Nimrod MRA.4
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There really is nothing worse than someone blaming the state of another companies workmanship, to explain the state of their own.
The inability to accept the human factors inherent in aviation is the first refuge of mostly inexperienced project managers. Not saying you fit into this category, but I see excuse after excuse by managers unable or unwilling to accept the limitations of their knowledge, and who ultimately push through inept decisions.
The conflict between turning a profit and safety is sadly compounded by PT's who expect to have the post Haddon Cave solution and then ask to cut corners.
The inability to accept the human factors inherent in aviation is the first refuge of mostly inexperienced project managers. Not saying you fit into this category, but I see excuse after excuse by managers unable or unwilling to accept the limitations of their knowledge, and who ultimately push through inept decisions.
The conflict between turning a profit and safety is sadly compounded by PT's who expect to have the post Haddon Cave solution and then ask to cut corners.
manccowboy,
The bl@@dy aircraft was overweight, years late and billions over budget. The whole project was a typical illustration of profligate British procurement incompetency starting with MOD(PE), and its oft-named successors, and compounded by British Waste of Space.
The fact that 9 airframes were, allegedly, on the verge of performing was too little too late to shore up a programme that has been a national, financial disaster.
As a Brit I mourn the loss of our maritime capability, but it has been driven by profligacy and, as ever, no-one will ever be held to account.
The bl@@dy aircraft was overweight, years late and billions over budget. The whole project was a typical illustration of profligate British procurement incompetency starting with MOD(PE), and its oft-named successors, and compounded by British Waste of Space.
The fact that 9 airframes were, allegedly, on the verge of performing was too little too late to shore up a programme that has been a national, financial disaster.
As a Brit I mourn the loss of our maritime capability, but it has been driven by profligacy and, as ever, no-one will ever be held to account.
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I remember the talk in '95 and '96 about Nimrod 2000 (ha ha ha)...
I remember being told by a high ranking officer that Nimrod 2000 had export potential...and
I remember BAe Nimrod AEW 3 (how many billions of £'s were wasted on that little project???)
Fool me once, shame on me, fool me twice....
I remember being told by a high ranking officer that Nimrod 2000 had export potential...and
I remember BAe Nimrod AEW 3 (how many billions of £'s were wasted on that little project???)
Fool me once, shame on me, fool me twice....
This book does it for me and illustrates the very issues that we're discussing - "Empire of the Clouds - When Britain's Aircraft Ruled the World" by James Hamilton-Paterson.
Here is what the Guardian's Jonathan Glancey wrote when he critiqued (my underline emphasis added):
Cracking read that I got for Christmas and it certainly explains lots of illustrations of the industry being "terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect". Bottom line is that there was not enough business to fully support the British aircraft industry after 1945 and the numbers that the companies sold to the UK could not support them all - in the end quality suffered as the UK MoD were sold increasingly poor kit for the money they spent.
COTS is the future, as others have mentioned already elsewhere, BAES is now globalised and protection of UK industry no longer 'cuts it' (I read earlier that less than 30% of BAES workforce is from the UK (approx 30k from 107k workforce)).
iRaven
Here is what the Guardian's Jonathan Glancey wrote when he critiqued (my underline emphasis added):
At first, all seems to have gone well. New Elizabethans like the young Hamilton-Paterson thrilled to the feats of test pilots scything the latest experimental jets over and along genteel south coast resorts, or else pirouetting above them at crowded Farnborough air shows. The assumption for boys of Hamilton-Paterson's generation, born during the second world war, was that British was rip-roaringly best.
One new aircraft after another appeared to take to the skies above southern England, each piloted by a self-deprecating daredevil who would as soon jump into the cockpit of some untried bomb-on-wings as whirl a girl in a swirling frock around the floor of the Café de Paris. Hamilton-Paterson cites the likes of Neville Duke, John Cunningham, Roland Beamont and Peter Twiss, as familiar to the public then, he says, as footballers are today, although they were charged with "extra voltage" because they had all flown in the war and were "authentic heroes".
While it was hard not to admire such men, it was harder – much harder – to thrill to the inner workings and commercial dimwittedness of the companies that built the craft they flew. And it is here, at the core of this book, that Hamilton-Paterson is at his convincing best. Britain certainly had the boffins and blueprints to fly into the future; what it lacked was the necessary back-up by politicians, management and labour. The decline of its aircraft industry – one that had shone like fireworks in the 1940s – makes for sorry if illuminating reading.
It is heartbreaking to hear about Beverly Shenstone, the Canadian aerodynamist who shaped the superbly efficient wing of the Spitfire alongside Reginald Mitchell at Supermarine, speaking at an industry conference in 1953. As chief engineer of British European Airways, Shenstone told how, "in the UK, the average finish given to aircraft is far inferior to that given to the average American aircraft". He said he had seen workers dragging wings across factory floors.
Stanley Hooker, chief engineer of the Bristol Aeroplane Company's engine division, believed the "Bristol lunch" to be symptomatic of all that was going wrong with the industry. This meal, he said, was the "biggest obstacle to Bristol's progress". How so? "In each factory, the top man had his own little private dining room. We would start with hot canapés while we partook of sherry. Then we would sit down to a multi-course lunch ending with cheese, fruit and coffee – and, on occasion, brandy." Management of the school of Terry-Thomas proved, far too often, to be little more than a "shower", tucking into club-like luncheons while the industry fell to earth around them.
Hamilton-Paterson reminds us that all too many British production aircraft of the time were little more than prototypes, bristling with faults. The De Havilland Comet jet airliner made its debut in 1951, and yet it took a further six years before its flight was as good as this jet-age Spitfire should have been in the first place.
Wrapped around this tale of Britain and the decline and fall of its native aircraft industry, however, are any number of literary flights of fancy, some that take wing, others that feel a little over-ornate and even unnecessary. If Hamilton-Paterson shows a weakness, it is in the way he sometimes seems like a lively raconteur at a dinner party who has a great story to tell, yet is simply unable to stop himself indulging in diversion after diversion. This makes him speed up at other times, as if trying to keep on course, so that too many aircraft and people come and go as Empire of the Clouds enters its final approach.
One new aircraft after another appeared to take to the skies above southern England, each piloted by a self-deprecating daredevil who would as soon jump into the cockpit of some untried bomb-on-wings as whirl a girl in a swirling frock around the floor of the Café de Paris. Hamilton-Paterson cites the likes of Neville Duke, John Cunningham, Roland Beamont and Peter Twiss, as familiar to the public then, he says, as footballers are today, although they were charged with "extra voltage" because they had all flown in the war and were "authentic heroes".
While it was hard not to admire such men, it was harder – much harder – to thrill to the inner workings and commercial dimwittedness of the companies that built the craft they flew. And it is here, at the core of this book, that Hamilton-Paterson is at his convincing best. Britain certainly had the boffins and blueprints to fly into the future; what it lacked was the necessary back-up by politicians, management and labour. The decline of its aircraft industry – one that had shone like fireworks in the 1940s – makes for sorry if illuminating reading.
It is heartbreaking to hear about Beverly Shenstone, the Canadian aerodynamist who shaped the superbly efficient wing of the Spitfire alongside Reginald Mitchell at Supermarine, speaking at an industry conference in 1953. As chief engineer of British European Airways, Shenstone told how, "in the UK, the average finish given to aircraft is far inferior to that given to the average American aircraft". He said he had seen workers dragging wings across factory floors.
Stanley Hooker, chief engineer of the Bristol Aeroplane Company's engine division, believed the "Bristol lunch" to be symptomatic of all that was going wrong with the industry. This meal, he said, was the "biggest obstacle to Bristol's progress". How so? "In each factory, the top man had his own little private dining room. We would start with hot canapés while we partook of sherry. Then we would sit down to a multi-course lunch ending with cheese, fruit and coffee – and, on occasion, brandy." Management of the school of Terry-Thomas proved, far too often, to be little more than a "shower", tucking into club-like luncheons while the industry fell to earth around them.
Hamilton-Paterson reminds us that all too many British production aircraft of the time were little more than prototypes, bristling with faults. The De Havilland Comet jet airliner made its debut in 1951, and yet it took a further six years before its flight was as good as this jet-age Spitfire should have been in the first place.
Wrapped around this tale of Britain and the decline and fall of its native aircraft industry, however, are any number of literary flights of fancy, some that take wing, others that feel a little over-ornate and even unnecessary. If Hamilton-Paterson shows a weakness, it is in the way he sometimes seems like a lively raconteur at a dinner party who has a great story to tell, yet is simply unable to stop himself indulging in diversion after diversion. This makes him speed up at other times, as if trying to keep on course, so that too many aircraft and people come and go as Empire of the Clouds enters its final approach.
Cracking read that I got for Christmas and it certainly explains lots of illustrations of the industry being "terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect". Bottom line is that there was not enough business to fully support the British aircraft industry after 1945 and the numbers that the companies sold to the UK could not support them all - in the end quality suffered as the UK MoD were sold increasingly poor kit for the money they spent.
COTS is the future, as others have mentioned already elsewhere, BAES is now globalised and protection of UK industry no longer 'cuts it' (I read earlier that less than 30% of BAES workforce is from the UK (approx 30k from 107k workforce)).
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Well at least the B Word is balanced, a huge chip against BAES clearly evident on both shoulders - regardless of the actual suituation.
B word and Biggus should remember to look closer to home too - MoD have not helped themselves in all these situations either.
B word and Biggus should remember to look closer to home too - MoD have not helped themselves in all these situations either.
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Raven
Also got Empire for Crimbo, and, amazingly for me, have almost finished it !
It is a good read, and I'd certainly recommend it to anyone on this thread trying to get their heads round the British aviation industry of the post war era which has led directly to where we are today. I can't believe that lessons have not been learnedand if the whole Nimrod saga is not ripe for a public inquiry into mismanagement and waste, then I don't know what is.
I wonder if Mr Hamilton-Paterson can be persuaded to write about this sorry state of affairs - that's if he can be prised away from his beach hut in the Philippines!
Also got Empire for Crimbo, and, amazingly for me, have almost finished it !
It is a good read, and I'd certainly recommend it to anyone on this thread trying to get their heads round the British aviation industry of the post war era which has led directly to where we are today. I can't believe that lessons have not been learned
and if the whole Nimrod saga is not ripe for a public inquiry into mismanagement and waste, then I don't know what is.I wonder if Mr Hamilton-Paterson can be persuaded to write about this sorry state of affairs - that's if he can be prised away from his beach hut in the Philippines!
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iRaven. Is the "Guardian's Jonathan Glancey" the same one who is their architecture and design correspondent? I wonder if George Wimpey was an expert on building Wellingtons?
The B Word. Just a minor point;
The Nimrod/HS801 wasn't built in "their" factory (presumably Woodford, HSA Avro Whitworth Div) but at Hawarden (HSA de Havilland Div). The production aircraft were assembled at Woodford from Hawarden (now Airbus) built fuselages and mainplanes. I think you will find that most of the fitters and all of the Shop managers who had experienced the joys working with de Havilland components had retired by the time work started on the MK4
In the olden days, a newly designed mainplane would have spent several thousand flying hours in the STS rig to discover such defects. As I understand it, modern CAD/CAM products (Airbus Hawarden?) are tested in a computer simulation. It seems that we are fortunate that prototypes are still test flown.
I'd be curious to know from the Nimrod IPT how often contracts and payments were "reprofiled" to make their overall Budget and that of others plug various gaps.
The B Word. Just a minor point;
Originally Posted by The B Word
So not realising that their own aircraft, built in their factory
Originally Posted by The B Word
Having to re-engineer the flap brackets because 2 out of the 3 cracked completely on a flight test
I'd be curious to know from the Nimrod IPT how often contracts and payments were "reprofiled" to make their overall Budget and that of others plug various gaps.
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GBZ
The answer is yes to the first question, hopefully not to the latter; my first Wimpey home developed more cracks than a Comet 1- see full article below. I have no idea how 'expert' he is compared to all the 'experts' on here, however he does appear to have some aviation provenance, having written a well regarded book on the Spitfire. He also appears to be a pilot himself - so no, probably not expert!
Empire of the Clouds by James Hamilton-Paterson ? review | Books | The Guardian
Indeed - these and many other questions should be aired in public and answered in public.
iRaven. Is the "Guardian's Jonathan Glancey" the same one who is their architecture and design correspondent? I wonder if George Wimpey was an expert on building Wellingtons?
Empire of the Clouds by James Hamilton-Paterson ? review | Books | The Guardian
I'd be curious to know from the Nimrod IPT how often contracts and payments were "reprofiled" to make their overall Budget and that of others plug various gaps.
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To be fair to manccowboy, I understand that emotions are running high. Those outside BAE treat it as a whole but those of us on the inside knew differently. The internal bickering within BAE was pretty bad but some the decisions within MOD and the RAF needed looking at as well.
I think that the problem was that yes, BAE had design authority on MR2, initially at Woodford and latterly at Chadderton so why the hell did they place the design leadership at Warton? If it was placed at Woodford in the first place, many of the issues would have been overcome in the early days, by those that understood MR2. By the time the issues were raised it too late. The reasons the aircraft was so late are long and complex but to cancel it after so much effort and expenditure seems bizarre at best. I don’t believe however that all of the issues which had dogged the project were fully resolved when it was cancelled and IMHO, it should have cancelled in about 2000. Mustn’t complain too much as it gave me 5 years employment.
All-in-all not one of the British aircraft industry’s finest moments.
I think that the problem was that yes, BAE had design authority on MR2, initially at Woodford and latterly at Chadderton so why the hell did they place the design leadership at Warton? If it was placed at Woodford in the first place, many of the issues would have been overcome in the early days, by those that understood MR2. By the time the issues were raised it too late. The reasons the aircraft was so late are long and complex but to cancel it after so much effort and expenditure seems bizarre at best. I don’t believe however that all of the issues which had dogged the project were fully resolved when it was cancelled and IMHO, it should have cancelled in about 2000. Mustn’t complain too much as it gave me 5 years employment.
All-in-all not one of the British aircraft industry’s finest moments.
Interesting thread ! Sounds like all we have to do is buy the project and invest another £2.4 B, perhaps fit a new fuselage, possibly tweek the radars and a few bits here and there and in just 10 years we could have a world beating project with export potential. Anyone want to chip in towards the £2.4B?
bb
bb
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I believe that DC, apparently against the advice of his Def Sec and senior air commander, had already decided that MRA4 did not fit in with his plans for an increasingly Euro-centric vision of Defence, in particular, an Anglo-French cost saving alliance. The project budget overrun, and apparently continuing safety issues simply gave him a convenient hook on which to hang this decision. That, and the ability to attach Nimrod 'bad news' onto the previous Labour administration, made it a neat judgement for him. Nice politics, Dave.
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Its all very well cancelling a "big ticket" project at the beginning of its lifecycle to teach BAES a lesson, but cancelling it at the end when its pretty much all bought and paid for, BAES have the money and they probably couldn't give a stuff about the cancellation as it'll have little effect on their bottom line, and they have a ready-built excuse to shed staff? Yeh, thats really going to teach them a lesson!
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I don't think this is teaching BAES anything! Thats my point! Who are the losers here? It isn't BAES - they got most if not all of the money they were owed I'd imagine, and thats before any cancellation clause. The loser here is the taxpayer and the forces - and the RAF / Navy in particular! We've just cut our nose off to spite our face!
If it IS teaching BAES anything, it is to make damn sure they keep including water tight cancellation clauses in all their contracts, because frankly the MoD will continue to be stupid enough to sign and and governments stupid enough to cancel things without any thought to the consequences!
If the government had perhaps threatened future submarine purchases, or any T45 / T26 orders, then perhaps BAES might have taken notice.
However BAES is still one of the biggest British owned private sector and industrial employers in this country - whatever its faults. Its one of the biggest arms manufacturers in the world. It makes this country a lot of money. It has no domestic competition, so they'll get first dibs on everything, whether we need it or not, or whether COTS would be as good an option. As much as most people don't seem to like BAES or its products, I don't honestly see ANY government doing anything to truly threaten the company - quite the opposite in fact! We'll continue to pay for its products - be they home grown or license built - whatever the price, even if they get cancelled.
and you know what? I doubt BoLockMartGrummOrp or Sukhoyan Yakovich are any different, and COTS only works if you accept something older / mature, rather than new and cutting edge.
If it IS teaching BAES anything, it is to make damn sure they keep including water tight cancellation clauses in all their contracts, because frankly the MoD will continue to be stupid enough to sign and and governments stupid enough to cancel things without any thought to the consequences!
If the government had perhaps threatened future submarine purchases, or any T45 / T26 orders, then perhaps BAES might have taken notice.
However BAES is still one of the biggest British owned private sector and industrial employers in this country - whatever its faults. Its one of the biggest arms manufacturers in the world. It makes this country a lot of money. It has no domestic competition, so they'll get first dibs on everything, whether we need it or not, or whether COTS would be as good an option. As much as most people don't seem to like BAES or its products, I don't honestly see ANY government doing anything to truly threaten the company - quite the opposite in fact! We'll continue to pay for its products - be they home grown or license built - whatever the price, even if they get cancelled.
and you know what? I doubt BoLockMartGrummOrp or Sukhoyan Yakovich are any different, and COTS only works if you accept something older / mature, rather than new and cutting edge.
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The loser here is the taxpayer and the forces - and the RAF / Navy in particular!
The RAF/Navy will get new toys when the economy recovers. The taxpayer is always getting screwed, that wont change.The losers here are the many thousands of people, engineers, RAF personnel, local businesses etc that depended on the MRA4 and all the Nimrod derivatives over the years for their living.
Half these dicks in the present government are multi millionaires and wouldn't know a days work if it hit them in the face. They don't have a clue about making ends meet and living on a budget.
Maybe they should get there arses down to Woodford and tell the workforce face to face they have made a shoddy product like some in this thread claim, explain why they increased foreign aid when cutting everything else.
This country's a bloody joke
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I'm not going to argue with much of that, but I'd be surprised if we do get toys when the economy recovers. If we can do without them between now and then, we can do without them forever.
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maybe Mr Fox is following the advice of lobbyists he met in the US who no doubt were promoting the P8.
Or was it a save tornado at all costs descision by the RAF?
We're following the Dutch lead with MPA wonder will we follow the New Zealanders and Belgians when it comes to typhoon replacement?
Or was it a save tornado at all costs descision by the RAF?
We're following the Dutch lead with MPA wonder will we follow the New Zealanders and Belgians when it comes to typhoon replacement?
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DPA v BAES
In my humble opinion (based on working with both organisations) the following was true.
BAES cared about profit and not product.
MODPE/DPA cared about process not product.
See the common link, no wonder the product failed.
Whilst all of the aircrew on the IPT were Nimrod experienced, quite a few engineers, especially the senior ones, were not. And of course the officers were posted every 3 to 5 years, otherwise their careers would stagnate. In contrast, service personnel cared most about product but they were not empowered.
Like most things in life, not a single cause for the demise, but when added together it comes as no surprise to find such projects late and over budget.
For DC to cancel the project to make a point that he is a strong leader ( a view I personally feel is not far from the truth) merely demonstrates what happens when student politics is applied to the real world.
Kawasaki XP1 (no not a motorbike), what price we build it under license in 5 years time? The politics (UN not national-well maybe) would be immense but you have to start somewhere. A snip at $114m each.
BAES cared about profit and not product.
MODPE/DPA cared about process not product.
See the common link, no wonder the product failed.
Whilst all of the aircrew on the IPT were Nimrod experienced, quite a few engineers, especially the senior ones, were not. And of course the officers were posted every 3 to 5 years, otherwise their careers would stagnate. In contrast, service personnel cared most about product but they were not empowered.
Like most things in life, not a single cause for the demise, but when added together it comes as no surprise to find such projects late and over budget.
For DC to cancel the project to make a point that he is a strong leader ( a view I personally feel is not far from the truth) merely demonstrates what happens when student politics is applied to the real world.
Kawasaki XP1 (no not a motorbike), what price we build it under license in 5 years time? The politics (UN not national-well maybe) would be immense but you have to start somewhere. A snip at $114m each.
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This will be my last post on here, but just to respond to the following statement:
"BAES cared about profit and not product."
Quite rightly so. BAES are a PLC and are primarily there to satisfy their shareholders. The profit they make as a result (largely from overseas trade) allow them to pay huge taxes which in turn help to pay the wages of the RAF/MoD personnel.
But don't confuse the primary motivation of the company with the primary motivation of the company employees. In many cases, the engineers at BAES care an awful lot more about the product than many of the RAF/MoD personnel. After all, they design and build the product - so they feel ownership (even though the taxpayer pays for it ultimately). As the MoD/RAF are simply users of the product (not too dissimilar to bus drivers really), why would they care more about it? They haven't designed it - they haven't built it - they haven't paid for it. How could they possibly care more about it than the engineers at BAES?
Over.
Ciao.
"BAES cared about profit and not product."
Quite rightly so. BAES are a PLC and are primarily there to satisfy their shareholders. The profit they make as a result (largely from overseas trade) allow them to pay huge taxes which in turn help to pay the wages of the RAF/MoD personnel.
But don't confuse the primary motivation of the company with the primary motivation of the company employees. In many cases, the engineers at BAES care an awful lot more about the product than many of the RAF/MoD personnel. After all, they design and build the product - so they feel ownership (even though the taxpayer pays for it ultimately). As the MoD/RAF are simply users of the product (not too dissimilar to bus drivers really), why would they care more about it? They haven't designed it - they haven't built it - they haven't paid for it. How could they possibly care more about it than the engineers at BAES?
Over.
Ciao.
Last edited by mra4eng; 7th Jan 2011 at 17:26.
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How could they possibly care more about it than the engineers at BAES?
No disrespect to XV230 and similar intended (ie unnecessary)