Battle of Midway. BBC Dan and Peter Snow
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Carrier Islands
Was watching one of those History Channel progs the other day, when they showed some footage of Japanese planes taking off to bomb Pearl Harbour. There were lots of Zeroes with drop tanks etc, and a few three-seat torpedo-bombers (Nakajimas? Jills?, Kates?). All of these appeared to take off from a carrier with the island on the port side of the flight-deck.
Was this a reverse image or did the Japs really have carriers like this?
Seem to remember seeing it before and thinking it somewhat strange.
jf
Was watching one of those History Channel progs the other day, when they showed some footage of Japanese planes taking off to bomb Pearl Harbour. There were lots of Zeroes with drop tanks etc, and a few three-seat torpedo-bombers (Nakajimas? Jills?, Kates?). All of these appeared to take off from a carrier with the island on the port side of the flight-deck.
Was this a reverse image or did the Japs really have carriers like this?
Seem to remember seeing it before and thinking it somewhat strange.
jf
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Carrier islands
Yes a number of japanese carriers had port islands - in fact if you looked carefully during the programme you would have noticed that the BBC had just that during the animated sequences. For example the Akagi - sunk at Midway - had her island to port.
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Codebreaking and Midway
Widger said:
I have the book of the series which is a very worthwhile project but the one thing that irritates me is the way the breaking of the Japanese codes was just a throw away line in the book. I didnt see the programme but assume it was just as throwaway there.
Bletchley Park did have a role in that it was the first to break JN25 the superenciphered code the Imperial Navy used. The work was then taken over by the British station in Singapore which cooperated with their US equivalent in the Philippines. But by this stage of the war, May 1942, both the Singapore and the Philippines stations had gone and the US station at Hawaii had the lead on breaking JN25, assisted by the British who had retreated to Colombo.
It was a brute to get into. A massive codebook encoding phrases and key words into five-figure groups. Having encoded the message, the operator took a randomly chosen string of five-figure groups of the same length from what was itself a random five-figure cipher book. He wrote the cipher groups out under the encoded message and added each cipher group to each code group. So if a code group was 11123 and the cipher group underneath it was 22113 then the group the operator sent was 33236. So to break it you had to somehow strip off the cipher before you even got to the code, a very difficult task. Not as difficult as you might imagine but nevertheless very hit and miss with a lot of skill and luck needed together with the odd dash of brilliance.
Throughout May 1942, the US Navy chiefs in Washington refused to believe persistent intelligence reports from both Hawaii and Colombo that Midway was about to be invaded. It was Colombo which intercepted the key message that showed it was. But it was the Hawaii Commander Joe Rochefort and his codebreakers - working day and night fuelled up by amphetamines - who quite brilliantly managed to break Yamamoto's final operations order to his commanders. Rochefort said: "We could tell them what was going to happen, such things as where the Japanese aircraft carriers would be when they launched their planes, degrees and distance from Midway. Then of course the rest of the dispatch would be the strength of the attack and the composition of the attack forces and so on."
The only thing they couldnt get from the Yamamoto ops order was the precise timing, which was enciphered a further time. But they could get that elsewhere. The British role here was fairly minimal and I wouldnt have wanted to see it mentioned in relation to Midway in either the book or the programme. It was Rochefort's role which should have been recorded a bit better. The above information helped ensure the US won. It's the sort of intelligence any commander would give his eye teeth for and was absolutely crucial. Should have been mentioned. They didnt have to go into all the detail I have to give Rochefort the credit he deserved.
Some things never change however. Rochefort had produced a brilliant piece of intelligence but he had also proven his bosses in Washington wrong and in doing so had made them look foolish. Nimitz recommended him for the Distinguished Service Medal but the big chiefs back in Washington ensured he never got it and had him posted to San Francisco to manage the commisioning of a new dry dock, a total waste of his talent. He was posthumously awarded his DSM by Ronald Reagan in 1986.
I noticed that the Snows talked about the US breaking the Japanese codes, didn't they get assistance from Bletchley Park in this matter?
Bletchley Park did have a role in that it was the first to break JN25 the superenciphered code the Imperial Navy used. The work was then taken over by the British station in Singapore which cooperated with their US equivalent in the Philippines. But by this stage of the war, May 1942, both the Singapore and the Philippines stations had gone and the US station at Hawaii had the lead on breaking JN25, assisted by the British who had retreated to Colombo.
It was a brute to get into. A massive codebook encoding phrases and key words into five-figure groups. Having encoded the message, the operator took a randomly chosen string of five-figure groups of the same length from what was itself a random five-figure cipher book. He wrote the cipher groups out under the encoded message and added each cipher group to each code group. So if a code group was 11123 and the cipher group underneath it was 22113 then the group the operator sent was 33236. So to break it you had to somehow strip off the cipher before you even got to the code, a very difficult task. Not as difficult as you might imagine but nevertheless very hit and miss with a lot of skill and luck needed together with the odd dash of brilliance.
Throughout May 1942, the US Navy chiefs in Washington refused to believe persistent intelligence reports from both Hawaii and Colombo that Midway was about to be invaded. It was Colombo which intercepted the key message that showed it was. But it was the Hawaii Commander Joe Rochefort and his codebreakers - working day and night fuelled up by amphetamines - who quite brilliantly managed to break Yamamoto's final operations order to his commanders. Rochefort said: "We could tell them what was going to happen, such things as where the Japanese aircraft carriers would be when they launched their planes, degrees and distance from Midway. Then of course the rest of the dispatch would be the strength of the attack and the composition of the attack forces and so on."
The only thing they couldnt get from the Yamamoto ops order was the precise timing, which was enciphered a further time. But they could get that elsewhere. The British role here was fairly minimal and I wouldnt have wanted to see it mentioned in relation to Midway in either the book or the programme. It was Rochefort's role which should have been recorded a bit better. The above information helped ensure the US won. It's the sort of intelligence any commander would give his eye teeth for and was absolutely crucial. Should have been mentioned. They didnt have to go into all the detail I have to give Rochefort the credit he deserved.
Some things never change however. Rochefort had produced a brilliant piece of intelligence but he had also proven his bosses in Washington wrong and in doing so had made them look foolish. Nimitz recommended him for the Distinguished Service Medal but the big chiefs back in Washington ensured he never got it and had him posted to San Francisco to manage the commisioning of a new dry dock, a total waste of his talent. He was posthumously awarded his DSM by Ronald Reagan in 1986.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
IIRC the award for the ski-jump was a GEMS award, the highest ever, and was £25k.
The primary function of carrier borne-airpower is the direct support of ground operations, for which the Harrier GR7/GR9 are eminently suited. In an operation where there is significant air threat to maritime forces, air defence will be provided by either land based or coalition aircraft in addition to sea based air defence. JSF will give the force the full spectrum of fast jet operations.
Hmmm, as long as there isn't any enemy airpower! As discussed here.
I remember seeing a programme about carriers in the mid/late 90s in which the Captain of a CVS stated that the main advantage of a carrier was to achieve local air superiority. Did doctrine change that much in just a few years?
Hmmm, as long as there isn't any enemy airpower! As discussed here.
I remember seeing a programme about carriers in the mid/late 90s in which the Captain of a CVS stated that the main advantage of a carrier was to achieve local air superiority. Did doctrine change that much in just a few years?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Strategy Page: If Today's Media Reported the Battle of Midway
Midway Island Demolished. Yorktown, destroyer sunk.
Many US planes lost
June 7, 1942
The United States Navy suffered another blow in its attempt to stem the Japanese juggernaut ravaging the Pacific Ocean. Midway Island, perhaps the most vital U.S. outpost, was pummeled by Japanese Naval aviators. The defending U.S. forces, consisting primarily of antique Buffalo fighters, were competely wiped out while the Japanese attackers suffered few, if any, losses.
In a nearby naval confrontation, the Japanese successfully attacked the Yorktown which was later sunk by a Japanese submarine. A destroyer lashed to the Yorktown was also sunk.
American forces claim to have sunk four Japanese carriers and the cruiser Mogami but those claims were vehemently denied by the Emporer's spokeman.
The American carriers lost an entire squadron of torpedo planes when they failed to link up with fighter escorts. The dive bombers had fighter escort even though they weren't engaged by enemy fighters. The War Dept. refused to answer when asked why the fighters were assigned to the wrong attack groups. The Hornet lost a large number of planes when they couldn't locate the enemy task force. Despite this cavalcade of errors, Admirals Fletcher and Spruance have not been removed.
Code Broken
The failure at Midway is even more disheartening because the U.S. Navy knew the Japanese were coming. Secret documents provided to the NY Times showed that "Magic" intercepts showed the Japanese planned to attack Midway, which they called "AF".
Obsolete Equipment
Some critics blamed the failure at Midway on the use of obsolete aircraft. The inappropriately named Devastator torpedo planes proved no match for the Japanese fighters. Even the Avengers, its schedule replacements, were riddled with bullets and rendered unflyable. Secretary of War Stimson dodged the question saying simply: "You go to war with the Navy you have, not the Navy you want or would like to have". Critics immediately called for his resignation.
Midway Island Demolished. Yorktown, destroyer sunk.
Many US planes lost
June 7, 1942
The United States Navy suffered another blow in its attempt to stem the Japanese juggernaut ravaging the Pacific Ocean. Midway Island, perhaps the most vital U.S. outpost, was pummeled by Japanese Naval aviators. The defending U.S. forces, consisting primarily of antique Buffalo fighters, were competely wiped out while the Japanese attackers suffered few, if any, losses.
In a nearby naval confrontation, the Japanese successfully attacked the Yorktown which was later sunk by a Japanese submarine. A destroyer lashed to the Yorktown was also sunk.
American forces claim to have sunk four Japanese carriers and the cruiser Mogami but those claims were vehemently denied by the Emporer's spokeman.
The American carriers lost an entire squadron of torpedo planes when they failed to link up with fighter escorts. The dive bombers had fighter escort even though they weren't engaged by enemy fighters. The War Dept. refused to answer when asked why the fighters were assigned to the wrong attack groups. The Hornet lost a large number of planes when they couldn't locate the enemy task force. Despite this cavalcade of errors, Admirals Fletcher and Spruance have not been removed.
Code Broken
The failure at Midway is even more disheartening because the U.S. Navy knew the Japanese were coming. Secret documents provided to the NY Times showed that "Magic" intercepts showed the Japanese planned to attack Midway, which they called "AF".
Obsolete Equipment
Some critics blamed the failure at Midway on the use of obsolete aircraft. The inappropriately named Devastator torpedo planes proved no match for the Japanese fighters. Even the Avengers, its schedule replacements, were riddled with bullets and rendered unflyable. Secretary of War Stimson dodged the question saying simply: "You go to war with the Navy you have, not the Navy you want or would like to have". Critics immediately called for his resignation.
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Wasn't there one of those on Salisbury Plain, near Upavon?
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Didn't the Japanese place the island on the port side of some of their carriers because the the aircraft operating off them had engines that rotated the opposite way to usual and thus had a tendancy to roll to starboard under power?
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Interestingly enough Mr. Ingram`s policy statement almost mirrors
the Admirality`s carrier policy in the early war years.British carriers
were sent to war with obsolete attack and anti sub. aircraft and
little in the way of defensive air capability.The result,a large
number of British carriers lost to enemy air attacks.The Admirals
had still not understood that capital ships were vulnerable to air
attack and a large number of British sailors had to die before the
lesson sank in.
While it is very true that the angled deck,mirror landing system,
and steam catapult,were all British inventions handed to the US
Navy, it was only fair that this be so, as it was the US Navy taught
the Royal Navy how to use carriers.
Very good read on the subject;They gave me a Seafire,by Comd.
R.Mike Crosley,DSC,RN.
Regards
the Admirality`s carrier policy in the early war years.British carriers
were sent to war with obsolete attack and anti sub. aircraft and
little in the way of defensive air capability.The result,a large
number of British carriers lost to enemy air attacks.The Admirals
had still not understood that capital ships were vulnerable to air
attack and a large number of British sailors had to die before the
lesson sank in.
While it is very true that the angled deck,mirror landing system,
and steam catapult,were all British inventions handed to the US
Navy, it was only fair that this be so, as it was the US Navy taught
the Royal Navy how to use carriers.
Very good read on the subject;They gave me a Seafire,by Comd.
R.Mike Crosley,DSC,RN.
Regards
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Interesting to see Mike Crosley and Eric Brown mentioned in the same thread. I read Eric Brown's "Wings on my Sleeve" closely followed by Mike Crosley's "Up in Harm's Way" - both of which describe their author's post-war careers test flying naval aircraft. Surprisingly neither pilot makes any direct reference to the other, but Crosley displays some disdain for whomever undertook the initial jet carrier trials of the Vampire - which failed to get a clearance. Reading between the lines it appears that they rather disliked each other. Both are fascinating books although Brown's is more readable.
the aircraft operating off them had engines that rotated the opposite way to usual
Initially the Rolls-Royce Merlin rotated in a different direction to nearly every other engine in production in the UK. It wasn't until the middle of the war that standardization was brought in. Spitfires powered by the later Griffon had to have rudder applied in the opposite direction to earlier Merlin powered efforts on takeoff.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Why are aircraft carriers right handed? Basically, they intended to build a class of them in matched pairs, islands left & right, so their circuits would deconflct when operating together. It confused the hell out of everyone and the concept was eventualy dropped.
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WEBF
I can see that "the ability to achieve local air superiority" (or, in other words, to defend itself) would be a very considerable advantage to a CVS. But is the ability to defend itself a justification for existence, when it is also making a high value target of itself?
I can see that "the ability to achieve local air superiority" (or, in other words, to defend itself) would be a very considerable advantage to a CVS. But is the ability to defend itself a justification for existence, when it is also making a high value target of itself?
Good to hear from you again FV.
A carrier with fighters would not just defend herself, but also the other ships and other forces in the area, hence the term fleet air defence. A bit like sending a ship with a particular weapon system will probably make that ship a priority target in some situations.
By "local air superiority" (not my term, it was a quote) I meant at ranges of 100 to 200 nautical miles or more, not point defence. I suppose the term local is relative, and was meant to suggest that even if their is no air superiority over the entire theatre of operations, the area around the carrier is afforded a degree of protection.
A carrier with fighters would not just defend herself, but also the other ships and other forces in the area, hence the term fleet air defence. A bit like sending a ship with a particular weapon system will probably make that ship a priority target in some situations.
By "local air superiority" (not my term, it was a quote) I meant at ranges of 100 to 200 nautical miles or more, not point defence. I suppose the term local is relative, and was meant to suggest that even if their is no air superiority over the entire theatre of operations, the area around the carrier is afforded a degree of protection.
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British Carrier Developments
One other development that the Brits can claim:-
Imitially,the USN pilots had a hard time getting the F4U Corsair aboard safely due to the practice of "straight-in" approaches; the pilots couldn't see over the nose. This was why, initially, many F4Us were assigned to the Marines for shore-based operations. When some were alocated to the Fleet Air Arm, someone figured out that a curved approach improved visibility almost on to the deck. The USN adopted this shortly afterwards.
I have a good friend who flew Corsairs in the Korean conflict off a carrier. He told me that by then the U.S. Navy had reverted to teaching the old method of approach which he felt very uncomfortable with. Once deployed, he remembered the British way and started using it.He was chewed out for it, but soon everyone picked it up and safer landings resulted.
Imitially,the USN pilots had a hard time getting the F4U Corsair aboard safely due to the practice of "straight-in" approaches; the pilots couldn't see over the nose. This was why, initially, many F4Us were assigned to the Marines for shore-based operations. When some were alocated to the Fleet Air Arm, someone figured out that a curved approach improved visibility almost on to the deck. The USN adopted this shortly afterwards.
I have a good friend who flew Corsairs in the Korean conflict off a carrier. He told me that by then the U.S. Navy had reverted to teaching the old method of approach which he felt very uncomfortable with. Once deployed, he remembered the British way and started using it.He was chewed out for it, but soon everyone picked it up and safer landings resulted.
Did I read somewhere that Corsairs in Korea (presumably land-based ones rather than carrier-borne) carried up to 4,000lb of bombs? In other words, the same payload as early B-17s?
Thread Starter
Thread Creep
Crikey, well I thought this thread was creeping way off track but, we have reached a nice juncture here to start talking about next weeks programme which is about Korea. The last programme on Stalingrad was very good and I found it extremely informative.
British Carriers were in action in Korea (I am sure that some historians on here will fill in the gaps)
British Carriers were in action in Korea (I am sure that some historians on here will fill in the gaps)
