Nimrod Information
MS
My point is that the aircarft should have been able to cope with a fuel leak, be it from AAR or a pipe or whatever. Any decent aviator or engineer will tell you that to design a bay that mixes hot air and fuel pipes with no fire suppression or mitigation is, literally, an accident waiting to happen (AAR or not). The Nimrod has been flying like that since day 1 and many of the so-called 'experts' should have spotted it. As did, in fact, the guy who drafted the safety case. Tragically, as a non-operator, he made a critical error in assuming/believing the pipes were cold when airborne.
CLA
My point is that the aircarft should have been able to cope with a fuel leak, be it from AAR or a pipe or whatever. Any decent aviator or engineer will tell you that to design a bay that mixes hot air and fuel pipes with no fire suppression or mitigation is, literally, an accident waiting to happen (AAR or not). The Nimrod has been flying like that since day 1 and many of the so-called 'experts' should have spotted it. As did, in fact, the guy who drafted the safety case. Tragically, as a non-operator, he made a critical error in assuming/believing the pipes were cold when airborne.
CLA
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Tragically, as a non-operator, he made a critical error in assuming/believing the pipes were cold when airborne.
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CLA is wrong in assuming this problem was not spotted by designers.
"Naturally the Nimrod's designers realised that 400-degree compressed air is stuff that ought to be kept separate from essentially everything else, so the pipes are heavily insulated.
Just as naturally, the insulation is only replaced if it goes wrong; the maintenance handbook does not state how much insulation is tolerable. An experiment on a dodgy section showed the insulation was only 16 degrees cooler than the bare metal. "In some areas on other aircraft it was noted the laces have loosened and there are visible gaps between the blanket edge and the main pipe insulation, leaving exposed sections of pipe surface", said the Board."
This was a contributory factor noted by the board.
I agree with Mr P the air in this pipe fulfills a number of functions. Would CLA confirm that Nimrod is no longer operated on 2 engines because there is not enough air to start another engine if one of them fails?
"Naturally the Nimrod's designers realised that 400-degree compressed air is stuff that ought to be kept separate from essentially everything else, so the pipes are heavily insulated.
Just as naturally, the insulation is only replaced if it goes wrong; the maintenance handbook does not state how much insulation is tolerable. An experiment on a dodgy section showed the insulation was only 16 degrees cooler than the bare metal. "In some areas on other aircraft it was noted the laces have loosened and there are visible gaps between the blanket edge and the main pipe insulation, leaving exposed sections of pipe surface", said the Board."
This was a contributory factor noted by the board.
I agree with Mr P the air in this pipe fulfills a number of functions. Would CLA confirm that Nimrod is no longer operated on 2 engines because there is not enough air to start another engine if one of them fails?
All this sniping could be nipped in the bud if;
a. People actually read posts, and,
b. The BAeS and, especially, the QinetiQ report were posted on Daily Orders at Kinloss (and all air stations).
As they say, read them and weep. Then ask why such flagrant and deliberate breaches of the MoD’s airworthiness regulations were ordered, condoned, supported and covered up with lies.
Then, if you will, point fingers. My opinion is you will not, as the starting point is mere 2 Stars. And if you’ve never pinned a 2 Star to a wall because he laughed at you when you tried to highlight a critical flight safety problem, then you have no concept whatsoever of just how hard people fight to keep you and your aircraft safe. And how they are treated for trying to meet their Duty of Care. And how bloody frustrating it is that people died as a result of him walking away and doing nothing. I weep for the people who suffer because of this criminal incompetence.
Just another side of the story. We’re a team guys. Some here don’t fully understand 1st and 2nd line, others don’t understand acquisition/support. But most of us have a common goal. It is those who don’t, and make a career of it, you need to target.
a. People actually read posts, and,
b. The BAeS and, especially, the QinetiQ report were posted on Daily Orders at Kinloss (and all air stations).
As they say, read them and weep. Then ask why such flagrant and deliberate breaches of the MoD’s airworthiness regulations were ordered, condoned, supported and covered up with lies.
Then, if you will, point fingers. My opinion is you will not, as the starting point is mere 2 Stars. And if you’ve never pinned a 2 Star to a wall because he laughed at you when you tried to highlight a critical flight safety problem, then you have no concept whatsoever of just how hard people fight to keep you and your aircraft safe. And how they are treated for trying to meet their Duty of Care. And how bloody frustrating it is that people died as a result of him walking away and doing nothing. I weep for the people who suffer because of this criminal incompetence.
Just another side of the story. We’re a team guys. Some here don’t fully understand 1st and 2nd line, others don’t understand acquisition/support. But most of us have a common goal. It is those who don’t, and make a career of it, you need to target.
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I was quite impressed by Des Browne's comments on Hansard. He suggested that a QC might well end up doing some finger pointing of his own. Tuc, with your knowledge, I would hope you offer your services to this gentleman.
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I entirely accept as I said earlier that the maintenance teams at Kinloss were doing their damndest and doing it well. I believe it not just because you say it here, or because having flown Crab Air too many times during my army service, it often seemed that if the slightest bloody nut was not up to scratch they wouldn't fly. I believe it because we have an independent report in the shape of the QinetiQ report of March 2006 which says it.
What I can't get my head round though is that ACM Torpy said on Tuesday that AAR was suspended without exception after last month's fuel leak during AAR because "we couldn't replicate the fault on the ground".
Strangely enough the QinetiQ report said something very similar:
So believing the first, I have to assume that a lot of people were saying with some degree of concern look we can't replicate this fault so we can't fix it, they clearly told the QinetiQ team exactly that. Who was it that was ignoring these concerns? And why did Torpy seem to think that the inability to replicate the fault was something new that suddenly meant AAR had to stop until it could be replicated?
What I can't get my head round though is that ACM Torpy said on Tuesday that AAR was suspended without exception after last month's fuel leak during AAR because "we couldn't replicate the fault on the ground".
Strangely enough the QinetiQ report said something very similar:
"It was also suggested that RAMS cannot detect some of the leaks reported in-theatre when the aircraft return to Kinloss. This is partially explained by fuel load in tanks, climatic conditions, ineffective vacuum in tanks, etc, and Qinetiq were unable to establish a clear impression of how these non-detected leaks are addressed.”
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I think your answer is here Mick. Torpy has had his train set taken away from him.
MoD preparing to pay Nimrod claims
Michael Evans
EDINBURGH Millions of pounds will have to be put aside to pay for compensation claims from the families of the Nimrod air crash victims, the Ministry of Defence confirmed, adding to a reported £1 billion black hole in the ministry’s finances.
Following the public acceptance of liability by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, for the death of 14 servicemen in the aircraft which exploded in Afghanistan, the families’ lawyers said that negligence had effectively been agreed. Fred Tyler, of Balfour and Manson, an Edinburgh solicitors’ firm which is handling 12 of the 14 claims, told The Times that although he had dealt with previous cases where the MoD had eventually admitted liability, it had never happened so early in the process.
The board of inquiry report into the crash said that there had been shortcomings in the way that the aircraft had been maintained.
MoD preparing to pay Nimrod claims
Michael Evans
EDINBURGH Millions of pounds will have to be put aside to pay for compensation claims from the families of the Nimrod air crash victims, the Ministry of Defence confirmed, adding to a reported £1 billion black hole in the ministry’s finances.
Following the public acceptance of liability by Des Browne, the Defence Secretary, for the death of 14 servicemen in the aircraft which exploded in Afghanistan, the families’ lawyers said that negligence had effectively been agreed. Fred Tyler, of Balfour and Manson, an Edinburgh solicitors’ firm which is handling 12 of the 14 claims, told The Times that although he had dealt with previous cases where the MoD had eventually admitted liability, it had never happened so early in the process.
The board of inquiry report into the crash said that there had been shortcomings in the way that the aircraft had been maintained.
Last edited by nigegilb; 6th Dec 2007 at 23:18.
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Tec:
Its easy to use the word, "lies" from the comfort of a screen name.
There were no lies. Yes, a safety case was ordered. Yes, it was accepted at face value (not condoned) and yes it was therefore supported. It is a fact that the analyis in the NSC was flawed and no-one spotted the errors until the BOI spotted them. One cannot lie if one doesn't know the truth.
I have to say this, unpalatable as it is, but ground engineering officers would never have spotted those errors. Why? Because they don't know everything about how the aircraft is operated. They don't need to. No air engineer was ever given the opportunity to participate in the NSC; indeed we didn't even know it existed. Had we been given sight of it, the errors would have been seen immediately. How do I know this? Because the air member of the BOI (an air eng) was the first aircrew to read the NSC and it was he who spotted the errors. I haven't asked him if I'm right about that. I just know it.
The simple fact is this: the RAF never had the opportunity to lie about the NSC. We never knew it was flawed. Hence the QC will have an abundance of people from many other agencies in the queue outside his door.
Then ask why such flagrant and deliberate breaches of the MoD’s airworthiness regulations were ordered, condoned, supported and covered up with lies.
There were no lies. Yes, a safety case was ordered. Yes, it was accepted at face value (not condoned) and yes it was therefore supported. It is a fact that the analyis in the NSC was flawed and no-one spotted the errors until the BOI spotted them. One cannot lie if one doesn't know the truth.
I have to say this, unpalatable as it is, but ground engineering officers would never have spotted those errors. Why? Because they don't know everything about how the aircraft is operated. They don't need to. No air engineer was ever given the opportunity to participate in the NSC; indeed we didn't even know it existed. Had we been given sight of it, the errors would have been seen immediately. How do I know this? Because the air member of the BOI (an air eng) was the first aircrew to read the NSC and it was he who spotted the errors. I haven't asked him if I'm right about that. I just know it.
The simple fact is this: the RAF never had the opportunity to lie about the NSC. We never knew it was flawed. Hence the QC will have an abundance of people from many other agencies in the queue outside his door.
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Nigegilb,
Due to the Limitation Log entry of keeping that pipe closed, after all engines are ground started, we cannot air start the engines at the moment. We can windmill start them. An engine can get air from the adjacent engine for an air start but, frustratingly, the electrics that control the air start also opens up the crossfeed pipe. So, we do not shut down any engine in flight unless in an emergency, such that when an engine that is shut down will not be considered to be safe to relight it.
Before you ask, yes, we are looking at ways we could air start an engine in the event of a failure to windmill relight following a precautionary shut down.
And, yes, that pipe has had this limitation in place since 3 Sep 06.
Regards
Ed Set
I agree with Mr P the air in this pipe fulfills a number of functions. Would CLA confirm that Nimrod is no longer operated on 2 engines because there is not enough air to start another engine if one of them fails?
Before you ask, yes, we are looking at ways we could air start an engine in the event of a failure to windmill relight following a precautionary shut down.
And, yes, that pipe has had this limitation in place since 3 Sep 06.
Regards
Ed Set
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Ed fella, I wasn't trying to be smart, just pointing out that the person reviewing the safety case or whatever he was doing didn't really know a lot about that pipe did he?
Also heard it is bloody hot in the aircraft now, and obviously idling engines are burning fuel all the time. Sorry, the error was a pretty big one and not one that can be brushed under the carpet.
In the light of the proposed multi million pound pay out for negligence would the chap from Whitehall who was threatening everyone with jail for OSA breaches like to come back to the thread?
Also heard it is bloody hot in the aircraft now, and obviously idling engines are burning fuel all the time. Sorry, the error was a pretty big one and not one that can be brushed under the carpet.
In the light of the proposed multi million pound pay out for negligence would the chap from Whitehall who was threatening everyone with jail for OSA breaches like to come back to the thread?
Last edited by nigegilb; 6th Dec 2007 at 23:38.
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NG,
OK. I thought it was a question that would lead onto another question.
I didn't read that particular threat message but, in general, I tend to agree with him. The individual(s) releasing IRs and e-mails and going on TV were spouting on about the SCP pipe and other similar pipes, leaking hot air onto fuel tanks. They also mentioned leaking wing tanks and TD, DV and Mick Smith were working on those releases as though the source(s) were whistle blowing. The fact is that they were far off the mark. We all know that wing tanks weep and seep. We were content that the hot air to cause fuel fires in the bomb bay had been removed. In fact, the source(s) contributed to poor morale, undermined the Stn Cdr, et al, and generally pi$$ed us all off. The OSA was the least of our concerns, but it will be used as the means to chase them down.
Ed fella, I wasn't trying to be smart
In the light of the proposed multi million pound pay out for negligence would the chap from Whitehall who was threatening everyone with jail for OSA breaches like to come back to the thread?
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Ed
It's easy to misunderstand some of the comments in this very long thread, many of them are made on the basis of what has gone before. Can I clear up a few things.
Most of the Safety Cases for in-service aircraft have not been properly scrutinised, in fact, many of them are not capable of passing close scrutiny. So in all probability, no one has even looked for possible errors. This is a failing of the IPT and of the MoD's Safety and Airworthiness management system.
The type of analyses needed to build a Safety Case requires expert input from a number of sources. It needs the participation of the designer (BAES), maintenance (RAF Engineering), operators (aircrew) and other specialists as required. The whole analysis needs to be led by an experienced Safety Engineer who understands the difference between a hazard, failure and fault etc. Many people don't ! The input needs to come from experienced people, not just a desk officer on a two year tour in the IPT either. In many cases this will best come from experienced SNCOs . You don't have to worry that the specialists brought in may not fully understand the analysis process. The Safety Engineers are there for that. There are similar requirements for reviewing the Safety Case. It is not just simply a case of reading it. When a claim is made, it has to be questioned, you have to look for the evidence to support a claim, in short, it has to be justified.
Much of what I describe above will be alien to many IPTs, because they simply don't do it. They don't understand that they need to do it, and they don't understand why they need to do it. If that sounds like incompetence, then......................
The IPTL is responsible for assuring himself that the aircraft has an acceptable Safety Case. Not knowing it was flawed will not be a defence in a court of law. If you have not looked for those flaws, now that would be indefensible. That will be the position that virtually all of the IPTs will be in.
S_H
It's easy to misunderstand some of the comments in this very long thread, many of them are made on the basis of what has gone before. Can I clear up a few things.
Yes, a safety case was ordered. Yes, it was accepted at face value (not condoned) and yes it was therefore supported. It is a fact that the analysis in the NSC was flawed and no-one spotted the errors until the BOI spotted them. One cannot lie if one doesn't know the truth.
I have to say this, unpalatable as it is, but ground engineering officers would never have spotted those errors. Why? Because they don't know everything about how the aircraft is operated. They don't need to. No air engineer was ever given the opportunity to participate in the NSC; indeed we didn't even know it existed. Had we been given sight of it, the errors would have been seen immediately.
Much of what I describe above will be alien to many IPTs, because they simply don't do it. They don't understand that they need to do it, and they don't understand why they need to do it. If that sounds like incompetence, then......................
The simple fact is this: the RAF never had the opportunity to lie about the NSC. We never knew it was flawed.
S_H
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They also mentioned leaking wing tanks and TD, DV and Mick Smith were working on those releases as though the source(s) were whistle blowing. The fact is that they were far off the mark. We all know that wing tanks weep and seep.
EdSet100
Your response to my post concentrates entirely on one very small part of the whole picture – the role of maintainers at Kinloss. It has been said many times here – no-one has ever pointed fingers in that direction.
Please read posts carefully. My point has always been that there are systemic failures across the MoD in the application of the processes and procedures underpinning airworthiness regulations. I have made this point repeatedly over time. The MoD have continually denied it, but the truth has been exposed.
In that context, please reflect on ACM Sir Clive Loader’s comment,
“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 service personnel who were aboard, resulted from shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.
He omits to say that the processes are not Nimrod-specific, that they apply to all aircraft. Hopefully the Review will explore this.
A remarkably similar sentiment to mine, may I suggest. I notice it is dated 2nd November 2007. Three weeks later MB were denying this very issue, in writing, on behalf of Min(AF). I have their letter in front of me, one of many over a period of years which all trot out the same mantra. “The MoD has a robust regulatory framework”. Frameworks collapse if they don’t sit on deep, stable foundations.
I am not Sir Clive Loader. Nor do MoD address their correspondence to "tucumseh".
Your response to my post concentrates entirely on one very small part of the whole picture – the role of maintainers at Kinloss. It has been said many times here – no-one has ever pointed fingers in that direction.
Please read posts carefully. My point has always been that there are systemic failures across the MoD in the application of the processes and procedures underpinning airworthiness regulations. I have made this point repeatedly over time. The MoD have continually denied it, but the truth has been exposed.
In that context, please reflect on ACM Sir Clive Loader’s comment,
“I conclude that the loss of XV230 and, far more importantly, of the 14 service personnel who were aboard, resulted from shortcomings in the application of the processes for assuring airworthiness and safe operation of the Nimrod”.
He omits to say that the processes are not Nimrod-specific, that they apply to all aircraft. Hopefully the Review will explore this.
A remarkably similar sentiment to mine, may I suggest. I notice it is dated 2nd November 2007. Three weeks later MB were denying this very issue, in writing, on behalf of Min(AF). I have their letter in front of me, one of many over a period of years which all trot out the same mantra. “The MoD has a robust regulatory framework”. Frameworks collapse if they don’t sit on deep, stable foundations.
I am not Sir Clive Loader. Nor do MoD address their correspondence to "tucumseh".
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A Note Of Caution
Gentlemen
As ex-RAF aircrew living overseas I am extremely grateful to be able to be able to keep abreast of this sad episode. Thank you all who contribute.
After reading the BOI with interest I was dismayed to read the recomendation that voice data recorders should be installed in aircraft. The BOI into the loss of XV193 at Blair Athol in 1993 was hampered by a similar lack of voice data. Having lost colleagues in that accident imagine my dismay to read a previous BOI, following the loss of XV216 in 1971 at Pisa, the recommendation for voice data recorders to be installed. I had ignorantly thought that a BOI recommendation would be followed. It is frustrating that 36 years later we are still not doing our utmost to follow the advice of a team of experts who investigate these sorry events. I fully understand that voice data would not have prevented these accidents but any BOI deserves as much data that could be made available to assist them.
Two final thoughts - Firstly, I was impressed that the Sec of State said " I am sorry". That honesty is long overdue from this Government. Finally, my thoughts are with the families of a team of fine aviators that died doing their bit. For that I am personally grateful.
Fly Safe.
As ex-RAF aircrew living overseas I am extremely grateful to be able to be able to keep abreast of this sad episode. Thank you all who contribute.
After reading the BOI with interest I was dismayed to read the recomendation that voice data recorders should be installed in aircraft. The BOI into the loss of XV193 at Blair Athol in 1993 was hampered by a similar lack of voice data. Having lost colleagues in that accident imagine my dismay to read a previous BOI, following the loss of XV216 in 1971 at Pisa, the recommendation for voice data recorders to be installed. I had ignorantly thought that a BOI recommendation would be followed. It is frustrating that 36 years later we are still not doing our utmost to follow the advice of a team of experts who investigate these sorry events. I fully understand that voice data would not have prevented these accidents but any BOI deserves as much data that could be made available to assist them.
Two final thoughts - Firstly, I was impressed that the Sec of State said " I am sorry". That honesty is long overdue from this Government. Finally, my thoughts are with the families of a team of fine aviators that died doing their bit. For that I am personally grateful.
Fly Safe.
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Firstly, I was impressed that the Sec of State said " I am sorry". That honesty is long overdue from this Government. Finally, my thoughts are with the families of a team of fine aviators that died doing their bit. For that I am personally grateful.
Fine words FMT, I agree and I have changed my view of Des Browne over this, he is obviously a decent man.
I am troubled by the response from Kinloss, I think some of you just don't get how serious this is. These 14 people were killed by negligence, systemic failures that resulted in one tank having been fixed but the other still overflowing due to pipes that couldn't take the gas on board quickly enough. I read the RAF Chief Engineers comments with dismay. He even had the temerity to blame the lack of incident reports on this very common problem as a reason for not fixing the other tank. A safety review had occurred on the age of the airframe, but the aircraft systems were not reviewed? The aircraft seals had not been maintained? Some were 38 years old? An aircraft goes in to get its fuel leaks fixed and is signed off with a majority of leaks still there. The words of a very experienced engineering contact
Seepage from integral tanks is fairly normal, we have ****/**** which regularly have a wet stain on the lower surface of the wing. Provided we can positively identify where the seep is originating then we can issue a tech log entry for repair at next "C" check, which could be 18 months into the future, provided that the seep does not become a weep or leak. The airframe that left equalised servicing with fuel leaks beggars belief.
The lack of training for engineers, the belief that the pipe that killed the boys was cold? The failure to shut off air to that pipe even though an aircraft was written off after a hot air leak on that very same fuel tank?
The list is endless. This is totally unprecedented, the MoD are paying up, no questions asked but senior people in the RAF are still saying this is nothing to do with the age of the aircraft.
And Sir Glenn Torpy and his sidekick AOC 2Gp insist on sending his boys up NFF fuel leaks. Not f****g Fixed, no way of testing.
This is an utter disgrace, please don't whine at the people who have campaigned,
Maybe Torpy would like to explain, why, 4 major leaks after the loss of XV230 he has finally stopped AAR. I am all ears.
Fine words FMT, I agree and I have changed my view of Des Browne over this, he is obviously a decent man.
I am troubled by the response from Kinloss, I think some of you just don't get how serious this is. These 14 people were killed by negligence, systemic failures that resulted in one tank having been fixed but the other still overflowing due to pipes that couldn't take the gas on board quickly enough. I read the RAF Chief Engineers comments with dismay. He even had the temerity to blame the lack of incident reports on this very common problem as a reason for not fixing the other tank. A safety review had occurred on the age of the airframe, but the aircraft systems were not reviewed? The aircraft seals had not been maintained? Some were 38 years old? An aircraft goes in to get its fuel leaks fixed and is signed off with a majority of leaks still there. The words of a very experienced engineering contact
Seepage from integral tanks is fairly normal, we have ****/**** which regularly have a wet stain on the lower surface of the wing. Provided we can positively identify where the seep is originating then we can issue a tech log entry for repair at next "C" check, which could be 18 months into the future, provided that the seep does not become a weep or leak. The airframe that left equalised servicing with fuel leaks beggars belief.
The lack of training for engineers, the belief that the pipe that killed the boys was cold? The failure to shut off air to that pipe even though an aircraft was written off after a hot air leak on that very same fuel tank?
The list is endless. This is totally unprecedented, the MoD are paying up, no questions asked but senior people in the RAF are still saying this is nothing to do with the age of the aircraft.
And Sir Glenn Torpy and his sidekick AOC 2Gp insist on sending his boys up NFF fuel leaks. Not f****g Fixed, no way of testing.
This is an utter disgrace, please don't whine at the people who have campaigned,
Maybe Torpy would like to explain, why, 4 major leaks after the loss of XV230 he has finally stopped AAR. I am all ears.
Last edited by nigegilb; 7th Dec 2007 at 09:27.
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Time To Stop And Think?
Gentlemen (and ladies),
As a retired Nimrod pilot with over 5000 hrs on type over a period of 30+ years, split between all 3 operational Mks, I have followed this thread with interest. I knew most of the crew of XV230 as trusted professional operators. This is my first post on this thread as I prefered to await the informed findings of the BOI rather than join the speculation here.
The BOI seem to have done an excellent, unbiased job and have produced sensible, informed, findings and far reaching recommendations. I worked with the President in the past and would have expected nothing less.
This forum has degenerated into a stream of accusations and criticism of those who posted previously in good faith. None of this will help the implementation of the Boards findings or, more importantly, the healing period for the bereaved families who have behaved with courage and fortitude whilst awaiting the findings of the Board.
Those at Kinloss, and in higher authority, must now be trusted to implement the findings of the Board and continue Nimrod operations safely until the arrival of MR4 or another platform that can cover the current essential roles of the Nimrod in operational theatres. I also predict that we shall soon be needing the Nimrod as an MPA again if Russia's sabre rattling increases. If
MR4 needs to be modified as a result of the boards findings this should be done before it enters service.
Before posting further, please think. Will my post make any difference? Will it offend or hurt anyone who now needs space to get on with their lives?
As a retired Nimrod pilot with over 5000 hrs on type over a period of 30+ years, split between all 3 operational Mks, I have followed this thread with interest. I knew most of the crew of XV230 as trusted professional operators. This is my first post on this thread as I prefered to await the informed findings of the BOI rather than join the speculation here.
The BOI seem to have done an excellent, unbiased job and have produced sensible, informed, findings and far reaching recommendations. I worked with the President in the past and would have expected nothing less.
This forum has degenerated into a stream of accusations and criticism of those who posted previously in good faith. None of this will help the implementation of the Boards findings or, more importantly, the healing period for the bereaved families who have behaved with courage and fortitude whilst awaiting the findings of the Board.
Those at Kinloss, and in higher authority, must now be trusted to implement the findings of the Board and continue Nimrod operations safely until the arrival of MR4 or another platform that can cover the current essential roles of the Nimrod in operational theatres. I also predict that we shall soon be needing the Nimrod as an MPA again if Russia's sabre rattling increases. If
MR4 needs to be modified as a result of the boards findings this should be done before it enters service.
Before posting further, please think. Will my post make any difference? Will it offend or hurt anyone who now needs space to get on with their lives?
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Vage rot, FATTER GATOR et al.
Just to put your unjustified slur against Jimmy Jones to bed, he left the RAF in 1978, before the air-to-air refuelling system was introduced and so could not possibly have been involved in any aspect of its use.
Just to put your unjustified slur against Jimmy Jones to bed, he left the RAF in 1978, before the air-to-air refuelling system was introduced and so could not possibly have been involved in any aspect of its use.