Nimrod MRA.4
Leon,
"...a box critical to the flight controls..." assuming that you are referring to the Aileron Feel Trim Unit (AFTU), I'm sure that had you listened a little more intently to the Nimrod team and had access to the relevant stress reports (as they did), you would have learnt that after significant amounts of testing and analysis it was deduced that prevention of damage from 'Seagulls' was not necessary. This was bought into by both the customer & QinetiQ. However, just to keep you up to date...A cover was designed (and was to be fitted) to prevent damage/restriction to the AFTU caused by FOD.
A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
Oh, and I almost forgot... It was never the design (idiot?) position that the AFTU would remain on the FWD lower face of the center box where it was seem as potentially vulnerable. It was customer who vetoed the relocation to the upper part of the center box where it was to be protected, on the grounds of cost & ease of maintenance issues.
"...a box critical to the flight controls..." assuming that you are referring to the Aileron Feel Trim Unit (AFTU), I'm sure that had you listened a little more intently to the Nimrod team and had access to the relevant stress reports (as they did), you would have learnt that after significant amounts of testing and analysis it was deduced that prevention of damage from 'Seagulls' was not necessary. This was bought into by both the customer & QinetiQ. However, just to keep you up to date...A cover was designed (and was to be fitted) to prevent damage/restriction to the AFTU caused by FOD.
A little knowledge is a dangerous thing.
Oh, and I almost forgot... It was never the design (idiot?) position that the AFTU would remain on the FWD lower face of the center box where it was seem as potentially vulnerable. It was customer who vetoed the relocation to the upper part of the center box where it was to be protected, on the grounds of cost & ease of maintenance issues.
Last edited by WasNaeMe; 7th Jun 2012 at 10:50.
So if you, as someone who sat not 10 feet away, can get these small and rather insignificant (in the larger scheme of things) facts wrong
There's no point in trying to explain. LJ believes that we have so many spare C130s that we have LR SAR covered.
And that we have spare T-boats, Merlins and Type 23s that can cover the ASW gap. Never mind that it invariably took an LRMPA...... never mind; there are those that know and those that think they know. I'm guessing LJ must work in the MOD's Department of Meeja, Comms, Spin and Blatent Lies; only they could believe some of the fiction that they put out.
As someone with a different background to most here (but not that different) a lot of the problems I see come from the “system” no longer articulating requirements, then quantifying against that requirement. Everything is so bloody vague these days.
We used to have 1st, 2nd and 3rd Order Assumptions; the last issued every February. In very general terms, a 1st would say (in this case) “We’re going to have an RAF with an MPA capability to do x, y, z”. God would issue that one. The 2nd, issued by God-1 in London, would say “To meet the 1st, we need qty x squadrons, they shall be located here, there and wherever, with y aircraft, shall average z hours per year and need the following kit”.
The 3rd would quantify that kit and make Materiel and Financial provision for the whole life; ensuring the 1st, 2nd and 3rd could be reconciled in the Defence Plan. If it couldn't be reconciled, you raised the red card. In my domain (avionics) that post came with a unique authority to overrule the permanent LTC Instructions using Engineering Judgement. (Something similar to airworthiness delegation; one had to have actually worked on the kit you were responsible for, at all Depths).
Fine tuning was done in the Autumn as part of the Alternative Assumptions. One always remembers these periods, because leave was cancelled for two 6-week periods, something you understood when applying for the job.
Today, very little of the above is carried out. The 3rd bit not at all. The 2nd barely, because the 1st is so vague. The whole cannot be reconciled, which is the important point I’m making. No-one has ability to raise a knowldgeable red card anymore.
The person who did the 3rd was the person who (a) Was seen to “own” the kit, a named individual responsible for Availability, Maintainability, Reliability etc and (b) Was the author of Board Submissions (now called Business Cases – hate that term). He worked for the User organisation, in an HQ staff post. Neither concept exists today. If you were any good, you may get lucky and be promoted to the most junior project manager level in PE. Another alien concept today.
The result is that nobody has a scoobie what’s going on. It results in announcements like the one being discussed, that MPA tasks can be undertaken by a vague mix of C130, Merlin and Joe Bloggs in his garden shed. I came to the conclusion long ago that the deliberate running down of this system, which worked very well, was designed to avoid politicians and VSOs being pinned down, allowing them to lie through their back teeth. As far as I can see, there has been no benefit since introduced.
But the resultant waste has been truly astronomical and the inability to carry out basic tasks has made MoD UK Ltd a laughing stock. MoD will never return to anything like this, because it is too embarrassing. The Bernard Gray’s of this world are beavering away trying to formulate alternative cunning plans, but the option to use a proven system is denied them. I sympathise. Even if allowed to propose such a reversion, he hasn’t got the staff anymore. We’ve dumbed down too much, as a Department of State and as a Nation.
We used to have 1st, 2nd and 3rd Order Assumptions; the last issued every February. In very general terms, a 1st would say (in this case) “We’re going to have an RAF with an MPA capability to do x, y, z”. God would issue that one. The 2nd, issued by God-1 in London, would say “To meet the 1st, we need qty x squadrons, they shall be located here, there and wherever, with y aircraft, shall average z hours per year and need the following kit”.
The 3rd would quantify that kit and make Materiel and Financial provision for the whole life; ensuring the 1st, 2nd and 3rd could be reconciled in the Defence Plan. If it couldn't be reconciled, you raised the red card. In my domain (avionics) that post came with a unique authority to overrule the permanent LTC Instructions using Engineering Judgement. (Something similar to airworthiness delegation; one had to have actually worked on the kit you were responsible for, at all Depths).
Fine tuning was done in the Autumn as part of the Alternative Assumptions. One always remembers these periods, because leave was cancelled for two 6-week periods, something you understood when applying for the job.
Today, very little of the above is carried out. The 3rd bit not at all. The 2nd barely, because the 1st is so vague. The whole cannot be reconciled, which is the important point I’m making. No-one has ability to raise a knowldgeable red card anymore.
The person who did the 3rd was the person who (a) Was seen to “own” the kit, a named individual responsible for Availability, Maintainability, Reliability etc and (b) Was the author of Board Submissions (now called Business Cases – hate that term). He worked for the User organisation, in an HQ staff post. Neither concept exists today. If you were any good, you may get lucky and be promoted to the most junior project manager level in PE. Another alien concept today.
The result is that nobody has a scoobie what’s going on. It results in announcements like the one being discussed, that MPA tasks can be undertaken by a vague mix of C130, Merlin and Joe Bloggs in his garden shed. I came to the conclusion long ago that the deliberate running down of this system, which worked very well, was designed to avoid politicians and VSOs being pinned down, allowing them to lie through their back teeth. As far as I can see, there has been no benefit since introduced.
But the resultant waste has been truly astronomical and the inability to carry out basic tasks has made MoD UK Ltd a laughing stock. MoD will never return to anything like this, because it is too embarrassing. The Bernard Gray’s of this world are beavering away trying to formulate alternative cunning plans, but the option to use a proven system is denied them. I sympathise. Even if allowed to propose such a reversion, he hasn’t got the staff anymore. We’ve dumbed down too much, as a Department of State and as a Nation.
Nail on head again, Tuc. Of course the old, effective system tends to be undermined these days by things like discovering that another committee/minister/study/exercise/review has decided to close the base that God-1 had chosen and then that the flying hours have been cut to save fuel costs.
Not to mention that someone else has decided to take the procurement of spares 'at risk' and then had the funding pulled.
As for the airworthiness case...
Not to mention that someone else has decided to take the procurement of spares 'at risk' and then had the funding pulled.
As for the airworthiness case...
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WasNaeMe
You seem to suggest relocation was always the intent, with time and cost penalty passed onto the customer. 
Could you elaborate?
It was never the design (idiot?) position that the AFTU would remain on the FWD lower face of the center box where it was seem as potentially vulnerable. It was customer who vetoed the relocation to the upper part of the center box where it was to be protected, on the grounds of cost & ease of maintenance issues.
Could you elaborate?
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^^^^ something doesn't sound right to me...
Either the flying controls box of tricks was not vulnerable or it was and needed moving but the RAF was not prepared for another delay and cost increase? Why would the designers look at moving it if it wasn't a problem? It all sounds a bit fishy to me (excuse the pun
).
CPL Clott
Either the flying controls box of tricks was not vulnerable or it was and needed moving but the RAF was not prepared for another delay and cost increase? Why would the designers look at moving it if it wasn't a problem? It all sounds a bit fishy to me (excuse the pun
).CPL Clott
Slight thread drift, I know, but the MAA has approached the RAeS about hosting a conference - "Military Air Safety" - on 24th-25th October 2012. Tucumseh, you should plan to attend and ask some searching questions!
Oilcan
Without going into detail (& there is a lot of it) the decision to move the AFTU from its original design location to a lower position on the Centre Box was taken in March 2001 to address a number of issues, maintainability being prominent amongst them and If you hadn’t noticed, time & cost penalties were indeed passed onto the customer. Who did you think paid for change & why do you think it was so late?
Cpl Clott
Worthy of note is that in March 2001 there was no requirement for Birdstrike protection. It was however picked up as an issue to be dealt with and various options were considered. 7 design schemes were produced to protect the AFTU and various locations were considered for relocation.
“…The Hazard Analysis for bird-strike on the AFTU is detailed within HN569 (Ref. 1), for which the probability of occurrence is 6.36 x 10-10 pfh, which is less probable than a primary structure failing. This results in an HRI of 12, which is considered low risk and is acceptable with System Safety agreement (Ref. 2)…”
“…Relocation of the AFTU (Section 2.1) is not considered practicable given the financial costs involved and subsequent delays to the programme…”
Without going into detail (& there is a lot of it) the decision to move the AFTU from its original design location to a lower position on the Centre Box was taken in March 2001 to address a number of issues, maintainability being prominent amongst them and If you hadn’t noticed, time & cost penalties were indeed passed onto the customer. Who did you think paid for change & why do you think it was so late?
Cpl Clott
Worthy of note is that in March 2001 there was no requirement for Birdstrike protection. It was however picked up as an issue to be dealt with and various options were considered. 7 design schemes were produced to protect the AFTU and various locations were considered for relocation.
Long story short…. The outcome can be summed up in the following, taken from the relevant DEF STAN 00-970 Non-Compliance Statement.
“…The Hazard Analysis for bird-strike on the AFTU is detailed within HN569 (Ref. 1), for which the probability of occurrence is 6.36 x 10-10 pfh, which is less probable than a primary structure failing. This results in an HRI of 12, which is considered low risk and is acceptable with System Safety agreement (Ref. 2)…”
“…Relocation of the AFTU (Section 2.1) is not considered practicable given the financial costs involved and subsequent delays to the programme…”
There seem to be two conversations going on here. The first, from the likes of tuc, seems to relate to the same old familiar tale told on the Hercules Parliamentary Questions thread, the Chinook HC2 Mull thread, and of course the Nimrod Afghanistan thread; of a deliberate and systematic suborning of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations by 2*s and above, resulting in a dysfunctional and dangerous system of UK Military Aircraft Provision. The other conversation seems to be about bomb bay doors, AFTUs, and other minutiae.
Might I suggest that we pay more attention to the woods, rather than be distracted by so many "trees"? The reason that the RAF has lost its Maritime Patrol capability (OK a rose by any other name, so please substitute the present up to date nomenclature for my incorrect one) is not because of speed limited bomb bay doors, or wrongly sited AFTUs, but because this nation can no longer provide such aircraft competently.
All that suborning has left us without such competence.
All that suborning has sabotaged this nation's defence.
All that suborning remains uninvestigated, let alone punished!
Might I suggest that we pay more attention to the woods, rather than be distracted by so many "trees"? The reason that the RAF has lost its Maritime Patrol capability (OK a rose by any other name, so please substitute the present up to date nomenclature for my incorrect one) is not because of speed limited bomb bay doors, or wrongly sited AFTUs, but because this nation can no longer provide such aircraft competently.
All that suborning has left us without such competence.
All that suborning has sabotaged this nation's defence.
All that suborning remains uninvestigated, let alone punished!
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There is plenty of competence out there. Perhaps if Bernard Grey gets his way an overhauls DE&S they will bring in some sound people from industry that are use to spending their own money wisely (eg from an oil company)
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Shell Man is right
even a medium size oil company can find an oil field that requires a vast technological leap forward and design, build and install the kit in 3-4 years
how very different from the MoD
even a medium size oil company can find an oil field that requires a vast technological leap forward and design, build and install the kit in 3-4 years
how very different from the MoD
Shell Man is right
It is an ex Dive Bomber, it has gone to the Great Hangar in the Sky, it has joined the Choir Celestial, it has quit this Mortal Coil...well you get the picture.
That is the poisoned chalice that the MAA has inherited, and to make their job totally impossible who can trust them, given that they are part of the institution that connived to create this mess?
Self Regulation doesn't work and in Aviation it Kills!
1.3
I’m afraid I would find it rather stressful sitting listening to the senior members of the MAA chuntering on about how they’ve spent two years dipping a few toes in the airworthiness pond, decided to quickly step back and dry them off while reinventing a few wheels. And a quick straw poll of the practical airworthiness staffs I’ve known in MoD tells me not a single one has ever been approached by the MAA.
What would be very interesting, and highly entertaining, is listening to the pro and anti airworthiness lobbies in the RAeS. The main question I’d want to ask is why the latter (i.e. the retired RAF senior officer cadre) demanded that the “3 Fellows” (Captains Kohn, MacDonald and Hadlow) “burn” their report on the Mull of Kintyre crash. I wonder if these retired VSOs, like Alcock, Graydon etc, will turn up to receive heartfelt thanks from the MAA? After all, the MAA owe their jobs to the actions of these people.
Finally, before attending, “delegates” should be required to read and inwardly digest the main airworthiness submission to Lord Philip, which subsumes the main submission to Haddon-Cave. Especially the documents that form the Bibliography (many of which MoD deny the existence of). Preferably, they should be examined on it. Then they’d realise how simple it was to avoid a host of accidents. Only with that understanding can they hope to contribute.
Slight thread drift, I know, but the MAA has approached the RAeS about hosting a conference - "Military Air Safety" - on 24th-25th October 2012. Tucumseh, you should plan to attend and ask some searching questions!
What would be very interesting, and highly entertaining, is listening to the pro and anti airworthiness lobbies in the RAeS. The main question I’d want to ask is why the latter (i.e. the retired RAF senior officer cadre) demanded that the “3 Fellows” (Captains Kohn, MacDonald and Hadlow) “burn” their report on the Mull of Kintyre crash. I wonder if these retired VSOs, like Alcock, Graydon etc, will turn up to receive heartfelt thanks from the MAA? After all, the MAA owe their jobs to the actions of these people.
Finally, before attending, “delegates” should be required to read and inwardly digest the main airworthiness submission to Lord Philip, which subsumes the main submission to Haddon-Cave. Especially the documents that form the Bibliography (many of which MoD deny the existence of). Preferably, they should be examined on it. Then they’d realise how simple it was to avoid a host of accidents. Only with that understanding can they hope to contribute.
Last edited by tucumseh; 11th Jun 2012 at 10:26.
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Chug
I think the point that ShellMan and I were making was not that is is individuals who are at fault but the whole cultural background of the organisation is the problem. Most oil companies do not have the paper shuffling, CMA, defer to politicians & other low life on bended knee approach. Unfortunately too many people in the MoD still do
I think the point that ShellMan and I were making was not that is is individuals who are at fault but the whole cultural background of the organisation is the problem. Most oil companies do not have the paper shuffling, CMA, defer to politicians & other low life on bended knee approach. Unfortunately too many people in the MoD still do
What you say may well be correct, HH, but again I make the point that military airworthiness was not lost by lack of individual competence, nor by the organisational bureaucratic inefficiencies described in your post, but by the issuing and enforcing of illegal orders by VSOs to subvert the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations and by the subsequent cover up. 62 deaths to date in airworthiness related fatal air accidents reviewed in this forum alone, but in reality probably a much higher death toll. Enormous costs then in blood and treasure and a terrible loss to the defence capability of this nation. No one, other than the victims, has yet to pay for that.
1.3VStall, the best thing that we can hope for is that the proposed MAA conference at the RAeS in October is cancelled, following an MAA announcement that it is to be disbanded, along with the MAAIB, to be immediately reformed as two independent (of the MOD and each other) bodies. Only then can the long and difficult climb back to proper Military Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation be commenced.
1.3VStall, the best thing that we can hope for is that the proposed MAA conference at the RAeS in October is cancelled, following an MAA announcement that it is to be disbanded, along with the MAAIB, to be immediately reformed as two independent (of the MOD and each other) bodies. Only then can the long and difficult climb back to proper Military Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation be commenced.
dear, dear, dear. That is all..........
???? Not sure what you mean. Are you unhappy with MoD's behavior over the airworthiness debacle? There are quite a few here who seem to condone it. Or that the main protagonists have been named? Better than naming innocent people. Or now that MRA4 has been scrapped there is nothing further to talk about on the subject? It was one of the XV230 reviewing officers who pointed out the problems applied across the board not just on Nimrod. If there's going to be an MRA4 thread surely the main topic of conversation should be what caused the problem?
