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Nimrod Information

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Nimrod Information

Old 5th Dec 2007, 08:20
  #1861 (permalink)  
 
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Ebtb

In my book “accident waiting to happen” = “this was an accident that occurred due to a cumulative sequence of events”. Ever heard of the phrase “for want of a nail…etc”? Similar analogy in this case?

You are quite correct however, that I am a former Supplier who has no expertise in engineering or flying related tasks (unless I include my gliding and paragliding badges). I do not make comment on the engineering and flying disciplines unlike those who seek to make comment in the reverse direction. I’m not a lawyer either, so does that excuse me from sitting on a jury? No! It does not, but it does allow me to form my own opinion based on the evidence presented. Whether or not my own verdict agrees with the other eleven members of the jury is down to me! I expressed my opinion on what had preceded - if you had read the whole thread you will see two posts from me prior to the one which has so irritated you; one was a question I asked as a layman and one to acknowledge the reply from Tucumseh who had the good grace and manners not to be so dismissive of my post even though his private thoughts may have not been so kind.

Perhaps, from your lofty position above the mere mortals who inhabit this earth, you might find time to ponder on the words of Voltaire.

The BOI has delivered it’s findings, the Government has made it’s excuses and I am not making any more comment on this thread except to express my continuing sympathy to the families, relatives and friends of the fallen and congratulate them on their admirable dignity and fortitude since that awful day.

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Old 5th Dec 2007, 08:48
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BBC News

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7128054.stm



"In an ideal world, the Nimrod would be grounded. But we don't live in an ideal world so the Nimrod will carry on flying."

Unbelievable Statement

NS
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:07
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rock34

If as your post suggests you were part of the team that rushed to the scene then you are to be commended.

You and your colleagues actions ensured that, we the relatives, had the small consolation of being able to bury our dead. We all owe everybody involved in the recovery operation a debt of gratitude that we will never be able to repay.





Tappers brother.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:12
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General allrounder said:
"The electorate sets the agenda on expenditure on the doorstep during elections. When voters start to ask politicians what they will do about the parlous state of the armed forces, then and only then will there be any more money. Until then the Treasury will put its money where the voters want it: Health, Education and Social Security."
Absoluteley bang on! This is the cause of this accident. The MR Force ( like the rest of the armed forces ) has always had a positive 'can-do' attitude. It has never been 'why can't we do this' but 'how are we going to do it with not enough crews and knackered jets!'
This has always been the case and with the exception of one excellent boss on 42, I can't ever remember squadrons saying 'no, sorry, we can't do that.' ( Cos it might affect my promotion if I say to 18Gp 'No', said the Wg Cdr ).
Unfortunately, their Airships don't seem to be able to draw a line in the sand - partly due to political manouevring and squabbling between the services for the limited pile of cash, I suspect. The message needs to start being forced back up the chain of command, loud and clear.
This tragic incident goes beyond the nitty gritty of how a Nimrod works. we can argue til we are blue in the face as to whether some sort of extinguisher in the bomb bay would have made any difference but where do you draw the line?
Its about time CDS realistically stated what can and cannot be achieved. Unfortunately, the armed forces have caught the disease of civvy street - performance targets, cost saving initiatives etc and it just doesn't work that way, especially when you are fighting 2 wars.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:14
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EdSet100 wrote:
Chug,
Have a look at page 2-22 through to Page 2-24. BAe was involved in the hazard analysis. It wasn't a case of self-policing, as you seem to suggest. It would be very difficult to challenge your boss about a risk when the design authority backs him up with an "improbable" assessment.
There used to be an RAF retort of "Not me Chief, I'm airframes". It seems that is the line of your defence for the RAF, even the MOD. Flash news people: "Flight Safety concerns you!" Another old tag that seems to have gone the same way as the rest of the RAF as was. So the responsibility for Airworthiness does not reside with the owner/operator (MOD/RAF) but with the manufacturer (BAe)? Do you ever step back from this mad house and wonder what the hell is going on here? BAe, RAF, MOD are all either inappropriate or proven unworthy to exercise Airworthiness Authority over our military air fleets, ergo we need someone who is. The model is the CAA, the answer is an independent Military Airworthiness Authority!
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:16
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This is the first battle in a long war for justice for Crew 3.

The people that failed in their responsibility to those 14 men know exactly who they are.

They have to live with the fact that their failings killed 14 good men. That must be unbearable.

It's no use saying, ''We are doing our best.'' You have got to succeed in doing what is necessary.
- Winston Churchill
The RAF/MOD did not succeed in doing what was necessary to prevent the deaths of Crew 3.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:20
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Duty Of Care

Rant On

The MoD has a duty of care to its "employees" and those directly influenced by it's activities (civilians on the ground etc). Recent comment - Panel falls of AWACS, no risk to public, What ???????????? I would ask where is the duty of care?

Had the Nimrod incident happened in the UK I would expect the press and the public to be crying for blood. Because it happened on ops it is ok?

The current culture (probably should say policy) within UK Military Aviation is to drive out costs and manage the risks associate with an accident occurring. It is not as safe as civil aviation, policy dictates that the probability of catastrophic failure is lower than on a civil aircraft. SofS has demanded a review of the safety case for the Nimrod, AOC 2 has indicated that all of his fleets should be subject to similar reviews.

The airworthiness management chain in the UK MoD has BROKEN.

Groundcrew and aircrew have raised concerns about lean, and cost cuts.

Swiss Des needs to review the regulation of Military Aviation and start to realise that root and branch reform is needed. Military aircraft are highly complicated machines designed by people with tefal heads. How can an engineering officer really understand the implications of their decisions several years on? More to the point, where is the independence in the process to challenge their decisions.

TD's comments are 150% correct, the aircrew and groundcrew are being let down by the people on the ground - the policy makers who are doing the wrong thing in order to balance the books are letting them down.

Rant Off

Whoever the QC is that investigates the Safety Case needs to get lots of e-mails, calls, etc, asking them to look into the establishment of an independent Military Airworthiness Authority as part of the CAA. Implement Mil Part M and Mil Part 145 across all fleets and regulate it INDEPENDANTLY.

To avoid incoming, I have respect for the Engineering Branch, but suspect that the cost cutting mentality is driving them to overlook the consequences of their decisions. The risk of Corporate Manslaughter is a massive driver in making sure, as a civvie, that your engineering solution is robust. Make the wrong decision and you live with the consequences.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:24
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The General said:

The electorate sets the agenda on expenditure on the doorstep during elections
which I think is bollocks. No one has ever knocked my door, or asked me what the priorities are. The reason for that is, that I live in one of the (vast majority of) constituencies where Margaret Thatcher would win if she wore a red rosette, and said, "I'm Labour really".

They do what is cheap electorally, not what is right. End of.

CG
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:31
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downsizer
In answer to your question "Do you mean Nimrod groundcrew and engineers".

Those that drafted the Safety Case
Those that failed to notify the Design Authority of MODs
Those that drafted the Nimrod Maintenance Policy
The lack of Fire suppression and detection equipment
Those who drafted the fuel system maintenance Policy
All those Bean Counters who knew about the leak problems on the ac and did nothing.

Oh yes and one gentleman who was asked in June 2007 prior to the recent Mayday by a Nimrod crew "A lot of people are concerned that air-to-air refuelling might have something to do with what happened at Kandahar. Are you satisfied that it's actually safe?"


SIR XXXX XXXXX "I am. It's exactly the same as the rest of the integrity of the aircraft. It has been a focus for understandable reasons and we did suspend air-to-air refuelling for a period in November. We looked at what we are doing. It is as safe as it needs to be."

We have to live with the knowledge our son was not killed by insurgents but by incompetence.

Those responsible for the failings reported in the BOI report will have to live with the knowledge that they contributed to the deaths of 14 good aviators .

Rest in peace now boys
Justice has been seen to be done, and retribution will surely follow.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:38
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Rock,

I totally agree that Skua's comments regarding the CSAR operation were at best naive.

When I read the BoI report last night, as well as thinking about the friends I lost last September, I was trying to picture the incredibly difficult task that RCD and then your (34 Sqn RAF Regt) Sqn faced. The CSAR response time was exceptionally fast and I believe that without such a reaction the BoI task would have been significantly more difficult.

Downsizer,

I think Graham was referring to facts such as, "NSC quotes the potential for fuel system leakage as Improbable", based on the mistaken idea that Zone 614 had fire detection and suppression systems. In addition, Nimrod IPT's decision not to follow the FRS manufacturer's recommendation to inspect the seals every 5 years as this would be impractical, leaves some serious questions to be answered. Who was overseeing the decision-making process?
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:45
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Yesterday at ISK we were told that flying the aircraft was a "Tolerable Risk". Tolerable for Whom?

I have always said the old girl was as safe as ever but I'm digging my way through the BOI report and would like to see the Safety Case before I decide whether to continue my career on the old lady. Whilst I am safe that the problems of XV230 have been mitigated (as I have said before) as best possible, what else is there that is known about but that we have not been told?

The Safety Case didn't exist in 2003 (when I was last at QQ). I can only guess that it's compilation by BAe was little more than a paperwork review of previous flight tests and the use of anecdotal evidence - ie it's been safe for 20 years so it's not going to hit us with any surprises now! I will know better when I track down the report and have a read.

For now, back to the BOI report with a highlighter - a long read!

Last edited by Vage Rot; 5th Dec 2007 at 09:47. Reason: put in paragraph breaks!
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 09:48
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Da4force, (edit for mongness)

Unfortunately i was there, i have several friends on the kipper fleet and was stunned when i found the wallet of one of my mates (although i can now chuckle at the 3 points and £60 fine he had on his driving licence in the wallet which he'd managed to keep quiet about!)

I'm glad you have some been able to find some consolation from our efforts - we are proud of what we did. Once we had returned to KAF and had a chat about it, not one of us said we would hesitate to do it again should the worst happen - we would want the same for us if we were in that position.


Gone but not forgotten,

Rock34

Last edited by rock34; 5th Dec 2007 at 11:06.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 10:04
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Questions.

Westminster SNP Leader, Angus Robertson MP, whose Moray constituency is home to the Nimrod fleet at RAF Kinloss, has today (Monday) written to Secretary of State for Defence, Des Browne, to ensure that all questions about Nimrod safety are answered.

Twelve RAF personnel and two other servicemen were killed on 2 September 2006 when their Nimrod, call sign XV230, exploded shortly after mid-air refuelling.

Speaking about the Board of Inquiry and the unanswered questions Angus Robertson MP said:

“Everybody hopes that the inquiry will answer all of the relevant questions about the Nimrod which crashed in Afghanistan and help avoid a repeat of the tragedy.

“There are however, a host of unanswered questions about the safety of the ageing Nimrod fleet as a whole which the Ministry of Defence must answer.

“The MOD has to restore confidence in the wake of the tragedy and a series of safety incidents.

“I have sent Secretary of State Des Browne 15 key questions about Nimrod safety which must be answered if confidence is to be restored.”

ENDS

Contact SNP Westminster Press: 0207 219 0074

The 15 questions to Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne are as follows:

1) A BAe report in 2004 on the Nimrod MR2 fleet recommended the fitting of fire extinguishers in the bomb bay. Why was none ever fitted by the RAF despite this recommendation? Was cost saving the priority?

2) The BAe report also recommended that the RAF keep a watching brief on fuel tank protection directives in the commercial aviation sector. For the crew of XV230, a fuel tank protection system would have provided a second layer of defence from a fire on-board, potentially giving them the time to make an emergency landing. Why was this recommendation also apparently ignored - despite the fact that the RAF had already lost Hercules XV179 to a fuel tank explosion in January 2005?

3) The BAe report also highlighted the supply of hot air to the supplementary conditioning pack (SCP) as a cause for concern when it spoke of the risk of adjacent hot air pipes to fuel tanks as a source of ignition, following an incident in which this happened. Why - when stopping the use of the SCP was a no-cost safety measure - did the RAF do nothing until they lost a crew? Now, apparently, the SCP on the MR2 is no longer used - suggesting the RAF only heeded BAe's recommendation when it was too late.

4) After the more recent emergency landing by a Nimrod MR2 last month, when fuel started spraying into the bomb bay during air to air refuelling, the RAF was unable to replicate the fault on the ground - meaning that it was unable to fix it. Why was the fleet not grounded at this stage?

5) Were such faults to be discovered on a civil airliner, e.g. a lack of fire extinguishers, the fleet would be grounded. Why is it deemed acceptable for military crews to run avoidable risks on top of the major risks they already agree to run by serving on operations in a war zone? Is operational tempo driving this, and should the MoD still be allowed to regulate itself in terms of RAF aircrafts' exemption from current civil aviation standards?

6) The ageing Nimrod MR2, now 37 years old, was due to leave service a decade ago - why is its replacement, the Nimrod MRA4, not coming into service until 2011 at the earliest - was this an example of inadequate procurement? And is it deemed safe to fly the current ageing fleet in demanding and difficult conditions for another four years or is this a decision being driven by the need to save money?

7) Another maintenance report on the MR2 fleet, carried out by QinetiQ in March 2006, six months ahead of the loss of the XV230, highlighted the extent of fuel leaks on board the fleet - a known problem - and in particular on the six aircraft flying intensive schedules over Afghanistan and Iraq. The leaks, the document says, represented a "critical" structural problem - dating back at least ten years, along with problems with the seals and sealants on the pipework. The report said those leaks were made worse by air-to-air refuelling (AAR), something the Nimrod was not originally designed to do. Was this report ever acted on by the RAF and why was it deemed necessary to continue air to air refuelling, even though it was known to exacerbate the problem of fuel leaks?

(8) In Feb 2006, seven months before XV230 crashed in Afghanistan, the Government organisation QinetiQ were invited to Kinloss by the Nimrod IPT to carry out a survey of several aircraft and advise on the growing number of fuel leak problems in the Nimrod fleet. One of the aircraft involved in the survey was Nimrod XV230. In March 2006, QinetiQ produced a very detailed visit report which contained several recommendations. Can MoD advise as to which of these recommendations have been implemented, some 20 months after the report was issued? In particular the use of outdated servicing documents and tools, and the lack of shared data between civilian contractors at Kinloss with the IPT, MoD and BAE.

(9) Prior to going to the Gulf on 3rd August 2006, Nimrod XV230 underwent a new form of servicing, drawn up by the Nimrod IPT, known as equalised maintenance. The maintenance period lasted some eight weeks and was carried out by a civilian contractor at Kinloss. Prior to entering this planned maintenance programme the aircraft had just returned back from the Gulf and had nine reported fuel defects. After eight weeks on the ground the aircraft left the civilian contractor with seven of those defects unrectified. Can MoD advise why this was allowed to happen, considering that this was the first aircraft to undergo the new programme and should have been closely monitored by the IPT? Can MoD also confirm that the contract does call for a fully serviceable aircraft on completion of maintenance, or has this been missed from the contract?

(10) In August 2004, BAE Systems issued a Safety Case report covering fire/explosion hazards on Nimrod MR Mk2 and R Mk1 aircraft. The report recommended that the bomb bay fire suppression system fitted for extended range tankage role be utilised in normal operation. Failure to do so could result in an uncontrollable bomb bay fire to the point of leading to loss of an aircraft. This recommendation was rejected by MoD on the grounds that is was thought that such a system would be ineffective. Can MoD state whether this conclusion was arrived at following system trials, or was it simply arrived at through some form of paper exercise?

(11) The same report recommended that in the light of the TWA 800 in-flight fuel tank explosion, that fuel tank nitrogen inerting systems should be seriously considered for all new and in-service aircraft, to prevent the occurrence of an explosive vapour in a partially empty tank. Can MoD advise what steps have been taken that to accommodate this recommendation?

(12) It is understood that the Nimrod R Mk1 is to receive a new mission fit under "project Phoenix", this should extend its operational life to 2025. In view of the comments made in the QinetiQ report regarding possible corrosion in wing fuel tanks and the age of the aircraft, how does the MoD expect the Nimrod R airframe to last to 2025? The R and the MR are two different aircraft types, but the basic airframe/ fuel systems are the same.

(13) In a 2005 report into an incident involving a corroded super hot air pipe in the Supplementary Cooling Pack (SPC) of XV227 it was recommended that a survey was to be undertaken to determine what similar pipes (ducts) were in the same condition. It appears that it has taken two years to undertake such a survey on just two aircraft, and as yet no revised inspection programme has been initiated. At the time of XV230's accident the SPC was still being used, but was isolated on all Nimrod aircraft immediately afterwards. Can MoD advise as to who was responsible for making the decision to continue using the SPC after the XV227 accident, as clearly, from the actions taken later it was a high risk component?

(14) On the 5th Nov, this year, there was an fuel leak incident over Afghanistan involving XV235. Like many of the in-flight fuel leaks the incident happened after AAR, and AAR was suspended. In the past AAR has resumed after ground test and AAR procedures have been revised, clearly without getting to the real problem. Can MoD new procedures are now being considered by the IPT to get AAR operational, and how sure are they that they have got it right this time?

(15) AAR was introduced to the Nimrod during the Falklands dispute in order to get the aircraft from one theatre of operation to another, not to be used on a regular basis as it is being used today. Can MoD advise as to what changes were made to the Nimrod safety case for (a) using AAR for the Falklands, and (b) for today's regular use, overland?
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 10:24
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Comment: Nimrod families' anger is entirely justified

Michael Smith, Defence Editor of the Sunday Times

It will be the anger of the families that grab the headlines over the Board of Inquiry report into last year's explosion of a Nimrod spy plane over Afghanistan, despite a concerted MoD attempt to defuse criticism that it sent 14 men to die in an aging aircraft. The families' anger is entirely justified.

Nimrod XV230 had just finished refuelling on September 2, 2006, when the pilot reported a fire in the bomb bay. He put out a mayday call and attempted to land at Kandahar air base but the No 7 fuel tank at the base of the starboard wing exploded and the aircraft fell apart.

It has always been suspected that the air-to-air refuelling system on the Nimrod MR2 was at the heart of the disaster that killed the crew of Nimrod XV230.

It was a quick fix solution fitted during the 1982 Falklands Conflict to get the aircraft to the south Atlantic to track the Argentine Navy and was never designed to be used in the intensive way in which it was used for aircraft flying over Afghanistan.

Using the system in this way had led to numerous leaks, not just of small amounts of fuel but of very large amounts, in one case close to 1,000 gallons. It was no surprise when the board of inquiry confirmed that it was to blame for the leaking fuel.

Excess pressure on the air-to-air refuelling system forced fuel to leak out either from the piping or the top of one of the tanks and flow into an empty area between the bomb bay and the No 7 fuel tank at the root of the starboard wing.

The source of ignition was also not a surprise. The board of inquiry pointed to the supplementary cooling pipe (SCP), a hot air pipe running between the bomb bay and the No 7 tank.

However the way in which the fuel caught fire was a shock. It had been believed until now that the hot air pipe must have fractured pouring out hot air at around 400 degrees Celsius - way above the spontaneous ignition point of the aircraft's Avtur fuel - and that this started the fire that destroyed XV230. The fire boiled the fuel in the No 7 tank until it exploded bringing down the aircraft.

But the board of inquiry found that part of the piping in the area next to the No 7 fuel tank on the Nimrod aircraft has no insulation on it. Fuel collecting on this pipe would have ignited in less than a minute.

This was on an aircraft which - given its age - was regularly monitored for safety and which was known to be prone to leakages of fuel. In the circumstances, it is a miracle that fuel had not come into contact with the pipe before.

Small wonder then that both Des Browne, the defence secretary, and the Chief of Air Staff Air Vice Marshal Glenn Torpy were quick to apologise profoundly to the families of those killed. That and the MoD's uncharacteristic rush to promise extensive compensation to the families were part of the MoD's damage limitation exercise, as was the announcement of a further, more extensive, inquiry by a senior Queen's Counsel barrister.

That of course neatly stops them having to answer any questions about the copious warnings that the RAF and the MoD received about the need to deal with the increasing dangers posed by continuing to fly the Nimrod MR2 on way beyond it's originally planned out-of-service date.

The questions the inquiry will need to answer, and which did not fall within the board of inquiry's remit, are:

— Why when a BAE Systems report warned as far back as August 2004 that there had been 880 fires or smoke-related incidents on board the Nimrod in just 22 years and that the SCP hot air pipe was too close to key areas of the fuel system, it was not taken out of use?

— Why it was not taken out of use in November 2004, when the pipe did fracture, pouring hot air onto the No 7 fuel tank?

— Why it was not taken out of use in September 2005, when the station commander at RAF Kinloss, the Nimrod's home base, warned that given the aircraft's age it was likely to happen again?

— Why when defence consultants QinetiQ expressed concern, just six months before the explosion, that leaks caused by the air-to-air refuelling system could not be replicated and were going unfixed, did the senior RAF officers overseeing the Nimrod fleet not suspend mid-air refuelling?

Indeed why was it only suspended last month, when another Nimrod suffered a major fuel leak during mid-air refuelling, put out a mayday distress call and made a thankfully successful emergency landing at Kandahar air base?

There has been much talk about the cost-cutting that delayed the aircraft's replacement until 2010, a date that is 15 years after its original out-of-service date. But stopping air-to-air refuelling and taking the SCP hot pipe out of use, both of which have now had to be done, cost not a single penny.

HAVE YOUR SAY
So it's official - 14 British servicemen unlawfully killed by our own government - sent into action in full knowledge of an avoidable risk. Not just content with these fourteen but an additional crew were subsequently sent into exactly the same scenario. Surely the families will not allow themselves to be bought off by taxpayers compensation. This government must surely answer fourteen court actions from fourteen bereaved families of fourteen incredibly brave young men.
Graham Tapper, Kenton, Devon, UK
Let's be clear - air-to-air refuelling has only stopped temporarily due to the latest incident not because of the Board of Enquiry report and this would be standard procedure anywhere. There is of course always a cost even if not in monetary terms. If the Nimrod can't stay on task for the required length of time in a hostile environment then the troops on the ground that rely on them are potentially at higher risk. It is very easy for the press to jump onto the proverbial bandwagon without having any expert knowledge and this saddens me and deeply affects morale of the aircrew still flying this aircraft with the utmost professionalism and dedication. My own husband and father to my baby is one of them.
Helen Crowley, Elgin, Moray
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 10:33
  #1875 (permalink)  

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I am puzzled by the assertion in the report that it is not feasible to carry crew parachutes in the Nimrod because of a lack of space. Surely there is plenty of room?

Whether or not Crew 3 would have actually used them, given that they (I assume, though they had no option) thought an emergency landing at Kandahar was attainable, or that bailing out over hostile territory is another consideration entirely, the non-provision of crew escape means on non-pax aircraft going into harm's way smacks to me of the former V-Force arguments for not fitting rear-crew ejection seats.

Riding a burning jet down should not be the only option.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 10:52
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Angus Robertson MP
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 11:44
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Nige,

The Board DID make reference to a fuel tank fire suppression system but concluded that this would not have saved the aircraft. They also believe that if the risk assessment of the No. 7 tank dry bay had been conducted accurately, that measured may have been taken to reduce the severity of a fire in this zone.

I was very cynical prior to the BoI release, but I believe (having read the entire report) that the report is as thorough as possible within their TORs.

Had a fire warning and suppression system been fitted in the dry tank bay, with the inclusion of fire retardant paint, the crew MAY have had precious minutes to reach Kandahar.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 11:53
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MrP any chance you could post the relevant passage.

Is the BoI Report implying that now the likely ignition source has been removed there is no requirement for fuel tank protection?

The likely source of ignition may have been removed but the fuel leaks keep occurring.
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 12:08
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The 7 tank Dry Bay does have firewire running through it, as part of the bomb bay firewire system - hence why the bomb bay fire warning went off.

For the record, this part of the aircraft design goes back to the original build, ie Hawker Siddely. I appreciate they were one of the founding companies OF British Aerospace, so is rather a moot point. However, just for accuracy...
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Old 5th Dec 2007, 13:04
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That and the MoD's uncharacteristic rush to promise extensive compensation to the families were part of the MoD's damage limitation exercise, as was the announcement of a further, more extensive, inquiry by a senior Queen's Counsel barrister.
Well heaven forbid that they don't use their magic ladder of compensation levels and drop themselves right it in it - again!

£1m each, at least. That's £14m total for the loss of some of the best talent the RAF had. People who would have provided their families with all they wanted when they left or retired.

It is an amount that would certainly have been well spent on the issues that were screaming to be addressed. Then the MoD and their pathetic masters might not have been in the position of paying compensation.

Now they must pay, generously and quickly. No if's and no but's - the tragedy has cost much grief and the MoD must do the decent thing.

The magnitude of this loss is incalculable.

Do it NOW!
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