal.
France
Germany
Italy
India
Pakistan
South Korea
(the Dutch used to)
Hopefully that's enough to at least prove my use of "many", if not "most"...
I believe the air forces of Australia and New Zealand, and possibly Canada were historically modeled on the RAF, hence no doubt the reason they operate MPA.
I said many (with most followed by a question mark) countries have navies which operate MPA, using your "from memory" approach, I could quote, in addition to the USN:
JMSDF - a mere 80 odd P-3s which no doubt exceeds the combined MPA fleets of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, Spain, and Portugal.
France
Germany
Italy
India
Pakistan
South Korea
(the Dutch used to)
Hopefully that's enough to at least prove my use of "many", if not "most"...
Last edited by Biggus; 21st Jun 2012 at 09:38.
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Italy is actually Air Force, as is Portugal, Spain, Greece, Taiwan, Brazil, Iran...
But enough of the pi$$ing contest - it doesn't matter who operates it as long as we have the expertise and suitable airframe to protect our SSBNs, SLOCs, provide real long range SAR, long endurance MCT, etc, etc, etc... After all we ARE an island nation that depends heavily (almost entirely?) on trade via the sea (both in and out of the country) and have vital maritime assets to protect.
But enough of the pi$$ing contest - it doesn't matter who operates it as long as we have the expertise and suitable airframe to protect our SSBNs, SLOCs, provide real long range SAR, long endurance MCT, etc, etc, etc... After all we ARE an island nation that depends heavily (almost entirely?) on trade via the sea (both in and out of the country) and have vital maritime assets to protect.