Gaining An R.A.F Pilots Brevet In WW II
Sometimes "Google" gets it when PPRuNe can't. Probably just me !
A new book written by Alan Turing's nephew, Dermot, is out now and titled X,Y, & Z (signifying the French, British, and Polish codebreakers). The author was interviewed on Radio 4's Today programme this morning. His main point was that the Poles should be given far more credit for their work in breaking Enigma than they have been hitherto. Well, point taken I guess, though I have always understood that they invented the techniques, especially the 'Bombas' that reverse engineered the military Enigma rotors, and that Turing simply refined further.
What is new to me though is that far from disappearing after the defeat of Poland, the Polish team escaped to work together as decoders with the French Resistance in Southern France and Algeria, rather than their military counterparts who ended up with the British. Presumably the British knew about this and the extraordinary security threat it posed. Churchill's geese that laid his Golden Eggs could be exposed at any time by German Counter Intelligence in its own back yard. It seems we were luckier than we ever imagined that the secrets of Station X remained just that.
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06149-y
What is new to me though is that far from disappearing after the defeat of Poland, the Polish team escaped to work together as decoders with the French Resistance in Southern France and Algeria, rather than their military counterparts who ended up with the British. Presumably the British knew about this and the extraordinary security threat it posed. Churchill's geese that laid his Golden Eggs could be exposed at any time by German Counter Intelligence in its own back yard. It seems we were luckier than we ever imagined that the secrets of Station X remained just that.
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06149-y
Chugalug2
Fascinating - thank you.
F H Hinsley in the official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War mentions the Polish contribution to early codebreaking as below:
Fascinating - thank you.
F H Hinsley in the official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War mentions the Polish contribution to early codebreaking as below:
For the bodies charged with producing intelligence the outbreak of war nevertheless presented the opportunity, hitherto lacking, to lay the foundations for their eventual success in providing decisive intelligence on a scale undreamed of in the first months of the war; and this was especially the case with GC and CS and the photographic reconnaissance (PR) organisation. GC and CS had established before the war began that, unlike their Italian and Japanese counter-parts, the German Army, Navy and Air Force used for all except their tactical wireless traffic different versions of the same electro-mechanical cypher machine - the Enigma. As late as July 1939, however, it could hold out little hope of mastering the machine. Nor was this an unduly gloomy judgment. The Enigma, which had appeared on the commercial market in the early 1920's, had been modified before being adopted by the German armed forces at different dates between 1926 and 1935, and had thereafter been subjected to further modifications. By 1939 the Germans believed that they had made it secure against all but local and temporary compromise in the event of capture; and they had indeed made it the basis of a set of related but different cyphers which presented formidable obstacles to the cryptanalyst.
Each of the services had different keys for the machine, that is different arrangements of its wheels and interconnecting plugs. Each of them also used different keys for different purposes or in different areas; GC and CS was eventually to identify nearly 200 keys, and at some stages in the war as many as 50 different keys were to be in force concurrently. Most elements of each key were changed regularly to give a different setting, and from the beginning of the war most settings were changed daily. Permutation of the elements - of the choice and order of the wheels and of the arrangements of the plugs - allowed millions of different settings for each key each day. But the Germans were unaware, as was GC and CS until 1939, that the Poles had reconstituted the Engima as early as the end of 1932 and had solved Army settings regularly, and other settings from time to time, between 1933 and 1938.
The Poles had achieved this success with brilliant mathematical ingenuity, but by methods they would have been unable to devise but for the fact that the French Secret Service had supplied them with material obtained from Hans-Thilo Schmidt, a German employee of the cypher branch of the German Army; it consisted of two instructional manuals for the Enigma in 1931 and, during 1932, copies of several monthly lists giving daily settings for the Army key. The Polish methods had surmounted all the changes made to the machine by the Germans up to the end of 1938, but from that date two further and more drastic modifications - a new indicator procedure and an increase from 3 to 5 in the number of wheels from which the 3 in use were selected - had put the continued exploitation of the Enigma beyond the resources of the Polish cryptanalysts.
In this situation and also, no doubt, because they were anxious about the approach of war, the Polish authorities, at meetings held in January and July 1939, divulged their results and described their methods to French and British delegations; and GC and CS received from them essential documents and, in August, a replica of the Enigma machine with its five wheels, the wiring of which had been re-constituted by the Poles. GC and CS had received from the French in 1931 a copy of the documents then given to the Poles. It had attached little importance to them, in all probability because little or no Enigma traffic was intercepted in the United Kingdom until German warships operated in Spanish waters during the Spanish civil war. Thereafter, while it had realized the possibility of solving keys by methods not dissimilar from those developed by the Poles, it had made no practical progress. But it immediately recognized what steps were necessary to apply the Polish data to the latest state of the Enigma. As soon as it received the wheel wirings it started work on developing the Polish methods.
These methods were two-fold, a hand method involving the preparation of perforated sheets and a method using a cryptanalytical machine, the 'Bombe', of which the Poles had constructed half a dozen by the end of 1938. The preparation of an improved version of the sheets, an onerous task, was not completed till November 1939 and a second copy of them was not ready for despatch to the Poles, who had moved to a base near Paris when the Germans invaded Poland, until January 1940. With this copy, however, the Poles obtained the first solution of any war-time Enigma setting on 17 January, and by 23 January GC and CS had solved settings for three further days. These four settings were those that had been in force on dates between 25 October 1939 and 17 January 1940. It was with similar considerable delays that the Poles and GC and CS, working in co-operation, solved by the end of March 1940 some fifty further settings for three keys - an Army administrative key, a GAF practice key and the general purpose operational key of the GAF. But GC and CS soon consolidated this first cryptanalytical advance of the war.
From a week after the outset of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway until the middle of May 1940 it solved continuously and almost always currently the daily settings of a key brought into force for that campaign (the Yellow key). The reasons for this success were that the key carried heavy traffic, the first to do so, and that the Enigma staff at GC and CS was increasing in size and experience. It was for the same reasons that, beginning on 22 May, GC and CS mastered the general purpose key of the GAF (the Red), which was solved daily and generally with little delay from that date till the end of the war. This success was achieved despite the fact that on 1 May the Germans had again changed the indicator system for all keys except the Yellow in such a way as to render the perforated sheets unusable: GC and CS had devised new hand- methods which overcame this set-back and enabled it to keep its grip on the Red key until the first electro-mechanical cryptanalytical machine became available in September 1940.
The Polish Bombe, like the perforated sheets, had been developed to attack the Enigma through its indicator systems. GC and CS, foreseeing that these systems would change, had from the time it received the Polish material set out to devise a more versatile machine. The first effective model, which had the power of at least 12 Polish Bombes, began working from early in August 1940. Thereafter, though their number increased only slowly, the machines, with their ability to produce faster solutions, gradually superseded the hand methods and were to be the mainstay of GC and CS's success in extending its mastery of the Red key to an ever increasing number of Enigma keys.
The regular reading of the Yellow key from mid-April and of the Red key from the end of May opened up to British eyes for the first time an intimate view of the organisation and methods of the German Air Force and, to a smaller extent, of the Army. But while the decrypts were from the outset invaluable for research purposes, they could not quickly be turned to account as a source of operational intelligence. They were full of code-names, pro-formas, and bewildering references to units and commands of which the intelligence authorities had acquired no previous knowledge. Not less important, they had become available so suddenly, not to say unexpectedly, that no provision had been made for the dissemination of their contents to British Commands with the degree of security that was essential when handling such a sensitive source. For these reasons no use could be made of them during the Norwegian campaign and they were of little operational value during the campaign in France.
Each of the services had different keys for the machine, that is different arrangements of its wheels and interconnecting plugs. Each of them also used different keys for different purposes or in different areas; GC and CS was eventually to identify nearly 200 keys, and at some stages in the war as many as 50 different keys were to be in force concurrently. Most elements of each key were changed regularly to give a different setting, and from the beginning of the war most settings were changed daily. Permutation of the elements - of the choice and order of the wheels and of the arrangements of the plugs - allowed millions of different settings for each key each day. But the Germans were unaware, as was GC and CS until 1939, that the Poles had reconstituted the Engima as early as the end of 1932 and had solved Army settings regularly, and other settings from time to time, between 1933 and 1938.
The Poles had achieved this success with brilliant mathematical ingenuity, but by methods they would have been unable to devise but for the fact that the French Secret Service had supplied them with material obtained from Hans-Thilo Schmidt, a German employee of the cypher branch of the German Army; it consisted of two instructional manuals for the Enigma in 1931 and, during 1932, copies of several monthly lists giving daily settings for the Army key. The Polish methods had surmounted all the changes made to the machine by the Germans up to the end of 1938, but from that date two further and more drastic modifications - a new indicator procedure and an increase from 3 to 5 in the number of wheels from which the 3 in use were selected - had put the continued exploitation of the Enigma beyond the resources of the Polish cryptanalysts.
In this situation and also, no doubt, because they were anxious about the approach of war, the Polish authorities, at meetings held in January and July 1939, divulged their results and described their methods to French and British delegations; and GC and CS received from them essential documents and, in August, a replica of the Enigma machine with its five wheels, the wiring of which had been re-constituted by the Poles. GC and CS had received from the French in 1931 a copy of the documents then given to the Poles. It had attached little importance to them, in all probability because little or no Enigma traffic was intercepted in the United Kingdom until German warships operated in Spanish waters during the Spanish civil war. Thereafter, while it had realized the possibility of solving keys by methods not dissimilar from those developed by the Poles, it had made no practical progress. But it immediately recognized what steps were necessary to apply the Polish data to the latest state of the Enigma. As soon as it received the wheel wirings it started work on developing the Polish methods.
These methods were two-fold, a hand method involving the preparation of perforated sheets and a method using a cryptanalytical machine, the 'Bombe', of which the Poles had constructed half a dozen by the end of 1938. The preparation of an improved version of the sheets, an onerous task, was not completed till November 1939 and a second copy of them was not ready for despatch to the Poles, who had moved to a base near Paris when the Germans invaded Poland, until January 1940. With this copy, however, the Poles obtained the first solution of any war-time Enigma setting on 17 January, and by 23 January GC and CS had solved settings for three further days. These four settings were those that had been in force on dates between 25 October 1939 and 17 January 1940. It was with similar considerable delays that the Poles and GC and CS, working in co-operation, solved by the end of March 1940 some fifty further settings for three keys - an Army administrative key, a GAF practice key and the general purpose operational key of the GAF. But GC and CS soon consolidated this first cryptanalytical advance of the war.
From a week after the outset of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway until the middle of May 1940 it solved continuously and almost always currently the daily settings of a key brought into force for that campaign (the Yellow key). The reasons for this success were that the key carried heavy traffic, the first to do so, and that the Enigma staff at GC and CS was increasing in size and experience. It was for the same reasons that, beginning on 22 May, GC and CS mastered the general purpose key of the GAF (the Red), which was solved daily and generally with little delay from that date till the end of the war. This success was achieved despite the fact that on 1 May the Germans had again changed the indicator system for all keys except the Yellow in such a way as to render the perforated sheets unusable: GC and CS had devised new hand- methods which overcame this set-back and enabled it to keep its grip on the Red key until the first electro-mechanical cryptanalytical machine became available in September 1940.
The Polish Bombe, like the perforated sheets, had been developed to attack the Enigma through its indicator systems. GC and CS, foreseeing that these systems would change, had from the time it received the Polish material set out to devise a more versatile machine. The first effective model, which had the power of at least 12 Polish Bombes, began working from early in August 1940. Thereafter, though their number increased only slowly, the machines, with their ability to produce faster solutions, gradually superseded the hand methods and were to be the mainstay of GC and CS's success in extending its mastery of the Red key to an ever increasing number of Enigma keys.
The regular reading of the Yellow key from mid-April and of the Red key from the end of May opened up to British eyes for the first time an intimate view of the organisation and methods of the German Air Force and, to a smaller extent, of the Army. But while the decrypts were from the outset invaluable for research purposes, they could not quickly be turned to account as a source of operational intelligence. They were full of code-names, pro-formas, and bewildering references to units and commands of which the intelligence authorities had acquired no previous knowledge. Not less important, they had become available so suddenly, not to say unexpectedly, that no provision had been made for the dissemination of their contents to British Commands with the degree of security that was essential when handling such a sensitive source. For these reasons no use could be made of them during the Norwegian campaign and they were of little operational value during the campaign in France.
Indeed, Warmtoast, and all familiar stuff I'm sure. Apart from the throw away line that the Polish decoders were in Paris, following the fall of their own country, not a hint that they were to remain in France following the fall of that country.
As I say, all new to me, and it rather overrides our own preoccupations with protecting Ultra, ie by reconnaissance flights "discovering" Wehrmacht supply convoys that had already been revealed by Enigma, or prohibiting those in the know from entering operational areas. All rather pointless if others in the know were currently helping the Gestapo with their enquiries while under duress!
As I say, all new to me, and it rather overrides our own preoccupations with protecting Ultra, ie by reconnaissance flights "discovering" Wehrmacht supply convoys that had already been revealed by Enigma, or prohibiting those in the know from entering operational areas. All rather pointless if others in the know were currently helping the Gestapo with their enquiries while under duress!
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It is invidious to put forward any one "silver bullet" which won WWII for the Allies, but "Ultra" must come pretty close. I believe that, on occasion, Churchill had on his desk transcripts of Hitler's orders to his generals - before the general concerned had received it !
It was also miraculous that this vital secret was kept inviolate for 29 years after the war.
It was also miraculous that this vital secret was kept inviolate for 29 years after the war.
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Aptly described by the Brandy guy as "the golden goose which never cackled".
Oddly, considering the casus belli in the first place, the Poles never got any credit, nor were even allowed to work at/with Bletchley.
Oddly, considering the casus belli in the first place, the Poles never got any credit, nor were even allowed to work at/with Bletchley.
There is something that doesn't quite add up here. What could these Polish codebreakers hope to achieve for victory over the Nazis and the liberation of Poland (OK, we now know what that led to but they didn't then) by remaining in occupied Europe? These were very intelligent people who knew full well that little other than minor tactical success by the French Resistance could be achieved by breaking Enigma for them in Vichy or in Occupied France. Of course, they wouldn't know what progress the British were making with Enigma, but whatever it was it could lead there to strategic successes that in turn could lead to final victory.
Was there an issue vis a vis them and the British? Had they decided we had betrayed them? If so, why didn't they feel the same about the French? Were they simply trapped there, with any attempt at escape (via the Pyrenees?) courting the danger of being captured and interrogated? Why hadn't we managed to persuade them to join us from the very start? Were the French hanging onto them simply to deny them to us? Unthinkable that one of course. Sorry!
Franek, can you help?
Was there an issue vis a vis them and the British? Had they decided we had betrayed them? If so, why didn't they feel the same about the French? Were they simply trapped there, with any attempt at escape (via the Pyrenees?) courting the danger of being captured and interrogated? Why hadn't we managed to persuade them to join us from the very start? Were the French hanging onto them simply to deny them to us? Unthinkable that one of course. Sorry!
Franek, can you help?
Having followed my nose through Google, it seems that some did escape, and via the Pyrenees route that has already been the subject of posts here:-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cadix
It appears that the five men mentioned at the end were not only brilliant codebreakers but brave ones as well. What a waste though that they were being shuttled around Paris, Algeria, and Southern France instead of joining Rejewski and Zygalski's successful, albeit belated, escape to Britain. They may or may not have contributed much there to the already successful efforts at Bletchley Park to prevail over Enigma, I don't know, but its secrets would have been much better safeguarded. As it is, we must celebrate the quiet courage of those five Poles and the typical efficiency of Nazi Counter-Intelligence.
On 8 November 1942, Allied forces landed in French North Africa. When the French authorities there submitted to the Allies and broke with Vichy France, Germany occupied southern France.Major Bertrand, anticipating this outcome, evacuated Cadix on 9 November, two days before the German forces moved. The Cadix staff dispersed, attempting to reach Allied territory.Rejewski and Zygalski eventually crossed into Spain, where they were arrested and imprisoned. Released after Red Cross intercessions, they went to Britain. There they were employed by British intelligence until the war's end, against German SS "hand" ciphers.Cadix's Polish military chiefs, Gwido Langer and Maksymilian Ciężki, were captured by the Germans as they tried to cross from France into Spain on the night of 10–11 March 1943. Three other Poles were captured with them, Antoni Palluth, Edward Fokczyński, and Kazimierz Gaca. Langer and Ciężki became prisoners of war. The other three men were sent as slave labor to Germany, where Palluth and Fokczyński perished. All five men protected the secret of Allied decryption of the Enigma cipher.
It appears that the five men mentioned at the end were not only brilliant codebreakers but brave ones as well. What a waste though that they were being shuttled around Paris, Algeria, and Southern France instead of joining Rejewski and Zygalski's successful, albeit belated, escape to Britain. They may or may not have contributed much there to the already successful efforts at Bletchley Park to prevail over Enigma, I don't know, but its secrets would have been much better safeguarded. As it is, we must celebrate the quiet courage of those five Poles and the typical efficiency of Nazi Counter-Intelligence.
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I still cannot recall why the name Bruno Szota is familiar to me. The training in Karachi was mentioned by another airman from the group, who mentioned that they initially had to go to Burma or China, but were recalled to the UK. This is a misty part of the story, as I have not found any documents on it. Without doubt there were talks with Chiang about forming Polish units in China, but they ended with nothing. IIRC there were about 70 airmen in the group. They went via Persia and Iraq to India, where they boarded the ship.
Re Enigma
The Poles were simply not wanted at Bletchley Park, so they took up the French offer and worked in unoccupied zone of France intercepting German messages. Their most important achievement was use of probablity theory to decode messages, and creating decoding machines.
I still cannot recall why the name Bruno Szota is familiar to me. The training in Karachi was mentioned by another airman from the group, who mentioned that they initially had to go to Burma or China, but were recalled to the UK. This is a misty part of the story, as I have not found any documents on it. Without doubt there were talks with Chiang about forming Polish units in China, but they ended with nothing. IIRC there were about 70 airmen in the group. They went via Persia and Iraq to India, where they boarded the ship.
Re Enigma
The Poles were simply not wanted at Bletchley Park, so they took up the French offer and worked in unoccupied zone of France intercepting German messages. Their most important achievement was use of probablity theory to decode messages, and creating decoding machines.
Franek, thank you for explaining why the Polish decoders spent the war in France and not in the UK, but I am still rather confused. You say they did valuable work, but for who? Vichy France, the French Resistance? Presumably it was not for the Free French, who were in London. It said somewhere (wiki?) that they initially and understandably went to France to be with the Polish Army who had gone there to continue the fight. That got promptly knocked on the head by the sudden collapse of France. Many of the fighting Poles got away to Britain to fight the Germans from there, but not the decoders. Why?
Had they already been given the cold shoulder by the Brits? It seems unbelievable if that were so, as Bletchley was beginning to break Enigma (especially the Luftwaffe codes), and it would be obvious that to leave the Polish codebreakers behind in France could seriously compromise any future use of Ultra. Was their fate less determined by the British than by the French, in particular Major Gustave Bertrand, their 'host'? Like I say, it doesn't quite add up. Well, not to me at least...
Had they already been given the cold shoulder by the Brits? It seems unbelievable if that were so, as Bletchley was beginning to break Enigma (especially the Luftwaffe codes), and it would be obvious that to leave the Polish codebreakers behind in France could seriously compromise any future use of Ultra. Was their fate less determined by the British than by the French, in particular Major Gustave Bertrand, their 'host'? Like I say, it doesn't quite add up. Well, not to me at least...
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It seems Vengeances belonged to No 23 Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Unit.
Vultee Vengeance in Italy
Re Polish decoders
Following evacuation from Poland, they approached British embassy but were refused of help and turned to the French. Supported by Maj. Bertrand they decoded messages in France and then established secret decoding centre Cadix, where they tackled with German messages, then send to the UK. Ultimately ended in the UK, but not allowed to Bletchley. I do not know British reasoning behind this.
Vultee Vengeance in Italy
Re Polish decoders
Following evacuation from Poland, they approached British embassy but were refused of help and turned to the French. Supported by Maj. Bertrand they decoded messages in France and then established secret decoding centre Cadix, where they tackled with German messages, then send to the UK. Ultimately ended in the UK, but not allowed to Bletchley. I do not know British reasoning behind this.
By June 1940, advancing German forces were approaching PC Bruno. Just after midnight on 10 June, Bertrand evacuated the Bruno staff from Gretz-Armainvillers. France surrendered on 22 June; on 24 June he flew the 15 Poles and seven Spaniards in three planes to Algeria.
What I don't understand about the story is who was getting the take from their activities. Before the evacuation they had a direct teletype link to Bletchley Park. Afterwards?
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And there was me, thinking I knew the whole Vultee Vengeance story ! But in sunny India we knew little of what was going on in 1945 in Europe. We thought that all the Mk.IVs that came over to Europe went to UK and were used as TTs. Not so, it seems.
"(No 23) Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Unit" - that was exactly what No.20 Squadron at Valley was in 1949-51. Disbanded, a Civil AA Co-Operation Unit (Marshalls ?) set up in Llanbedr, took over our aircraft and our task.
Think 20 reformed with Hunters ....
Danny.
"(No 23) Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Unit" - that was exactly what No.20 Squadron at Valley was in 1949-51. Disbanded, a Civil AA Co-Operation Unit (Marshalls ?) set up in Llanbedr, took over our aircraft and our task.
Think 20 reformed with Hunters ....
Danny.
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Re Cadix
A radio link to the UK has been established, and worked for a while. I hope the link works, it provides some more information. The Enigma story deserves a good book, but I am not sure anybody is capable to tackle it. The only book available in English is rather old. Kozaczuk, Władysław (1984), Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two.
https://translate.google.pl/translat...arian_Rejewski
Re Vengeance
Such units and aircraft simply avoided attention of historians - no glamour!
A radio link to the UK has been established, and worked for a while. I hope the link works, it provides some more information. The Enigma story deserves a good book, but I am not sure anybody is capable to tackle it. The only book available in English is rather old. Kozaczuk, Władysław (1984), Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two.
https://translate.google.pl/translat...arian_Rejewski
Re Vengeance
Such units and aircraft simply avoided attention of historians - no glamour!
I am awed by this story of Marian Rejewski and his Polish colleagues. To think they were turned away by Britain … While most readers of this thread will know that Polish cryptologists played a very large role in discovering the secrets of Enigma, Franek's link tells the story of a brave and brilliant man whose achievements did not received the honour they deserved until long after the event.
Thanks for the link Franek. So now we get to the nub of it and the British really messed up it seems. From your link :-
Wiki:-
That one arbitrary rejection by our Bucharest Embassy (no doubt overwhelmed by the evacuation of the Polish Army) condemned these brilliant men, to which the Allies and the occupied countries of Europe owe so much, to remaining in France following its occupation. How interesting that just when we thought we knew the whole Bletchley Park story it seems the most important people involved in breaking Enigma were never there though desperately wanted to be. Having finally escaped from the Nazis it was too late of course, for having spent all that time in both Vichy and occupied France they posed a potential security risk. The whole saga was a tragedy for them and for us, and a very serious threat to Ultra. All because of some FO apparatchik in Romania...
I agree with steam chicken though. The question remains. What were they doing in those years at Cadiz and who were they working for?
Wiki:-
In September 1939, after the outbreak of the war, Rejewski and his colleagues from the Cipher Bureau were evacuated from Poland to Romania . Together with Zygalski and Różycki, they escaped internment in the refugee camp, getting to Bucharest , where they made contact with the British embassy. The British refused to help Polish cryptologists, therefore the next step was the French embassy, where they introduced themselves as friends of Bolek (codename Gustave Bertrand). After receiving instructions from Paris, the embassy staff helped in the immediate evacuation of mathematicians to France, where they arrived at the end of September
I agree with steam chicken though. The question remains. What were they doing in those years at Cadiz and who were they working for?
From the BoB thread (it is still BoB Day BTW!):-
Wokkafans:-
An interesting 303 Squadron story about Josef Frantisek, a Czech ace on a Polish Squadron! An outsider by nature, the posting might well have suited him better than being posted to one of the Czechoslovak squadrons. Typical BBC, the closest you now get from them in celebrating the RAF's special day, it is really a plug for the new film 'Hurricane'. Nonetheless, a worthy tribute to a brave man credited with 17 confirmed and one probable, the highest score in the Battle. That greatly added to the other 303 Sqn Polish victories, making it the highest scoring Hurricane squadron in the Battle of Britain. As Dowding said (well almost), we couldn't have done it without them.
Wokkafans:-
The BBC are running an article, with a European side-story. It is rather tucked away though.https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/stories-45516556
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Hello
Re Frantisek
Do not believe media! Frantisek was an excellent pilot with a keenness to fly and who caused some minot disciplinary problems as plenty of young pilots of the era. In 1939 he fled from the Protectorate to Poland, but instead of going to France like most of the Czech airmen, he decided to join the Polish Air Force with a number of his compatriots. He was one of few, who managed to take active part in combat operations, and then he was evacuated to France, and then to the UK. He and his pals at some point approached Czech mission, but they were called traitors or something similar, for joining the Polish Air Force, so they left, leaving few particularly warm words. Later in the war most of the Czech and Slovak airmen transferred to Czech AF, anyway, but it was too late for Frantisek. The other foreign pilot in No 303 was Josef Kana, a Slovak, who remained with the Polish Air Force for duration of the war, but has not achieved any successes. Aside, there is no clear evidence of Frantisek being a lone wolf and separating from the formation. Could be a myth actually.
Re Enigma
Cadix decoded German messages intercepted by them. I got your point, but not sure if I can help. The man who arranged this, Bertrand, was a French officer, but I am not sure for whom he was working, ie. if he was tied to de Gaulle (I doubt it) or Vichy or a conspiracy within Vichy but not related to de Gaulle. Those are quite mysterious stories, and I am not sure if they were properly researched. It is a little outside of my area, so my knowledge is quite limited, but I can tell you, that two Polish decoders served with Japanese army for the duration of the war, intercepting Soviet codes. This is a little known story.
Re Frantisek
Do not believe media! Frantisek was an excellent pilot with a keenness to fly and who caused some minot disciplinary problems as plenty of young pilots of the era. In 1939 he fled from the Protectorate to Poland, but instead of going to France like most of the Czech airmen, he decided to join the Polish Air Force with a number of his compatriots. He was one of few, who managed to take active part in combat operations, and then he was evacuated to France, and then to the UK. He and his pals at some point approached Czech mission, but they were called traitors or something similar, for joining the Polish Air Force, so they left, leaving few particularly warm words. Later in the war most of the Czech and Slovak airmen transferred to Czech AF, anyway, but it was too late for Frantisek. The other foreign pilot in No 303 was Josef Kana, a Slovak, who remained with the Polish Air Force for duration of the war, but has not achieved any successes. Aside, there is no clear evidence of Frantisek being a lone wolf and separating from the formation. Could be a myth actually.
Re Enigma
Cadix decoded German messages intercepted by them. I got your point, but not sure if I can help. The man who arranged this, Bertrand, was a French officer, but I am not sure for whom he was working, ie. if he was tied to de Gaulle (I doubt it) or Vichy or a conspiracy within Vichy but not related to de Gaulle. Those are quite mysterious stories, and I am not sure if they were properly researched. It is a little outside of my area, so my knowledge is quite limited, but I can tell you, that two Polish decoders served with Japanese army for the duration of the war, intercepting Soviet codes. This is a little known story.
Franek, thank you for your valuable input on both issues; Frantisek and Cadix. You are absolutely correct by saying that we should not believe everything we read in the media, or even the settled conventional take on things. There is no better source than those who were there, witness Danny and his fellow posters, or those who have studied closely those who were there, witness yourself. That is the unique value of this very unique thread, and is the continuous link throughout it. Whatever Frantisek's combat techniques were, they clearly worked, and added greatly to the successful outcome of the Battle of Britain. I am not a revisionist and sincerely believe that had the outcome been otherwise we would have become another protectorate of Hitler's Reich.
As to Cadix (Cadiz?), this is clearly a known unknown. The French of WWII were a much divided people, with many factions ranging from full collaborationists, through armed resisters, to the Free French armed services, with the majority ranged between the two extremes, among whom were those who used the situation to settle old scores, indulge their racial prejudices, or simply seek more wealth or power. Vichy in particular harboured some very unpleasant people. Some of their military leaders were possessed of more than an average amount of arrogance. One thinks of General Giraud demanding total command of the invasion forces of Operation Torch and then taking no part at all when that was refused! The thought that a Polish team under Bertrand was breaking German, Italian, (and Allied?) codes at the physical centre of this maelstrom of intrigue and treachery is truly alarming, and is entirely new to me, as I say.
As to a Polish team breaking codes for the Japanese? Another blockbuster revelation! Much more about that please.
As to Cadix (Cadiz?), this is clearly a known unknown. The French of WWII were a much divided people, with many factions ranging from full collaborationists, through armed resisters, to the Free French armed services, with the majority ranged between the two extremes, among whom were those who used the situation to settle old scores, indulge their racial prejudices, or simply seek more wealth or power. Vichy in particular harboured some very unpleasant people. Some of their military leaders were possessed of more than an average amount of arrogance. One thinks of General Giraud demanding total command of the invasion forces of Operation Torch and then taking no part at all when that was refused! The thought that a Polish team under Bertrand was breaking German, Italian, (and Allied?) codes at the physical centre of this maelstrom of intrigue and treachery is truly alarming, and is entirely new to me, as I say.
As to a Polish team breaking codes for the Japanese? Another blockbuster revelation! Much more about that please.
Last edited by Chugalug2; 16th Sep 2018 at 14:13. Reason: Speling
As a brief sideline from Franek's fascinating posts, here are more childhood memories from the 1940s RAF: anyone remember the Tannoy in those faroff days before pagers and mobile phones? Massive steel horns were installed on buildings and hangars around the station, while inside featured big wooden boxes with the Tannoy logo in fretwork across the speaker aperture. Messages were broadcast from station headquarters and if the wind was in the right direction could be faintly heard at Binbrook school a mile away.
At RAF North Coates in 1948, used for families awaiting MQ at Binbrook on our return from India, a couple of horns were installed on corner houses at each end of the Patch although Coastal Command and its Beaufighters had left two years before. Sixty years ago the families were clearly in need of a morale booster, so a record of the RAF March on a scratchy windup gramophone in front of the microphone was played at full volume at 0900 every Saturday morning.