Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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MOD slammed for Nimrod safety delay
Minister admits measures put back another 6 months
The Ministry of Defence is coming under criticism for delaying the implementation of key safety recommendations in Nimrod aircraft.
The revelation came during todays Nimrod safety debate called by Westminster SNP leader Angus Robertson MP in the wake of the tragic loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan which killed 14 servicemen.
The entire Nimrod fleet is based in RAF Kinloss in Mr Robertson’s Moray constituency.
During the Westminster Hall Debate Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth MP confirmed that the full implementation of key safety criteria was now expected in June 2009, in contrast to recent MOD evidence to a Coroners Inquest which promised completion by the end of 2008.
Following the loss of Nimrod XV230 the MOD commissioned a report by defence contractor QinetiQ, which concluded there were 30 safety improvements needed before the risk-level of the Nimrod fleet was at the acceptable standard of “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP).
Speaking after the debate Mr Robertson said:
“It is a real concern that the MOD has delayed the implementation of key safety requirements for the Nimrod aircraft fleet.
“The Minister gave no explanation for the slippage which is hardly going to provide the reassurance that so many people want to hear.
“Defence contractor QinetiQ made 30 key recommendations in October 2007 and the MOD has still not confirmed how many have been implemented in full and when the rest will be completed.
“Having paid more than £26 million pounds for this advice it is beyond me why senior MOD managers are dragging their feet.
“It is like your car failing its MOT and taking 20 months to make the necessary improvements. It wouldn’t be allowed in a motor vehicle, so I don’t see why the MOD think it is acceptable for an RAF aircraft.”
Minister admits measures put back another 6 months
The Ministry of Defence is coming under criticism for delaying the implementation of key safety recommendations in Nimrod aircraft.
The revelation came during todays Nimrod safety debate called by Westminster SNP leader Angus Robertson MP in the wake of the tragic loss of Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan which killed 14 servicemen.
The entire Nimrod fleet is based in RAF Kinloss in Mr Robertson’s Moray constituency.
During the Westminster Hall Debate Defence Minister Bob Ainsworth MP confirmed that the full implementation of key safety criteria was now expected in June 2009, in contrast to recent MOD evidence to a Coroners Inquest which promised completion by the end of 2008.
Following the loss of Nimrod XV230 the MOD commissioned a report by defence contractor QinetiQ, which concluded there were 30 safety improvements needed before the risk-level of the Nimrod fleet was at the acceptable standard of “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP).
Speaking after the debate Mr Robertson said:
“It is a real concern that the MOD has delayed the implementation of key safety requirements for the Nimrod aircraft fleet.
“The Minister gave no explanation for the slippage which is hardly going to provide the reassurance that so many people want to hear.
“Defence contractor QinetiQ made 30 key recommendations in October 2007 and the MOD has still not confirmed how many have been implemented in full and when the rest will be completed.
“Having paid more than £26 million pounds for this advice it is beyond me why senior MOD managers are dragging their feet.
“It is like your car failing its MOT and taking 20 months to make the necessary improvements. It wouldn’t be allowed in a motor vehicle, so I don’t see why the MOD think it is acceptable for an RAF aircraft.”
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Moray MP Angus Robertson has now asked Defence Ministers the same question three times about the 30 QinetiQ recommendations without success: How many have been implemented in full already? When specifically do you expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?
Last edited by nigegilb; 3rd Jul 2008 at 22:34.
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One of the reasons there was some mud slinging on this thread recently is that some armchair experts have consistently confused Fuel Tanks, Fuel Pipes & Fuel Vent Pipes, sometimes deliberately.
As for the spat about Licensed/Unlicensed Engineers -
Winco - Stop digging yourself deeper into that hole, you're wrong and you've had plenty of chance to back off.
As for the spat about Licensed/Unlicensed Engineers -
Winco - Stop digging yourself deeper into that hole, you're wrong and you've had plenty of chance to back off.
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Winco please don't retire there are too many MOD trolls here and IPT look outs. I understand that MOD has gone into mini meltdown tonight over the revelation that Hickman may have misled the Inquest.
If anyone was there on the day he gave his evidence please PM me.
If anyone was there on the day he gave his evidence please PM me.
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waterhorse
old fat one
I agree
the truth is that there is an awful lot of codswallop and trumpet blowing that goes on in this thread
which in my opinion disguises the real human problem
Nimrods are old, they need replacing and another is going to fall out of the sky unless they are replaced soon.
24 good men have died and both accidents were preventable
yes they were - before u all even think about arguing about it.
families are left to cope and dedicated airmen have been lost to the airforce and their loved ones.
who cares about ALARP they should be properly serviceable
not past their best
have u ever considered why they give u a number when u join up?
yes it hurts - but the truth is that is what u are to the MOD
at the end of the day more good men are being put at risk.
MAKES ME PUKE - (deliberate use of caps lock)
I agree
the truth is that there is an awful lot of codswallop and trumpet blowing that goes on in this thread
which in my opinion disguises the real human problem
Nimrods are old, they need replacing and another is going to fall out of the sky unless they are replaced soon.
24 good men have died and both accidents were preventable
yes they were - before u all even think about arguing about it.
families are left to cope and dedicated airmen have been lost to the airforce and their loved ones.
who cares about ALARP they should be properly serviceable
not past their best
have u ever considered why they give u a number when u join up?
yes it hurts - but the truth is that is what u are to the MOD
at the end of the day more good men are being put at risk.
MAKES ME PUKE - (deliberate use of caps lock)
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Winco:
The RAF uses appropriate test equipment to check for fuel leaks, just like any other aircraft operator. I would go further and state that the Nimrod fleet is probably the only operator that checks vent pipes for leaks, in addition to post fit examination, etc. After all, they are not pressurized pipes, they are open to atmosphere and they direct air into, and out of, fuel tanks. 90% of the vent system is submerged in, or is routed above, fuel. There are some relatively short lengths of pipe, in the Rib 1 areas, that interconnect the fuel tanks. Air leak tests of these pipes, however they are achieved, ARE NOT MANDATED by the designer.
Its a matter of opinion if the absence of leak tests on vent pipes makes an aircraft unsafe. Therefore, its also a matter of opinion on how any such tests are best carried out. The fact that we are doing them, now, and the method employed does not necessarily infer that it was unsafe to omit them before. The IPT are simply acting on an observation made by 3 senior officers (the BOI).
Forget about licensed engineers and all that nonesence and concentrate on the important matters here. The hard fact is that at ISK (and probably elsewhere in the RAF) you DO NOT use up-to-date kit to locate fuel leaks do you? You use a method that we have all used for years when we have had a puncture on our bikes! Unfortunately, as has been proven and shown (in my last posting) this is NOT reliable, and should not be used. ENDEX
Its a matter of opinion if the absence of leak tests on vent pipes makes an aircraft unsafe. Therefore, its also a matter of opinion on how any such tests are best carried out. The fact that we are doing them, now, and the method employed does not necessarily infer that it was unsafe to omit them before. The IPT are simply acting on an observation made by 3 senior officers (the BOI).
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Ed
I notice your use of the word 'appropriate' test equipment (sounds like something Torpy might say!) so are you saying therefore, that the 'whistle & soapy water' method, as has been described on this forum is now not used? or is now not the only method used for leak detection in the RAF?
Do you use either of the methods that the winco refered to in his earlier post (I notice a lack of response from anyone regarding that) ie the sniffer kit, litmus paper, pressure testing etc. The report from the scientist bloke is quite straight forward and states that the soapy water is completely unreliable, and yet some on here claim to be still using it. If proper modern kit is being used, I just wonder why no one has mentioned that before on here.
MightyHunter AGE - perhaps you can comment on the current kit that is used at Kinloss to detect fuel leaks? that is assuming you have some of course.
Regards to all
TSM
I notice your use of the word 'appropriate' test equipment (sounds like something Torpy might say!) so are you saying therefore, that the 'whistle & soapy water' method, as has been described on this forum is now not used? or is now not the only method used for leak detection in the RAF?
Do you use either of the methods that the winco refered to in his earlier post (I notice a lack of response from anyone regarding that) ie the sniffer kit, litmus paper, pressure testing etc. The report from the scientist bloke is quite straight forward and states that the soapy water is completely unreliable, and yet some on here claim to be still using it. If proper modern kit is being used, I just wonder why no one has mentioned that before on here.
MightyHunter AGE - perhaps you can comment on the current kit that is used at Kinloss to detect fuel leaks? that is assuming you have some of course.
Regards to all
TSM
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Nigegilb (to Winco):
Who do you have in mind? Screen names, please, Nige.
What revelation?
Its not a surprise that his testimony misled the Coroner. But, why am I not surprised that it has taken this long for the grown-ups to recognize the severity of his mistakes. "Its not ALARP" and "its tolerably safe". Its rubbish. All he had to say was that all risks of fire (catastrophic failure) have been mitigated, as confirmed by QQ, which means that the risks are minimal (broadly acceptable).
Therefore, risk reduction to ALARP is not required.
Of course, we all agree that this was NOT the case before the crash. The families have a good case for negligence, IMHO, and I am prepared to provide any technical or historical facts about the aircraft and its modus operandi before 2 Sep 06. But, they really should steer clear of any discussions about Nimrod safety management since the accident. Except to point out that the amount of (successful) mitigation work since the crash serves to support the case that the fleet was not safe before then.
Winco please don't retire there are too many MOD trolls here and IPT look outs.
I understand that MOD has gone into mini meltdown tonight over the revelation that Hickman may have misled the Inquest.
Its not a surprise that his testimony misled the Coroner. But, why am I not surprised that it has taken this long for the grown-ups to recognize the severity of his mistakes. "Its not ALARP" and "its tolerably safe". Its rubbish. All he had to say was that all risks of fire (catastrophic failure) have been mitigated, as confirmed by QQ, which means that the risks are minimal (broadly acceptable).
Therefore, risk reduction to ALARP is not required.
Of course, we all agree that this was NOT the case before the crash. The families have a good case for negligence, IMHO, and I am prepared to provide any technical or historical facts about the aircraft and its modus operandi before 2 Sep 06. But, they really should steer clear of any discussions about Nimrod safety management since the accident. Except to point out that the amount of (successful) mitigation work since the crash serves to support the case that the fleet was not safe before then.
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TSM, I used the word, "appropriate" because it is the case that when we check for leaks from fuel pipes we do it in an appropriate manner. I don't doubt that BA uses the methods, described by Winco, to check fuel pipes and we would do something similar when required. But, importantly, the pipes we are discussing in this side topic are vent pipes, not fuel pipes.
Winco, can you ask your colleagues at BA if they routinely check the fuel tank vent pipes for leaks? I would guess that they do not do so. And, if I'm right with my guess, that would place the Nimrod fleet in better light than our national carrier, regardless of how we do the tests......Winco? Over to you.....
Winco, can you ask your colleagues at BA if they routinely check the fuel tank vent pipes for leaks? I would guess that they do not do so. And, if I'm right with my guess, that would place the Nimrod fleet in better light than our national carrier, regardless of how we do the tests......Winco? Over to you.....
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"I wonder again if the Coroner would take a view on this. Would his recommendation that the fleet be grounded have been expressed more strongly if he had been told the timescale was a year or more, not 6 months? As I said, he (coroner) would have assumed from the evidence that MoD had a clear way ahead agreed, knew the cost and had an agreed delivery / embodiment plan with industry. What would he have said, or what other evidence/witnesses would he have sought, had he been told "We've done cock all, and it could be December 08 or June 09, or....". he had in front of him a "senior" officer making (I think) a firm statement. If the IPTL had said "I'm not sure", surely the Coroner would have demanded someone who was sure."
EDSET, I don't agree with your post 1234 RE ALARP not required I have the technical argument why I believe you are wrong, will PM you later.
Also, the families are right to pursue the MOD over matters post crash. Just as in XV179 nobody wants this to happen again and it is now clear that IPT did hardly anything RE 30 recs until very recently. Just confirms what we have been saying about inability to implement airworthiness regulations. If he deliberately misled the Court, you do know what that is called don't you?
BTW ANY changes to the MR2 build standard by definition change the MRA4 contract. next thing they'll be announcing another delay to MRA4!
EDSET, I don't agree with your post 1234 RE ALARP not required I have the technical argument why I believe you are wrong, will PM you later.
Also, the families are right to pursue the MOD over matters post crash. Just as in XV179 nobody wants this to happen again and it is now clear that IPT did hardly anything RE 30 recs until very recently. Just confirms what we have been saying about inability to implement airworthiness regulations. If he deliberately misled the Court, you do know what that is called don't you?
BTW ANY changes to the MR2 build standard by definition change the MRA4 contract. next thing they'll be announcing another delay to MRA4!
Last edited by nigegilb; 2nd Jul 2008 at 06:53.
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Ed Sett 100. Welcome back.
I am not sure where you got the idea that Nimrod is now at the "broadly acceptable" level of risk, and ALARP is not required. Quoting from BoB Ainsworth, yesterday, he said that all aircraft in service are at the tolereble level.
Whilst on the subject of "Bob", I found the following comment of his very interesting. It went something like;
" Having listened to all the evidence (two people reported to him on a daily basis), I knew what the verdict would be"
So clearly "Bob" came to the same conclusion as the coroner, but for some reason decided to go against it. What evidence does "Bob" have that the coroner did not have? And if such evidence does exist, why was it not presented to the court?
DV
I am not sure where you got the idea that Nimrod is now at the "broadly acceptable" level of risk, and ALARP is not required. Quoting from BoB Ainsworth, yesterday, he said that all aircraft in service are at the tolereble level.
Whilst on the subject of "Bob", I found the following comment of his very interesting. It went something like;
" Having listened to all the evidence (two people reported to him on a daily basis), I knew what the verdict would be"
So clearly "Bob" came to the same conclusion as the coroner, but for some reason decided to go against it. What evidence does "Bob" have that the coroner did not have? And if such evidence does exist, why was it not presented to the court?
DV
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Ed
Thank you for your explanation, however I do not understand your use of the word ‘appropriate’ I’m afraid. The point I was making is this; do you use modern, up to date, accurate and reliable test equipment? Or, as has been suggested on this forum, do you use an inaccurate, unreliable and disproven method that employs soapy water?
That’s all I want you, or Nimrod AGE, or Spanners or indeed anyone at Kinloss to tell us! What method do you use? I have tried to be as open as possible on how we test for leaks in the civilian aviation world, why can’t you or your colleagues do the same? Nevertheless, I will gladly ask the engineers the next time I see them, and will pass on their comments, but as some on here think this is all fabricated by myself, I’m not sure of the point, but I will ask.
What you and many others here fail to understand is that, in the main, the aircraft that I fly in BA and all the major carriers, are a lot lot younger than Nimrod (Yes, I know, someone is going to say that BA have some old aircraft, and I am aware of that, but none are as old as Nimrod I think) Couple that with the fact that the flight profiles of the aircraft are so vastly different, and it goes without saying that Nimrod will need a great deal more ’looking after’ than my B747 will ever do! I therefore have to reject outright your comment that because you check your pipes more often that it puts you in a better light than BA. The fact is that you probably have to check your pipes more often simply because of the age of them!
So Ed, it’s back over to you…..Just what bit(s) of equipment are being used at Kinloss to check for fuel leaks and to locate them? Is it some fancy bit of kit or is it a good old bucket of H2O and some Fairy liquid??
Yours Aye
Thank you for your explanation, however I do not understand your use of the word ‘appropriate’ I’m afraid. The point I was making is this; do you use modern, up to date, accurate and reliable test equipment? Or, as has been suggested on this forum, do you use an inaccurate, unreliable and disproven method that employs soapy water?
That’s all I want you, or Nimrod AGE, or Spanners or indeed anyone at Kinloss to tell us! What method do you use? I have tried to be as open as possible on how we test for leaks in the civilian aviation world, why can’t you or your colleagues do the same? Nevertheless, I will gladly ask the engineers the next time I see them, and will pass on their comments, but as some on here think this is all fabricated by myself, I’m not sure of the point, but I will ask.
What you and many others here fail to understand is that, in the main, the aircraft that I fly in BA and all the major carriers, are a lot lot younger than Nimrod (Yes, I know, someone is going to say that BA have some old aircraft, and I am aware of that, but none are as old as Nimrod I think) Couple that with the fact that the flight profiles of the aircraft are so vastly different, and it goes without saying that Nimrod will need a great deal more ’looking after’ than my B747 will ever do! I therefore have to reject outright your comment that because you check your pipes more often that it puts you in a better light than BA. The fact is that you probably have to check your pipes more often simply because of the age of them!
So Ed, it’s back over to you…..Just what bit(s) of equipment are being used at Kinloss to check for fuel leaks and to locate them? Is it some fancy bit of kit or is it a good old bucket of H2O and some Fairy liquid??
Yours Aye
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'NIMROD CORONER MISLED BY RAF'
No surely not! Hickman wouldn't have deliberately misled the coroner would he?
Bob Ainsworth MP confirmed that the full implementation of key safety criteria was now expected in June 2009. Expected!
30 QQ recommendations = £26 million
MoD incompetence = priceless
No surely not! Hickman wouldn't have deliberately misled the coroner would he?
Bob Ainsworth MP confirmed that the full implementation of key safety criteria was now expected in June 2009. Expected!
30 QQ recommendations = £26 million
MoD incompetence = priceless
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Careful DA4 you might get the typo police on to you.
Wonder what the MRA4 team are making of all this. Let's second guess shall we. Could be that the June 09 target is the paper exercise, and implementation/embodiment is shelved because someone decides to wait for MRA4. It will be diluted to a task to ensure the same/equivalent recs are in MRA4. I am reliably informed that a 6 month slip doesn't happen in a few weeks on this type of work. It's largely a case of manhours, not materiel, so it's easier to plan, cost, schedule accurately. That's why we were sure it couldn't be done - MoD and Industry don't have the capacity as MoD ditched the concept of retaining flexibility about 15 years ago. "no real surprise - people who've done this for fun for years knew it was impossible to repair years of neglect in a few months".
Before anyone has a go for second guessing, think again, our predictions have been far more accurate than anything MoD/RAF have offered to date.
Wonder what the MRA4 team are making of all this. Let's second guess shall we. Could be that the June 09 target is the paper exercise, and implementation/embodiment is shelved because someone decides to wait for MRA4. It will be diluted to a task to ensure the same/equivalent recs are in MRA4. I am reliably informed that a 6 month slip doesn't happen in a few weeks on this type of work. It's largely a case of manhours, not materiel, so it's easier to plan, cost, schedule accurately. That's why we were sure it couldn't be done - MoD and Industry don't have the capacity as MoD ditched the concept of retaining flexibility about 15 years ago. "no real surprise - people who've done this for fun for years knew it was impossible to repair years of neglect in a few months".
Before anyone has a go for second guessing, think again, our predictions have been far more accurate than anything MoD/RAF have offered to date.
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Question for Legal Beagles
Gentlemen,
I am sorry to admit that I was caught reading a copy of the Jun/July BALPA magazine (which had been left on the flight-deck). However, there was within this fine publication an article on the recently updated law on corporate manslaughter - namely, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.
The article described how the law has been amended to make it easier to prosecute senior mangement of organisations who failed any, or all, of 3 basic tests as result of an inquiry following an accident/incident. The most important of these tests is:
"The duty (of care) owed by an organistion to its employees or others working for it."
To prosecute under this Act, one would have to ascertain a gross breach of conduct which -
"falls far below what can reasonably be expected of an organisation in the circumstances."
The article went on to list a number of failings that would
'make an organisation vulnerable' to this legislation.
One could argue that 5 out of 10 failings on this list might be appliacble to the Nimrod case:
"6. Poor communication with the workforce and contractors."
"7. Inadequate management, audit and review of safety systems and contractors."
"8. Inadequate attention to 'near misses'."
"9. Failures of lower managers to report failings up the chain."
"10. Senior managers/directors makinng decisions on incomplete or wrong information - such as cutbacks adversely affecting safely."
It is also arguable that the other 5 failings might also apply (you'll have to read the full article)!
However, the questions to which I would like to know the answers:
a. Is RAF senior management liable to this Act (as it is to the Health and Safety at Work Legislation)?
b. Do we have a 'we're at war, poke off' get-out clause?
c. Does this new Act apply to 'legacy' aircraft built before 2007?
If the answers are Yes, No, Yes.... then, as Sherlock Holmes would say,
"The game's afoot Watson!"
If so, now might be a good time for all lower-order managers (Cpl/JT upwards) to comply with Number 9 (above) and start telling their bosses (in writing) what the bosses don't want to hear (if you haven't already).
Furthermore, it could leave senior management at star-level most vulnerable if they themselves don't insist that HM Treasury provides funding to ensure the remedial action to the QQ recs is completed much, much sooner than the middle of next year.
flipster
I am sorry to admit that I was caught reading a copy of the Jun/July BALPA magazine (which had been left on the flight-deck). However, there was within this fine publication an article on the recently updated law on corporate manslaughter - namely, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.
The article described how the law has been amended to make it easier to prosecute senior mangement of organisations who failed any, or all, of 3 basic tests as result of an inquiry following an accident/incident. The most important of these tests is:
"The duty (of care) owed by an organistion to its employees or others working for it."
To prosecute under this Act, one would have to ascertain a gross breach of conduct which -
"falls far below what can reasonably be expected of an organisation in the circumstances."
The article went on to list a number of failings that would
'make an organisation vulnerable' to this legislation.
One could argue that 5 out of 10 failings on this list might be appliacble to the Nimrod case:
"6. Poor communication with the workforce and contractors."
"7. Inadequate management, audit and review of safety systems and contractors."
"8. Inadequate attention to 'near misses'."
"9. Failures of lower managers to report failings up the chain."
"10. Senior managers/directors makinng decisions on incomplete or wrong information - such as cutbacks adversely affecting safely."
It is also arguable that the other 5 failings might also apply (you'll have to read the full article)!
However, the questions to which I would like to know the answers:
a. Is RAF senior management liable to this Act (as it is to the Health and Safety at Work Legislation)?
b. Do we have a 'we're at war, poke off' get-out clause?
c. Does this new Act apply to 'legacy' aircraft built before 2007?
If the answers are Yes, No, Yes.... then, as Sherlock Holmes would say,
"The game's afoot Watson!"
If so, now might be a good time for all lower-order managers (Cpl/JT upwards) to comply with Number 9 (above) and start telling their bosses (in writing) what the bosses don't want to hear (if you haven't already).
Furthermore, it could leave senior management at star-level most vulnerable if they themselves don't insist that HM Treasury provides funding to ensure the remedial action to the QQ recs is completed much, much sooner than the middle of next year.
flipster
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Nimrod Safety Debate 01 Jul 08 Westminster Hall
Here is the Hansard link to yesterday's debate: "Safety of the RAF Nimrod Fleet":
http://pubs1.tso.parliament.uk/pa/cm...08070171000005
Try this if link does not work;
RAF Nimrod Fleet: 1 Jul 2008: Westminster Hall debates (TheyWorkForYou.com)
The text version of the opening statement follows below. Media coverage from today's Scotsman, Daily Record, Press and Journal and BBC.
1 July 2008 : Column 211WH
RAF Nimrod Fleet
12.30 pm
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP): I welcome this opportunity to raise the important matter of the safety of the RAF Nimrod fleet, a subject relating largely to the tragedy that befell Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006 in which 14 brave service personnel lost their lives. This debate is also about the lessons that have emerged since then from the board of inquiry and the coroner’s inquest; from information that has come to light through freedom of information requests; from the Ministry of Defence’s reaction to those developments; and in time, we hope, from the independent review conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave, QC, into the broader issues surrounding the loss of XV230.
The Minister will appreciate that, as the Nimrod MR2 fleet is stationed at RAF Kinloss in my constituency, the issues are of direct concern. Safety questions affect all air and ground crew as well as civilian workers, who take great and justifiable pride in their work and want to secure the highest safety standards. Safety questions affect the families of those who died aboard Nimrod XV230 and those who continue to fly the Nimrod fleet. Safety questions remain for many experts and former RAF personnel who have watched the developments and have significant concerns. Safety questions also remain for me as a constituency MP. In the absence of appropriate, detailed information from the Ministry of Defence, I have had to rely on FOI requests, letters to and from the MOD, and statements by Ministers in the media. Safety questions remain because the ageing Nimrod fleet has experienced continual fuel leaks; because there is a repeated inability to get planes airborne; and, most recently, because the coroner’s inquest expressly recommended that the fleet should be grounded until risk levels are as low as reasonably practicable.
On 4 December 2007, the official board of inquiry published its findings on the loss of XV230. The board believed that the No. 7 tank dry bay was the most likely location for the seat of the fire and the most probable cause was escaped fuel contacting a supplementary conditioning pack air pipe at 400º C
“after entering a gap between two types of insulation”.
Four separate factors were listed as contributing to the accident: the age of the aircraft, the maintenance policy, the failure of hazard analysis and the lack of a fire detection and suppression system, and the failure to identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and associated procedures.
In an oral statement to the House of Commons on the same day, the Secretary of State for Defence said:
“At the time of the accident, the Department took action to ensure that a similar scenario could not occur again on the Nimrod aircraft. Those measures have been revised as the board’s findings have emerged. The chain of command has accepted the majority of the board’s recommendations and continues to pursue the outstanding recommendations made by the board to enhance the safety of our aircraft.
The hot air system remains switched off so that there is no hot pipe against which any fuel could ignite, and we have an enhanced inspection regime to examine for any sign of fuel leakage. QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate.”
I shall return to that point. He went on:
1 July 2008 : Column 212WH
“Air-to-air refuelling has also been suspended subject to further investigation. The Chief of the Air Staff’s professional judgment is that the Nimrod fleet is safe to fly. I have accepted his advice.”—[Official Report, 4 December 2007; Vol. 468, c. 686-87.]
In my reply to the statement, I said to the Secretary of State:
“Only recently, another Nimrod aircraft suffered a serious fuel leak and it has proved impossible fully to understand why it happened. It is also a cause for concern that the inquiry confirmed the loss of experienced engineering personnel from RAF Kinloss. Will the Secretary of State confirm that the Ministry of Defence will do everything in its power to restore confidence in the Nimrod fleet, which performs such a vital military role?”
The Secretary of State answered:
“I have no hesitation in giving him the reassurance that he seeks. The safety of those who fly in these aircraft is our priority; it is not secondary to any other consideration. I have given careful thought to the issue of age and to all the other issues identified in the BOI as contributory factors. I am assured—and I accept those assurances—by those who have the vast technical ability and experience to understand these matters, and having gone into them in detail myself, that this aircraft is safe to fly and airworthy. I would not allow it to fly if I did not believe that to be the case.—[Official Report, 4 December 2007; Vol. 468, c. 693-94.]
That statement of confidence by the Ministry of Defence was followed in May by the coroner’s inquest. During the proceedings, which I attended, the court heard about the development of the Nimrod in the 1950s from the world’s first jet airliner, the de Havilland Comet. To make the Nimrod into a military aircraft, the Hawker Siddeley company added extra fuel tanks and a whole new bottom half to the Comet’s fuselage. Crucially, it also changed the engines, which meant installing a hot air pipe system to start the new Spey engines.
The hot pipe system crosses the centre section of the aircraft to enter the wings, where the engines are, passing through an area called dry bay 7, which was to become well known to the inquest. It is the area around the new No. 7 tanks, and it also contains fuel feed pipes. That should not have been a problem, as the hot air system was used only for engine starting. However, when the early Nimrod MR1 was developed into the MR2 version in the late 1970s, an extra cooling pack was added for all the new electronic equipment. Such packs work off hot air, from the cross feed pipe, which meant that the pipe had to be used continuously.
In dry bay 7, the cross feed pipe, operating at temperatures of 400º C to 500º C, was next to the large fuel feed pipes. That was a serious fire hazard, and it should have alerted the continuous safety assessment systems operated by the RAF and BAE Systems, the present aircraft maker, to the potential hazards. The coroner, Andrew Walker, said:
“I am satisfied that the design modifications to the MR2 made the aircraft unsafe to fly. This serious flaw in the design was not discovered despite a baseline safety case study undertaken by the (Nimrod) Integrated Project Team and the manufacturer.”
Mr. Walker added that in a previous incident to a Tornado aircraft, fuel had been drawn into the lagging around a hot pipe and had ignited, causing the loss of the aircraft. There had been no follow-up on the Nimrod, despite a recommendation from the RAF board of inquiry. He said:
“This cavalier approach must come to an end. In my view, it was this very source of ignition that, on the balance of probability, caused the loss of Nimrod XV230 with all souls on board.”
1 July 2008 : Column 213WH
The coroner went on to detail failures of the so-called Cassandra hazard log, another matter to which I shall return. Had failures been recorded properly in the log and dealt with, the design flaw in the Nimrod fleet would have been discovered. He said:
“I simply do not understand”
how the Cassandra system could have assumed that there was a fire detection and suppression system in dry bay 7 when there was clearly no such system and there never had been. That meant that the crew of XV230 could do nothing to prevent the fire from developing into an explosive ignition of fuel in tank 7 in the wing root. The coroner added in his final verdict that
“the deaths were in part the result of failures...on the part of the aircraft manufacturer and those responsible for the safety of the aircraft”.
Mr. Walker recommended to the Defence Secretary that the whole Nimrod fleet should not fly again until the risks thrown up by the inquest have been reduced to a level known as ALARP, or as low as reasonably practicable. The Nimrod integrated project team leader, Group Captain Hickman, had already said in evidence that that was not expected to happen until the end of 2008. Asked if the process could be speeded up, Group Captain Hickman replied:
“No, it is driven by resources.”
I appreciate that the situation presents the MOD with a huge problem. The Nimrod performs an important role for the UK armed forces and coalition allies. It is also true that there is no replacement aircraft immediately available for the work and that the replacement Nimrod MRA4 is a few years off. Nevertheless, it was a surprise to all who attended the coroner’s inquest that literally within minutes of his lengthy summing-up, the Minister issued a statement refusing to accept the inquest’s main recommendation. It was, in my view, a rushed reaction. It cannot have been considered, and it illustrates my concerns about the developments.
I shall highlight three areas on which there has been precious little considered information from the MOD. In the 15 minutes that the Minister has following my contribution, he has an opportunity to provide details that I hope will reassure everybody about the safety concerns with regard to risk management, the hazard log and responsibility. First, on risk management, as I have already outlined, the Secretary of State assured the House that Nimrod was safe, citing a report by QinetiQ, the defence consultancy. To establish whether that was factually correct has been difficult, and it took an FOI request to establish that the report said that the aircraft would not be fully safe until its 30 recommendations were carried out. All but one of those related to a failure to implement mandatory airworthiness regulations.
The inquest heard that, if the risk of something going wrong on a plane is only “tolerable”, MOD rules stipulate that it must be further reduced to make it
“as low as reasonably practicable”
before the plane can be declared safe. In a letter to me on 19 May 2008, the Defence Secretary said that of the 30 recommendations, 21 have been accepted by the MOD and are still being implemented, six relate to air-to-air refuelling, which is no longer done with Nimrods, and three more are still being considered.
1 July 2008 : Column 214WH
On 26 May, I wrote to Secretary of State asking:
“Please could you make a status report on all 24 recommendations which do not relate to Air-to-Air refuelling? How many have been implemented in full already? When specifically do you expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?”
I am still waiting for an answer! Two weeks ago, in the defence procurement debate, I asked the very same questions, and the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg), said he would write to me. Again, I am still waiting for an answer. Today, Minister, I expect answers, and the questions are the same: how many of the 30 QinetiQ safety recommendations have been implemented in full, and when specifically does the MOD expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?
Secondly, as the Minister must know, QinetiQ has already raised an issue relating to the structure of the Cassandra hazard log and linking of hazards to causes, controls and supporting evidence. It proved very difficult, if not impossible, to track the accident from the hazard back to the cause and the corresponding controls, and then to establish whether the controls had been fully implemented. In addition, it was found that the assessment of probability made assumptions concerning the implementation of recommendations that proved not to be valid, and supporting evaluations were found to be contradictory.
It was unclear which recommendations and controls required implementation to support the hazard probability. Furthermore, hazard controls often did not apply to all causes of hazard and, therefore, did not mitigate the hazard in full, but mitigated only specific causes. It proved impossible, therefore, to validate the hazard probability. QinetiQ recommended that the hazard log be restructured to facilitate ease of further review. It argued that that would clarify hazard-accident risk controls, the hazard causes to which they apply and the status of their implementation, which would in turn clarify the argument underpinning the evaluation of risk. In view of the importance placed on the Cassandra hazard log in determining Nimrod safety, what steps have been taken by the MOD and the integrated project team to implement QinetiQ’s important recommendations? With the current hazard log in such a confusing state, how can anyone claim that Nimrod is safe to operate?
My third point is simple, but crucial, and relates to responsibility: has any action been taken in relation to those with delegated responsibility for Nimrod airworthiness at the time of the Nimrod crash? Safety worries about the Nimrod fleet will remain as long as concerning incidents continue. With more than 111 fuel leaks since the crash of XV230, and the regular grounding of aircraft, those concerns remain and will remain until the MOD maintains its aircraft to its own applicable risk standard which must be as low as reasonably practicable, and for as long as it fails to restore confidence in the Nimrod fleet as promised.
Visits to RAF Kinloss by the Secretary of State are welcome—I have said that on the Floor of the House—and his participation in a Nimrod test flight was a statement of confidence, but that is not enough. Ministers have failed to make written or oral statements to the House of Commons when necessary, have imparted key information only after a coroner demanded it and released key studies only after freedom of information requests were made. Asserting from a television studio that the
1 July 2008 : Column 215WH
Nimrod fleet is safe is not good enough. I know that the Minister wants the best for our service personnel, as do I, and I strongly urge him to answer my questions, because otherwise this matter will not rest.
http://pubs1.tso.parliament.uk/pa/cm...08070171000005
Try this if link does not work;
RAF Nimrod Fleet: 1 Jul 2008: Westminster Hall debates (TheyWorkForYou.com)
The text version of the opening statement follows below. Media coverage from today's Scotsman, Daily Record, Press and Journal and BBC.
1 July 2008 : Column 211WH
RAF Nimrod Fleet
12.30 pm
Angus Robertson (Moray) (SNP): I welcome this opportunity to raise the important matter of the safety of the RAF Nimrod fleet, a subject relating largely to the tragedy that befell Nimrod XV230 in Afghanistan on 2 September 2006 in which 14 brave service personnel lost their lives. This debate is also about the lessons that have emerged since then from the board of inquiry and the coroner’s inquest; from information that has come to light through freedom of information requests; from the Ministry of Defence’s reaction to those developments; and in time, we hope, from the independent review conducted by Charles Haddon-Cave, QC, into the broader issues surrounding the loss of XV230.
The Minister will appreciate that, as the Nimrod MR2 fleet is stationed at RAF Kinloss in my constituency, the issues are of direct concern. Safety questions affect all air and ground crew as well as civilian workers, who take great and justifiable pride in their work and want to secure the highest safety standards. Safety questions affect the families of those who died aboard Nimrod XV230 and those who continue to fly the Nimrod fleet. Safety questions remain for many experts and former RAF personnel who have watched the developments and have significant concerns. Safety questions also remain for me as a constituency MP. In the absence of appropriate, detailed information from the Ministry of Defence, I have had to rely on FOI requests, letters to and from the MOD, and statements by Ministers in the media. Safety questions remain because the ageing Nimrod fleet has experienced continual fuel leaks; because there is a repeated inability to get planes airborne; and, most recently, because the coroner’s inquest expressly recommended that the fleet should be grounded until risk levels are as low as reasonably practicable.
On 4 December 2007, the official board of inquiry published its findings on the loss of XV230. The board believed that the No. 7 tank dry bay was the most likely location for the seat of the fire and the most probable cause was escaped fuel contacting a supplementary conditioning pack air pipe at 400º C
“after entering a gap between two types of insulation”.
Four separate factors were listed as contributing to the accident: the age of the aircraft, the maintenance policy, the failure of hazard analysis and the lack of a fire detection and suppression system, and the failure to identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and associated procedures.
In an oral statement to the House of Commons on the same day, the Secretary of State for Defence said:
“At the time of the accident, the Department took action to ensure that a similar scenario could not occur again on the Nimrod aircraft. Those measures have been revised as the board’s findings have emerged. The chain of command has accepted the majority of the board’s recommendations and continues to pursue the outstanding recommendations made by the board to enhance the safety of our aircraft.
The hot air system remains switched off so that there is no hot pipe against which any fuel could ignite, and we have an enhanced inspection regime to examine for any sign of fuel leakage. QinetiQ has conducted an independent investigation into the fuel system and confirmed that, in light of the measures taken since the crash, the fuel system is safe to operate.”
I shall return to that point. He went on:
1 July 2008 : Column 212WH
“Air-to-air refuelling has also been suspended subject to further investigation. The Chief of the Air Staff’s professional judgment is that the Nimrod fleet is safe to fly. I have accepted his advice.”—[Official Report, 4 December 2007; Vol. 468, c. 686-87.]
In my reply to the statement, I said to the Secretary of State:
“Only recently, another Nimrod aircraft suffered a serious fuel leak and it has proved impossible fully to understand why it happened. It is also a cause for concern that the inquiry confirmed the loss of experienced engineering personnel from RAF Kinloss. Will the Secretary of State confirm that the Ministry of Defence will do everything in its power to restore confidence in the Nimrod fleet, which performs such a vital military role?”
The Secretary of State answered:
“I have no hesitation in giving him the reassurance that he seeks. The safety of those who fly in these aircraft is our priority; it is not secondary to any other consideration. I have given careful thought to the issue of age and to all the other issues identified in the BOI as contributory factors. I am assured—and I accept those assurances—by those who have the vast technical ability and experience to understand these matters, and having gone into them in detail myself, that this aircraft is safe to fly and airworthy. I would not allow it to fly if I did not believe that to be the case.—[Official Report, 4 December 2007; Vol. 468, c. 693-94.]
That statement of confidence by the Ministry of Defence was followed in May by the coroner’s inquest. During the proceedings, which I attended, the court heard about the development of the Nimrod in the 1950s from the world’s first jet airliner, the de Havilland Comet. To make the Nimrod into a military aircraft, the Hawker Siddeley company added extra fuel tanks and a whole new bottom half to the Comet’s fuselage. Crucially, it also changed the engines, which meant installing a hot air pipe system to start the new Spey engines.
The hot pipe system crosses the centre section of the aircraft to enter the wings, where the engines are, passing through an area called dry bay 7, which was to become well known to the inquest. It is the area around the new No. 7 tanks, and it also contains fuel feed pipes. That should not have been a problem, as the hot air system was used only for engine starting. However, when the early Nimrod MR1 was developed into the MR2 version in the late 1970s, an extra cooling pack was added for all the new electronic equipment. Such packs work off hot air, from the cross feed pipe, which meant that the pipe had to be used continuously.
In dry bay 7, the cross feed pipe, operating at temperatures of 400º C to 500º C, was next to the large fuel feed pipes. That was a serious fire hazard, and it should have alerted the continuous safety assessment systems operated by the RAF and BAE Systems, the present aircraft maker, to the potential hazards. The coroner, Andrew Walker, said:
“I am satisfied that the design modifications to the MR2 made the aircraft unsafe to fly. This serious flaw in the design was not discovered despite a baseline safety case study undertaken by the (Nimrod) Integrated Project Team and the manufacturer.”
Mr. Walker added that in a previous incident to a Tornado aircraft, fuel had been drawn into the lagging around a hot pipe and had ignited, causing the loss of the aircraft. There had been no follow-up on the Nimrod, despite a recommendation from the RAF board of inquiry. He said:
“This cavalier approach must come to an end. In my view, it was this very source of ignition that, on the balance of probability, caused the loss of Nimrod XV230 with all souls on board.”
1 July 2008 : Column 213WH
The coroner went on to detail failures of the so-called Cassandra hazard log, another matter to which I shall return. Had failures been recorded properly in the log and dealt with, the design flaw in the Nimrod fleet would have been discovered. He said:
“I simply do not understand”
how the Cassandra system could have assumed that there was a fire detection and suppression system in dry bay 7 when there was clearly no such system and there never had been. That meant that the crew of XV230 could do nothing to prevent the fire from developing into an explosive ignition of fuel in tank 7 in the wing root. The coroner added in his final verdict that
“the deaths were in part the result of failures...on the part of the aircraft manufacturer and those responsible for the safety of the aircraft”.
Mr. Walker recommended to the Defence Secretary that the whole Nimrod fleet should not fly again until the risks thrown up by the inquest have been reduced to a level known as ALARP, or as low as reasonably practicable. The Nimrod integrated project team leader, Group Captain Hickman, had already said in evidence that that was not expected to happen until the end of 2008. Asked if the process could be speeded up, Group Captain Hickman replied:
“No, it is driven by resources.”
I appreciate that the situation presents the MOD with a huge problem. The Nimrod performs an important role for the UK armed forces and coalition allies. It is also true that there is no replacement aircraft immediately available for the work and that the replacement Nimrod MRA4 is a few years off. Nevertheless, it was a surprise to all who attended the coroner’s inquest that literally within minutes of his lengthy summing-up, the Minister issued a statement refusing to accept the inquest’s main recommendation. It was, in my view, a rushed reaction. It cannot have been considered, and it illustrates my concerns about the developments.
I shall highlight three areas on which there has been precious little considered information from the MOD. In the 15 minutes that the Minister has following my contribution, he has an opportunity to provide details that I hope will reassure everybody about the safety concerns with regard to risk management, the hazard log and responsibility. First, on risk management, as I have already outlined, the Secretary of State assured the House that Nimrod was safe, citing a report by QinetiQ, the defence consultancy. To establish whether that was factually correct has been difficult, and it took an FOI request to establish that the report said that the aircraft would not be fully safe until its 30 recommendations were carried out. All but one of those related to a failure to implement mandatory airworthiness regulations.
The inquest heard that, if the risk of something going wrong on a plane is only “tolerable”, MOD rules stipulate that it must be further reduced to make it
“as low as reasonably practicable”
before the plane can be declared safe. In a letter to me on 19 May 2008, the Defence Secretary said that of the 30 recommendations, 21 have been accepted by the MOD and are still being implemented, six relate to air-to-air refuelling, which is no longer done with Nimrods, and three more are still being considered.
1 July 2008 : Column 214WH
On 26 May, I wrote to Secretary of State asking:
“Please could you make a status report on all 24 recommendations which do not relate to Air-to-Air refuelling? How many have been implemented in full already? When specifically do you expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?”
I am still waiting for an answer! Two weeks ago, in the defence procurement debate, I asked the very same questions, and the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg), said he would write to me. Again, I am still waiting for an answer. Today, Minister, I expect answers, and the questions are the same: how many of the 30 QinetiQ safety recommendations have been implemented in full, and when specifically does the MOD expect the remaining recommendations to be implemented in full?
Secondly, as the Minister must know, QinetiQ has already raised an issue relating to the structure of the Cassandra hazard log and linking of hazards to causes, controls and supporting evidence. It proved very difficult, if not impossible, to track the accident from the hazard back to the cause and the corresponding controls, and then to establish whether the controls had been fully implemented. In addition, it was found that the assessment of probability made assumptions concerning the implementation of recommendations that proved not to be valid, and supporting evaluations were found to be contradictory.
It was unclear which recommendations and controls required implementation to support the hazard probability. Furthermore, hazard controls often did not apply to all causes of hazard and, therefore, did not mitigate the hazard in full, but mitigated only specific causes. It proved impossible, therefore, to validate the hazard probability. QinetiQ recommended that the hazard log be restructured to facilitate ease of further review. It argued that that would clarify hazard-accident risk controls, the hazard causes to which they apply and the status of their implementation, which would in turn clarify the argument underpinning the evaluation of risk. In view of the importance placed on the Cassandra hazard log in determining Nimrod safety, what steps have been taken by the MOD and the integrated project team to implement QinetiQ’s important recommendations? With the current hazard log in such a confusing state, how can anyone claim that Nimrod is safe to operate?
My third point is simple, but crucial, and relates to responsibility: has any action been taken in relation to those with delegated responsibility for Nimrod airworthiness at the time of the Nimrod crash? Safety worries about the Nimrod fleet will remain as long as concerning incidents continue. With more than 111 fuel leaks since the crash of XV230, and the regular grounding of aircraft, those concerns remain and will remain until the MOD maintains its aircraft to its own applicable risk standard which must be as low as reasonably practicable, and for as long as it fails to restore confidence in the Nimrod fleet as promised.
Visits to RAF Kinloss by the Secretary of State are welcome—I have said that on the Floor of the House—and his participation in a Nimrod test flight was a statement of confidence, but that is not enough. Ministers have failed to make written or oral statements to the House of Commons when necessary, have imparted key information only after a coroner demanded it and released key studies only after freedom of information requests were made. Asserting from a television studio that the
1 July 2008 : Column 215WH
Nimrod fleet is safe is not good enough. I know that the Minister wants the best for our service personnel, as do I, and I strongly urge him to answer my questions, because otherwise this matter will not rest.
Last edited by nigegilb; 2nd Jul 2008 at 10:51.
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I am just a layman here so I am not going to juggle the technical aspects - there are plenty of people here who are demonstrably eager and capable of doing that.
One major thing which is apparent to me is that much of the argument concerns whether or not the risk is ALARP.
OK, ALARP = As Low As Reasonably Practical. This interesting but pivotal phrase encompasses three subjective aspects (which may well be defined somewhere but nevertheless give space for argument), namely
There are too many factors in this for everybody to be able to agree on what standard constitutes ALARP at a given time so it has to come down to the chap who gets to make the call. If he says it is ALARP then it is. 6 months down the line the ALARP standard will have changed and the situation can be reassessed.
The real question has to be "is it safe"?
Is the MR2 safe? No. What is?
Is the MR2 safe enough? Yes, and it will get safer as time and resources allow.
What we cannot do with any system is rest on our laurels - there must always be a drive to improve the safety and survivability of the systems we use. Unfortunately, that ball is in the government's court.
One major thing which is apparent to me is that much of the argument concerns whether or not the risk is ALARP.
OK, ALARP = As Low As Reasonably Practical. This interesting but pivotal phrase encompasses three subjective aspects (which may well be defined somewhere but nevertheless give space for argument), namely
- Low. What constitutes low and who decides what is low enough? OK, so this one is mitigated by the next 2.
- Reasonable. What is reasonable to one person is not necessarily reasonable to another. What is reasonable in peacetime is not necessarily reasonable during hostilities or emergencies.
- Practicable. This depends so much on resources such as parts, equipment, cash and time as to be a vague concept at best. If the government gave the project more money then better safety would be more practicable. Importantly, what is practicable in 6 months may not be practicable now.
There are too many factors in this for everybody to be able to agree on what standard constitutes ALARP at a given time so it has to come down to the chap who gets to make the call. If he says it is ALARP then it is. 6 months down the line the ALARP standard will have changed and the situation can be reassessed.
The real question has to be "is it safe"?
Is the MR2 safe? No. What is?
Is the MR2 safe enough? Yes, and it will get safer as time and resources allow.
What we cannot do with any system is rest on our laurels - there must always be a drive to improve the safety and survivability of the systems we use. Unfortunately, that ball is in the government's court.
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From the Commons debate yesterday:
[QUOTE]
From yesterdays Commons debate:
Well here's the problem Mr Ainsworth, that was not the view expressed by all of those stakeholders at the recent Coroners Inquest. In fact Grp Cptn Hickman (IPT) stated on oath that the fleet would not be ALARP until the end of 2008. This leaves us with a number of questions:
1. Has a miracle happened in the intervening period and the fleet has reached ALARP earlier than Hickmans' evidence suggested, if so great but where's the evidence?
2. Or does Hickman not know his ALARP from his SCP elbow?
[QUOTE]
From yesterdays Commons debate:
The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.
1. Has a miracle happened in the intervening period and the fleet has reached ALARP earlier than Hickmans' evidence suggested, if so great but where's the evidence?
2. Or does Hickman not know his ALARP from his SCP elbow?
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Flipster you asked:
a. Is RAF senior management liable to this Act (as it is to the Health and Safety at Work Legislation)?
They answer is that the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was not in force at the time of the loss of XV230 and therefore does not apply to this case, hence the seeking of a legal ruling under Article 2 Human rights Act.
Were such an incident to happen today and the MoD be found to have failed in their duty of care then yes it would apply.
a. Is RAF senior management liable to this Act (as it is to the Health and Safety at Work Legislation)?
They answer is that the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was not in force at the time of the loss of XV230 and therefore does not apply to this case, hence the seeking of a legal ruling under Article 2 Human rights Act.
Were such an incident to happen today and the MoD be found to have failed in their duty of care then yes it would apply.