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Nimrod MRA.4

Old 29th Jan 2011, 17:46
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Liam Fox did not declare the MRA4 "potentially unsafe", it was the Project Team back in September.

DV
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Old 29th Jan 2011, 17:50
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I've just read the appalling article from the Telegraph by Dr Fox. I'd like to know just who was briefing him such a contorted view of reality, or whether he has made it up himself. It beggars belief.

Of course it is only now, with aircraft being shredded, that such twists of the truth will be impossible to refute. Such political spin will go on to become the 'confirmed wisdom'. Please please please do not give this ANY credence - the MRA4 was a good weapon system, with huge untapped potential.

By the way - please don't tell me to 'move on'; I'm more than ready for that, but don't don't don't tell me that what several thousand of us, across many organisations spent 16 years of our lives in generating was not fit for purpose - that is a lie.

And another thing - 'Public Enquiry' - bring it on.

Last edited by Mend em; 29th Jan 2011 at 17:52. Reason: Forgot further need to rant
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Old 29th Jan 2011, 18:46
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Mend em,

I couldn’t agree with you more. Just wish one of the airframes i.e PA4 could have been saved in its entirety and sent to a museum, but for some reason it seems impossible.

As I said earlier it would appear the govenment is now trying to distract people away from their bad descision making by spinning miss information.

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Old 29th Jan 2011, 19:56
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With (genuinely, it's not a polite way of calling you names) respect -

Liam Fox did not declare the MRA4 "potentially unsafe", it was the Project Team back in September.
I doubt I am the only ex Nimrod aircrew on here (sadly that now encompasses ALL RAF MPA aircrew) to wonder just how true this really is.

You can call virtually anything 'potentially' anything you like, I will require - but will probably never get - a great deal more detail before I accept what Liam Fox has said. Apart from anything else he is a politician, and wouldn't (ergo) recognise the truth if it bit him on the ar$e.

'Potentially unsafe' doesn't cut it, in my view, let's hear exactly what was still wrong and needed fixing, and how much time and money that would have taken - only then can a sensible decision be made on whether it was worth persevering or not. It is FAR too easy to blackguard a project after cancellation with half truths, smoke and mirrors, which (cynical as I am) is what I think is going on here.

If there were genuinely significant issues with MRA4 the cynic in me says we'd have heard the gory details by now - 'the wings fell off at 38,000 ft' for example is not something that LibCon would have kept quiet about... the fact that NO details are emerging about the supposed problems suggests that they were, in fact, not really a problem at all.

I remain quite open to persuasion otherwise, but my gut feeling is that the Nim 4 was cancelled at the point where it was very nearly ready for service, and that cancelling it was a decision based more on the bad name gained since 230 than any reasonable assessment of capability and cost.

Yes, BAEs should have their nuts kicked in for failing to turn out more airframes at lower price - 9 airframes was always a bit of a joke - but it's awful late to restart from scratch, and I suspect it wasn't needed.

For those with memories that exceed that of the goldfish, I am sure I am not the only person to fly on the Mk1 and 2 who heard 'this is the safest aircraft in the RAF, we should have lost x by now,....' when we still had to lose the first one. Flying as we did at very low level, in crappy weather, in winter, miles out over the oggin I am still amazed that we never lost one on a bog standard sortie - I am sure the crew of the Bahams Mama, and several other crews (including mine) sometimes thought the clock was running out, but the fact is that we have one lost kite (230) that we could put down to the aircraft failing us - chuck in an R1 off Lossie if you want to go outside maritime....now compare that to the hours flown, miles covered, lives saved, and (let us not forget) astronomical number of fishing boats logged....

Nimrod does not have a bad name, it had an excellent name for 30 years, sadly suffering from one bodge too many - and even that took over 20 years to bite us. Nimrod served the UK brilliantly, it was (arguably) let down by those who were supposed to oversee it, it did a hell of a lot to protect the UK and her allies over 4 decades - much of which will remain unknown to the general public. If only those charged with ensuring that it remained safe to fly had done their jobs then the MRA4 would be in squadron service today.


Dave
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Old 29th Jan 2011, 20:21
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I think the MRA4 unfortunately suffered from the "perfect storm" of things conspiring against its smooth introduction into service.

For example, I believe, from the second hand information I was hearing, that the recently created MAA wanted to be "whiter than white" in ensuring the MRA4 was "safe" for entry into service, no doubt understandable in the light of XV230 and the H-C report. No doubt this lead to some inevitable bureaucratic delays, which may have appeared from the outside to be technical faults.....

However, I can't claim to have much personal insight into this side of things.
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Old 29th Jan 2011, 20:22
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I echo all your plaudits about the old girl, but my gut feeling goes the other way re the MRA4. Being associated with the programme only for a brief period, I think there were more to come, and too many fixes were required.

A new fuselage/rudder and up to date fly by wire, could have solved the C of G issues and heavy flying controls prevalent at one stage. Was there too many work arounds to resolve these issues?
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Old 29th Jan 2011, 21:51
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DaveJB

Beautifully put my old china. But now I beg of you give up...because you, I and quite a few others are just feeding the I-haven't-got-ten-minutes-on-top-a-sov-nuc-but-I-can-talk-sh**e-all-day-long-about-uavs brigade and frankly we need to get on with our lives.

QED

TOFO

OUT
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Old 29th Jan 2011, 23:35
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Agree well put Dave..... Alot of those fishing boats were with us flying together as were many of the other tasks. Keep up the good work at least some of us care that our history will show the real truth sometime. When and if it comes out we will probably be past caring but you never know. At least I feel safe on my Island as we still have a Maritime fleet here with updated and well looked after kit.
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 07:06
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Well said davejb.

I have a sneaking feeling that the "safety" concerns are not all directly related to the aircraft itself, but centre on MoD's inability to demonstrate to the approving authority that the regulations have been complied with and the aircraft is, indeed, airworthy. (Bearing in mind that airworthiness covers an awful lot more than just the aircraft).

The penny is only just dropping in MoD that for over two decades the stated policy has been that a product should be physically safe, but need not be functionally safe. This, despite numerous reports complaining of the same thing over the same period - Haddon-Cave merely collated some of the more recent.

The MAA was mentioned above and I imagine they were asking what effect this and similarly dangerous policies may have had on a project that kicked off 20-odd years ago. That is a lot of expensive and time consuming regression, at a time when the same will have been ordered (I hope) on other aircraft; particularly those whose failings are now known to date back 3 decades. And, while I do not like getting personal, the MAA may have looked at past crashes and the DE&S senior staff list and concluded there are a number in the latter whose judgment and word simply cannot be trusted on this matter, as they in part owe their position to a willingness to ignore the safety regulations and knowingly deliver unsafe equipment (which for 20 years has been construed as efficiency).
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 08:27
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ST Article

An interesting article in today's Sunday Times which, given Liam Fox's comments last week, has the total ring of truth about it. If true yet another reason for a Public Inquiry - both MOD and BAES would deserve to be utterly castigated, and the guilty parties punished, for the waste of money and the loss of this "vital" operational capability. Also, if BAES has failed to meet mandated and contracted (ie paid for) design standards why are MOD now paying them yet more money to break the aircraft up rather than suing the a*** off them for their failure to design and build an airworthy and "fit for purpose" (bomb bay doors that cannot be opened 15 years into the project?) aircraft?

If, on the other hand, BAES have fully complied with the contracted requirement and MOD failed properly to specify what was needed for an airworthy and functionally acceptable aircraft to be delivered we will, I suggest, need a Public Inquiry to find out just who did what and why (more cost saving measures perhaps?).

Either way I suggest that this is not something those concerned should be allowed to "walk away" from as it seems happened with the Nimrod AEW fiasco.

JB

Last edited by John Blakeley; 30th Jan 2011 at 09:15.
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 08:59
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Yes, it's a shame that the Sunday Times has gone to subscription only on line, as that article makes very interesting reading.
It says it's based on a restricted document that has come into their possession which lists over 100 faults with the aircraft including: Nose gear that sticks, bomb bay doors that don't open correctly (the first ones into service would have not been able to use the Bomb bay), engine bays that overheated and had gaps in the fire walls, aileron controls that could have been disabled by a bird strike, limitations for operating in icing conditions and even worse the design fault that caused the loss in Afghanistan was still there.

A BAE spokesman said they were working to sort them out and were confident the could have been rectified.

Considering it was 12 years late? exactly what had they been doing all that time?
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 09:22
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Sunday Times article.

Nimrods had ‘critical fault’
Simon McGee
THE nine Nimrod aircraft cancelled amid a storm of condemnation and at a cost of £4 billion were designed with the same critical safety fault blamed for the downing of an RAF Nimrod in 2006 with the loss of 14 lives.
Liam Fox, the defence secretary, has been accused of leaving a “massive gap” in the nation’s security by scrapping the fleet of maritime patrol planes.
But classified documents seen by The Sunday Times reveal Ministry of Defence (MoD) safety tests conducted last year on the first Nimrod MRA4, built by BAE Systems, found “several hundred design non-compliances”.
Among them were problems opening and closing the bomb bay doors, failures of the landing gear to deploy, overheating engines and gaps in the engine walls, limitations operating in icy conditions, and concerns that “a single bird-strike” could disable the aircraft’s controls.
However, the most serious problem discovered by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) inspectors at MoD Abbey Wood in Bristol involved a stillunresolved design flaw. It concerns the proximity of a hot air pipe to an uninsulated fuel line, widely blamed for an explosion on board Nimrod XV230 on September 2, 2006, near Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. A three-page summary of the faults, labelled “restricted” and written on September 17, last year, stated: “The work being undertaken by the MoD to validate the BAE Systems aircraft’s safety case during the week of September 13, 2010, identified a potentially serious design defect: a small section of a hot air pipe was discovered to be uninsulated in an area that also contains fuel pipes, which is outside the design regulations.”
It added: “Parallels could be drawn between this design defect and that which is thought to have caused the loss of the Nimrod MR2 (XV230) in Afghanistan in September 2006 resulting in the death of 14 personnel.”
The revelations support Fox’s claim that the aircraft simply was not airworthy. The Nimrod is designed as a maritime aircraft capable of roles including submarine detection and warfare, and long-range sea rescue.
But the DE&S report found the ability of the new MRA4 aircraft to drop sonar buoys, depth charges or life rafts would be seriously hampered: “The aircraft will enter service with a restriction preventing the opening of the bomb bay doors and a longer term solution has yet to be found.”
It added: “A single bird-strike has a potential to cause it critical damage, which could disable primary aileron flight control to both wings.” The first “few flights” of the first Nimrod saw it failing to deploy its nose landing gear “due to incorrect tolerance design”. Inspectors also found the Nimrod had “severe limitations for operating in icing [sic] conditions”, without going into detail, and said there were unresolved problems with “wing fatigue”.
They also highlighted overheating in the engine bay, and gaps in the engine bay firewalls that BAE Systems had claimed did not exist: “BAES had previously produced a report that incorrectly stated that these had been inspected and met design and build standards.”
The MoD report concluded: “MRA4 carries in total several hundred design non-compliances. Whilst many of these relate to legacy design and necessary design constraints, a significant number (including some of the issues listed above) are not what we would expect to find in a well-designed aircraft.”
Last night, a defence source said: “The project has been a disaster and should have been cancelled years ago.
“There were clearly serious safety concerns about the aircraft, and it is incredible that the flaw that saw 14 people killed near Kandahar was repeated in this new Nimrod. It would cost another £1 billion to fix all these problems, but there comes a point where you just have to say enough is enough.”
BAE Systems said: “At the time of the cancellation of the MRA4 programme, we were working with the Ministry of Defence — in the normal way — to resolve a number of issues relating to the aircraft.
“We are confident that these would have been resolved to enable the aircraft’s entry into service as planned.”  ■

Sunday Times 30 Jan 11
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 09:23
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If the MRA 4 had a similar hot air/fuel problem to that of the MK2, then someone must be stupid. This problem has been flagged up in so many reports since the XV230 accident.

DV
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 09:39
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Naive comment probably, but if that many non compliances, why is MOD paying for it - "not of satisfactory quality" under consumer legislation - OK, I have my coat!

Last edited by Wander00; 30th Jan 2011 at 10:58.
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 09:58
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"The most serious problem discovered by Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) inspectors at MoD Abbey Wood in Bristol involved a stillunresolved design flaw. It concerns the proximity of a hot air pipe to an uninsulated fuel line, widely blamed for an explosion on board Nimrod XV230 on September 2, 2006, near Kandahar airport in Afghanistan. A three-page summary of the faults, labelled “restricted” and written on September 17, last year, stated: “The work being undertaken by the MoD to validate the BAE Systems aircraft’s safety case during the week of September 13, 2010, identified a potentially serious design defect: a small section of a hot air pipe was discovered to be uninsulated in an area that also contains fuel pipes, which is outside the design regulations.” It added: “Parallels could be drawn between this design defect and that which is thought to have caused the loss of the Nimrod MR2 (XV230) in Afghanistan in September 2006 resulting in the death of 14 personnel.”
So the lessons of XV230 and the Hadden-Cave report have had no impact on BAE. This is nothing short of criminal, a public inquiry appears to be needed so the public can see how far the rabbit hole went. I'm pretty sure it was right to the door of at least the last 2 Defence Secretary's.
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 10:09
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If the Sunday Times article is remotely correct, well done the current MRA4 team.

The inevitable public inquiry (!) should ask at what point the following mandated process broke down for each of the identified problems.


· Allocated Development Phase Baseline
· Configuration Management Plan
· System Requirement Review
· Configuration Item Review
· Configuration Item Identification / Selection
· System Design
· Functional Baseline
· Requirements Analysis
· System Design Review
· Configuration Item Specification Review
· Allocated Development Baseline
· Preliminary Design
· Preliminary Design Review
· Detailed Design
· Critical Design Review
· Configuration Item Manufacture
· A Model Build
· Configuration Item Test And Integration
· System Test Readiness Review
· System Test And Integration
· Design Development Review
· Qualification
· Trials Baseline (Preliminary Master Record Index Issued)
· Pre-Production Model Build
· Functional Configuration Audit
· Production (Physical) Configuration Audit
· Product Baseline (Consisting of the MoD approved Master Record Index)
· Production Readiness Review


I’d be particularly keen on the CDRs (underlined) which, you can see, must have taken place a long time ago; and should have been repeated following significant specification changes.

On the other hand, I simply note that in June 1998 senior management in this MoD(PE) Directorate General were formally notified (on another programme) that their ruling that Critical Design Reviews could be waived, yet full payment made with critical safety issues unresolved, should be rescinded as it was absolutely barking and illegal. The notification ends “To not even insist on a CDR when the main subject is electrical and structural integrity of the aircraft is beyond me”. No reply was received and no action taken.

Among the problems listed were invalid safety case, invalid hazard log, unverified stress calculations, HF hazards, electrical bonding, connector design, load shedding, reliability and maintainability. None of these were of any concern (apparently) to either senior staff or the contractor. In the aircraft in question, the problems were resolved by contracting and paying a third party (bearing in mind the prime had already received full payment). But that meant disregarding senior staff instructions. I wonder how often MRA4 disregarded these rulings?

Last edited by tucumseh; 30th Jan 2011 at 10:53.
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 10:34
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As stated in another thread, my gut feeling is that there are far too many issues to make this a viable and more importantly safe platform.

On reflection, it should have been cancelled 8 years ago. How did they resolve the issue associated with the nose wheel, where the pressure required to support the weight of the aircraft was too high, and would risk a blow out on landing. Fundamentally it was one of many issues that required a completely redesigned fuselage IMO.
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 11:32
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A laymans perspective

I've been driven to join in rather than remain a long time lurker.
Firstly, I always viewed the Mighty 'Rod as a spectacular platform manned by the very best in their field (or should I say pond?) and was very upset at the loss of the crew over Afghanistan.
Then, I became increasingly disturbed, disillusioned and disheartened as the truth began to get out. I've viewed Tucumesh as a lone voice in the wilderness fighting an utterly corrupt system. Indeed, I've lost faith in the principles and institutuions upon which I thought our Country rested.

The so called leaders in our armed forces are a pathetic bunch, totally spineless, ingratiating themselves with the political establishment and potential future employers at the expense of their sworn duty. Thank God our people on the frontline have more mettle!
The supplier.... BWoS is a title which I once saw as a rather unfair joke as I felt that they turned out good products and probably had no more problems than any other manufacturer of complex cutting edge military toys. Now I know, if the ST is accurate, differently.

As for the decision to cancel Nimrod. I see two gross errors.
1. Why scrap them? I would have held the supplier to account and required them to make good to a proper standard. Thus rubbing their noses in it and making it emphatically clear that the gravy train is no longer running. Instead we see the government stumping up more funds to scrap them! Question: Who really governs? Corruption?
2. The loss of a vital capability. No, actually several in the case of Nimrod.
Which leaves me to question the real motives behind this... European agenda? Is the Uk a sovereign nation anymore? Answer: No

There are people collecting nice pensions who ought to be behind bars, when it comes to military aviation sfaety, or the lack of it!

MOD... Who are the idiots to allow such slack contract terms? In my experience of fleet purchasing we hammered them down on price, got a specification to suit ourselves and didn't pay until the product was delivered fit for purpose.

Public enquiry? Forget it if you expect a fair outcome that is designed to expose wrongdoing and serve truth & justice. The rules have changed.
Check the Enquiries Act 2005.

Gawd! I get more like Victor Meldrew every day.
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 11:56
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With that list I'm a little surprised we had any flying up here with service crews on - I wonder if anyone involved with the flight testing feels free to confirm or deny that list....


Still, at least now we know what he based his decision on.

Dave
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Old 30th Jan 2011, 12:24
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I've not been near an MRA4, but I've been reliably informed that the exposed part of a hot pipe was/is(?) only a clamp and it was approx 30cm above a fuel feed pipe. OK, not a perfect design, but this was inside an engine compartment, where fire detection and protection existed. For that design to cause a catastrophic failure, there would have to be a fuel leak of sufficient pressure to spray upwards and impinge on the very hot clamp. The fire systems and crew drills would then have to be unable to extinguish the fire.

Engine compartments in all aircraft necessarily bring together the ingredients for a fire, which is why there is fire protection in those zones. Its the nature of the business.

So, lets not get too excited by headline criticism.

Having said that, it is a fact that the specimen production aircraft made available to the RAF engineers (air engs and ground engs) was significantly lacking in build standard. Their findings have been recorded and reported.

The safety case work, sponsored by the MOD as required by the new MAA before a MAR could be issued, had hardly started. There was no way that a MAR would have been issued anytime soon. It would have required the MOD safety case work being subjected to enormous pressure to stay on the existing delivery schedule.
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