Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
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It has been BANNED
On one hand, Nige, you dismiss the politicians and the airships because you believe they are misleading you and the public about Nimrod safety. Yet, it is they who are restraining the Nimrod operators from returning to AAR.
XV235's diversion into Kandahar is the only reason we are not conducting AAR at the moment. The report on that incident (for that was all it was...a minor incident in the air that became a major news story) has now been issued. If that aircraft did not divert, an IR would not have been raised, the minor leak into a benign and well ventilated area would have been investigated, fixed and sent up for more much-needed AAR; all routine stuff. But, no, our leaders are displaying the same emotional frailties as the crew and they are not taking a structured and balanced view of the situation. What saddens me most is that the crew on XV235 did not have all the facts available, so the human factors naturally took over while, on the other hand, our politicians and airships do have all the facts available and they are allowing flawed and frail human factors to take the lead in their decisions.
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EdSett, I am certain Bob Ainsworth has used the word banned, you say the Nimrod is cleared to AAR when tasked, just goes to show you can't believe a word politicians say.
Can you just confirm that Nimrod is cleared to AAR with no restrictions?
Or is it still under AOC2Gp authority when operationally necessary and subject to ACC tasking?
Could you also confirm that the 6 recommendations specific to AAR in QQ Report 2007 have now been completed.
Ainsworth said recently that the 6 recommendations have not been acted on because the aircraft no longer carries out AAR.
"Even as the bereaved relatives held a press conference outside court yesterday, the MoD declared that the Nimrods, based at RAF Kinloss in Scotland, would not be grounded.
Officials insisted that new measures have removed the risk of a similar accident, as air-to-air refuelling has been banned for Nimrods and the hot air system involved is now switched off for all flights."
Bob Ainsworth in the recent HoC debate, "Of the 30 recommendations in the report, six related to air-to-air refuelling, which no longer takes place. "
"Confirming the leak figures in a written reply to a request from his Conservative opposite number Liam Fox last week, Mr Ainsworth said the abolition of mid-air refuelling and the shutting down of the aircraft's hot air system during flight meant the risks were now "extremely low".
There you go Ed, abolition, banned, six outstanding recs ignored because AAR no longer takes place. Do you understand why I said AAR was banned?
Can you just confirm that Nimrod is cleared to AAR with no restrictions?
Or is it still under AOC2Gp authority when operationally necessary and subject to ACC tasking?
Could you also confirm that the 6 recommendations specific to AAR in QQ Report 2007 have now been completed.
Ainsworth said recently that the 6 recommendations have not been acted on because the aircraft no longer carries out AAR.
"Even as the bereaved relatives held a press conference outside court yesterday, the MoD declared that the Nimrods, based at RAF Kinloss in Scotland, would not be grounded.
Officials insisted that new measures have removed the risk of a similar accident, as air-to-air refuelling has been banned for Nimrods and the hot air system involved is now switched off for all flights."
Bob Ainsworth in the recent HoC debate, "Of the 30 recommendations in the report, six related to air-to-air refuelling, which no longer takes place. "
"Confirming the leak figures in a written reply to a request from his Conservative opposite number Liam Fox last week, Mr Ainsworth said the abolition of mid-air refuelling and the shutting down of the aircraft's hot air system during flight meant the risks were now "extremely low".
There you go Ed, abolition, banned, six outstanding recs ignored because AAR no longer takes place. Do you understand why I said AAR was banned?
Last edited by nigegilb; 7th Aug 2008 at 23:37.
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Ed,
That is either a very bold, very stupid or very naiive statement to make about XV235, and I think it is probably the middle one.
To further state that the RAF has now declined to allow AAR of Nimrod because of the crews 'emotional frailties' is a pretty poor thing to say about your fellow aviators at Kinloss, as well as your superiors.
I have no doubt that those on board 235 that day might not agree with your comments, but then again, as you keep telling us, you know best.
That is either a very bold, very stupid or very naiive statement to make about XV235, and I think it is probably the middle one.
To further state that the RAF has now declined to allow AAR of Nimrod because of the crews 'emotional frailties' is a pretty poor thing to say about your fellow aviators at Kinloss, as well as your superiors.
I have no doubt that those on board 235 that day might not agree with your comments, but then again, as you keep telling us, you know best.
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Winco, ignoring the fact that you, I and just about every pilot I know would have diverted to Kandahar in similar circumstances, remember the Captain ordered a ground evacuation as well, which I also agree with. Ed Sett makes an interesting point and that is, the ac is safe to continue AAR. He really should be careful though as this is contrary to the heavily spun line coming out of MoD HQ.
""The MoD must be loving this. Many still thinking, or want others to think, “leaks + ignition source = not airworthy, therefore stop AAR = airworthy”. That is precisely what MoD wants everyone to believe - that stopping AAR makes the aircraft airworthy, so all is ok.
The MoD had to admit it was not airworthy, not because it leaked, but because the airworthiness regulations, and underpinning procedures and processes, had not been implemented. It just so happens the catalyst was Nimrod/fuel leaks/AAR/hotpipes. It could just have easily been any other aircraft and its systems; in fact a series of previous BoI reports shows that the same failures were responsible for previous accidents.
Those who state the R1 is affected are only partially correct. ALL aircraft are potentially affected. THIS is where MoD doesn’t want to go; it wants to limit the damage by perpetuating the myth that stopping AAR on Nimrod solves all their airworthiness problems."
I am not expecting a reclearance for AAR any time soon and I think Edsett knows that.
""The MoD must be loving this. Many still thinking, or want others to think, “leaks + ignition source = not airworthy, therefore stop AAR = airworthy”. That is precisely what MoD wants everyone to believe - that stopping AAR makes the aircraft airworthy, so all is ok.
The MoD had to admit it was not airworthy, not because it leaked, but because the airworthiness regulations, and underpinning procedures and processes, had not been implemented. It just so happens the catalyst was Nimrod/fuel leaks/AAR/hotpipes. It could just have easily been any other aircraft and its systems; in fact a series of previous BoI reports shows that the same failures were responsible for previous accidents.
Those who state the R1 is affected are only partially correct. ALL aircraft are potentially affected. THIS is where MoD doesn’t want to go; it wants to limit the damage by perpetuating the myth that stopping AAR on Nimrod solves all their airworthiness problems."
I am not expecting a reclearance for AAR any time soon and I think Edsett knows that.
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CATB, you waited over five years for your first post, have to say it was worth it, thank you for the clarification.
Bob Ainsworth declared to the world that Nimrod is ALARP and airworthy the other day. I suppose it is a natural step for Bob to start writing RTS instructions as well.
Ed Sett?
Bob Ainsworth declared to the world that Nimrod is ALARP and airworthy the other day. I suppose it is a natural step for Bob to start writing RTS instructions as well.
Ed Sett?
Last edited by nigegilb; 8th Aug 2008 at 10:57.
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Duct Replacement Program
Does anyone know how far we have got with the duct replacement program? (see my posting No 1323) Until it is complete we are flying Nimrods with an HRI of A (Intolerable risk) for the hot air system.
DV
DV
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Duct Replacement Program
Does anyone know how far we have got with the duct replacement program? (see my posting No 1323) Until it is complete we are flying Nimrods with an HRI of A (Intolerable risk) for the hot air system.
DV
DV
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MRA4
It would appear someone is listening. I have posted here many a time that MRA4 has LESS protection than the aircraft it replaces. I have also pointed out the complete void in defensive capability when compared with the American multi mission aircraft P8A.
Well, would you believe it, New task for BAE ....To study Fuel Tank Protection for MRA4 .
Another victory for common sense, not an easy task when dealing with MOD.
That only leaves;
Dry bay protection,
Bomb bay protection,
Under-floor fire protection,
Fuel probe inerting,
Flight deck armour,
on the list!
Yet more evidence, if any were needed, that MoD policy is increasingly based on Pprune posts. This one is simple. The MoD must have got the shock of their lives when the link was posted to the 1981/82 MoD(PE) specifications for foam in (a) Fuel tanks and (b) Dry Bays.
Well, would you believe it, New task for BAE ....To study Fuel Tank Protection for MRA4 .
Another victory for common sense, not an easy task when dealing with MOD.
That only leaves;
Dry bay protection,
Bomb bay protection,
Under-floor fire protection,
Fuel probe inerting,
Flight deck armour,
on the list!
Yet more evidence, if any were needed, that MoD policy is increasingly based on Pprune posts. This one is simple. The MoD must have got the shock of their lives when the link was posted to the 1981/82 MoD(PE) specifications for foam in (a) Fuel tanks and (b) Dry Bays.
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Nigegilb,
I wish to unreservedly apologise for wrongly contradicting your statement that AAR is banned. I was not keeping up to date with the Release to Service document. No excuse.
Regards
Ed Sett
I wish to unreservedly apologise for wrongly contradicting your statement that AAR is banned. I was not keeping up to date with the Release to Service document. No excuse.
Regards
Ed Sett
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Winco,
Who do you think you are? When you have read the XV235 report, if you ever do, you might then be qualified to some small degree, to comment on what the crew did and what you might have done yourself. You will never be qualified to infer that I am stupid and that I am always saying that I know best. Whenever possible I stick to facts from the documents and manuals. If I get it wrong, when writing from my home pc, I will not edit the original message, but I will write another message correcting myself and, if necessary, apologising for my error. One apology I will never give, because I will never be guilty of it, is for personal attacks, like yours. I look forward to your reply...
Regards
Ed Sett
Who do you think you are? When you have read the XV235 report, if you ever do, you might then be qualified to some small degree, to comment on what the crew did and what you might have done yourself. You will never be qualified to infer that I am stupid and that I am always saying that I know best. Whenever possible I stick to facts from the documents and manuals. If I get it wrong, when writing from my home pc, I will not edit the original message, but I will write another message correcting myself and, if necessary, apologising for my error. One apology I will never give, because I will never be guilty of it, is for personal attacks, like yours. I look forward to your reply...
Regards
Ed Sett
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That's OK fella, sounds like politicians are writing RTS these days. I was more interested in the fact that the Kandahar IR follow up report effectively cleared the aircraft to continue AAR.
Perhaps you can help me on this one.
Post XV230, when AAR was still taking place I understand that at least two incidents happened very similar to XV230, involving serious fuel leaks. Two IRs were submitted detailing the theory that the high angle of attack/Deck angle and slow speed was allowing the fuel running along the airframe to re-enter the aircraft? I understand on one of these occasions the flares were corroded by the fuel and this gave the ground crew/armourers massive problems with how to dispose of them. If the flares had gone off in flight, a catastrophic failure could have occurred. I remember from my time on Hercs that flares left in automatic can be set off by the tiniest of heat sources. I can guess what the setting is for Kandahar airfield having operated out of similar places myself. I would say the crew were very lucky.
Strange because I don't remember the BoI referring to these two incidents.
Any ideas? I would have thought the very fact that these IRs had been raised was proof enough to warrant an investigation.
Perhaps you can help me on this one.
Post XV230, when AAR was still taking place I understand that at least two incidents happened very similar to XV230, involving serious fuel leaks. Two IRs were submitted detailing the theory that the high angle of attack/Deck angle and slow speed was allowing the fuel running along the airframe to re-enter the aircraft? I understand on one of these occasions the flares were corroded by the fuel and this gave the ground crew/armourers massive problems with how to dispose of them. If the flares had gone off in flight, a catastrophic failure could have occurred. I remember from my time on Hercs that flares left in automatic can be set off by the tiniest of heat sources. I can guess what the setting is for Kandahar airfield having operated out of similar places myself. I would say the crew were very lucky.
Strange because I don't remember the BoI referring to these two incidents.
Any ideas? I would have thought the very fact that these IRs had been raised was proof enough to warrant an investigation.
Nigegilb:
Nigel, what might appear as a throw away line, or mere bravado, is upon reflection one of the most damning comments, of a very great many, made of the MOD and the RAF Higher Command on this Forum. I truly believe that the MOD is in meltdown. Whatever credibility it ever had for long term planning and provision of UK Defence needs now lies in tatters. It has been infected by the hour by hour, never mind day to day, presentation imperatives of its political masters forming the present administration (I cannot bring myself to characterise them as a Government). As Squidlord reminds us they have very serious safety issues to attend to that extend beyond those of Flight Safety. It is, however, the latter that this thread, this forum, must be principally concerned with. Nige says he sees little or no way of the MOD retracing its path back to the days when it would, when it could, properly implement UK Military Airworthiness Regulations. If he is right, and I suspect that he is, then the situation is very grave and prompt and urgent action is necessary. Aviation doesn't conveniently wait for Ministers to become 'mindful', for Senior Officers to become 'somewhat concerned'. It bites you in the arrse and then we'll have yet another thread born that will last a decade or more. Bite the bullet now SoS's, ACM's, Your Honour, and get an independent MAA rolling. It will have the limitations envisaged by Nige, it will confer Grandfather Rights on compromised aircraft, but it will be many orders of magnitude safer than the shambles left for us by the beancounters from over twenty years ago who dared to ask, "what cost benefit is all this Flight Safety really giving us?". I think that their question is now only too tragically answered.
Yet more evidence, if any were needed, that MoD policy is increasingly based on Pprune posts.
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Powerful post Chug, I am afraid the evidence keeps rolling in. I am trying to check out reports of cracks on VC10 and TriStar fleet. Massive pressure to keep the Afg airlift in motion. Things are getting grim in Bastion, nuff said in open forum, but no matter the pressure, safety has to come first.
Take a look at the Puma BoIs. Question marks remain over the training and experience of crews carrying out SF Missions at a time when pressure is on to REDUCE training costs. I have been told that the loss rate acceptance for Puma has gone from 3 years to 18 months. Haven't substantiated this yet, but where are the anticipators? Is it really cheaper not to fit them. One definite fatality and loss of puma as described here.
Coroner: Training was 'insufficient'
"Equally interesting, from a safety viewpoint (which affects, for example, the competence and experience component of airworthiness), is the fact that while MoD can make a case to lower safety requirements due to exceptional circumstances (the ALARP argument) this specifically DOES NOT apply to training. I'm actually told that this has been re-iterated recently by various top level MoD safety committees.
I'd say they are standing into danger on this one. It seems fatuous to claim its ok as they can do more time in a simulator. If the simulator is sufficient, then why not buy/use more? This is why sim time is always balanced with real flying. I wonder if a risk assessment has been done? Same old issues. Safety decisions made for financial reasons. Who will be brave enough to wave the red card?"
I'd say MELTDOWN is an accurate way to describe the situation. And at the top of the list, concerning airworthiness issues is Nimrod, even though it has been described as "safe to fly".
Take a look at the Puma BoIs. Question marks remain over the training and experience of crews carrying out SF Missions at a time when pressure is on to REDUCE training costs. I have been told that the loss rate acceptance for Puma has gone from 3 years to 18 months. Haven't substantiated this yet, but where are the anticipators? Is it really cheaper not to fit them. One definite fatality and loss of puma as described here.
Coroner: Training was 'insufficient'
"Equally interesting, from a safety viewpoint (which affects, for example, the competence and experience component of airworthiness), is the fact that while MoD can make a case to lower safety requirements due to exceptional circumstances (the ALARP argument) this specifically DOES NOT apply to training. I'm actually told that this has been re-iterated recently by various top level MoD safety committees.
I'd say they are standing into danger on this one. It seems fatuous to claim its ok as they can do more time in a simulator. If the simulator is sufficient, then why not buy/use more? This is why sim time is always balanced with real flying. I wonder if a risk assessment has been done? Same old issues. Safety decisions made for financial reasons. Who will be brave enough to wave the red card?"
I'd say MELTDOWN is an accurate way to describe the situation. And at the top of the list, concerning airworthiness issues is Nimrod, even though it has been described as "safe to fly".
Last edited by nigegilb; 10th Aug 2008 at 10:33.
Sorry in advance guys for stupid/naive question (which probably won't be answered - thanks for the last answer zedder), but in post 1352 Nige says......
'Bob Ainsworth declared to the world that Nimrod is ALARP and airworthy the other day......'
If that is true, by which I mean that statement was actually made (as opposed to that statement is correct!) and is indeed the Govs/MODs stated position on the matter, then why is rectification work, such as duct replacement, being carried out, presumably at some cost?
'Bob Ainsworth declared to the world that Nimrod is ALARP and airworthy the other day......'
If that is true, by which I mean that statement was actually made (as opposed to that statement is correct!) and is indeed the Govs/MODs stated position on the matter, then why is rectification work, such as duct replacement, being carried out, presumably at some cost?
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ED,
A simple question..............................
What would you have done if you had been the Captain of XV235? Would you have got the aircraft on the ground asap??
Another simple question.....................
You say in your post 'the crew on XV235 did not have all the facts available, so the human factors naturally took over while, on the other hand, our politicians and airships do have all the facts available and they are allowing flawed and frail human factors to take the lead'
So, not only was the Captain wrong, but the rest of the crew were wrong together with the politicians and the airships were they? It seems like everyone got it wrong except you Ed!
It was you that made an unfair and unwarranted comment about the Captain of 235, and I feel you were wrong and you should retract it, so sorry Ed, no apologies. Oh, and as for me saying that you are always right, well, what are you suggesting now then Ed, that I got that wrong also?
A simple question..............................
What would you have done if you had been the Captain of XV235? Would you have got the aircraft on the ground asap??
Another simple question.....................
You say in your post 'the crew on XV235 did not have all the facts available, so the human factors naturally took over while, on the other hand, our politicians and airships do have all the facts available and they are allowing flawed and frail human factors to take the lead'
So, not only was the Captain wrong, but the rest of the crew were wrong together with the politicians and the airships were they? It seems like everyone got it wrong except you Ed!
It was you that made an unfair and unwarranted comment about the Captain of 235, and I feel you were wrong and you should retract it, so sorry Ed, no apologies. Oh, and as for me saying that you are always right, well, what are you suggesting now then Ed, that I got that wrong also?
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Biggus this is what Ainsworth said on 1st July 08;
The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.
I am in process of contacting QQ and BAe to check out their demurring position. MoD are publically trying to close the book on airworthiness issues surrounding Nimrod, at the same time, tearing a "serviceable" frame apart and carrying out AW work, which will continue until at least next June. I am told that Nimrod is the number one concern at the top of the Air Force, I am really not surprised. Perhaps time for a PQ, if anyone has genuine info about the duct work I will see that the deed is done just send me a PM.
Regards,
Nige
BTW I understand the rectification cost is £52m! And sadly, that is not new money, so another project must have been robbed.
The MOD, having carefully considered all those issues, has declared that all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce to ALARP the risk to the Nimrod aircraft. It is the view of all those involved in the equipment safety and environmental working group, which includes QinetiQ, BAE Systems, the RAF and the IPT, that the Nimrod is tolerably safe and ALARP, and is therefore safe to fly. No member of the group demurs from that view.
I am in process of contacting QQ and BAe to check out their demurring position. MoD are publically trying to close the book on airworthiness issues surrounding Nimrod, at the same time, tearing a "serviceable" frame apart and carrying out AW work, which will continue until at least next June. I am told that Nimrod is the number one concern at the top of the Air Force, I am really not surprised. Perhaps time for a PQ, if anyone has genuine info about the duct work I will see that the deed is done just send me a PM.
Regards,
Nige
BTW I understand the rectification cost is £52m! And sadly, that is not new money, so another project must have been robbed.
Last edited by nigegilb; 10th Aug 2008 at 22:21.
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Ed and Winco,
I have not read the final report covering the incident involving XV235, but it was my understanding that the Captain and crew acted the way they did because fuel was spraying from a coupling "like water from a hose pipe with a fingure over the end" into the bomb bay. This was a repeat of an incident on the ground on 15th Oct, and this was the first AAR flight since that incident. The fault on the ground uncovered other leaks in the system which could have been active in flight on 5th Nov. QinetiQ stated in their 2006 report that one of the problems was that infight conditions can not aways be replicated on the ground. In flight could be worse. Also, it is worth remembering that the Coroner stated that the fire on XV230 was fed from a feed line, not a refuel line. So whilst disconnecting from the tanker may have solved the "hose pipe" problem, there was no way of knowing what other damage had been done.
Ed, I can not believe that the crew would not have raised an IR had they been aware of all the facts. I draw your attention to the two incidents mentioned by Nig, 8th Nov 2006 and 8th Dec 2006. This was fuel in the bomb bay following AAR. By the way Nig, I have no idea why these IR were not mentioned by the BOI. I have asked the same question myself.
DV
I have not read the final report covering the incident involving XV235, but it was my understanding that the Captain and crew acted the way they did because fuel was spraying from a coupling "like water from a hose pipe with a fingure over the end" into the bomb bay. This was a repeat of an incident on the ground on 15th Oct, and this was the first AAR flight since that incident. The fault on the ground uncovered other leaks in the system which could have been active in flight on 5th Nov. QinetiQ stated in their 2006 report that one of the problems was that infight conditions can not aways be replicated on the ground. In flight could be worse. Also, it is worth remembering that the Coroner stated that the fire on XV230 was fed from a feed line, not a refuel line. So whilst disconnecting from the tanker may have solved the "hose pipe" problem, there was no way of knowing what other damage had been done.
Ed, I can not believe that the crew would not have raised an IR had they been aware of all the facts. I draw your attention to the two incidents mentioned by Nig, 8th Nov 2006 and 8th Dec 2006. This was fuel in the bomb bay following AAR. By the way Nig, I have no idea why these IR were not mentioned by the BOI. I have asked the same question myself.
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 13th Aug 2008 at 16:40.
