RAF "Utterly, Utterly, Useless" in Afghanistan
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Training is an 'individual' event leading to operational proficiency. Individual in the sense that one unit works up.
Exercises are supposedly combined events with different units coming to together to evaluate and practise the events the trained for as individual units.
Operations are were you find out whether training and exercises counted.
Is there any real training between units before they get in to the exercise scenarios? Ie simple inter-service training - FAC on the ground - fixed wing on CAP? Not under exercise conditions but simply as a routine? Only jointery, except the odd Casex, that I have seen has been full blwn exercises.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Mutley, I agree, except for the (Air) bit. It needs two to tango.
I would like to see FAC of whatever flavour talking to Air of whatever flavour.
Dropping a bomb where Int told you is as simple as dialling in numbers (I quote) but dropping it where a guy on the ground wants, when he wants, now that is the interesting bit (I quote again).
We don't need to practise dropping bombs on Polish airfields (I quote again).
I would like to see FAC of whatever flavour talking to Air of whatever flavour.
Dropping a bomb where Int told you is as simple as dialling in numbers (I quote) but dropping it where a guy on the ground wants, when he wants, now that is the interesting bit (I quote again).
We don't need to practise dropping bombs on Polish airfields (I quote again).
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Perhaps an effects of weapons phase should be added to the FAC course. It would help tremendously the FAC brief his unit components exactly what to expect.
This may already be in place but certainly wasnt when I attended the course.
This may already be in place but certainly wasnt when I attended the course.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Paras almost retreated under Taliban assault
British forces in southern Afghanistan came within hours of retreating from a key base because they suffered a critical shortage of helicopters, the task force commander has disclosed.
In an exclusive interview with The Daily Telegraph Brig Ed Butler said Taliban fire was so heavy and accurate at Musa Qala, a key forward base in northern Helmand, that Army helicopters faced a serious risk of being hit. He said the loss of such crucial equipment — together with the political impact of a large loss of life — meant he came close to ordering his soldiers to abandon the base. Brig Butler said he had warned his superiors early last month that the intensity of Taliban attacks was such that mounting air supply and casualty evacuation missions was likely to lead to the loss of Chinook helicopters.
The brigadier, who leaves his posting at the end of the week, said: "The strategic significance of losing Musa Qala would have been huge, but that was set against the likelihood of helicopters being lost. The political impact, particularly so soon after the loss of the Nimrod, was also going to be huge.".....
British forces in southern Afghanistan came within hours of retreating from a key base because they suffered a critical shortage of helicopters, the task force commander has disclosed.
In an exclusive interview with The Daily Telegraph Brig Ed Butler said Taliban fire was so heavy and accurate at Musa Qala, a key forward base in northern Helmand, that Army helicopters faced a serious risk of being hit. He said the loss of such crucial equipment — together with the political impact of a large loss of life — meant he came close to ordering his soldiers to abandon the base. Brig Butler said he had warned his superiors early last month that the intensity of Taliban attacks was such that mounting air supply and casualty evacuation missions was likely to lead to the loss of Chinook helicopters.
The brigadier, who leaves his posting at the end of the week, said: "The strategic significance of losing Musa Qala would have been huge, but that was set against the likelihood of helicopters being lost. The political impact, particularly so soon after the loss of the Nimrod, was also going to be huge.".....
I think there is a better and simpler answer than "Buy enter-yank-kit-here that turns out to be unavailable (A10) or unsuitable (AC130)" or "Quick! Let's save money by inventing a new plane!"
More Harriers. The design exists, the tooling exists, the SOPs and training process exist. Turn the tap back on. (and whilst we're at it, what about that radar?)
More Harriers. The design exists, the tooling exists, the SOPs and training process exist. Turn the tap back on. (and whilst we're at it, what about that radar?)
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Did the guys request air support? looks as if they did if an Apache turned up, whos Apache? Where were the Harriers? Is this the Sun making up stories?
http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2...50334,,00.html
http://www.thesun.co.uk/article/0,,2...50334,,00.html
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NSF - we can't tell from the footage whether that AC-130 engagement was in darkness/daylight - the footage is in IR, so I'd suspect that it's a night-time action.
I understand that the AC-130 is only deployed at night in AFG. This article would seem to confirm this.
I understand that the AC-130 is only deployed at night in AFG. This article would seem to confirm this.
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AC-130 H and U models fly at night per SOP. They are too vulnerable to MANPADS during daylight (nothing beadwindow related, all very open source stuff) as was proved in DESERT STORM when an H model with 13 guys went down due to an SA-7 after staying too long after sunrise.
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Telegraph 03.10.06
Typhoon wins gun dogfight
The RAF has been forced into an embarrassing U-turn on its policy of not allowing pilots of the new Eurofighter Typhoon to fire their gun.
The service has decided to issue ammunition to future Typhoon squadrons and train pilots in using the fighter's single German-made 27mm Mauser cannon, reversing its cost-cutting edict.
The decision follows experience in Afghanistan showing that guns are still one of the most effective weapons when supporting ground troops.
In a scathing e-mail, a Parachute Regiment major commanding an isolated outpost described air support from RAF Harriers, which have no guns and rely on rockets, as "utterly, utterly useless".
He contrasted their performance with the support offered by US air force A10 aircraft, which are equipped with a 27mm (surely 30mm?) rotary cannon.
At a conference last week, Air Vice-Marshal David Walker, the officer commanding No 1 Group, which includes the Harrier and the newly-forming Typhoon squadrons, said he had decided to proceed with the Typhoon gun, buying ammunition, spares and maintenance equipment (a 2 star can do this in today's RAF??!!).
Seven years ago, the ministry decided to dispense with the gun on all but the first 55 of the 232 Typhoons planned for RAF service, in contrast to the other nations in the Eurofighter consortium, which kept it on all ordered aircraft.
The experts argued that Typhoon did not need anything as crude as a gun. The plan would have saved the taxpayer about £90 million.
But Typhoon is designed to such fine specifications that the loss of the gun created a weight imbalance and it was finally realised that the cheaper and easier option would be to fit a real cannon.
The RAF has been forced into an embarrassing U-turn on its policy of not allowing pilots of the new Eurofighter Typhoon to fire their gun.
The service has decided to issue ammunition to future Typhoon squadrons and train pilots in using the fighter's single German-made 27mm Mauser cannon, reversing its cost-cutting edict.
The decision follows experience in Afghanistan showing that guns are still one of the most effective weapons when supporting ground troops.
In a scathing e-mail, a Parachute Regiment major commanding an isolated outpost described air support from RAF Harriers, which have no guns and rely on rockets, as "utterly, utterly useless".
He contrasted their performance with the support offered by US air force A10 aircraft, which are equipped with a 27mm (surely 30mm?) rotary cannon.
At a conference last week, Air Vice-Marshal David Walker, the officer commanding No 1 Group, which includes the Harrier and the newly-forming Typhoon squadrons, said he had decided to proceed with the Typhoon gun, buying ammunition, spares and maintenance equipment (a 2 star can do this in today's RAF??!!).
Seven years ago, the ministry decided to dispense with the gun on all but the first 55 of the 232 Typhoons planned for RAF service, in contrast to the other nations in the Eurofighter consortium, which kept it on all ordered aircraft.
The experts argued that Typhoon did not need anything as crude as a gun. The plan would have saved the taxpayer about £90 million.
But Typhoon is designed to such fine specifications that the loss of the gun created a weight imbalance and it was finally realised that the cheaper and easier option would be to fit a real cannon.
