A400 Doomed?
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This is a good idea:
Air Force Copies Marines’ “Bolt-On” Gunship Plan
Sunday July 05th 2009, 10:58 pm
Filed under: Up in the Air, David Axe
061013-f-9999w-001.jpg
by DAVID AXE
The Marines have always envied the Air Force’s two dozen AC-130 gunships — which, with their accurate guns and long loiter times, count as some of the deadliest weapons in U.S. wars. This spring, the Marines decided to buy nine kits for their KC-130J tanker-transports, each kit comprising Hellfire and Viper Strike missiles and bolt-on sensors — with a door gun, optional. The result, code-named Harvest Hawk, turns a tanker into a gunship, in just four hours, on the cheap.
Now the twist: the Air Force has struggled for years to build a new gunship to replace the AC-130s, which average more than 20 years old. The AC-X gunship concept went nowhere. The AC-XX “gunship lite” program, meant to turn the twin-engine C-27J transport into a small gunship, apparently died this year, when the Pentagon cut the C-27J program in half. So now the Air Force is borrowing the Harvest Hawk idea, adding “sensors, communication systems, precision guided munitions and a single medium-caliber gun” to eight MC-130W infiltration transports, pictured, according to budget documents. ...
War Is Boring
Air Force Copies Marines’ “Bolt-On” Gunship Plan
Sunday July 05th 2009, 10:58 pm
Filed under: Up in the Air, David Axe
061013-f-9999w-001.jpg
by DAVID AXE
The Marines have always envied the Air Force’s two dozen AC-130 gunships — which, with their accurate guns and long loiter times, count as some of the deadliest weapons in U.S. wars. This spring, the Marines decided to buy nine kits for their KC-130J tanker-transports, each kit comprising Hellfire and Viper Strike missiles and bolt-on sensors — with a door gun, optional. The result, code-named Harvest Hawk, turns a tanker into a gunship, in just four hours, on the cheap.
Now the twist: the Air Force has struggled for years to build a new gunship to replace the AC-130s, which average more than 20 years old. The AC-X gunship concept went nowhere. The AC-XX “gunship lite” program, meant to turn the twin-engine C-27J transport into a small gunship, apparently died this year, when the Pentagon cut the C-27J program in half. So now the Air Force is borrowing the Harvest Hawk idea, adding “sensors, communication systems, precision guided munitions and a single medium-caliber gun” to eight MC-130W infiltration transports, pictured, according to budget documents. ...
War Is Boring
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Release the Gunships! Part Two
Tuesday October 02nd 2007, 9:33 pm
Filed under: Up in the Air, Other Side of the COIN
The Air Force is struggling to adapt its Cold War airplanes and attitudes to new counter-insurgency fights. On Monday I introduced Major Robert Seifert, an AC-130 pilot who, in an excellent article, proposed putting the sensor-laden, heavily-armed gunships at the front of a new COIN strategy.
...
Q: So if you were in charge, what would you do to improve Air Force COIN capability?
Seifert: If I were King, I’d have several irregular-warfare wings, but I’d break them down between [Close Air Support] and transport wings. I found no synergy from being part of a wing that had transports and CAS aircraft. For example, I’d have an irregular wing of A-10s, AC-130s, an OV-10-type aircraft — and I think the small gunship is an awesome idea. Not necessarily for operating out of small airstrips, but for the ability to buy enough of them so they’re not hoarded and so they don’t cause the Air Force to only have two dozen like they do the present gunships. A small gunship with one or two 30-mm cannons and a crew of about four would be awesome. I also would put the wings in ACC versus AFSOC, as I found AFSOC deep in their heart only wants to support “special ops” ground forces, whereas I have found ACC wants to kill bad guys for whoever was nice enough to point them out. The transport irregular warfare wing would obviously have some C-130s, CV-22s and a small transport. And both wings though would have a … squadron for training friendly forces on how to operate the various wing aircraft.
...
War Is Boring
Tuesday October 02nd 2007, 9:33 pm
Filed under: Up in the Air, Other Side of the COIN
The Air Force is struggling to adapt its Cold War airplanes and attitudes to new counter-insurgency fights. On Monday I introduced Major Robert Seifert, an AC-130 pilot who, in an excellent article, proposed putting the sensor-laden, heavily-armed gunships at the front of a new COIN strategy.
...
Q: So if you were in charge, what would you do to improve Air Force COIN capability?
Seifert: If I were King, I’d have several irregular-warfare wings, but I’d break them down between [Close Air Support] and transport wings. I found no synergy from being part of a wing that had transports and CAS aircraft. For example, I’d have an irregular wing of A-10s, AC-130s, an OV-10-type aircraft — and I think the small gunship is an awesome idea. Not necessarily for operating out of small airstrips, but for the ability to buy enough of them so they’re not hoarded and so they don’t cause the Air Force to only have two dozen like they do the present gunships. A small gunship with one or two 30-mm cannons and a crew of about four would be awesome. I also would put the wings in ACC versus AFSOC, as I found AFSOC deep in their heart only wants to support “special ops” ground forces, whereas I have found ACC wants to kill bad guys for whoever was nice enough to point them out. The transport irregular warfare wing would obviously have some C-130s, CV-22s and a small transport. And both wings though would have a … squadron for training friendly forces on how to operate the various wing aircraft.
...
War Is Boring
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Airbus Needs U.S. Help to Dispose of Elephant
Commentary by Celestine Bohlen
Airbus Needs U.S. Help to Dispose of Elephant: Celestine Bohlen - Bloomberg.com
July 7 (Bloomberg) -- Can elephants fly?
That’s one way of looking at the Airbus A400M military- transport plane, which a group of mostly European nations has been trying to get off the ground since 2003.
It’s time to get real. Time and money are running out, and the four-engine turboprop plane designed to ferry troops and equipment still hasn’t even had a test flight.
After a delay of almost four years, and cost overruns that are digging into profits, the European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co. should pull the plug on this 20 billion-euro ($28 billion) project, and let its customers buy American.
With 6,000 jobs at stake, this would cause economic pain and howls of political protests. European pride would be wounded, and the reputation of the region’s defense industry would be badly damaged.
There may be a solution: If the Europeans swallow their pride, and buy American military-transport planes, then maybe the U.S. Air Force could stifle its own protectionist urges and award a much-disputed $40 billion contract for aerial-refueling tankers to EADS and its U.S. partner, Northrop Grumman Corp.
The Europeans have a refueling tanker -- the A330-200 -- which is already up and flying. The Americans have well-tested military-transport planes. Why reinvent the wheel when there is one already on the shelf?
Surely, burden sharing is what the trans-Atlantic alliance is all about. Why should the U.S. and Europe be duking it out for orders when in another 20 years, they will both be desperate to save their defense industries from being cannibalized by China and India?
Camel-Like
The point isn’t to chip away at one aerospace industry at the expense of the other, but rather to save them both. Letting politics dictate business decisions -- or tying down political projects with commercial contracts -- isn’t the way to go. The A400M is one example.
Politics have plagued the project from the start. Early on, EADS was forced to pick a group of European companies, including Rolls-Royce Group Plc to make the plane’s engine, instead of Pratt & Whitney, whose price was better.
The project has become a kind of Christmas tree, with the different governments trying to add on special features, such as low-flying or all-weather capability. The result is a product that looks more like a camel than a racehorse, according to Bernard Jenkin, a Conservative member of the U.K. Parliament who sits on the House of Commons defense committee.
“We should dump it,” he said. “It was always a political airplane.”
Capability Gap
EADS has already had to book 2.3 billion euros in charges for the A400M, denting its profits. Its customers -- France, Germany, the U.K., Luxembourg, Spain, Belgium and Turkey -- have twice pushed back a deadline for contract renegotiations, with the latest set for this month.
As they wait for the plane, now due in 2013, France and Germany, with contracts for 50 and 60 planes respectively, have had to check out alternatives to fill their capability gap. These include Boeing Co.’s C-17, the Lockheed Martin C-130J or even the Antonov 124, built in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the U.K., which seems to be trying to wriggle out of its order for 25 planes, is leasing six C-17s for the Royal Air Force. All three countries badly need military- transport planes for their operations in Afghanistan.
No wonder people talk about the A400M as a nightmare.
Looming Catastrophe
Nick Witney, a former director of the European Defense Agency, calls it a disaster. “If it doesn’t proceed to producing an aircraft, it will be a catastrophe,” he said. “The stakes are huge.”
From its inception, the A400M -- which began life as the Future Large Aircraft -- has been plagued by bad decisions, hubris and the problems that come from design-by-committee, particularly when the committee is made up of Air Force generals, each with their own demands.
For EADS and its Airbus unit, the main concern is the original 2003 contract, which it is now trying to renegotiate so that the customers shoulder some of the burden of the cost overruns. Naturally, no government wants to be presented with that kind of bill -- especially for a plane that has yet to fly -- in the middle of a recession.
‘Plane That Works’
With hindsight, everybody agrees the project’s original timeframe was unrealistic. As a report issued this spring by a French Senate Committee concluded, EADS “underestimated the size of the challenge,” which itself is an understatement.
Europe and the U.S. have a healthy competition going between Airbus and Boeing. That has spurred both airline companies to keep costs down and improve their products.
But in the military sphere, this competition is getting in the way of delivery. If Europe is to have a credible defense capability, it needs to be able to move its troops, tanks and equipment around.
Before they start throwing more good money after bad, the governments involved should think about their priorities. As a top adviser to French President Nicolas Sarkozy said this week: “All we want is a plane that works.”
(Celestine Bohlen is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.)
Airbus Needs U.S. Help to Dispose of Elephant: Celestine Bohlen - Bloomberg.com
July 7 (Bloomberg) -- Can elephants fly?
That’s one way of looking at the Airbus A400M military- transport plane, which a group of mostly European nations has been trying to get off the ground since 2003.
It’s time to get real. Time and money are running out, and the four-engine turboprop plane designed to ferry troops and equipment still hasn’t even had a test flight.
After a delay of almost four years, and cost overruns that are digging into profits, the European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co. should pull the plug on this 20 billion-euro ($28 billion) project, and let its customers buy American.
With 6,000 jobs at stake, this would cause economic pain and howls of political protests. European pride would be wounded, and the reputation of the region’s defense industry would be badly damaged.
There may be a solution: If the Europeans swallow their pride, and buy American military-transport planes, then maybe the U.S. Air Force could stifle its own protectionist urges and award a much-disputed $40 billion contract for aerial-refueling tankers to EADS and its U.S. partner, Northrop Grumman Corp.
The Europeans have a refueling tanker -- the A330-200 -- which is already up and flying. The Americans have well-tested military-transport planes. Why reinvent the wheel when there is one already on the shelf?
Surely, burden sharing is what the trans-Atlantic alliance is all about. Why should the U.S. and Europe be duking it out for orders when in another 20 years, they will both be desperate to save their defense industries from being cannibalized by China and India?
Camel-Like
The point isn’t to chip away at one aerospace industry at the expense of the other, but rather to save them both. Letting politics dictate business decisions -- or tying down political projects with commercial contracts -- isn’t the way to go. The A400M is one example.
Politics have plagued the project from the start. Early on, EADS was forced to pick a group of European companies, including Rolls-Royce Group Plc to make the plane’s engine, instead of Pratt & Whitney, whose price was better.
The project has become a kind of Christmas tree, with the different governments trying to add on special features, such as low-flying or all-weather capability. The result is a product that looks more like a camel than a racehorse, according to Bernard Jenkin, a Conservative member of the U.K. Parliament who sits on the House of Commons defense committee.
“We should dump it,” he said. “It was always a political airplane.”
Capability Gap
EADS has already had to book 2.3 billion euros in charges for the A400M, denting its profits. Its customers -- France, Germany, the U.K., Luxembourg, Spain, Belgium and Turkey -- have twice pushed back a deadline for contract renegotiations, with the latest set for this month.
As they wait for the plane, now due in 2013, France and Germany, with contracts for 50 and 60 planes respectively, have had to check out alternatives to fill their capability gap. These include Boeing Co.’s C-17, the Lockheed Martin C-130J or even the Antonov 124, built in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the U.K., which seems to be trying to wriggle out of its order for 25 planes, is leasing six C-17s for the Royal Air Force. All three countries badly need military- transport planes for their operations in Afghanistan.
No wonder people talk about the A400M as a nightmare.
Looming Catastrophe
Nick Witney, a former director of the European Defense Agency, calls it a disaster. “If it doesn’t proceed to producing an aircraft, it will be a catastrophe,” he said. “The stakes are huge.”
From its inception, the A400M -- which began life as the Future Large Aircraft -- has been plagued by bad decisions, hubris and the problems that come from design-by-committee, particularly when the committee is made up of Air Force generals, each with their own demands.
For EADS and its Airbus unit, the main concern is the original 2003 contract, which it is now trying to renegotiate so that the customers shoulder some of the burden of the cost overruns. Naturally, no government wants to be presented with that kind of bill -- especially for a plane that has yet to fly -- in the middle of a recession.
‘Plane That Works’
With hindsight, everybody agrees the project’s original timeframe was unrealistic. As a report issued this spring by a French Senate Committee concluded, EADS “underestimated the size of the challenge,” which itself is an understatement.
Europe and the U.S. have a healthy competition going between Airbus and Boeing. That has spurred both airline companies to keep costs down and improve their products.
But in the military sphere, this competition is getting in the way of delivery. If Europe is to have a credible defense capability, it needs to be able to move its troops, tanks and equipment around.
Before they start throwing more good money after bad, the governments involved should think about their priorities. As a top adviser to French President Nicolas Sarkozy said this week: “All we want is a plane that works.”
(Celestine Bohlen is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.)
Celestine Bohlen is a Bloomberg News columnist. The opinions expressed are her own.
Now run along and worry about knitting and kittens, there's a good dear.....
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Those opinions would be more credible if the basic facts were correct.
The original "lease" was for 4 aircraft, which have subsequently been bought outright, as have the 2 additional frames.
It's not difficult to get things correct, but if the basic stuff is wrong, then all credibility goes out the window.
Whether people want to admit it or not, the A400 will fill a capability gap that neither Albert nor the 17 can fill.
One is too small, the other too big. If there was a viable alternative then that would be another story, but there isn't.
Meanwhile, the U.K., ....., is leasing six C-17s for the Royal Air Force.
It's not difficult to get things correct, but if the basic stuff is wrong, then all credibility goes out the window.
Whether people want to admit it or not, the A400 will fill a capability gap that neither Albert nor the 17 can fill.
One is too small, the other too big. If there was a viable alternative then that would be another story, but there isn't.
That is one awesome load of undiluted codswallop.
If the Europeans swallow their pride, and buy American military-transport planes, then maybe the U.S. Air Force could stifle its own protectionist urges and award a much-disputed $40 billion contract for aerial-refueling tankers to EADS and its U.S. partner, Northrop Grumman Corp.
Errrm... the USAF already did that.
No wonder people talk about the A400M as a nightmare. Nick Witney, a former director of the European Defense Agency, calls it a disaster.
Strong words. The trouble is that it's the opposite of what he said.
“If it doesn’t proceed to producing an aircraft, it will be a catastrophe,” he said.
If the Europeans swallow their pride, and buy American military-transport planes, then maybe the U.S. Air Force could stifle its own protectionist urges and award a much-disputed $40 billion contract for aerial-refueling tankers to EADS and its U.S. partner, Northrop Grumman Corp.
Errrm... the USAF already did that.
No wonder people talk about the A400M as a nightmare. Nick Witney, a former director of the European Defense Agency, calls it a disaster.
Strong words. The trouble is that it's the opposite of what he said.
“If it doesn’t proceed to producing an aircraft, it will be a catastrophe,” he said.
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One is too small, the other too big. If there was a viable alternative then that would be another story, but there isn't
Oooh, one chair is too big, and that other chair is too small! said Goldilocks. And that porridge is much too hot, and this porridge is much too cool, but this bowl of porridge is just right for me! ... and so Goldilocks' story goes on ...
Oooh, one chair is too big, and that other chair is too small! said Goldilocks. And that porridge is much too hot, and this porridge is much too cool, but this bowl of porridge is just right for me! ... and so Goldilocks' story goes on ...
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One is too small, the other too big. If there was a viable alternative then that would be another story, but there isn't.
That is not an excuse for procuring the wrong kit if it is all that is available, but it is the main reason why money should not be pumped into a development that fails to achieve what it set out to do for a reasonable cost.
Yes, the A400M would do a huge range of tasks that are unfulfilled by either the C17 or C130 alone at present, but together they manage, and both are available to purchase at a lower cost to the Exchequer (under the assumption that an A400M bailout is required). Do you want one piece of kit to do everything (much capability of which is unused day-to-day), or two pieces of kit that specialise in the tasks required, each having different strengths and weaknesses. It is of course nice to be able to do anything, anytime with the one piece of kit, but if unused in the vast majority of ocassions, it is wasted.
If there was further demand for it (among NATO/Western-allied countries that is), the market would produce it. If the A400M cannot attract further orders, and costs per unit continue to inflate, it should be cancelled.
That surely is the lesson of the Nimrod 2000, or did we not take that one onboard?
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Its a shame that the A400m may bite the dust as compition would force Beoing and Lockheed to produce an improved product range instead of being able to sit back and rake in the cash.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Davies hints at A400M cancellation
Wednesday, July 08, 2009
Divisions are growing within the MoD and government over what to do with the troubled A400M programme, after a defence minister made comments yesterday which were in sharp contrast to the ones made by Prime Minister Gordon Brown just a day earlier in regards to the A400M.
Minister for defence equipment and support Quentin Davies told reporters yesterday that Britain "may not" be part of a renegotiated contract for the A400M. Just a day earlier, Brown had told a press conference that he wanted to see the A400M produced.
Davies has become an outspoken critic of the programme in recent months in a sign that he is likely resisting proposals by other partnering nations to carry ahead with a programme four years late and already a billion euros over budget.
"I have to say that we have very little time left and it would be quite irresponsible to express undue optimism about the prospects of a successful renegotiation involving the U.K.," Davies said in an interview in Glasgow. "Other countries may take a different view, of course."
While avoiding direct criticism of the manufacturer EADS, Davies reiterated that Britain has made its requirements clear for a new contract and if they are not met, Britain will walk away.
So far according to Davies, the Britain's terms are not being met. Aerospace officials speculate that the main "terms" put forth by Britain are for EADS to shoulder most of the additional costs. Engine troubles and design flaws have caused the delays and cost overruns. EADS has claimed it could go bankrupt if it has to pay all of the cost increases.
If Britain walks away from the programme it will most likely have to buy additional C-130Js and C-17s.
Wednesday, July 08, 2009
Divisions are growing within the MoD and government over what to do with the troubled A400M programme, after a defence minister made comments yesterday which were in sharp contrast to the ones made by Prime Minister Gordon Brown just a day earlier in regards to the A400M.
Minister for defence equipment and support Quentin Davies told reporters yesterday that Britain "may not" be part of a renegotiated contract for the A400M. Just a day earlier, Brown had told a press conference that he wanted to see the A400M produced.
Davies has become an outspoken critic of the programme in recent months in a sign that he is likely resisting proposals by other partnering nations to carry ahead with a programme four years late and already a billion euros over budget.
"I have to say that we have very little time left and it would be quite irresponsible to express undue optimism about the prospects of a successful renegotiation involving the U.K.," Davies said in an interview in Glasgow. "Other countries may take a different view, of course."
While avoiding direct criticism of the manufacturer EADS, Davies reiterated that Britain has made its requirements clear for a new contract and if they are not met, Britain will walk away.
So far according to Davies, the Britain's terms are not being met. Aerospace officials speculate that the main "terms" put forth by Britain are for EADS to shoulder most of the additional costs. Engine troubles and design flaws have caused the delays and cost overruns. EADS has claimed it could go bankrupt if it has to pay all of the cost increases.
If Britain walks away from the programme it will most likely have to buy additional C-130Js and C-17s.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
And now, the differences between the JSF and the A400M 
This Bloomberg article on the seemingly intractable problems with the Airbus A400M military transporter is a reminder of the risks of reality suspension in defence projects world wide.
The A400M has the potential to destroy government funds on a European scale, in terms of cancellation and total loss of investment.
But the JSF, which is looking tragically short of capabilities to destroy enemy aircraft and targets, has the capability of destroying western defence budgets world wide.
Europe needs to try harder.
This Bloomberg article on the seemingly intractable problems with the Airbus A400M military transporter is a reminder of the risks of reality suspension in defence projects world wide.
The A400M has the potential to destroy government funds on a European scale, in terms of cancellation and total loss of investment.
But the JSF, which is looking tragically short of capabilities to destroy enemy aircraft and targets, has the capability of destroying western defence budgets world wide.
Europe needs to try harder.
Good point, ORAC.
In fact, our lad Quentin should consider that while an overrun on 25 A400Ms may be painful, his operation is (so far) unhesitatingly committed to 75-140 JSFs which are two years behind the 2004 schedule, have no fixed price and are overweight to the point where they may need to perform risky SRVLs.
And he has no vote at all on a decision which will saddle him with a monopoly supplier for an engine which has already delayed the program and already costs too much, and which faces a large and undisclosed bill for a thrust increase to restore performance.
In fact, our lad Quentin should consider that while an overrun on 25 A400Ms may be painful, his operation is (so far) unhesitatingly committed to 75-140 JSFs which are two years behind the 2004 schedule, have no fixed price and are overweight to the point where they may need to perform risky SRVLs.
And he has no vote at all on a decision which will saddle him with a monopoly supplier for an engine which has already delayed the program and already costs too much, and which faces a large and undisclosed bill for a thrust increase to restore performance.
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Re ORAC post jsf ........???? http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...er-hornet.html
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The Half-Full, Half-Empty A400M Glass
Comment by Dr. Ezio Bonsignore, Editor-in-Chief of MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (MILTECH) 09:16 GMT, July 27, 2009
With so many exceedingly important factors, interests and considerations being involved in the A400M saga, and with quite a few of them being in contradiction with each other, it was arguably unavoidable that even the most prudent and logical decision being taken in trying to identify a way forward for the programme would leave a bittersweet taste in one’s mouth.
The member countries have now decided on a further “grace period” until the end of the year, which comes on top of the previous three-month extension granted in April. This implies that at least for the time being, the member countries do not intend to cancel the programme, nor do they want to punish EADS by imposing the financial penalties they are entitled to. Rather, the months ahead will be used to try and define a new overall structure for the programme that would necessarily require a complete renegotiation of technical goals, time schedules and costs.
In itself, the decision to carry on with the A400M makes eminent sense. The European Air Forces do need a new transport aircraft for both tactical and strategic roles, and there is plenty of political and industrial reasons to argue for this to be a European-designed and –manufactured plane. No matter the very strong reservations one might have about the appalling mixture of incompetence and arrogance EADS displayed in handling the project, it remains that at this point in time for the member countries to completely cancel the programme would come dangerously close to cut off one’s nose to spite one’s face. The money that could be extracted from EADS as penalties and compensations, and the malignant satisfaction of “teaching ‘em a lesson”, would be a very meagre counterbalance to the unmitigated disaster of a cancellation.
Yet, one cannot avoid being disturbed by certain aspects and implications of the decision as announced in Le Castelet.
First of all, there is nothing in the wording of the communiqué to sternly indicate the end of the year as the absolute final deadline for the programme to be brought back on track. Unfortunately, past experience is only too clear a pointer to the dangers of leaving industry in the comfortable perception that as a monopolistic supplier, they are virtually guaranteed against any conceivable harsh move. What is supposed to happen, should 31 December 2009 fail to bring about real and tangible results? Another farcical six-month extension, perhaps? And so on and so on?
Even more significantly and indeed alarmingly, there is nothing in either the official communiqué or the accompanying commentaries to suggest that the lessons of the past mistakes have been duly understood, and steps will be implemented to avoid repeating them.
The programme will be renegotiated, which in clear terms will unavoidably mean giving EADS more time and more money to design and produce an aircraft, substantially below the original performance and specifications. And so be it. But there is not the slightest hint at the programme being also revised as regards its management and overall structure. EADS has finally been able to correct some long-standing weaknesses in the organisation of Airbus Military (to be honest to them, these weaknesses were not EADS’ own fault and rather stemmed from political interference), but it is still too early to assess whether this move will really have a positive impact on the A400M programme. And on the other side of the fence, the governments quite clearly have not the slightest intention to give OCCAR, which is formally in charge of managing the programme on their behalf, the level of authority and responsibility it would need.
This is not a good omen.
Comment by Dr. Ezio Bonsignore, Editor-in-Chief of MILITARY TECHNOLOGY (MILTECH) 09:16 GMT, July 27, 2009
With so many exceedingly important factors, interests and considerations being involved in the A400M saga, and with quite a few of them being in contradiction with each other, it was arguably unavoidable that even the most prudent and logical decision being taken in trying to identify a way forward for the programme would leave a bittersweet taste in one’s mouth.
The member countries have now decided on a further “grace period” until the end of the year, which comes on top of the previous three-month extension granted in April. This implies that at least for the time being, the member countries do not intend to cancel the programme, nor do they want to punish EADS by imposing the financial penalties they are entitled to. Rather, the months ahead will be used to try and define a new overall structure for the programme that would necessarily require a complete renegotiation of technical goals, time schedules and costs.
In itself, the decision to carry on with the A400M makes eminent sense. The European Air Forces do need a new transport aircraft for both tactical and strategic roles, and there is plenty of political and industrial reasons to argue for this to be a European-designed and –manufactured plane. No matter the very strong reservations one might have about the appalling mixture of incompetence and arrogance EADS displayed in handling the project, it remains that at this point in time for the member countries to completely cancel the programme would come dangerously close to cut off one’s nose to spite one’s face. The money that could be extracted from EADS as penalties and compensations, and the malignant satisfaction of “teaching ‘em a lesson”, would be a very meagre counterbalance to the unmitigated disaster of a cancellation.
Yet, one cannot avoid being disturbed by certain aspects and implications of the decision as announced in Le Castelet.
First of all, there is nothing in the wording of the communiqué to sternly indicate the end of the year as the absolute final deadline for the programme to be brought back on track. Unfortunately, past experience is only too clear a pointer to the dangers of leaving industry in the comfortable perception that as a monopolistic supplier, they are virtually guaranteed against any conceivable harsh move. What is supposed to happen, should 31 December 2009 fail to bring about real and tangible results? Another farcical six-month extension, perhaps? And so on and so on?
Even more significantly and indeed alarmingly, there is nothing in either the official communiqué or the accompanying commentaries to suggest that the lessons of the past mistakes have been duly understood, and steps will be implemented to avoid repeating them.
The programme will be renegotiated, which in clear terms will unavoidably mean giving EADS more time and more money to design and produce an aircraft, substantially below the original performance and specifications. And so be it. But there is not the slightest hint at the programme being also revised as regards its management and overall structure. EADS has finally been able to correct some long-standing weaknesses in the organisation of Airbus Military (to be honest to them, these weaknesses were not EADS’ own fault and rather stemmed from political interference), but it is still too early to assess whether this move will really have a positive impact on the A400M programme. And on the other side of the fence, the governments quite clearly have not the slightest intention to give OCCAR, which is formally in charge of managing the programme on their behalf, the level of authority and responsibility it would need.
This is not a good omen.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Russia, Ukraine Revive Plan to Build An-70
Russia, Ukraine Revive Plan to Build An-70
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE - 19 Aug 2009
MOSCOW - Russia and Ukraine have agreed to revive long-standing plans to produce the An-70 military transport plane, the head of the design bureau at Ukrainian aerospace company Antonov said Aug. 19.
"I am sure that we will manage this with Russia until its completion and this aircraft will be part of the Russian and Ukrainian air forces," Dmytro Kiva said at the Maks-2009 air show outside Moscow, news agencies reported. Kiva said the project could be completed as early as 2010.
In a statement, the Russian defence ministry confirmed the report and said the agreement was signed by Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Ukrainian Defence Minister Valery Ivashchenko during the air show.
Russia and Ukraine signed agreements on the An-70 in 1993 and 1999 but Moscow warned in 2003 that the aircraft was not safe and in 2006 it formally pulled out of the project as relations with Ukraine deteriorated.
Ukraine has taken an increasingly pro-Western stance since the coming to power of President Viktor Yushchenko following the Orange Revolution protests of 2004. Its bid for NATO membership has particularly angered Russia.
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE - 19 Aug 2009
MOSCOW - Russia and Ukraine have agreed to revive long-standing plans to produce the An-70 military transport plane, the head of the design bureau at Ukrainian aerospace company Antonov said Aug. 19.
"I am sure that we will manage this with Russia until its completion and this aircraft will be part of the Russian and Ukrainian air forces," Dmytro Kiva said at the Maks-2009 air show outside Moscow, news agencies reported. Kiva said the project could be completed as early as 2010.
In a statement, the Russian defence ministry confirmed the report and said the agreement was signed by Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Ukrainian Defence Minister Valery Ivashchenko during the air show.
Russia and Ukraine signed agreements on the An-70 in 1993 and 1999 but Moscow warned in 2003 that the aircraft was not safe and in 2006 it formally pulled out of the project as relations with Ukraine deteriorated.
Ukraine has taken an increasingly pro-Western stance since the coming to power of President Viktor Yushchenko following the Orange Revolution protests of 2004. Its bid for NATO membership has particularly angered Russia.