UK Apache...this can't be true
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We did this with new aircraft!! Tucanos were stored on day one and Tornados were ripped apart for spares when new!! The saddest thing for me, is that when we bought AH, everyone knew that this would happen. We talked about it in crewrooms around the country, this would have happened WITHOUT a war, so the engineers must be doing a brilliant job keeping the frames in the air. Getting aircraft back in the air by using 'experience' is commendable, but if we had a serious accident, guess who would be nailed to the wall. Just look at the Nimrod thread to see how the families feel about the engineers 'cutting corners' to get the aircraft flying. In this libellous world you are presented with a difficult choice, get it done or do it by the book and don't get it done........... which is correct???
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If you can believe 'reliable sources' it is far better than that.
Rumour has it that parts were stripped off delivered aircraft already in storage to enable the subsequent delivery of the latter frames.
Begs the question - Where were all the bits in the first place?
Rumour has it that parts were stripped off delivered aircraft already in storage to enable the subsequent delivery of the latter frames.
Begs the question - Where were all the bits in the first place?
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Due to the spares contract being so badly written, HEDP is correct. I was at Shawbs collecting an Apache and could see with my own eyes that gearboxes etc were being removed from aircraft already delivered, when I asked the Westlands Tech's what was going on they told me they were being removed and sent back to Yeovil so that Westlands could comlpete the contract on time and therefore look good on the text book delivery. So, the Army has never had 67 complete Apache.
The problem was, the AAC started flying the aircraft without the spares being available to replace components such as gearboxes etc. In the early days we had a couple of incidents during training which due to being over-cautious resulted in components being changed. Those were delivered from the production line an not replaced. The Army robbed Peter to pay Paul.
Brewster has a point though. Out of the 67 Apache's bought and paid for, we can only supply 8 to combat operations. Is that value for money? Where are the 8 CTT's worth of pilots if we are at less than 50% manning? Why is nothing positive being done?
The problem was, the AAC started flying the aircraft without the spares being available to replace components such as gearboxes etc. In the early days we had a couple of incidents during training which due to being over-cautious resulted in components being changed. Those were delivered from the production line an not replaced. The Army robbed Peter to pay Paul.
Brewster has a point though. Out of the 67 Apache's bought and paid for, we can only supply 8 to combat operations. Is that value for money? Where are the 8 CTT's worth of pilots if we are at less than 50% manning? Why is nothing positive being done?
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Brewster has a point though. Out of the 67 Apache's bought and paid for, we can only supply 8 to combat operations.
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It is shamefull that we can only supply 8 airframes to Herrick!.
Given the clip the AAC is in I was amazed to discover the output of the AH was so low...
i have it from a reliable source that a squadron in a wet and damp place has more tasklines, utilising a "legacy" aircraft operates more tasklines than the AH fraternity.....
Obviously its a case of horses for courses....but....please.
Are we really becoming that AH centric over a few tasklines in Herrick (Doing a very very valuable job i might add!)....that every single other role of AAvn should become subservient to in all respects??..
There is a bigger picture...Imagine if Afghan had not happened!??
Where would we be?
Given the clip the AAC is in I was amazed to discover the output of the AH was so low...
i have it from a reliable source that a squadron in a wet and damp place has more tasklines, utilising a "legacy" aircraft operates more tasklines than the AH fraternity.....
Obviously its a case of horses for courses....but....please.
Are we really becoming that AH centric over a few tasklines in Herrick (Doing a very very valuable job i might add!)....that every single other role of AAvn should become subservient to in all respects??..
There is a bigger picture...Imagine if Afghan had not happened!??
Where would we be?
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Ralph and Peeps,
If Afghan and AH had not happened then might I suggest we as a Corps would have been up the creek without a paddle. As it is, AH happened but we were not really given a funding 'paddle' until Herrick began. The contingency funding has gone a long way to helping but not overcoming the funding gaps in the original plan however.
Dare I say that with the percieved doubt over a Lynx replacement that it is hardly suprising that AH has become something of a Corps and Joint focus. The platform delivers capability that the Corps has aspired to for many years and simply could not replicate with the Lynx TOW platform.
If a Lynx replacement is not forthcoming we are likely to be left with core capability of AH, fixed wing and a disparate collection of periferal capabilities in that order of importance. Which of these capabilities do you suspect that PJHQ will be seeking to contribute to the kinetic as well as ISTAR battle?
By default AH has a longer training requirement than the other platforms and is somewhat more expensive in terms of funding and technical manpower. It is dissapointing that the main frustration to developing more capability in terms of operational task lines is in fact the REME capability to generate training airframes on which to train more crews and sustain UK training. It seems that the AAC's well won reputation on ops is likely to be tarnished by this logistic inability to generate the requirement. The Corps future reputation is in the hands of the REME and out of our own, simple as that.
Given the ability to train to generate more crews and a stronger will to retain those trained in the seats they relinquish on appointment to desks, departing disilussioned with the continued workload and the like it is more likely that we can increase the number of trained aircrew within the units.
My earlier estimate of 60% manning will be frustrated in the coming year not just by routine and premature termination of sevice but also by six appointments on the CCRB of AH officers to non-AH pilot LSNs. We will as a result only slowly generate more crews.
I can assure you however that if we had the manning for a one on three off regime of whatever duration then the aircrew themselves would certainly be up for the extra opportunities to contribute to the kinetic effort that more task lines would bring.
Yours, skill faded,
HEDP
If Afghan and AH had not happened then might I suggest we as a Corps would have been up the creek without a paddle. As it is, AH happened but we were not really given a funding 'paddle' until Herrick began. The contingency funding has gone a long way to helping but not overcoming the funding gaps in the original plan however.
Dare I say that with the percieved doubt over a Lynx replacement that it is hardly suprising that AH has become something of a Corps and Joint focus. The platform delivers capability that the Corps has aspired to for many years and simply could not replicate with the Lynx TOW platform.
If a Lynx replacement is not forthcoming we are likely to be left with core capability of AH, fixed wing and a disparate collection of periferal capabilities in that order of importance. Which of these capabilities do you suspect that PJHQ will be seeking to contribute to the kinetic as well as ISTAR battle?
By default AH has a longer training requirement than the other platforms and is somewhat more expensive in terms of funding and technical manpower. It is dissapointing that the main frustration to developing more capability in terms of operational task lines is in fact the REME capability to generate training airframes on which to train more crews and sustain UK training. It seems that the AAC's well won reputation on ops is likely to be tarnished by this logistic inability to generate the requirement. The Corps future reputation is in the hands of the REME and out of our own, simple as that.
Given the ability to train to generate more crews and a stronger will to retain those trained in the seats they relinquish on appointment to desks, departing disilussioned with the continued workload and the like it is more likely that we can increase the number of trained aircrew within the units.
My earlier estimate of 60% manning will be frustrated in the coming year not just by routine and premature termination of sevice but also by six appointments on the CCRB of AH officers to non-AH pilot LSNs. We will as a result only slowly generate more crews.
I can assure you however that if we had the manning for a one on three off regime of whatever duration then the aircrew themselves would certainly be up for the extra opportunities to contribute to the kinetic effort that more task lines would bring.
Yours, skill faded,
HEDP
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REME Lack of Manning
In 1993 my father, who was at the REME Officer's School at Arborfield at the time, told the senior powers that as the Apache Longbow was as sophisticated as a Tornado F3 then they'd better man the REME AAC LADs to the same level as an RAF F3 Sqn if they wanted the same flying rate. They didn't and therefore no surprise that they now have these problems.
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Serf. I'm not sure that back in 1993 your Dad would have had a very good look at a Longbow Apache, (it didn't enter service with the US Army until 1998) but even the AH64A was a quatum leap forward over what we (the AAC) were operating, and they (REME) were servicing. What everyone must realise, that although the Army Air Corps operate this machine, it is an Army capability.
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I'm afraid I have to disagree with that. It is a JOINT capability, delivered by the Army - who are actually now operating the aircraft in better and more innovative ways, and improving, so although we all have to live within our manning and provisioning limits, I would say that it is out of date to criticise the way the Army operates Apache.
Back to the Joint capability - we have learnt that it is not very effective always to tie really capable assets like these to a particular battle group or bde - the fact that it is operated by the Army and tasked by the Land component (2 different things), doesn't mean that it isn't of use to other components - in the first Gulf War AH64 was employed in the SEAD role, and it can play a similar role in escorting CSAR, which is arguably an air power role.
This is a good aircraft operated by good people. Shame about the poor support and provisioning but let's not keep beating ourselves with that particular stick.
Back to the Joint capability - we have learnt that it is not very effective always to tie really capable assets like these to a particular battle group or bde - the fact that it is operated by the Army and tasked by the Land component (2 different things), doesn't mean that it isn't of use to other components - in the first Gulf War AH64 was employed in the SEAD role, and it can play a similar role in escorting CSAR, which is arguably an air power role.
This is a good aircraft operated by good people. Shame about the poor support and provisioning but let's not keep beating ourselves with that particular stick.
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OA,
I'd say it is an Army capability delivered in a Joint environment and I'd go as far as to say the crews can hold their own in that environment.
It's not a question of how the Army operate the aircraft but more a question of how it is employed that can be questioned at times. Once you get away from 16 AABde then the wider army still needs educating as do some elements of non-army JHF headquarters.
The wider army is still waking up to its contribution in the kinetic battle and discovering the appropriate balance between burning hours on escort and the like against having it able to repond and deliver kinetic effect. Not always, there is a balance to be struck and the customers (HQ's) are becoming more aware.
HEDP
I'd say it is an Army capability delivered in a Joint environment and I'd go as far as to say the crews can hold their own in that environment.
It's not a question of how the Army operate the aircraft but more a question of how it is employed that can be questioned at times. Once you get away from 16 AABde then the wider army still needs educating as do some elements of non-army JHF headquarters.
The wider army is still waking up to its contribution in the kinetic battle and discovering the appropriate balance between burning hours on escort and the like against having it able to repond and deliver kinetic effect. Not always, there is a balance to be struck and the customers (HQ's) are becoming more aware.
HEDP
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Naah - I'd still say it was a joint capability delivered by the Army. A bit like BH provide joint mobility (usually to the land component), delivered by any or all of the 3 services.... but maybe I'm just being a doctrine nerd.
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Eric
Putting my banter head back in the cupboard and putting my sensible one on I can answer your 3 part question:
Firstly lack of staff, its fair to say the REME are suffering from a lack of manpower whom are offered much better contracts to do similar work in civillian street and have suffered ever since pay 2000 was introduced.
Secondly, quality of staff is as good as it has ever been and they work extremely hard to provide as much as possible given the circumstances.
Lastly, I will be honest and say that it would seem to me that following a catalogue of errors introducing this aircraft into service and the associated bad press it received during the early years corners were cut to enable the mop up operation by the MOD. Almost every meeting I attend with IPT's mention the need to ensure their project doesn't follow the disasterous lines that the Apache did. Hence the spares and TLMP remain a tad disorderly.
Finally I applaud the manpower involved with keeping this aircraft on duty through all of the difficult times, and only hope that the car crash the MOD is on doesnt preclude such a vital piece of hardware supporting our men and women on the frontline.
Putting my banter head back in the cupboard and putting my sensible one on I can answer your 3 part question:
Firstly lack of staff, its fair to say the REME are suffering from a lack of manpower whom are offered much better contracts to do similar work in civillian street and have suffered ever since pay 2000 was introduced.
Secondly, quality of staff is as good as it has ever been and they work extremely hard to provide as much as possible given the circumstances.
Lastly, I will be honest and say that it would seem to me that following a catalogue of errors introducing this aircraft into service and the associated bad press it received during the early years corners were cut to enable the mop up operation by the MOD. Almost every meeting I attend with IPT's mention the need to ensure their project doesn't follow the disasterous lines that the Apache did. Hence the spares and TLMP remain a tad disorderly.
Finally I applaud the manpower involved with keeping this aircraft on duty through all of the difficult times, and only hope that the car crash the MOD is on doesnt preclude such a vital piece of hardware supporting our men and women on the frontline.
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Uk Apache - Do They Really Mean All Of This?
Well this thread is in the right place, a rumour network. There is more rumour/I have it on good authority/A friend in the know told me/and any other poor excuse for flinging mud than I’ve had hot dinners. Just as plainly there are more experts here than the Army needs, who know didley squat about some of the intricacies of equipment procurement, management of resources, maintenance and project management in the round or the truth of the matter about Apache introduction to service.
Before I start a plethora of WTF does he know about it replies I should declare my hand. I’m outside the programme looking in and also inside looking out, somewhat of a luxury you might say. I also know most of the staff officers who have been on the receiving end of the ill educated comment on this thread. They are good men and true working tirelessly against considerable odds doing the best for you. In fact they are doing jobs that most of the brickbat throwers couldn’t or wouldn’t do but are vital to the success of the programme. I have also been in Operational Requirements in the MoD during a War and been at War with the AAC. So in this thread IMHO there is a lot of pretty offensive manure but hidden, sadly without bands and banners, one or two pearls which the majority of muck spreaders are too blinkered to see.
First, I think what you should be doing is slapping yourselves on the back – all of you; suppliers, maintainers, aircrew, groundcrew, staff and anyone frankly associated with the equipment. You are doing a fantastically successful job given some of the constraints. Stop beating yourselves up, OK some things could be better but all in all it’s a success story.
Second when I spoke at an Attack Dinner some years ago BA (Before Apache or Before Afghanistan whichever is applicable) in this case the latter I made the point to the attendees that if they thought the MoD was going to spend this much money on the Apache it would certainly want to justify the expense by seeing what it could do on operations sooner rather than later. None of us then foresaw that it would be that soon – such is the way of things military. I know now, which I didn’t know at the time, that there had been an estimate of when the MoD thought that the aircraft might be exposed to operations and that this was being used to plan all sorts of things such as manning levels, support holdings and establishments to name but a few. You have to have a plan, it can change and the requirement to change is not an admission of having got it wrong its an evolution of the plan. In fact the aircraft was sent on operations before this date so it isn’t entirely surprising that all the dominoes were not lined up, but they are getting lined up real quick. For those sniping at spares shortages if you think that curing the problem is merely nipping across the Atlantic with a very big wedge and a large truck you are demonstrating a level of ignorance which is beyond comment. Example, not with Apache I grant you but similar examples will apply – some years ago if you wanted a Lynx MRH there was a two year lead time, you could only order them in batches of 20 and they were only made in France.
Third there is much talk of ‘can we only send 8 aircraft’ or can we only manage to send 8 out of 48. This displays a poor understanding of ‘fleets within fleets’ ‘depth servicing cycles’, UOR fits to mention but a few. If you think I’m just tossing words into a pond to keep you quiet do talk to someone who knows the implications of what I’m on about. It would take too long here. So 8 aircraft, as things stand now, can complete the requirement. Note the word requirement, that’s THE requirement NOT your requirement which sounds more akin to Bader’s Big Wings. Eight aircraft at present rates is presumably containable with current support manning levels. The addition of more aircraft will skew the support manning requirement out of all proportion. The example to try and get your heads around follows the premise that the greatest enemy of aircraft availability and serviceability is the Squadron Commanders who through the ages (and I was one once) have traditionally wanted to have all their aircraft out in a line for pictures and flypasts with their names painted on the side of the cockpit. This is appalling use of aircraft and a terrible waste of engineering resource. It is always better to fly 6 hours each off 2 aircraft than one hour each off 12.
Enough I guess. I don’t want to get into repeat tour arguments it’s not productive. Suffice to say the older among us do understand. In the late seventies and early eighties it was not unheard of for pilots to complete 2 four month tours in NI in 12 to 15 month periods. It will not go on forever. Manning levels will improve as will spares holdings and experience, all of which will ease the problem, after all HERRICK is only 2 years old. I also understand the management challenges in keeping returned operational crews fired up and enthused during the period between tours, no one said it would be easy.
Do stick with it, you are all doing a fantastic job and the Army and RAF crews that I talk to would not be without you. We know there is pain but there is terrific gain. I spoke with a young soldier of the Mercian Regiment, currently at Headly Court ,very recently as he visited us in support of our Help for Heroes fundraising. He said ‘I wouldn’t be talking to you now if it wasn’t for the Apache’. Nuff said, I’m proud to play a small part in your efforts and to sit in your reflected glory.
LB
Before I start a plethora of WTF does he know about it replies I should declare my hand. I’m outside the programme looking in and also inside looking out, somewhat of a luxury you might say. I also know most of the staff officers who have been on the receiving end of the ill educated comment on this thread. They are good men and true working tirelessly against considerable odds doing the best for you. In fact they are doing jobs that most of the brickbat throwers couldn’t or wouldn’t do but are vital to the success of the programme. I have also been in Operational Requirements in the MoD during a War and been at War with the AAC. So in this thread IMHO there is a lot of pretty offensive manure but hidden, sadly without bands and banners, one or two pearls which the majority of muck spreaders are too blinkered to see.
First, I think what you should be doing is slapping yourselves on the back – all of you; suppliers, maintainers, aircrew, groundcrew, staff and anyone frankly associated with the equipment. You are doing a fantastically successful job given some of the constraints. Stop beating yourselves up, OK some things could be better but all in all it’s a success story.
Second when I spoke at an Attack Dinner some years ago BA (Before Apache or Before Afghanistan whichever is applicable) in this case the latter I made the point to the attendees that if they thought the MoD was going to spend this much money on the Apache it would certainly want to justify the expense by seeing what it could do on operations sooner rather than later. None of us then foresaw that it would be that soon – such is the way of things military. I know now, which I didn’t know at the time, that there had been an estimate of when the MoD thought that the aircraft might be exposed to operations and that this was being used to plan all sorts of things such as manning levels, support holdings and establishments to name but a few. You have to have a plan, it can change and the requirement to change is not an admission of having got it wrong its an evolution of the plan. In fact the aircraft was sent on operations before this date so it isn’t entirely surprising that all the dominoes were not lined up, but they are getting lined up real quick. For those sniping at spares shortages if you think that curing the problem is merely nipping across the Atlantic with a very big wedge and a large truck you are demonstrating a level of ignorance which is beyond comment. Example, not with Apache I grant you but similar examples will apply – some years ago if you wanted a Lynx MRH there was a two year lead time, you could only order them in batches of 20 and they were only made in France.
Third there is much talk of ‘can we only send 8 aircraft’ or can we only manage to send 8 out of 48. This displays a poor understanding of ‘fleets within fleets’ ‘depth servicing cycles’, UOR fits to mention but a few. If you think I’m just tossing words into a pond to keep you quiet do talk to someone who knows the implications of what I’m on about. It would take too long here. So 8 aircraft, as things stand now, can complete the requirement. Note the word requirement, that’s THE requirement NOT your requirement which sounds more akin to Bader’s Big Wings. Eight aircraft at present rates is presumably containable with current support manning levels. The addition of more aircraft will skew the support manning requirement out of all proportion. The example to try and get your heads around follows the premise that the greatest enemy of aircraft availability and serviceability is the Squadron Commanders who through the ages (and I was one once) have traditionally wanted to have all their aircraft out in a line for pictures and flypasts with their names painted on the side of the cockpit. This is appalling use of aircraft and a terrible waste of engineering resource. It is always better to fly 6 hours each off 2 aircraft than one hour each off 12.
Enough I guess. I don’t want to get into repeat tour arguments it’s not productive. Suffice to say the older among us do understand. In the late seventies and early eighties it was not unheard of for pilots to complete 2 four month tours in NI in 12 to 15 month periods. It will not go on forever. Manning levels will improve as will spares holdings and experience, all of which will ease the problem, after all HERRICK is only 2 years old. I also understand the management challenges in keeping returned operational crews fired up and enthused during the period between tours, no one said it would be easy.
Do stick with it, you are all doing a fantastic job and the Army and RAF crews that I talk to would not be without you. We know there is pain but there is terrific gain. I spoke with a young soldier of the Mercian Regiment, currently at Headly Court ,very recently as he visited us in support of our Help for Heroes fundraising. He said ‘I wouldn’t be talking to you now if it wasn’t for the Apache’. Nuff said, I’m proud to play a small part in your efforts and to sit in your reflected glory.
LB
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As someone that is on the shop floor, feels this pain I totally agree with your post Low Ball.
To me the gain (saving lives) is the biggest reason to keep going and yes, although I would like more hours to train I reckon that if UK plc is that broke and there genuinely is no other option but to run our fleets of AH in the way we do, then I am with you.
But, all I hope is that when/if I or one of my colleagues makes a mistake due to a Human Factors error (aircraft, weapon delivery etc etc) and the associated BoI finds me guilty that the same people that knowingly are having to save money (including training hours) also stand by and accept the blame and protect me.
The moment that I lose faith in the military hierarchy in this area then I no longer become a warrior or a 'gun pilot' - I become a risk averse, safety extreme Apache pilot, which in my opinion (and experience) will not be what the guys on the ground want.
But thank you Low Ball for putting the other side of the case forward - and I know that there are loads of Staff wollers out there that would just love to be flying AH and will never get the chance, but still work long hours to ensure that we have the best support possible in an environment where the politicians want to use the UK military to punch above its weight, but not put any weight or substance into its military.
To me the gain (saving lives) is the biggest reason to keep going and yes, although I would like more hours to train I reckon that if UK plc is that broke and there genuinely is no other option but to run our fleets of AH in the way we do, then I am with you.
But, all I hope is that when/if I or one of my colleagues makes a mistake due to a Human Factors error (aircraft, weapon delivery etc etc) and the associated BoI finds me guilty that the same people that knowingly are having to save money (including training hours) also stand by and accept the blame and protect me.
The moment that I lose faith in the military hierarchy in this area then I no longer become a warrior or a 'gun pilot' - I become a risk averse, safety extreme Apache pilot, which in my opinion (and experience) will not be what the guys on the ground want.
But thank you Low Ball for putting the other side of the case forward - and I know that there are loads of Staff wollers out there that would just love to be flying AH and will never get the chance, but still work long hours to ensure that we have the best support possible in an environment where the politicians want to use the UK military to punch above its weight, but not put any weight or substance into its military.
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Good post it might be but it does seem to gloss over the main problem
I think actually they probably think that the way to solve the spares problem is to build them into the initial programme instead of the same old, same old cannibalisation process. The way in which the Apache programme was procured was scandalous, as is very well known, too many helicopters bought without the necessary add-ons like training and spares. But then that probably doesnt make it any different from most other UK defence procurement programmes.
For those sniping at spares shortages if you think that curing the problem is merely nipping across the Atlantic with a very big wedge and a large truck you are demonstrating a level of ignorance which is beyond comment.
